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1.1 
CHAPTER. 1 
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I 
I 
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1.2 
This volume contains the economic studies which have been undertaken as 
part of the research programme on the 'Costs of Non-Europe', a programme 
which was launched in 1986 and completed in early 1988. 
The 'Cost of Non-Europe' project, funded and undertaken by the European 
Commission, has sought to establish the cost of the present market 
fragmentation of the European Community and thus, the potential benefit to 
be derived from the removal of market barriers. 
From the beginning, it was clear that this would be a complex task. On the 
one hand it was necessary to examine what kind of changes could be expected 
in a number of important sectors and the impact that certain key 
liberalisation measures might have, such as removing technical barriers, 
border related controls and administrative formalities and public 
procurement restrictions; executive summaries of the sectoral and thematic 
studies that address these questions are to be found in volume 1 of this 
series. 
At the same time, it was evident that the combined and inter-related effect 
of all the changes would profoundly influence the way in which economic and 
commercial activity was organised in the Community. 
therefore, to both fully investigate these effects 
It was necessary, 
and to develop an 
analytical framework which would evaluate them in a consistent fashion. 
This was particularly true for the benefits that might be expected from 
greater market integration. Such benefits comprise the gains that appear 
from increased competition, from improved technical efficiency, from the 
exploitation of scale economies and from the encouragement of innovative 
activity, both in terms of technical progress and in the development of new 
products and services. 
These integration effects, despite their extreme importance, are difficult 
to quantify. To come to grips with the problem and to try and establish a 
satisfactory methodology, the Commission organised in December 1986 a 
Round-Table meeting in which a number of economic experts participated. 
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The discussion at that meeting was wide-rangingl even if the initial focus 
was on economies of scale. One of the important features of commercial 
activity in the Community to date has been the dramatic increase in 
intra-industry trade. The phenomenon of intra-industry trade can be 
explained by the presence of economies of scale in the production and 
provision of differentiated goods. Free trade allows both lower unit 
costs due to the scale effects of producing for larger markets and 
increased variety via two-way trade in differentiated goods. But it is 
also important to consider the aspect of technical efficiency. The opening 
of markets and expansion of trade can produce benefits in addition to those 
arising from scale and variety because the presence of foreign competition 
can diminish the oligopoly power of domestic companies and exercise a 
positive impact on X-inefficiency. 
One of the important points to emerge, therefore, from the discussion was 
that market power was a key issue. Not only were the benefits of market 
integration sensitive to market structure but that the question of 
competition and merger policy at a Community level, to combat the emergence 
of oligopoly power in a larger market, would be extremely important. The 
potential benefits of lower trade barriers in Community sectors 
characterised by scale economies and imperfect market structures could be 
substantial. 
Another conclusion of the Round-Table meeting was the need for a number of 
methods to tackle such a complex problem, if only because alternative 
approaches would produce a check on the results obtained. It is in this 
fashion that the research programme on the 'Cost of Non-Europe' was 
developed and refined. 
An industrial survey of 11,000 companies in the Community has produced a 
wealth of qualitative and quantitative information on the extent of 
existing barriers to trade and business activity and on the expected 
changes in costs and sales that would follow internal market completion. 
1 The bibliography at the end of this volume provides the background. 
1.4 
The results of this survey are reproduced and analysed in volume 3 of this 
series. At the same time an analysis of existing price differences for 
consumer and investment goods in the Community (Chapter 7, European Economy 
no. 35, European Commission, 1988) has indicated the potential for price 
convergence and lowering in a unified market. 
The contents of the present volume reflect two requirements of the research 
programme on the 'Cost of Non-Europe'. The first is the need to examine 
both economies of scale and market structure in the context of market 
integration. Furthermore, the scale economies analysis should be as 
wide-ranging, sectorally, as possible and take into account the impact of 
technological change. The second is the necessity of having an overall 
analytical framework and one which would preferably provide a link between 
all the microeconomic effects and the macroeconomic ones. 
Chapters 2 to 4 of this volume present work on the potential for cost 
reductions from economies of scale. Chapter 5 treats the question of both 
market structure and scale effects in the context of market integration by 
using a modified partial equilibrium approach. The sixth chapter examines 
the relationship between increased competition and innovation while the 
seventh is devoted to the characteristics of intra-industry trade in the 
Community. 
The remaining chapters are of a slightly different nature. They present 
two quite separate through complementary approaches to the quantification 
of the potential benefits arising from completing the internal market. 
Chapter 8 deals with the microeconomic approach which has been developed 
using partial equilibrium techniques to measure the welfare gains from 
reducing or eliminating non-tariff barriers. Part of the microeconomic 
aggregation exercise (Annex A of European Economy no. 35, European 
Commission) has involved estimates of the economies of scale gains from 
restructuring. This work is presented in Chapter 9. Chapter 10 is devoted 
to a description of the simulations which have been undertaken using the 
Hermes and Interlink models, in order to interpret the findings of the 
microeconomic studies on internal market completion in terms of 
macroeconomic variables and their dynamic behaviour. 
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One of the difficulties throughout this work has been the need to obtain 
both quantitative and qualitative data at a relatively disaggregated 
level. The paucity of data in some cases has meant that geographical 
coverage is less widespread than would be desirable. In certain 
circumstances, therefore, some of these studies should be considered as 
illustrative rather than totally comprehensive, though attempts have been 
made to generalise the work. Though supervised by services of the 
Commission, these studies remain the responsibility of the respective 
authors. 
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CHAPTER 2 
A Survey of the Economies of Scale 
Cliff Pratten, 
Department of Applied Economics 
University of Cambridge 
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2.5 
Section 1. Introduction 
This paper surveys estimates of the economies of scale and analyses 
the implications of these estimates for the completion of the EC. 
Section 2 of the paper gives an outline definition of the economies 
of scale. Section 3 provides a brief description of the alternative 
methods of measuring the economies of scale. The conclusion to Section 
3 is that engineering estimates are the most reliable estimates of scale 
economies. Section 4 describes the characteristics of industries which 
predispose them to being industries with large or moderate economies of 
scale. Engineering estimates of economies of scale are surveyed in 
Section 5. Engineering estimates are a reliable source for assessing the 
economies of scale for development and production costs. They are far 
less satisfactory for evaluating the economies of scale for multi-plant 
and multi-product firms. The economies of scale for firms are analysed 
in Section 6. Other evidence bearing on the magnitude of economies of 
scale is reviewed in Section 7. 
The emphasis on, and the apparently rapid growth of employment in, 
small businesses in some countries in recent years conflicts with the 
perception of generally large economies of scale. This conflict is the 
subject of Section 8. In Section 9 the pattern of the Community's 
exports is related to the estimates of the economies of scale. The 
purpose of this analysis is to test whether the community's exports are 
concentrated on trades subject to large economies of scale. 
Most of the material in the earlier sections focusses on 
manufacturing industries. The economies of scale for services are 
considered in Section 10. Finally the impact of the completion of the 
EC via the economies of scale is assessed in Section 11. 
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Section 2. Definition of the Economies of Scale 
Definitions 
Economies of scale (EOS) are reductions in average unit costs 
attributable to increases in the scale of output. Diagram 1 illustrates 
the point. As output increases from x1 to x2, unit costs fall from y1 
to y2• The scale at which unit costs cease to fall is labelled theMES 
- the minimum efficient scale. In practice, the MES is usually defined 
in terms of the scale above which costs cease to fall rapidly, rather 
than the level at which they cease to fall at all. 
In this paper the principal measure of the extent to which costs 
rise below the MES level is the percentage increase in costs at a half 
theMES. In diagram l(b) this is (y2 ·- y1) as a percentage of y1 • 
Again, in practice, costs are often divided between the bought out 
element of costs, materials, components and services bought from other 
firms, and internal costs including proftts, or value added. This 
distinction is made because for some industries relatively few economies 
of scale relate to the bought out component of costs. 
Diagram 2.1. (a) Costs and Output 
.x.. X. a. ,~ $ 
Quantity of Output 
Unit 
(b) Costs at Output 
below the MES 
Costs 
.,.1----+---=-. 
;_N.~ ~.,-s 
Quantity of output 
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The Dimensions of Scale 
In the literature economies of scale are most often associated with 
the scale or output of establishments (alternatively termed plants or 
factories) or the size of firms (companies). Cement is a relatively 
homogenous product and cement plants are often used to illustrate the 
economies of scale. Also many cement plants produce a single product, 
portland cement. Economies of scale for these plants apply to an output 
capacity of more than a million tons of cement a year. 
In practice, at most plants a range of products is made and there 
are many, often inter-related, dimensions of scale to which economies of 
scale apply. Increases in the size of establishments or the overall 
size of firms per se are not necessarily the principal sources of 
economies of scale to be reaped from completion of the internal EC 
market. 
The main dimensions of scale are: 
a) Dimensions affecting the efficiency of production 
1) The total output of particular products through time 
2) the duration of production runs - the period during which a 
distinct product is made or produced before switching to the 
processing of another product. 
3) The rate of production of particular products per unit of time 
(The size of batches is determined by the duration of 
production and the rate of production) 
4) The extent of standardization of components and products. 
5) The capacity of units of plant, machines and production lines 
within plants 
6) The total capacity of individual plants 
- 20 -
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7) The overall size of a complex of plants at one site 
8) The extent of vertical integration - the range of operations 
and stages of production performed at plants and by firms 
b) Dimensions affecting selling and distribution costs 
9) Sales to each customer 
10) The geographic concentration of customers 
11) The size of consignments to customers 
c) Overall dimensions of scale 
12) The size of firms 
13) The scale of an industry 
14) The scale of a national econ6my 
Scale economies are reductions in unit costs attributable to 
different positions along dimensions of soale. In the same way that 
there are scale economies attributable to the size of plants, scale 
economies may relate to the.size of batches, the size of firms or 
industries, etc. However a noteworthy distinction has been introduced 
into the literature. Where the production of two or more products 
reduces costs compared to the position where each product is produced 
separately in similar quantities, the economies are termed the economies 
of scope. 
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The Sources of Economies of Scale 
The forces making for economies of scale are: 
a) Indivisibilities 
There are many costs which are at least partly independent of scale 
over certain ranges of output i.e. costs which are wholly or partly 
indivisible with respect to output. The following are examples: 
Type of cost: Partly or wholly indivisible with 
The initial development and 
design costs for a new car 
First copy costs of books, 
newspapers, etc. 
Obtaining tenders and studying 
sources of supply for a 
component 
Items of capital equipment 
Office records for a batch 
of a product 
Preparation of advertisements 
respect to: 
The output of the car 
The number of copies produced 
The size of orders placed for the 
component 
The total output for which the 
equipment is required 
The size of the batch 
The area of the country in which 
the advertisements are shown 
As the relevant dimensions of scale are increased, indivisible costs can 
be spread over a larger throughput and the cost per unit is therefore 
reduced. 
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b) The economies of increased dimensions(!) 
For many types of capital equipment both initial and operating 
costs increase less rapidly than capacity. A typical example of such 
economies occurs in the construction of tanks, pressure vessels and road 
and sea tankers which are used in the chemical and oil industries. If 
the thickness of the walls of a tank are not affected by its size, then 
the cost of increasing capacity increases approximately 
in proportion to the surface area, while the capacity of the tank rises 
in proportion to its cubic capacity. Another reason for large units 
being relatively less costly is that there are proportionately fewer 
parts to make and fabricate. Operating costs may also be affected by 
the size of units. In the processing industries the total direct labour 
costs of operating units of equipment are not much affected by their 
size, and maintenance costs are usually assumed to be proportional to 
the capital costs of equipment. 
(1) The economies of increased dimensions and the economies of 
specialisation which are considered in the following sub-section, 
may be considered as examples of indivisibilities. If labour and 
capital equipment were divisible in the same way, as say, a bucket 
of sand, then there would be no economies from these sources. Many 
types of equipment and labour are divisible in the sense that it is 
possible to build units with smaller capacity and employ less 
expensive labour, or to employ staff on a part-time basis, but the 
cost per unit of capacity may be higher because of the economies of 
increased dimensions and of specialisation, i.e. if the factors are 
purchased in small quantities, they may be less efficient. This 
distinction was made by E.H. Chamberlin in 'Proportionality, 
Divisibility and Economies of Scale'. Q. Jnl. of Econ., 1948. 
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One possible source of diseconomies for using larger units of 
capital equipment is that they may take longer to design, build and run 
in, particularly if the size is outside the manufacturer's existing 
experience. If large plants take longer to construct this will increase 
the cost of equipment because of the cost of capital tied up while the 
plant is built and run in. 
c) The economies of specialisation 
The larger the output of a product, plant or firm, the greater will 
be the opportunities for, and advantages of, specialisation of both the 
labour force and the capital equipment. Increased output may enable a 
firm to employ staff with special skills, or staff with more highly 
developed skills. Also it may be economic for firms with a large 
throughput to use special purpose machinery. 
Increased output will provide greater opportunities for 
specialisation not only within a plant, but also for suppliers of 
materials and services bought out. 
d) The economies of massed resources(!) 
The operation of the law of large numbers may result in economies 
of massed resources. For example, a firm using several identical 
machines will have to stock proportionately fewer spare parts than a 
firm with only one machine, because the firm with several machines can 
assume that its machines are unlikely to develop the same faults at the 
(1) If all factors of production and all products were infinitely 
divisible, there would be no economies of massed resources i.e. the 
economies of massed resources may also be regarded as a type of 
economy caused by indivisibilities. 
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same time. There may be similar economies for stocks of raw materials, 
and intermediate and final products, part of which may be held to meet 
interruptions to the supply of raw materials, a temporary breakdown of 
intermediate plants, and the uncertain flow of orders from customers. 
Similar economies for certain types of labour and monetary resources may 
be achieved by a large firm. 
A large company's ability to spread risk may enable it to take 
greater risks. Large concerns have a greater opportunity for 
experimenting with new methods and introducing new products without 
jeopardising the future of the business if particular new methods or 
products are unsuccessful. Similarly if a firm operates in a number of 
national markets it can experiment with different policies in individual 
markets. 
e) Superior techniques of organising production 
Increased scale may make it possible to use more efficient 
techniques or methods of organising production; for example, as scale is 
increased automatic machinery may be used instead of manually operated 
machinery, or it may be possible to substitute methods of flow 
production for batch production. If high rates of output enable a firm 
to substitute flow for batch production, this usually results in a 
faster rate of production i.e. the time taken between work commencing on 
a product and its completion is reduced, and this should reduce unit 
costs for stocks and work in progress. 
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f) The learning effect 
Learning is a source of economies which relates to movements along 
some dimensions of scale, particularly the cumulative output of products 
and the length of production runs. Diagram 2.2 illustrates the 
relationship. Unit costs are shown to decline as the cumulative output 
of a product increases. In theory the effects of learning (or 
experience) can be divided between the invention and introduction of new 
techniques - technical progress - during a production run, and the other 
cost-reducing effects of sustained production of a good. Examples of 
the latter are greater manual dexterity brought about by experience of 
production and machining successive batches of components more exactly 
as experience of assembly is obtained. 
Diagram 2.2 The Learning Curve 
Unit Costs 
Log scale 
Cumulative output of a product 
- 26 -
2.14 
g) Economies through control of markets 
A vertically integrated concern may be able to achieve economies by 
evening out the flow of output. If the operation of two consecutive 
processes required to produce a product are under independent ownership, 
a conflict of interest may arise and result in fluctuating 
output. For example, an independent retailer when reducing his stocks 
will not take into account the losses to be incurred by a manufacturer 
due to lost production. The price system, operating through reductions 
in prices by manufacturers at times of slack capacity, may not counter 
this tendency because retailers may assume that the slackness of demand 
on manufacturers will continue for some time, and that prices will fall 
still further, and so price cuts may not stimulate orders. 
Control of a market by a manufacturer may reduce the uncertainty he 
faces - he will know that customers cannot switch their custom to 
competitors - and so enable him to invest more heavily in capital 
intensive methods of production. The possible economies a firm can 
achieve through the control of its markets which have been outlined so 
far are advantages attributable to a monopoly situation - the supplier 
controls the customer. Also they only occur because there are changes 
through time in market conditions. 
Apart from the scale economies which may be achieved by vertical 
expansion there are also other economies - such as reductions in buying 
and selling costs, reduced need for checking the quality of consignments 
and control of the timing of deliveries and quality - which are 
attributable to the control of suppliers. 
This completes the outline of the sources of economies of scale. 
We now turn to the sources of diseconomies of scale. 
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The Sources of Diseconomies of Scale 
Increases in unit costs may occur as scale increases for two groups 
of reasons: 
(a) The supply of a factor of production is fixed or the cost of a 
factor increases as demand for the factor rises. 
Examples of factor limitations are: 
(i) the labour supply in an area available to a firm 
(ii) the space available at one site for a factory 
(iii) the supply of water which can be taken from a river for 
purposes of cooling a plant 
(iv) the supply of a material produced as a by-product of another 
process 
(v) the size of ship which can dock at a port. 
(b) The efficiency in use of a factor of production declines as 
the quantity of the factor of production used by a firm increases. 
The first source of increases in costs caused by the supply of 
factors of production being fixed or the costs of factors increasing as 
demand rises is not a source of diseconomies of scale. For the purpose 
of measuring the economies of scale, it is assumed that there is a 
perfectly elastic supply of factors of production available to firms -
the quantity of factors they buy does not affect the price. In practice 
factor costs may rise with increasing scale and offset the economies of 
scale. 
The efficiency in use of factors of production may decline with 
increases in scale for the following reasons: 
- 28 -
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(a) Technical forces 
There are some technical forces which cause diseconomies of scale. 
As the capacity of individual units of plant is increased, increased 
stresses and strains(!) and friction may result, and to combat these, 
wider gauge walls etc., may have to be used, different, and more 
expensive materials employed, cooling systems, or improved cooling 
systems be introduced, or more elaborate foundations may have to be 
built. It is usually technically possible to overcome the problems 
caused by increasing stresses and strains etc., in large plants, but in 
certain cases, and over certain ranges of capacity, the costs of 
overcoming them increase faster than the increase in scale. There are 
in practice two types of costs required to overcome these problems - it 
may be necessary to use more expensive (and stronger) materials etc. 
and/or there may be initial costs required to invent new techniques to 
overcome the technical limitations when the first of a larger scale of 
plant is built. A way of avoiding any net diseconomies because of 
increased stresses and strains in many cases is to duplicate units of 
plant. Thus stresses, etc. are a limitation on the sources of economies 
of scale rather than a source of diseconomies. 
(I) An example of stresses and strains increasing more than 
proportionately over a range of output is provided by turbines. If 
very large turbines are built the ends of the blades travel at a 
speed near to that of sound. At this speed the strains and 
stresses increase more than proportionately with the capacity of 
the turbines. 
- 29 -
2.17 
(b) Management 
It has been argued that the costs of management may increase more 
than proportionately with scale or the effectiveness of management may 
decline as scale is increased. If so, this could set a limit to the 
optimum scale for plants and firms(!). Given a changing environment, 
and evolving firms, as scale increases, the costs of coordinating and 
organising production may rise more than proportionately. The 
effectiveness of management may decline as the chain of management is 
extended because of delays in taking decisions brought about by the 
length of the management chain and/or the tendency for those ultimately 
taking decisions to get out of touch with events affecting the 
decisions. Scale may also affect the motivation of managers. Whether 
or not the management and ownership of a large firm are separated, the 
determination to maximise profits at the expense of other objectives may 
decline as scale is increased. Within a large organisation it may be 
difficult to focus financial incentives as accurately as in a small 
concern. In some cases the management of large firms may be able to 
shelter behind the technical economies of scale achieved by their firms. 
Small firms may face the choice between economising and achieving a 
higher level of efficiency, or being forced out of business and this may 
spur the managers to achieve relatively greater efficiency and to avoid 
mistakes(Z). 
(I) If the effectiveness of management falls as scale is increased, the 
costs of production are increased, but not necessarily the cost of 
management itself. 
(2) Small firms may operate nearer to the bounds of their production 
possibility surface (p.p.s.). For a discussion of X-efficiency 
(the degree to which firms operate within the bounds of their 
p.p.s.) see Harvey Leibenstein, Am. Econ. Rv. LVI (June, 1966) and 
Q. Jnl of Econ. (Nov. 1969). 
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On the other hand a large firm can employ more management 
specialists, and increasing scale may result in a less than 
proportionate demand for decision taking and management expertise. For 
example the problems of managing some types of large plant may not 
increase proportionately because of the economies of scale for direct 
labour costs. 
(c) Labour relations 
As scale is increased people may simply work less well. The 
possibility that the performance of employees declines with scale could 
apply to more than one dimension of scale. As the length of production 
runs increases this may result in specialized and/or repetitive work, as 
the size of factories is increased it may be difficult to retain a 
'family spirit', and similarly in a large firm labour relations may be 
inherently worse. The larger the factory or firm the greater the 
hierarchical chain must be - employees tena to be further away from the 
'boss', and he is less likely to understand them. Also it may be easier 
for the employees of a large-firm, or at a large factory, to oppose the 
management and to organise restrictive practices. This could be because 
the management of a small firm can spot sooner, and remove, employees 
who might create diversions, or because in a large organisation it is 
easier to whip up feelings in the same way that it is easier to whip up 
mass hysteria at a football match watched by a great many spectators, 
compared to a match watched by very few spectators, or simply because a 
large organisation breeds more dissatisfaction. 
In order to minimise the problems of managing large organisations 
and of labour relations, companies have adopted strategies of focussing 
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their activities, of selling off peripheral lines of business, and of 
delegating responsibility to the managers of separate subsidiary 
companies and profit centres. 
(d) Selling and distribution 
Selling and distribution costs are possible sources of increased 
costs at higher scales of output. For example, if, as the scale of a 
plant is increased, the geographic spread of markets, and so the average 
length of haul, is increased, the average unit costs of transport will 
rise. If the additional sales are obtained from a new, less 
concentrated, market, the costs per unit of representation may be 
increased. On the other hand if the additional sales are made to 
existing customers and the size of consignments are increased, both 
selling and delivery costs per unit may be reduced. Whether there are 
increased unit costs at higher scales of output depends on which 
marketing dimensions of scale are increased. 
Technical Progress 
The inter-relationships between economies of scale and technical 
progress are important. 
a) Development and other initial costs may, or may not, involve 
technical progress. Spreading these costs over the output to which they 
relate is often an important source of reductions in unit costs with 
increases in scale. In practice, it is not always possible to 
distinguish development costs which produce, or require, new knowledge 
or techniques and those which do not. 
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b) As noted above learning effects may include the invention and 
introduction of new techniques - technical progress. 
c) In order to build plants with larger capacity than at present 
operated, it may be necessary to invent and use new techniques. It may 
not be technically possible to simply increase the dimensions of a plant 
or machine. 
d) Firms have to adapt to changes in the techniques of production 
through time, and it is sometimes claimed that large firms have 
advantages in achieving and introducing technical progress. 
Many but not all of the 'engineering' estimates of scale effects 
given in Section 5 of the paper include the effects of spreading 
development and other initial costs for products over varying outputs of 
the products, and the effects of learning for production runs of varying 
length. Some of the estimates therefore include an element of technical 
progress. The advantage of including development costs in analyses of 
the economies of scale is that it makes them more realistic. Firms in 
many industries have to develop a stream of new and improved products to 
remain competitive and dev~lopment costs are a substantial proportion of 
total costs for many firms. But problems are introduced when 
development expenditure is included. The costs of developing many new 
products depends in part on the expected demand for the product, and a 
firm's expenditure on developing new products depends upon the 
development strategies adopted by its competitors. In an oligopolistic 
market if one firm introduces new products, its competitors may follow 
this lead and introduce similar new products. 
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The Economies of Rapid Growth 
The concept of economies of scale for cement plants which was used 
earlier as an example is static, it measures differences in unit costs 
for positions along the dimension of scale measuring the sizes of 
plants. The estimates of costs and economies of scale are for plants 
built at one point in time or more realistically are estimates made for 
hypothetical plants for which blueprints are designed at one point in 
time. The important point is that the plants are designed to minimise 
costs for their scales of production and are based on the set of 
techniques of production known at one point in time. Otherwise unit 
costs for the plants would differ because of changes in technical 
knowledge through time as well as scale differences. When movements 
along some dimensions of scale, such as the cumulative output of 
products, are considered, the estimates of economies of scale can not 
relate to one point in time, though they can be based on a constant set 
of techniques. 
A related concept is the economies related to rapid growth. In 
practice there are a number of forces (apart from the utilization of 
spare capacity) which may enable a firm which increases its output 
rapidly to achieve lower costs than a firm which expands less rapidly. 
(1) There may be disequilibrium between the capacity for different 
operations - existing resources may not be in perfect balance - and by 
bottle-neck breaking it may be possible to achieve some increase in 
overall capacity without a proportionate increase in costs. The 
disequilibrium may occur because of indivisibilities, errors when the 
original plant was built or extended, the original plant was designed 
with the expectation that it would be expanded later, differential rates 
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of learning or technical progress for different operations, the freeing 
of resources, particularly management resources, engaged in previous 
expansion, etc. The rate of growth of output will determine the extent 
to which a firm takes up these economies in a given period. 
(2) There may be scope for taking advantage of the economies of 
scale, by, for example, spreading first copy costs for a periodical over 
a larger circulation, by building larger units of plant, and by 
extending existing plants. The rate of growth is a factor determining 
the total output of products through time, and hence the extent to which 
the economies for spreading initial costs are achieved. It is also an 
important influence on the size of new plants and extensions to existing 
plants. 
(3) New techniques which were not available, or were not used, 
when existing plants were built may be incorporated in new capacity: 
growth may enable a firm to take_ advantage of technical progress. The 
rate of growth of a firm may affect, or depend upon, technical progress. 
For example, a firm which is expanding rapidly may have more incentive 
to invest in developing ne~ techniques of production which it can 
incorporate in its new capacity. 
The following are the main sources of increased unit costs and 
diseconomies of rapid growth. 
(1) Existing capacity will have been built when price levels were 
lower, and, other things being equal, in book value terms, but not in 
real terms, capital costs will be lower than for new plants. Also, in 
practice, much of the capital equipment employed in old plants will have 
been written off against previous profits and capital costs may be 
low. The rate of growth will determine the proportion of 'high cost' 
new plant operated by a firm. 
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(2) The costs per unit of some factors may increase if scale is 
increased. Examples of limitations on the supply of factors were given 
above. 
(3) Growth may result in firms reaching levels of output where 
technical diseconomies of scale operate. 
(4) Marketing and distribution costs per unit of output may have 
to be increased to dispose of a larger output. 
(5) Rapid growth may influence the costs and effectiveness of 
management and labour relations favourably or otherwise. For example 
rapid rates of growth may enable a firm to maintain a balanced, or 
younger labour force, alternatively it may result in a dilution of a 
skilled and loyal labour force. 
Avoiding the Disadvantages of Small Scale 
It is possible to avoid some of the disadvantages of operating on a 
small scale. For example, a firm may buy out production operations or 
components for which there are large scale economies from domestic 
suppliers or suppliers in other countries. If these suppliers produce 
on a large scale or have low costs for other reasons, such as lower 
wages in other countries, then the firm may be able to buy at prices 
which are competitive with the costs of larger scale rivals. 
The scope for avoiding the disadvantages of small scale apply 
particularly to research, development~marketing and distribution. Small 
firms may adopt strategies which enable them to compete. One marketing 
strategy is to produce for niche markets requiring distinct products for 
which there are few potential economies of scope for production if they 
were made with other products. Similarly a small firm may avoid a 
marketing and distribution handicap by adopting a strategy of selling 
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own-label products to a supermarket or chain store groups which market 
and distribute the products. Similarly there may be scope for a firm 
with smaller output than its rivals to concentrate on products which do 
not require research and development expenditure, or to buy in research 
and development from a firm operating in another country. 
Efficiency 
This discussion of the sources of economies and diseconomies of 
scale and growth would be incomplete without a brief reference to the 
other forces affecting the success of a business. Most important is the 
ability of management to ensure efficient operation and to move with the 
times. More specifically in many industries the ability of management 
to control the quality of products and rejection rates, to organise 
production efficiently within the limits set by the size of plant and 
firm, to develop and introduce new or improved products, to search for 
profitable investment opportunities, to maintain a high level of 
capacity utilisation, etc. are very important to the success of a 
business. Firms which are so_large that they control their markets may 
use their monopoly position to go peacefully to sleep, and efficient 
firms of less than optimum size may be absolutely more efficient than 
sleepy firms of a technically optimum size. 
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Section 3. Methods of Estimating Economies of Scale 
Comparisons of costs 
If experiments could be conducted to measure economic variables 
then to measure the economies of scale for plants in an industry, plants 
of varying size would be constructed and operated. Each plant would be 
built to incorporate the most efficient techniques for its scale of 
production. Unit costs of production for each plant would be measured 
and the economies of scale estimated by comparing unit costs for the 
plants. 
It is, of course, impractical to build plants merely to measure the 
economies of scale. One alternative is to obtain costs of production 
for existing plants which operate at varying scales of output. Apart 
from the difficulties of obtaining such data, the main qualifications to 
this approach are that the data usually relate to plants built at 
different points in time. The plant and equipment is of varying 
vintages and the latest plant and equipment may incorporate knowledge 
which was not available when the earlier units were built. Also the 
plants may not be fully adapted to the scale of production at which they 
operate. Inevitably cost data for actual plants relate to operations in 
existence and cannot provide estimates for scales of production outside 
that range. For some industries cost data for a great many actual 
plants is available and have been analysed to isolate each of the 
factors influencing costs and to estimate the economies of scale. 
Electricity generation is the industry most fully researched for this 
purpose. 
Another source of information about economies of scale is the costs 
of expanding the capacity of plants. Certainly experience of expanding 
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capacity provides insights to the economies of scale, but straight 
comparisons of costs pre- and post-expansion do not give estimates of 
scale economies. These comparisons are affected by the extent to which 
existing plant was written down, technical progress, the extent to which 
the original and new capacity plant were adapted to their scales of 
production, as well as economies of scale. 
Census data 
Censuses of Production contain data on costs for large numbers of 
plants and firms. The clear advantages of these data are that they 
cover a great many establishments, again they are actual costs, and they 
are collected on a standardised basis. 
The main limitations on estimating the economies of scale from 
Census data are that the definition of most Census 'trades' includes the 
production of a range of products for which economies of scale, market 
size and growth vary, and affect the size of establishments. For 
example, one U.K. Census trade includes the production of components for 
vehicles such as seat belts as well as engines and the assembly of cars, 
commercial vehicles, buses and battery driven vehicles. Some components 
for cars can be manufactured very efficiently in a factory of very small 
absolute size, but for the assembly of standard cars substantial 
economies of scale extend to an output of at least a quarter of a 
million cars a year on one site. Similarly production of most 
agricultural equipment is lumped together in one Census 'trade', and 
there are wide differences in the complexity and hence economies of 
scale for different types of agricultural equipment. These trades are 
not exceptional. The Index to the Standard Industrial Classification(!) 
(1) HMSO 1981. 
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lists many products and processes for each three digit SIC heading. The 
number of products shown for each of 104 three digit headings was summed 
and the headings reordered in terms of the number of products and 
processes listed against them. For the median heading, the number of 
products and processes distinguished was 38, for the lower quartile 22, 
and for the upper quartile 75. 
Comparisons of Census data for establishments of varying size does 
not provide unqualified estimates of the economies of scale because 
plants of different sizes make different products. Another limitation 
on Census data is that they can be used to derive estimates of the 
economies of scale for only one or possibly two dimensions of scale -
the size of establishments and possibly the size of firms. 
Time series data 
Another source of cost data for estimating the economies of scale 
is time series data of costs and prices for products, plants, firms or 
industries. These data can be related to volumes of output, to trace 
the reduction in unit costs through time, as output increases. The 
principal and important qualification to this method is to distinguish 
the effects of those improvements in technology and efficiency which 
occur through time and which are independent of scale from the effects 
of increasing scale. Improvements in technology may involve the 
introduction of more efficient techniques which were not used previously 
or the introduction of newly developed methods of production. It is 
technically very difficult to isolate the effects of technical change 
and increases in scale. 
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Engineering Estimates 
Another approach to estimating the economies of scale is to 
assemble estimates from managers, engineers, economists and accountants 
of the cost of operating at different scales of production, where full 
adaptation to the scale of production is allowed for. This is the 
method on which most reliance is placed in this paper and so this method 
is described in more detail. 
In order to make engineering estimates the methods of production 
have to be broken down into individual processes and operations, and the 
technical basis for economies af scale has to be investigated. Usually 
it is not possible to describe processes in terms of engineering 
production functions which are based on scientific laws or experimental 
data, and so the estimates of the economies of scale for machines, 
process units, and operations, are based on engineers', cost 
accountants' and managers' estimates of costs. Their estimates are 
based on operating experience for plants of varying size, the experience 
of planning and building new plants and expanding plant capacity and 
general experience of the~r industry. Estimates of the components of 
costs, capital and operating costs for individual items of equipment of 
varying size, costs for processes and/or for groups of processes, 
development, first copy or initial costs for products, etc. are 
assembled for each industry, and are used to estimate the relationships 
between unit costs and the various dimensions of scale. The reliability 
of the estimates depends upon the experience of those making the 
estimates. Managers familiar with the construction and operation of 
giant steel works in Japan or cigarette factories in the USA are in a 
strong position to make estimates for those sizes of plant. 
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The weakness of 'engineering' estimates of the type described are 
that they are subject to a margin of error and that they lack rigour. 
Their accuracy is particularly suspect when dealing with some of the 
non-technical forces determining the effects of scale, for example, when 
estimating the relationship between size and the quality and 
effectiveness of management, and the effect of scale on the development 
of new techniques and products. 
The main advantage of the engineering approach is that it is 
possible to hold other conditions, such as the state of the arts, the 
quality of factors of production, their relative prices, and some 
dimensions of scale, constant when making estimates of the economies of 
scale.(!) In spite of the limitations of the engineering approach it 
has been used in this paper because it is the most satisfactory method 
of making estimates of the economies of scale. 
The best of the 'engineering' estimates are based on technical 
relationships and detailed castings. Such estimates are related to the 
production of specific ranges of products. The main qualifications to 
these 'engineering' estimates are that they are estimates for 
hypothetical operations. In practice, costs may vary from expected 
levels and such variances could be related to scale. Where 
'engineering' estimates extend beyond scales for which experience has 
been obtained, unforeseen technical and management problems could 
invalidate the estimates. Transport costs and market constraints are 
usually excluded from engineering estimates. Transport costs can be 
(1) Plainly the quality of factors of production does vary. For 
example, the number and quality of apprentice trained craftsmen is 
greater in Germany than the UK and this difference contributes to 
differences in labour productivity and the performance of firms in 
the two countries. But it is separate from the economies of scale. 
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included, but they have to be related to an actual or hypothetical 
distribution of markets. 
The Survivor Technique 
The qualifications to estimates of the economies of scale based on 
costs have been described. Stigler suggested a method of avoiding these 
difficulties(!). The survivor technique is based on the reasonable 
assumption that if there is a most efficient scale of production for an 
industry then plants of that scale of production will gain an increasing 
share of an industry's output. A number of attempts have been made to 
apply the survivor technique to census data. If at successive censuses 
a size class of establishments gains an increasing share of a trade's 
output, it is claimed that size range is the optimum scale for the 
trade. The advantage of the technique is that the effects of all the 
forces which determine the success of a business are tested. These 
forces include the effectiveness of management and the ability of a 
business to adapt to changes in technology and the state of business. 
Again the principal problem involved in applying the survivor 
technique to data for census trades is that each trade covers a wide 
range of activities for which the optimum scale and the state of 
business varies. 
(1) C.J. Stigler, 'Economies of Scale', Jnl. of Law and Economics, 
1958. 
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Sources of Estimates 
Table 3.1 lists some of the principal sources of estimates of the 
economies of scale for a range of manufacturing industries(!). Table 
3.2 summarises the advantages and disadvantages of the methods of 
measuring the economies of scale. 
Conclusions 
There are qualifications to all the methods of estimating the 
MES and the economies of scale. In practice the only sources of 
estimates of scale gradients for many industries available for use in 
this paper were engineering estimates and estimates based on census 
data. In this paper we concentrate on the engineering estimates. 
Estimates of the MES and scale gradients based on census data were not 
used as a principal source of estimates. The main reason for this 
decision was the author's view thAt the main dimension of scale to which 
economies of scale relate is the output of products and closely related 
products at plants and by firms. Censuses provide no indicators of 
costs relative to the output of products. (2) Engineering estimates are 
described in Section 5. Estimates made by other methods are included in 
section 7 where other evidence of the economies of scale is reviewed to 
assess whether it confirms or conflicts with the engineering estimates. 
(1) Studies of economies of scale for a single industry and for 
industries apart from manufacturing industries have been excluded 
from Table 3.1. 
(2) There is no justification for assuming that the number of products 
made at each establishment in a trade is fixed and that the output 
or size of each establishment indicates the scale of output of the 
products made there. 
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Section 4. Characteristics of Industries and the Economies of Scale 
Most businessmen claim that their industry is different from 
others. There is some justification for these claims, nevertheless 
industries can be grouped according to various characteristics. In this 
section some characteristics of industries and their relationships to 
the economies of scale are considered. 
PRODUCTION CHARACTERISTICS 
Costs of developing products 
Drugs, aircraft and cars are products which involve considerable 
expenditure for development and testing. Spreading these costs over the 
output of products to which they relate provides significant economies 
of scale. 
Paradoxically completely new types products also provide 
opportunities for small and new firms. Where the market for a radically 
new product is small initially and the costs of development are limited, 
small firms may be able to grow with the market for the product. 
Complexity of products 
Aircraft, cars and lorries are products for which there are large 
economies of scale. One explanation is the complexity of these 
products, they are made up of many distinct parts. Also many of the 
parts have to be made very accurately. Complexity affects design, 
development and production costs. 
Similarly where a series of complex manufacturing operations are 
required to produce products as in oil refining, there will tend to be 
large economies of scale. Where production processes are simple as for 
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the production of many items of food, the economies of scale for 
production are smaller. 
Standardised products 
Industries producing standardised products such as cement tend to 
be organised in large units. Standard products facilitate large scale 
production. Although computer control of stocks and production aids 
manufacture of a variety of products, the scope for economies for joint 
production depends upon the degree of variation between products. 
Industries such as paint and footwear which produce a very wide range of 
products in terms of colours, sizes, fashions, quality and price provide 
opportunities for small firms and establishments. 
An interesting contrast is between the motor and computer 
industries. The latter provides greater opportunities for small and new 
firms to enter. The rapid evolution of computer technology has enabled 
firms to set up and grow with new segments of the market. Another 
explanation is that a higher proportion of the costs of a car relate to 
the components which do not vary for special uses or to provide product 
variety. For many computer systems much of the software and some of the 
hardware relate to special applications. Much of the hardware can be 
bought off the shelf. 
Units produced 
Production of a very large number of units of a product is 
associated with less significant economies of scale. The tobacco 
industry produces billions of cigarettes and the scale curve for tobacco 
factories of the size in existence is shallow. 
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Size of products 
Bulky products such as large ships and process plant have to be 
built on a one off basis and this limits the scope for scale economies, 
though there are economies for producing a series of a type of ship or 
design of process plant through spreading the costs of design and 
learning from experience. 
Processes of production 
Some processes are generally associated with large scale economies 
of scale in relation to the output of products, and others do not lend 
themselves to large scale operation. 
a) Processes associated with large economies of scale for the output of 
products: 
1. Continuous process operations as in oil refining. 
2. Rolling operations as in the metal manufacturing, pulp, paper 
and printing industries. 
3. Stamping and forging. 
4. Machining metal. 
5. Processing in vessels as in the paint and dyes industries. 
b) Processes associated with smaller economies of scale: 
1. Casting and moulding(!) 
2. Extrusion 
3. Spinning 
(1) Spreading the costs of moulds over large outputs of a product is a 
significant source of economies for some applications. 
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4. Weaving 
5. Sewing 
6. Assembly 
MARKETS 
Markets are segmented by the costs of transport which increase with 
the distance of deliveries, tariffs, legal and language differences, and 
differences of taste. One approach to estimating the economies of scale 
is to ignore selling, marketing and distribution costs and focus on the 
costs of production. This procedure is deceptive because there are 
economies of scale for marketing and distribution related to a firm's 
share of a market. For example, advertising by a firm with many 
customers in an area will result in many messages per advert getting to 
customers, and unit delivery costs will be less for a firm with large 
sales in an area, compared with a firm with fewer more scattered sales. 
An alternative approach is to relate the costs of selling and 
distribution to an actual or hypothetical pattern of markets and 
channels of distribution, _and estimate the costs of marketing and 
distribution for firms with different shares of a market. 
Distribution costs are important for explaining the actual size of 
plants in many industries. Other things being equal, the larger the 
output of a plant the greater will be unit delivery costs. Higher 
delivery costs may offset the lower costs for large plants compared to 
costs for a series of plants sited to minimise transport costs. Even 
for industries in which modern methods of bulk transport have reduced 
delivery costs, it may not be economic to close existing small plants 
which serve local markets, and concentrate production. The capital 
costs of plant and equipment for the small plants will have been written 
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down and the plant may have a low second hand value. The reduction in 
the costs of production may be more than offset by the increased costs 
of transport. 
The Size of National Markets 
In smaller countries, such as Norway and New Zealand, the average 
size plants is smaller than in the large industrial countries. One 
explanation is, of course, transport costs and tariffs, but there are 
more complex reasons for the differences. After barriers to trade are 
reduced, there will be a legacy of small production units which will 
persist for many years. Often new small plants would not be set up 
where existing small plants can compete because the costs of developing 
products have been incurred and much of their capital equipment has been 
written off. Easy access and close proximity to a large market provides 
firms with advantages for developing products and marketing. Firms in 
relatively small countries may circumvent their small domestic market by 
exporting, and protecting their position in foreign markets by 
investment. They may also tend to specialise in producing intermediate 
goods for sale to other firms to avoid a marketing disadvantage, and 
make and export goods for which the economies of scale are modest to 
avoid being at a disadvantage for production costs. Such specialisation 
can be self-reinforcing. Managers and other employees in smaller 
countries are experienced and efficient at operating smaller scale 
units. 
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Section 5. A Survey of Engineering Estimates of the Economies of Scale 
Introduction 
Engineering estimates of the economies of scale are based on 
estimates of the unit costs of operating at different scales of 
production. In brief the assumptions made when estimating unit costs 
and the relationship between scale and costs are: 
1. The estimates are for hypothetical production runs, plants and 
firms where the production facilities, manning etc., are adapted to the 
scale of output so as to minimise costs at that scale. 
2. Relative prices of factors of production are those ruling in 
the countries for which the estimates were made, generally the USA or 
European countries. 
3. The technologies available are those used in the developed 
industrial countries. 
4. The degree of vertical integration is fixed. 
There are problems involved in presenting a summary of engineering 
estimates of the economies of scale. There is a great deal of 
information to be summarised, the information is not comprehensive, 
either for all trades, or for all the dimensions of scale for the trades 
for which information is available, and the assumptions and definitions 
used by authors who have made the engineering estimates of the economies 
of scale are not identical. 
Table 5.1 summaries the relatively thorough estimates of the 
economies of scale. The next step was to extend the estimates to some 
trades for which engineering estimates were not available. This 
exercise is reported in Table 5.2. In table 5.3 the information 
available is used to draw conclusions about the economies of scale for 
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industry groups. Tables 5.4 to 5.8 summarise the quantitative estimates 
of the economies of scale for the main dimensions of scale. 
Introduction to Table 5.1 
Table 5.1 lists 'engineering' estimates of the economies of scale 
in NACE3 order. Only the salient sources and figures are given in this 
survey. For those industries for which a number of studies have been 
made only the more recent studies are included. The first four columns 
of Table 5.1 list the NACE3 references, the industries, the sources of 
the estimates of the economies of scale and the countries from which 
information was collected to make the estimates. The next two columns 
summarise the quantitative estimates. The fifth column lists the 
estimates of the minimum efficient scale (MES) which is defined below. 
This column gives the dimensions of scale to which quantitative 
estimates of the MES relate, and the MES scale for each of the 
dimensions of scale listed. The sixth column gives the increase in unit 
costs below the MES scale, usually this is given in terms of the 
increase in unit costs at a half or, one third of the MES scale. The 
seventh column lists the main dimensions of scale to which economies 
relate and indicates the extent of the economies. This column includes 
dimensions of scale for which no quantitative estimates of the MES are 
available. 
Definition of the MES 
The information for Table 5.1 is drawn from a number of sources and 
the definitions used by authors of the sources were not uniform. One 
problem is the definition of the MES. In practice most engineering 
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Glossary of Terms used in Table 5.1 
~s- Minimum efficient scale. This term was defined on page 2. In 
Table 5.1 the definition used by the authors of the studies surveyed 
varies. The definitions used for the main sources are reported on page 
35 and 50. 
Dimensions of scale. These were described on page 3. 
Plants, works, factories. The term establishment is used for censuses 
of production. It refers to the operations of a firm at a single site. 
In practice different terms are used for such operations. In the steel 
industry the terms steel plant or steel works are used, works is the 
term used in the cement industry and for footwear the term is factory. 
Firms, companies. The term enterprise is used for censuses of 
production for firms operating one or more establishments in a trade. 
For Table 5.1 the terms firms and companies are used for this purpose. 
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estimates of unit costs do not identify a scale at which costs are at a 
minimum. The two main sources of information for Table 5.1 are the 
studies made by Pratten (1971) and by Scherer (1975). The latter study 
has spawned derivatives including Owen's and Muller and Owen's studies. 
Pratten used the following definition of the MES: 'the minimum scale 
above which any possible doubling in scale would reduce total unit costs 
by less than five percent and above which any possible subsequent 
doubling in scale would reduce value added per unit by less than ten per 
cent'. Also theMES was limited to 'the feasible range of output in ••• 
the UK'. Scherer's definition involved two sets of conditions. 'Where 
there was considerable experience with plants believed to realize all 
known scale economies, we have defined the MOS as the smallest scale at 
which unit costs in 1965 - vintage plants attained a perceived minimum 
or at least came so close that remaining unexploited scale economies 
were viewed as insignificantly slight. When little or no experience in 
the highest-volume and still declining reaches of the long-run cost 
function existed we defined the MOS as the size of "best current 
practice" plants in operation during 1965'. 
Another definition of the MES for plants and firms lurks in many 
studies of the economies of scale. Most industries produce a range of 
products and the market for these products varies. Often the market for 
some products is small. For multi product industries the MES is 
sometimes defined as the scale of plant or firm which can make and sell 
any combination of products and be competitive in terms of costs for 
those products with larger firms in the industry. This is the 
definition used in table 5.1 for pottery, machine tools, the knitting 
industry, general rubber goods and plastics. For some combinations of 
products the MES could, of course, be much higher than the MES specified 
for these industries. 
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The Country of Origin of the Estimates 
Column 4 of Table 5.1 reports the country of origin of the 
estimates. It is sometimes suggested that the size of a country may 
influence the economies of scale or estimates of the economies of scale. 
Certainly firms operating in countries with small markets on average 
have smaller plants. Also, as noted on page 23, firms operating in a 
country with a small market could be relatively efficient at operating 
small plants. It may be difficult for managers of these firms to assess 
costs for large scale operations outside their own operating experience, 
and this could inject a downward bias on estimates of the economies of 
scale made in small countries. Pratten's estimates of theMES scale and 
scale gradients were obtained from managers of firms operating in the 
UK. Some, but not all of these managers knew about production 
facilities in the larger US market. Those whose experience and 
knowledge were limited to the UK market may have given lower estimates 
of the MES scale than managers of US firms would have estimated. 
Scherer's (1975) study is the most helpful for assessing the 
significance of the countries for which estimates of the MES and 
the economies of scale were made because he studied firms in different 
countries. If the country of origin had a systematic influence on 
estimates of the economies of scale, Scherer could be expected to 
identify this bias. Scherer's sample of six countries ranged in size 
from Sweden to the USA. He concluded that 'we found little divergence 
among the views of producers in the six nations with respect to basic 
process optima, nor did perceived limits on the size of plants which 
could be managed successfully vary much between nations for a given 
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product mix' .<I) 'Much more variance was encountered in estimates of 
the amount by which unit costs rose for plants built with only one-third 
of the MOS capacity. These deviations were evidently attributable at 
least in part to systematic international differences in factor costs 
and especially wages'. In terms of factor costs, Scherer's sample 
stretched from India to the USA. Most of the estimates surveyed in 
Table 5.1 were obtained in the USA or Europe. Factor prices in Europe 
and the USA are closer than they were in 1965 when Scherer made his 
study. 
Engineering estimates generally relate to new plants, factories or 
production facilities set up at the time the estimates are made. 
Differences in relative factor prices are an important influence on 
whether firms install new plant, technology and methods, or soldier on 
with the existing production facilities. Countries where wages are 
relatively low have an incentive to retain in use small old plants which 
may operate efficiently at lower scales than new plant. 
Size of country is not the only factor which could cause 
differences in estimates of economies of scale between countries. For 
example, Germany has special rules for brewing beer. Such rules could 
affect the MES scale of production. However, such differences of rules 
for production are unusual and their effects on estimates of the MES are 
not important. 
(1) F.M. Scherer et al. 'The Economies of Multi-plant Operation', 
Cambridge, Mass. 1975, p. 81. 
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Costs 
Most engineering estimates concentrate on production costs. Scherer 
specifically limited his estimates of the MOS to production costs. The 
' 
reason for excluding selling and distribution costs is that they vary 
depending on the characteristics of the market assumed. Nor, in 
practice, can engineering estimates allow for differences in the 
effectiveness of management attributable to scale. 
Jurgen Muller et al. (1985) go further and exclude development 
costs from their estimates of MES and scale gradients. 
Overview of Table 5.1 
There are several features of Table 5.1 which are noteworthy. 
Firstly, the industries for which engineering estimates of economies of 
scale have been made are spread right across manufacturing industry. 
Secondly substantial economies of scale relate to the output of products 
and production runs. In many trades these dimensions of scale are more 
important than the size of plants and firms. Thirdly, the extent of 
economies of scale vary across industries and for different products 
made in many industries. 
Extending the Coverage of Estimates of the Estimates of the Economies of 
Scale. 
Table 5.2 relates trades for which no estimates of the economies of 
scale are available to trades for which such estimates are to hand. The 
purpose of the table is to extend, in a rough and ready way, the number 
of trades for which estimates of the economies of scale are available 
for statistical exercises. The basis for making the allocation is the 
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complexity of the products and the manufacturing processes used. No 
attempt was made to classify chemical, food, textile, clothing or 
footwear trades in this table. In very broad terms, trades in these 
groups are adequately represented by the observations included in Table 
5.1. 
The next stage of the analysis was to relate the estimates of 
economies of scale to the complete NACE3 classification in Table 5.3(a) 
and to assess the economies of scale for each industry group or branch. 
The number of employees engaged in each trade in EClO is shown in column 
3 of the table to indicate the relative importance of each trade. Some 
additional observations and references to statements about the economies 
of scale are added.(!) The observations are based on the author's 
knowledge of the industries obtained during visits to firms. 
In the final column of Table 5.3(a) a summing up on the economies 
of scale for each industry group is attempted. This survey concentrates 
on the economies of scale for production and the spreading of 
development costs. For the most part economies of scale for marketing 
distribution and acquiring finance are ignored. 
An ordering of industry groups in terms of the importance of 
economies of scale is attempted in Table 5.3(b). This classification is 
qualitative, but it takes into account two indicators - the MES as a 
percentage of the output of industries and the cost gradient below the 
MES scale. An attempt is also made in this table to indicate the 
principal dimension of scale to which economies relate in each industry. 
For two industries two dimensions are ticked because in the case of 
(1) Studies which include quantitative estimates are included in Table 
5.1; the additional reference in Table 5.3 are qualitative. 
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motor vehicles it is difficult to distinguish between the economies for 
large outputs of products and large firms(!) and for paper, printing and 
publishing, size of plants are very important for paper products and for 
printing and publishing. The output of book, periodical and newspaper 
titles is highly important. This very crude test indicates that the 
output of products and production runs are the principal dimensions of 
scale to which economies for development and production costs relate. 
Estimates of the Economies of Scale for Products, Production Runs and 
Specialisation 
Most industries produce a wide range of products and so there is 
scope for varying output of products, for production runs of varying 
length and specialisation. (A production line or plant specialising on 
a narrow range of products is in effect an example of production of long 
runs). There are many references in the literature to the cost 
advantages of specialisation and long production runs. For example, in 
1960, Professor Verdoorn suggested that differences in the length of 
production runs 'might well account for a considerable part of the 
differences in productivity' between America and Europe. He suggested 
the diversity of technical processes carried out in the same plant was 
much smaller in America. ( 2) 
{1) In this industry firms have to be large to have large outputs of 
products. 
(2) E.A.G. Robinson, ed., 'Economic Consequences of the Size of 
Nations', London, 1960, p. 346. 
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The extent of the economies of long runs and large outputs of 
products are elusive. The economies of long production runs relate to 
the use of larger capacity, more efficient equipment as output 
increases, learning effects and the spreading of the costs of organising 
production runs. For products which may be made in repeated production 
runs, development costs can be spread. A substantial and increasing 
proportion of the costs of firms are fixed or semi-fixed relative to the 
output of products. These costs include design and development costs, 
the costs of setting up specialised production facilities and tooling, 
and product related marketing expenditure. 
Increases in trade and hence scale since 1970 have directly 
increased the length of production runs and outputs of products. The 
increase in incomes and availability of imports on the other hand has 
enabled customers to be more choosy. European firms have reduced 
production of many standard traditional products and moved up market 
making new and distinctive products. These forces have reduced the 
average output of products and production runs in Europe, and increased 
the importance of these dimensions of scale for an assessment of the 
economies of scale. 
One of the problems of assessing the effects of a general increase 
in the length of production runs for, say, dyes or paints is that such a 
change is remote from the expectations of managers. Also, in the short 
run firms would not change their plant and equipment in response to an 
increase in the length of run. In the long term firms would respond to 
a, say, doubling of length of production runs by installing larger units 
of plant and equipment. 
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Table 5.4 lists some estimates based on production conditions in 
the UK circa 1970. Substantial economies of scale are indicated in 
Table 5.4. Although only five estimates are shown, they are 
illustrative for many other trades; dyes for batch process trades, 
machine tools for many mechanical engineering trades, electronic capital 
goods for instruments, cotton weaving for textiles and clothing and 
books for printing and publishing. Data is not available to test 
whether the magnitude of these economies has changed since 1970 but it 
seems unlikely that there have been substantial changes. New methods of 
machining machine tool components, electronic chips, and computer type 
setting may have lowered the economies somewhat. 
Throughout much of Table 5.1 and the summaries in Table 5.3 
qualitative references were made, the economies for long production runs 
and for large outputs of products. Also the estimates of economies of 
scale for establishments and firms analysed below include economies of 
scale for products and production runs. If 'pushed to the wall' to make 
an estimate of the effects on unit costs of a doubling in the average 
output of products, production runs and specialisation from the pres~nt 
levels in the EC, the very rough expected orders of magnitude would be 6 
per cent for total unit costs and 14 per cent for value added (total 
unit costs less the bought out component of costs) per unit. These are 
very large economies. In terms of marginal costs, the total unit costs 
of the extra output would be 88 per cent of those for the original 
output and value added per unit for the extra output would be only 72 
per cent of that for the original output. 
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Table 5.4 Economies for Long Production Runs and Specialisation 
NACE3 Dyes 
Code 
251 New dye made in new plant 
Traditional dye made in 
industries 
322 Machine Tools 
Models of machine tools 
345 Electronic capital goods 
432 Cotton weaving(!) 
473 Books 
Hardback 
Paperback 
Percentage 
Increase in 
Costs at 50% 
of MES 
Comments 
total 
unit 
costs 
value 
added 
per unit 
22 
17 
5 
8 13 
(5) (2) 15 
36 50 
20 30 
44 The estimates are 
representative for 
56 other batch process 
industries 
10 Approximate 
estimate. 
The extent of the 
economies depends 
upon the level of 
development costs. 
Machine tools are 
representative of much 
of the engineering 
industry. 
Approximate estimate. 
The extent of economies 
depends upon the level 
of development costs. 
Electronic capital 
goods are represent-
ative of instruments 
This estimate is repre-
sentative for the 
textile, clothing and 
footwear industries. 
Spreading first copy 
and set up costs are 
very important in this 
trade. 
(1) MES runs assumed to be 15,500 yds. 
(2) Estimate by author. 
Source: C.F. Pratten, 'Economies of Scale in Manufacturing Industry', 
Cambridge, 1971. 
- 87 - 2.75 
Plants 
It is clear that the extent of economies of scale for plants varies 
across industries in terms of the size of MES plants relative to 
industry output and the increase in costs below the MES scale. Table 
5.5 lists the estimates of the MES for plants and relates them to UK and 
EC output. Table 5.6 summarises the estimates of the MES for plants as 
a percentage of EC output. 
The estimates of the output to which MES scales are related tend to 
exaggerate output relative to theMES. In many trades there is scope 
for plants to specialise. For example, steelworks make a wide range of 
products and all steelworks specialise. Similarly machine tool 
factories each make a limited range of tools. 
Table 5.6 shows that for 5 per cent of the observations the MES 
scale of plants is less than 2.5 per cent of EC output, and for 63 per 
cent the MES scale of plants is less than five per cent of EC output. 
This is a very rough indicator of the size of MES plants because the 
figures are not weighted. However, when UK employment was used as 
weights the percentages-rose to 60 per cent below 2.5 per cent and 88 
per cent below five per cent. (l) The estimates suggest that in most 
industries the EC market can support 20 or more MES plants. The 
equivalent figure for the larger EC industrial economies, such as 
Germany, France, Italy and the UK would be four or more plants. 
Titese estimates understate the impact of scale economies for 
plants. It is a common observation that many small plants survive in 
the metal goods, mechanical engineering, textile, clothing and 'other' 
(1) There are severe problems in weighting the observations; it is 
difficult to assess how representative estimates for special plants 
are for industries. Should the chemical plants be taken as 
representative of all -chemical plants, etc. Fortunately the broad 
conclusions are not sensitive to the weights used. 
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Table 5.6 Summary of MES Scale of Plants and Output in the EC 
Percentage of EC output Number of observations Weighted by UK 
% of employment 
total 
0- < 1 20 29 50 
1- < 2.5 17 25 10 
2.5- < 5 13 19 28 
5- < 10 11 16 9 
10- < 20 5 7 3 
20- < 50 2 3 0 
50- < 100 1 1 0 
100 and over 
68 100 100 
manufacturing industries. However for many of these plants the secrets 
of survival are that they are sub-contractors or they specialise. Pins 
provide an example. In Adam Smith's time a whole trade made up of many 
firms manufactured pins. Now all the production of pins in the UK is 
concentrated in quite small parts of two factories. For the most part 
small plants make different product ranges to those made by the large 
plants, and for these products there are economies for specialisation 
and large outputs of products. Specialisation can take the form of 
differences in quality rather than distinct products. A firm with a 
small plant may specialise in making high quality products or products 
of low quality and/or specialise in selling own branded products to 
retailers or selling products without advertising. 
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Again the estimates of scale gradients in Table 5.5 vary. No doubt 
the extent of economies does vary for different types of plants but also 
there is a margin of error for all the estimates. Unfortunately there 
is no way of estimating the extent of the possible errors. Table 5.7 
summarises the increase in costs at ~ the MES for the plants listed in 
Table 5.5. 
Table 5.7 The Increase in Average Costs at half theMES 
Increase in Number of Plants for which estimates of 
costs plants the increase in average value 
(percentage) added are also available 
Average Average 
costs value 
added per 
unit 
0-2 2 1 
2-5 16 2 
5-10 13 2 2 
10-15 11 1 1 
15-20 1 0 2 
20-25 1 1 1 
25 and over 1 0 1 
45 7 7 
Average 8 9 18 
One reason why the estimates of scale gradients vary for different 
industries is that the proportion of output bought out varies for 
different types of plant, and the bought out content of output often 
offers much less scope for economies of scale. Average unit costs and 
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value added per unit are also shown in Table 5.7 for the plants for 
which both estimates are available. The unweighted average increase in 
value added per unit is twice that for average unit costs. 
It is important to note that the estimates of economies of scale 
for plants are based on the assumption that the range of products made 
at a plant is fixed and does not increase with the scale of the plants. 
The estimates of the effects of increasing the size of plants therefore 
includes the effects of increasing the output of the products made at 
the plants and of increasing the length of production runs. 
Firms 
Table 5.8 lists the MES for firms for the trades for which 
estimates of the economies of scale for firms were given in Table 5.1. 
The size of firm is used as the main dimension of scale for these 
observations because some division of output between plants is possible 
without substantially increasing costs. ( 1) Again it is important to 
note that the economies of larger outputs of products are incorporated 
in these estimates. It is assumed that the range of products is fixed 
and does not increase with the size of firms. The reductions in unit 
costs for large firms includes the cost reducing effects of spreading 
development costs over a larger output and for longer production runs. 
The unweighted average MES as a percentage of the EC market was 34 and 
weighted by UK employment 55. These two estimates are heavily 
influenced by the motor vehicle and aerospace industries. The increase 
in costs at half the MES for the six trades for which estimates are 
available is 9 per cent. 
(1) For example, car manufacturers can separate the manufacture of 
engines and the assembly of the cars. 
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Cars and Trucks 
The estimates of scale effects for the production of cars are 
noteworthy for several reasons. First the two estimates of the MES are 
widely different, two million and 500,000 cars a year. One explanation 
for this divergence is that the first estimate by Muller and Owen 
includes the spreading of development costs, while the second estimate 
by Muller excludes these costs. For cars the effects of spreading 
product development costs are an important source of economies of scale. 
The MES estimate of two million cars a year exceeds the production in 
Europe of any single firm and suggests there would be scale economies 
associated with further concentration of the industry. 
Another reason why the estimates for cars and trucks are of great 
interest is that they are representative for many products made by the 
mechanical engineering, electrical and instrument industries. Cars and 
trucks are more or less complex than the products of these industries, 
but the main difference is the much'greater output in terms of numbers 
of cars and trucks. This suggests that there are substantial 
unexploited economies of scale for the production of many products made 
by these industries. Another example of the economies of scale for 
precision engineering products continuing to very large outputs is ball 
bearings. These products are made in vast quantities. SKF claims about 
twenty per cent of the Western World market. When it was challenged by 
Japanese producers in the 1970s~it cut costs by rationalising production 
at its European factories. Each of its subsidiaries in the U.K., 
France, Germany and Italy ceased to produce a full range; instead they 
manufactured a limited range and took supplies from other subsidiaries to 
complete their range. 
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Another example of economies of scale continuing to very large 
outputs is for semiconductors. It is claimed that the large domestic 
markets for chips from the domestic and electronic appliance industries 
in Japan and the computer industry in the USA have given these countries 
advantages for chip production. 
The output of motor vehicle and computer companies is concentrated 
on cars and trucks, and computers. In most industries the possible 
permutations of products for firms is in practice immense and it is 
difficult to pin down a range of output for estimating the economies of 
scale. This is the explanation for Table 5.1 including only a few 
estimates of the MES for firms. Plainly there are economies of scale 
for, say, giant chemical companies for organising and controlling 
production of intermediate chemicals, basic research and development, 
for marketing and distribution, for raising finance and for risk taking. 
These economies are difficult to estimate but they can not be ignored. 
In the following section they are described. 
Estimates of the MES 1951 to 1982 
Many of the estimates of the economies of scale used in this 
Section were made during the 1960s. Are these estimates accurate for 
the technological and marketing conditions of the 1980s? Table 5.9 
compares estimates of the MES for eight industries for which DIW 
prepared estimates of the economies of scale in 1982. The DIW estimates 
are compared with those made by J.S. Bain in 1951(1), and by Scherer, 
Weiss and Pratten between about 1965 and 1969. 
(1) J.S. Bain, 'Barriers to new Competition', Cambridge, Mass., 1965. 
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The lower estimate of the MES for cars in 1982 is striking. As 
noted earlier it may be explained by the fact that the DIW estimates 
are based on production costs, they do not include the costs of 
spreading research and development costs. 
As is usual with studies of the economies of scale, the pattern is 
not uniform. On balance there is evidence of an upward drift of the MES 
scale. The DIW estimates of theMES scale are higher than Bain's for 
four out of five industries, and the exception is cars. The DIW 
estimates are higher than those made between 1965 and 1969 for eleven of 
the sixteen observations and lower in three cases. These results are 
not surprising. Many technological developments are increasing the MES 
and the integration of national markets is providing firms with 
opportunities to test larger scale operations. 
Conclusions 
In this section engineering estimates of the economies of scale for 
products have been surveyed. One conclusion is that the economies of 
scale for production and development costs for complex engineering 
products such as cars continue to levels of output which represent a 
substantial fraction of the EC output of the products. Also in these 
trades scope for achieving some economies continues more or less 
indefinitely. 
For other trades the MES varies in relation to the EC market as 
does the steepness of the scale gradients. It is not possible to 
provide a synopsis for these trades. 
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Table 5.9 Estimates of the MES Scale 1951 to 1982 
MES Scale 
* * * * * 
Industry 
Bain+ Schere~ Weiss+ Pratt$n D. I.¥· 
195*-f._ 1965 ++ 196~ 196~ 1982 ++ 
USA International USA UK Germany 
Cars 300-600 1,000 500 
(th. a year) (3 models) (2 models) 
Domestic 
Appliances 800 500 1,500 
White Goods 
(th. a year) 
Tyres for 
Cars 4-5 16.5 20-40 
(th. a day) 
Oil Refineries 6 10 5.95 10 10 
(m. tons a year) 
Steel 0.9-2.3 3.6 3.6 4.1 9.5-12 
(m. tons a year) 
Cement 1.2 2.0 1.3 
(m. tons a year) 
Beer 5.3 2.4 1.6 2.8 
(m. hectolitres 
a year) 
Cigarettes 18-23 36 70 
(bills a year) 
* Source 
+ Approximate year of study 
++ Country for which estimates made 
Source: The table was prepared from comparisons made by Dr J. Schwalbach 
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Section 6. Economies of Scale for Firms 
A firm which achieves large scale by producing large outputs of 
individual products, long production runs and operating large plants 
will achieve the technical economies of scale for production and for 
spreading development costs which were surveyed in Section 5. In this 
section, we consider the economies of scale for marketing, research and 
development and risk taking which may apply to firms making a limited or 
wide range of products. First, the scope for technical economies of 
scale for firms making a wider range of products than those included in 
Section 5 are outlined. 
Scale and concentration are related. Other things being equal, if 
some firms increase their scale of output, concentration increases. Both 
scale and the degree of concentration affect marketing and research and 
development expenditure. In this section we side step the relationships 
with concentration and focus on the scale effects. Completion of the 
Community will not result in 'other things being equal', it will 
increase competition within the Community and offset the effects of 
increased scale leading to greater concentration. 
PRODUCTION 
It is not possible to generalise about the economies of scope for 
production costs. For a firm making a range of products, the economies 
of scope for production relate to processes which are common to a number 
of products, for example, processes to harden or coat metals or dye 
textiles. 
There are also important technical economies of scope for a firm 
which produces products by a sequence of operations. Chemicals provide 
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an example. A chemical company which produces a wide range of final 
chemical products can achieve large scale for the production of 
intermediate and basic chemicals which are used to produce the final 
products. These technical economies relate to the scale of production 
of the basic and intermediate chemicals, to linking processes, to 
control of the markets for the output of the initial processes and to 
the coordination of production. 
Although it is not possible to quantify these economies except on a 
I 
case by case basis, they are quantitatively important in some cases. 
MARKETING 
Scherer has provided the following description of the economies of 
scale for marketing:(!) 
'Economies of large-scale promotion and marketing also raise 
analytic difficulties. For one, they may show up not only in the 
form of lower costs, but also in the ability of firms to charge 
prices higher than those of smaller rivals for comparable products, 
or in some combination of price premiums and cost savings. Thus, 
both cost curves and demand curves are affected. A second 
complication is the element of chance associated with sales 
promotion. A massive advertising campaign may be a spectacular 
success or a resounding flop, depending upon the ingenuity and luck 
of the Madison Avenue people in charge. And most important of all, 
the private benefits realized through large-scale promotion may not 
be mirrored by benefits to the public. It is not clear that 
society gains when one firm's monopoly power is bolstered by a 
successful promotional campaign or whether bleary-eyed television 
viewers are better off from the barrage of messages to which they are 
subjected. Here we confine ourselves to the narrower question, to what 
extent is market concentration encouraged or entrenched by the private 
advantages of large scale promotion? 
(1) F.M. Scherer, 'Industrial Market Structure and Economic 
Performance'. Chicago, 1980. p. 108 •••• 
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Even there, no simple answer can be provided. In his 
pioneering study of 20 American industries, Professor Bain 
concluded that product differentiation was "of at least the same 
general order of importance ••• as economies of large scale 
production and distribution" in giving established market leaders a 
price or cost advantage over rivals, and especially over new 
entrants. (1) (Product differentiation is a condition for the 
advertising of products by firms). However, a later 12-industry 
study found that although product differentiation was very 
important, firms with only a single plant of efficient scale were by no 
means barred from success. (2) In several industries, single-plant 
enterprises were able to promote their products on virtually equal 
terms, realizing all or most scale economies; and in others they could 
find sizeable market segments in which to operate profitability despite 
a promotional handicap. 
To explore further the reasons for these somewhat disparate 
conclusions, let us begin by focusing on advertising, which Bain 
found to be the single most important basis of large-firm 
advantages. 
One possible source of scale economies is the need to attain a 
certain threshold level of advertising messages before reaching 
maximum effectiveness. There are two main reasons why this might 
be so. First, the average consumer's behaviour may not be 
influenced by a single message, whereas five or six delivered 
messages (out of a possibly larger number sent) are likely to 
induce action, if indeed advertising is able to do so at all. (3) 
Second, when advertising messages are communicated further by word 
(1) Bain, Barriers to New Competition, pp. 142-43, 216. 
(2) Scherer et al, 'The Economies of Multi-Plant Operation', p. 258. 
(3) See "Advertising: Frequency and Effectiveness", New York Times, 22 
June 1976, p. 57 
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of mouth and peer influence, conditions analogous to those 
governing chain reactions or the spread of epidemics may apply. (1) 
A small impulse soon peters out, but one that affects a 
sufficiently large initial critical mass spreads rapidly and covers a 
large segment of the population. To the extent that either of these two 
models of advertising effectiveness is valid, there must exist an 
"advertising response function" of the logistic shape illustrated in 
Diagram 6.1. OVer the range AB the threshold (no doubt varying for 
different consumers) is being approached and surmounted, and the 
average sales generated by an additional message rise. But beyond 
point B average returns fall, at first slowly and then (if 
oversaturation can occur) precipitously. 
Diagram 6.1 Advertising response function 
Sales 0 
Number of advertising messages 
There is a debate as to whether the shape assumed in Diagram 
6.1 in fact reflects real-world conditions or whether diminishing 
returns set in immediately. The answer may depend upon the 
specific advertising medium. Julian Simon has brought together a 
persuasive body of evidence showing continuously diminishing 
(1) See Stephen Glaister, 'Advertising Policy and Returns to Scale 
Where Information is Passed Between Individuals', Economica 41 (May 
1974): 139-56. 
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(1) 
returns for direct-mail and clip-out coupon methods. The 
studies he cites on other media suffer from methodological 
shortcomings and therefore are less convincing. Perhaps the most 
carefully controlled marketing research on which a published 
account is available, covering beer advertising on television, 
suggests a relationship like Diagram 6.1 but with separate maxima 
for each of two distinct market segments. (2) When the intensity of 
Budweiser beer advertising was varied systematically among local 
markets, increasing returns showed up at lower message levels. But 
at high intensities, the response function turned downward, as with 
segment CD. Consumers deluged with Budweiser adds reportedly 
requested of their liquor dealers, "Give me anything but Bud". 
The existence of an increasing returns range AB is not by 
itself enough to imply an advertising cost advantage for larger 
firms. If all firms face essentially the same advertising response 
(1) Julian L. Simon, 'Issues in the Economics of Advertising' (Urbana, 
Ill: University of Illinois Press, 1974), Chapter 1. 
(2) Russell L. Ackoff and James R. Emshoff, 'Advertising Research at 
Anheuser-Busch, Inc. (1963-68)', Sloan Management Review 17 (Winter 
1975): 1-15. The response function derived by Ackoff and Emshoff 
was measured in terms of percentage changes in sales rather than 
absolute sales levels, but it can be transformed into one like 
Figure 6.1. 
For other evidence on response functions and economies of scale 
in advertising, see William S. Comanor and Thomas A. Wilson, 
'Advertising and Market Power (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University 
Press, 1974), pp 49-53; Jean-Jacques Lambin, 'Advertising, 
Competition and Market Conduct in Oligopoly over Time' (Amsterdam: 
North-Holland, 1976), pp. 94-98, 127-29; and Randall S. Brown, 
'Estimating Advantages to Large-Scale Advertising', Review of 
Economics and Statistics 60 (August 1978): pp. 428-37. 
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function, all will find it profitable to carry their advertising to 
approximately the threshold level B if they advertise at all, and 
all will thereby enjoy similar sales responses. For economies of 
scale to exist, there must be some further interacting set of 
circumstances conferring an advantage to larger firms- e.g., by 
letting them have different and more favourably configured response 
functions than their smaller rivals. This may stem from consumer 
inertia or from physical barriers to the rapid expansion of sales. 
For example, one supermarket chain may for a variety of historical 
reasons operate 50 stores in some metropolitan area, another chain 
only 15. Most of both chains' customers are apt to be tied by 
force of habit or other considerations to their regular shopping 
locales; only a small fraction are movable in any given short 
period by advertising. And if either chain did attract customers very 
rapidly through advertising, congestion would build up in its aisles, 
curbing the patronage gains. The large chain may therefore face a 
response function like LR1 in Diagram 6.2 while the small chain 
faces SR2• If both must send approximately OX advertising messages 
to achieve a threshold level of awareness, the large chain will 
cover the population of switchable consumers and reinforce the 
purchasing habits of its (larger) group of regular patrons at a 
substantially lower advertising cost per sales dollar than the 
smaller chain. The response functions facing firms of varying size 
may also differ because advertising has cumulative as well as 
current effects. It takes a long time to build an image and get 
consumers in the habit of requesting Prestone when what the need is 
ethylene glycol antifreeze. In the short or medium run, the small 
firm trying to expand its sales of an essentially equivalent 
product through vigorous advertising runs into sharply diminishing 
returns long before it has achieved the size of the 
well-established sellers it is seeking to displace. What this says is 
that short- or medium-run response functions may differ between small 
and/or new as compared to large firms, but it does not necessarily imply 
that over the long run a newcomer cannot gain an equivalent sales volume 
at comparable advertising cost if it cultivates the market slowly and 
patiently. Such long-run equivalence may be ruled out as well, however, 
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Possible Advertising Response Functions for Large and 
Small firms 
Number of advertising messages 
if more or less permanent marketing advantages accrue to firms that 
pioneered some product segment, or managed through superior skill 
or luck to come up with a captivating product image. 
This overview of the advantage of size in advertising has 
skipped over some potentially important tactical details. For one, 
with respect to what organizational unit are advertising scale 
economies reali~ed? For supermarket chains, advertising strives to 
lure consumers into stores, but most advertising by consumer goods 
manufacturers is focused on individual b·rands, not (the output of) 
plants or firms. When threshold effects apply in the latter case, 
they may have to be attained brand by brand not at the aggregate 
firm level. Unless there are multibrand interactions, firm size is 
largely irrelevant. Partly related questions are, how does the 
array of feasible media vary with firm size, and how in turn are 
costs affected by any such variations? Jewel, a Chicago area 
retail grocery chain with the largest local market share, cannot 
sensibly advertise on nationwide network television or in national 
magazines. A & P, with a much smaller Chicago position but broader 
geographical compass might. 
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Multibrand and multi-product interactions can occur if a 
favourable reputation from one set of products (e.g. General 
/Electric's refrigerators) spills over to other products (such as 
hair dryers), or if the media offer discounts for combining a large 
volume of advertising, perhaps spanning multiple brands, in one 
place or time period. Discounts do exist. The New York Times, for 
example, offered general contract advertisers volume discounts 
ranging up to 4.5 per cent for buying the equivalent of 40 pages in 
a year as compared to one 
page •••• (I) 
Potentially more important than such volume-massing advantages 
might be the savings nationwide advertisers enjoy by purchasing 
network time, which, depending upon the time of day, costs 15 to 30 
per cent less than what one would pay buying the same coverage 
through individual station spot messages. For regional firms, more 
costly spot messages may be the only practical option ••••• 
For industries like brewing with high product transportation 
costs, the chief advantage of nationwide multi-plant operation may 
lie not so much in having a more attractive array of advertising 
options as in capitalizing fully on the nationwide image one 
enjoys. That is, somehow or other, certain products catch on, and 
once they do, the word spreads. As with Coors beer, this can 
happen even without any advertising outside one's home territory. 
Once a product does gain a favourable nationwide image, that image 
is an asset whose full value is captured only through nationwide 
distribution. If transportation costs are high, this in turn may 
require the operation of multiple decentralized plants. 
Another quite different advantage of large scale is sometimes 
enjoyed by the sellers of complex durable goods, especially 
consumer durables. The automobile industry affords the leading 
example. Most consumers are unwilling to buy a particular new car 
unless they are confident they can obtain prompt, reliable service 
not only at home, but wherever they may travel or migrate. This 
gives the manufacturer with a far-flung, high-quality dealer 
(1) Simon, 'Issues in the Economics of Advertising', p. 148 
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network a sales advantage. Establishing such a network is 
difficult for the smaller manufacturer, since there are economies 
of scale at the sales and service establishment level. (1) A 
certain minimum investment in specialized testing equipment, tools 
and spare parts is necessary. 
The automobile industry provides the premier example of a 
further interacting advantage of size associated with product 
differentiation. Through some perverse quirk of human nature, the 
average consumer is decidedly unhappy driving around last season's 
assemblage of metal stampings. Body designs are therefore altered 
periodically-usually with thorough going changes every three to 
five years and exterior facelifts of varying extent more 
frequently. This is expensive. (These development costs have been 
included in the estimates of economies of scale given in Section 
5.) 
In summary, in at least some industries and especially in 
certain consumer goods industries, there are appreciable economies 
of scale in many aspects of sales promotion and product 
differentiation. The implication conveyed thus far is that these 
advantages of size and their interactions can lead to market 
concentration exceeding what is required to realize all narrowly 
cottstrued production and physical distribution economies. This is 
correct, but it does not tell the whole story. The product 
differentiation sword can also cut in the opposite direction. 
Through successful product differentiation, smaller firms may be 
able to carve out for themselves a small but profitable niche in 
some special segment of a large market. Their sales volume may be 
too low to confer all production and promotional scale economies, 
but the higher costs associated with foregoing these advantages 
(1) On similar scale economies in servicing computers, see Brock, 'The 
U.S. Computer Industry', pp. 33-37. 
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may be more than offset by the price premium consumers pay for the 
special product features they offer. Product innovation is one 
tactic by which smaller firms can survive despite conventional 
scale disadvantages. 
Another strategy is to cater to some narrow geographic market 
segments, or to some special consumer taste with a sales potential 
too small to interest the leading firms'. 
Many small firms do not sell to final consumers. For example, they 
manufacture and sell machinery or instruments to other firms. Such 
firms do not use the mass media for advertising. Nevertheless,many 
small firms of this sort which compete with giant companies fear the 
marketing advantages of large companies most. The giant companies have 
much more knowledge about markets - the firms likely to use a product 
and the people within firms likely to decide whether to buy it, etc. 
The giant companies can afford to take a loss to gain a sale and even 
give away some products. Also international companies should be able to 
rapidly develop export markets for a new product. Where the product is 
important for the viability of customers then the greater creditibility 
and reliability of a giant company or a smaller company with a large 
share of a product market may win orders against smaller competitors and 
firms with a small share of a market. 
Marketing and Completion of the EC 
Completion of the EC will provide opportunities for economies of 
scale for marketing, but economies for advertising are probably of 
second order importance. Given the language differences in the EC 
much of the media will remain national. 
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There are, however, some potential sources of economies. For 
example, the introduction of more European brands (brands sold in more 
than one European country) will offer some possibilities for economies. 
These brands will become progressively more important. They will 
provide opportunities for spreading the costs of making adverts over a 
greater audience. (This is a source of economies not included in 
Scherer's description of economies of scale for advertising(!).) Some 
advertising messages in existing media, for example, in periodicals 
which are read in a number of countries, and which are wasted for 
national brands will score for European brands, and new television 
channels may provide efficient advertising to a number of European 
countries simultaneously which will not be cost effective for 
advertising national brands. 
More important are some marketing cQsts, for example, market 
research for new products, preparation of catalogues, product 
descriptions,manuals for new products and other costs of informing 
potential customers about new products which are an essential part of 
development costs. Spreading these costs over greater sales will 
provide important economies in some industries. If national controls 
for products are harmonised and/or centralised that too will provide a 
source of very substantial economies for marketing in certain 
industries. These economies relate to the output of individual products 
or narrow ranges of products. 
(1) Costs of making television adverts represented of the order of ten 
per cent of television advertising circa 1970. 
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RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT 
Research and development expenditure effects not only the costs of 
products but also the products and demand. Again, as for marketing, the 
results of R & D expenditure is uncertain, programmes to develop new 
products may or may not be successful, and if new products are produced 
they may or may not be well received by consumers or users. Also much R 
& D expenditure is in the nature of a sunk cost. A firm can sell many 
types of capital equipment; there is a second hand market for machine 
tools, printing machines, etc. The market for half completed R & D 
projects is not so well developed, and if a firm offers a project for 
sale it may lose the benefits of secrecy for its innovation. Another 
feature of R & D expenditure is that in many industries innovation 
created by R & D is the main key to international competitiveness for 
European countries. 
In this sub-section we start by considering the general 
relationships between scale and research and development. The bulk of 
expenditure on R & D expenditure - of the order of 90 per cent of total 
industrial R & D in the UK - is for development which is product 
specific. These costs were included in the estimates of economies of 
scale given in Section 5. 
The Sources of Economies of Scale for R & D 
One source of economies of scale for R & D is simply the 
requirement for a large team to develop products such as large 
commercial aeroplanes. A firm with large R & D resources can devote 
more staff to such a project and should be able to develop a superior 
product to those of smaller firms or be able to develop the product 
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faster. These are product specific advantages or economies. Aeroplanes 
and cars are extreme examples of products which require very large teams 
of development engineers. Nevertheless, similar economies apply to many 
other products, including machinery, for which total output in value 
terms is much less. 
Another source of advantage for large chemical and electrical 
companies such as Hoechst, ICI, IBM, AT & T, GE, Siemens, Philips and 
GEC is that they have teams of R & D personnel who have and pursue 
knowledge relevant to their industries, and apply this knowledge. 
These companies have the equivalent of an internal research university. 
Smaller competitors have to rely on outside sources of research 
information and/or have more specialised internal research departments. 
Compared to a number of smaller competitors a large company can avoid 
duplication of research. 
The potential sources of diseconomies of scale for R & D are that 
in a large organisation, R & D personnel may not be in close touch with 
marketing and production staff, and so their work may lose commercial 
relevance. Commercial motivation may be more difficult to maintain in a 
large organisation. Also there are the general problems involving the 
flow of, and assimulation of information and control within large 
organisations. Finally the ability or talent to successfully organise, 
manage and carry thorough development projects is scarce even at large 
companies. 
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The Importance of Research and Development 
Recent technological changes which are considered in Section 8, may 
on balance have favoured small scale operations, but another powerful 
economic development has swamped these changes~ The vast expansion of 
markets since 1950 brought about by reductions in barriers to trade and 
the growth of income, has given large scale producers an increased 
advantage. The motor industry provides an example. In 1950, there were 
five companies manufacturing standard cars in Britain, as many as in the 
USA. They were secure in the much smaller UK market which was 
protected. For cars and for many other industrial products, the market 
is now world-wide. Other changes opening national markets have been 
improvements in transport and communications. Simultaneously 
industrialization in developing countries has increased competition. 
Even for each of the larger European countries their markets for cars, 
telecommunications equipment, chemicals and so on, are only about five 
per cent of the Western world markets. 
An increase in market size operates in two ways to increase the 
significance of the economies of scale for spreading research and 
development costs. Firstly, some firms grow larger with the market. If 
there are technical or other economies of scale, firms which do not grow 
with the market will be at a disadvantage. A motor company which 
produces 500,000 cars a year will be competitive in a market for 
1,500,000 cars a year. It will be handicapped if it competes in" a world 
market for 20 million cars with companies producing two million or more 
cars a year. Secondly, competition intensifies as barriers to trade are 
reduced, and in many industries competition focuses on the quality and 
novelty of products, so product development and improvement are key 
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factors for the success of companies. Development costs have to be 
recovered from the sales of products to which they relate. A motor 
manufacturer which can sell 500,000 of a model a year is in a much 
stronger position to spend on development, than a company which can sell 
only 100,000 of a similar model. 
The growth of markets has not only focused attention on product 
development, it has also speeded up developments. Generally there are 
limits to the extent of technical economies of scale as machines and 
processes have a finite capacity. In contrast, for many products 
expenditure on R & D is relatively unlimited, so the economies of scale 
through spreading these costs can extend over far greater outputs. As 
firms increase development expenditure the evolution of products speeds 
up. For many lines of business, product lives are less than ten years. 
In the 1980's a company which develops a new, or improved product, is 
likely to have less time in which to build its market position before 
competitors produce rival products than was the case in the 1960s. This 
increases the advant~ge of an existing giant international company which 
has knowledge of, and access to, world markets. 
It is easy to claim that markets have expanded with the reductions 
in trade barriers. In reality the changes are complex. International 
differences in consumer tastes and preferences have not disappeared. 
Many products have to be adapted to the special features of demand and 
requirements in each country. To give an obvious example, air 
conditioning of cars is essential in some markets but not others. Also 
governments, companies and consumers favour suppliers in their own 
country for all sorts of reasons. Local suppliers may provide a more 
reliable service and, directly or indirectly, create demand for the 
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products or services produced by their customers. In some countries 
nationalistic practices and sentiment may be stronger than in other 
countries and such barriers to free markets are much more difficult to 
eliminate than tariff barriers. Again, the differences in national 
markets and preference for national firms provide giant multi-national 
companies with a potential source of advantage. They will be familiar 
with, and have experience of operating in, different markets. If they 
have manufacturing operations in a country, that may enable them to 
market imported products or components more readily. 
There are two other effects of the increase in the size of markets. 
Firstly, firms can grow but still be disciplined by the market. Most 
giant industrial companies face intense competition in international 
markets. Secondly, the rewards for innovation as well as the costs of 
product development have increased. A company that can launch a new 
product - drug, machine, computer - on world markets obtains far greater 
sales and profits than a company limited to a small domestic market. 
A possible argument to refute the importance of R & D might be that 
total expenditure on R & D is small in relation to total costs. For 
Germany, France, UK and Italy expenditure on R & D averages about two 
per cent of GDP. The percentage is larger for manufacturing - R & D 
expenditure represents six per cent of value added by UK manufacturing 
industry. However the main point is that these statistics underestimate 
the significance of product specific expenditure. Official estimates 
of R & D expenditure do not include much of the design and product 
specific marketing expenditure undertaken by firms. Nor do they include 
the loss of production when a new product is introduced. 
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Scale and Research and Development - The Evidence 
If, as suggested, the spreading of research and development costs 
is an important source of economies of scale, there should be evidence 
to support the claim. The relationship between the size of companies 
and innovative activity has been studied intensively but the various 
dimensions of scale have not been clearly differentiated in much of this 
research. 
There is some evidence that organized research and development 
activities do increase with the size of companies, large companies spend 
proportionally more on research and development and that R & D 
programmes are highly concentrated. Twenty firms account for about a 
half or more of R & D expenditure in each of the Western industrial 
countries. There is no evidence that the productivity of research 
expenditure increases with the scale of companies. Indeed the evidence, 
for what it is worth, points weakly in the other direction, towards 
diminishing productivity. However, the studies are not conclusive 
because of the difficulty of measuring the output from research and 
development effort. The main measures which are used by respected 
scholars are numbers of significant technological innovations achieved 
and the numbers of patents obtained. Both are seriously flawed as 
measures of output. The value of individual innovations and patents 
varies greatly. Also the measures do not provide a guide to the use 
companies are able to make of innovations or patents; a principal 
advantage of a giant company may lie in its ability to fully exploit an 
invention. Even more important is the fact that much development 
expenditure (perhaps more than half of all expenditure) is not aimed to 
create innovations or patents but to develop improved products with 
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known technology. In any case, the result that R & D expenditure and 
the effectiveness of R & D is not closely related to the size of 
companies would not be surprising when the analysis relates to all 
companies. 'The major source of variations in research intensity 
between firms is the industry concerned'. ( 1) Some large companies, 
including large motor car manufacturers which spend heavily on R & D, 
are not searching for new products. Much, if not all, of their R & D is 
devoted to improving their existing products. Many small firms are set 
up to exploit ideas for new products, and the proprietors of many small 
firms are continuously searching for ideas for new products and markets. 
The estimates of the effects of spreading development costs 
included in Section 5 relate to individual products and narrow ranges 
of products. Research to assess the relationship between scale and 
research and development expenditure at this level of disaggregation are 
scarce. Research at an industry group level suggests that in some 
trades small firms do contribute to innovation. These include 
machinery, instruments, electronics, clothing and footwear. (2) The 
safest conclusion is that existing research does not provide conclusive 
results on the advantages of large companies for research and 
development. It does not disprove the common sense notion that a 
(1) F.M. Scherer in 'Innovation and Growth - Schumpeterian 
Perspectives', MIT Press, Cambridge, USA, 1984, C. Freeman in 'The 
Economies of Industrial Innovation', London 1982 and Kamien and 
Schwartz in 'Market Structure and Innovation', Cambridge, 1982, 
report the state of research on the relationship between corporate 
size and innovative activity. 
(2) C. Freeman, 'The Economics of Industrial Innovation', London, 1982. 
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company with a larger share of a market than its rivals for a 
technically sophisticated product has an important though not 
necessarily decisive source of advantage in being able to spread 
research and development costs over a larger output. ( 1) 
Research and Development and Completion of the EC. 
Completion of the EC will provide a number of opportunities for 
economies of scale for research and development. The principal source 
will be for firms to spread product specific development costs over 
larger output of products and/or to speed up development. These 
economies were included in Section 5. In addition as larger firms 
emerge within the EC there will be potential economies from reducing 
duplication of both research and development which will make it possible 
to use R & D resources more efficiently. .As R & D personnel are one of 
the principal scarce resources for creating new industry and jobs in the 
EC this increased efficiency would be doubly significant as it would 
release resources which could have a multiplier effect on employment 
elsewhere. 
(1) F.M. Scherer in 'Innovation and Growth- Schumpeterian 
Perspectives', MIT Press, Cambridge, USA, 1984 and C. Freeman in 
'The Economies of Industrial Innovation', London 1982, report state 
of research on the relationship between corporate size and 
innovative activity. 
- 121 -
2.109 
RISK TAKING AND THE COST OF FINANCE 
The advantages of a large company with a large share of a market 
for development are not only the greater resources at its disposal and 
its scope for employing more specialists. Within large companies 
development work is carried out by teams of scientists, engineers and 
craftsmen, and the teams are often quite small. The increasing 
importance and pace of development has increased risks. While it is 
true that an entrepreneur managing a small firm may be willing to take 
immense risks because he is particularly knowledgeable and in a position 
to assess the chances of success, or, in some cases, because he is 
simply unaware of the risk; large companies do have advantages in risk 
taking. Firstly, they can spread their risks; they can take on a number 
of projects and if some fail, or absorb more resources than expected, 
this need not jeopardise the future of a large company. This advantage 
of large companies reflects a market failure. Development of new 
products is risky but it is not possible for a firm concentrating on one 
or a small range of new products to insure to cover these risks. 
Another source of advantage is that a large company may have access to 
more information about technology, markets, and strategies of rivals 
when deciding whether to take on a project. 
Riskiness and the cost of finance are related. A large company 
which can spread its resources over a number of individually risky 
projects may expect to be able to obtain finance at a lower cost. Its 
shares may trade at a lower yield on the stock market, and it will pay a 
lower rate of interest for loans. The difference in interest rates for 
the smallest and giant companies is about four per cent. 
The fact that the shares of many small hi-tech companies are on 
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very low dividend yields does not wholly disprove the link between 
equity yields and size of companies. Clearly investors may achieve a 
spread of risks by buying shares in a range of small companies. 
However, the problem for small companies is the availability, and very 
high cost of finance when they encounter a crisis. A large company with 
diversified risks may be able to carry a few failures, and is able to 
move resources within the group. This difference may reflect another 
market failure. The top managers of a large company may be able to 
assess the possibilities for recovery of one of its operating businesses 
more accurately than independent shareholders or financiers assessing 
the prospects for a small company beset by a crisis. The top managers 
of a large company will have more information than the independent 
shareholders of a small company when taking decisions. 
The advantage of small firms for ris~ taking is that their managers 
are under greater pressure to make the right decisions about which 
options to take. Also the managers taking decisions may have better 
information, for example, they may themselves deal with customers and be 
familiar with production and development. 
MANAGEMENT 
Economists have long seen management as the main source of 
diseconomies of scale and the limitation on the optimum scale of firms. 
For example, EAG Robinson concluded the 'problems of management in 
certain contexts set an upper limit to the optimum size of the closely 
integrated production unit.'(l) Scherer states boldly that 'it is much 
(1) E.A.G. Robinson 'The Structure of Competitive Industry', Cambridge, 
1958, p. 49. 
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harder to manage a big plant than a small one, all else being equal'. ( 1) 
Peters and Waterman have claimed that 'the excellent companies 
understand that beyond a certain surprisingly small size, diseconomies 
of scale seem to set in with a vengeance'. (2) The source of 
diseconomies they describe are problems of management, organising 
operations and motivating employees. 
,Robinson stresses the inter action between 'change' and management. 
'If change is not required, I should not be inclined to stress the 
difficulties of managing the very large resulting concern, so long as it 
remains engaged in continuous and unvaried production'. Again cement 
plants provide an example of unvaried production, though they have to 
contend with varying demand. The argument of this section has been that 
the pace of change and in particular the rate of evolution of many 
products has increased, reinforcing the importance of management. The 
stress placed on the 'management of change' in management schools and 
literature show that the problems are recognised. 
O.E. Williamson has analysed management relationships in a series 
of major studies, and provides case studies to illustrate his 
theoretical analysis. (3) So far, however, it has not been possible to 
quantify the relationships between scale and the costs and effectiveness 
of management, and specify an MES scale of management. In part this 
(1) F.S. Scherer, 'Industrial Market Structure and Economic 
Performance', Chicago, 1980, p. 85. 
(2) T.J. Peters and R.H. Waterman, 'In Search of Excellence', New York, 
1981, p. 112. 
(3) O.E. Williamson, 'Corporate Control and Business Behaviour', 
Englewood Cliffs, 1970 and 'Markets and Hierarchies', 1975. 
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reflects the fact that the ability of individual managers to manage 
large organisations varies, the ease of managing different types of 
operations varies and there may be international differences in the 
difficulty of managing large organisations. The competitiveness of some 
giant companies such as IBM, Toyota, Boeing, Siemens, etc shows that the 
problems of managing very large organisations and motivating employees 
of large organisations are surmountable. 
ACCOUNTING RATES OF RETURN 
If large companies have general advantages and benefit from 
economies of scale, it might be expected that rates of return on assets 
would be positively related to size. There are all sorts of 
qualifications to using such tests. Large and small companies operate 
in different trades and/or may produce d~fferent products if they are in 
the same trade. They may pay different prices for factors of production 
and there may be differences in the accounting methods companies use 
systematically related to the size of companies. 
For what they are worth, studies indicate that for US companies, 
rates of return on assets are positively related to scale measured by 
total assets but that the relationship is a weak one(l). For the UK, 
the results of tests indicate a negative relationship but 'it is 
unlikely that size will have an appreciable influence on ••• 
profitability'. (2) 
(1) G.L. Salomon, 'Accounting Rates of Return', American Economic 
Review, 1985, p. 495. 
(2) A. Singh and G. Whittington, 'Growth, Profitability and Valuation, 
Cambridge, 1968, p. 67. 
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CONCLUSIONS ON ECONOMIES OF SCALE FOR FIRMS 
The a priori analysis and the review of evidence of the economies 
of scale for firms given in this section and the studies of company 
profits do not lead to any simple rules such as "the bigger the better" 
or "small firms are best". Nevertheless a range of potential sources of 
economies of scale for firms is identified. This suggests that in 
manufacturing trades where all the leading EC companies have lower 
output than their Japanese and US counterparts this must be a prima 
facie cause for concern. 
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Section 7. Other Evidence on the Economies of Scale 
Ideally economists would measure the contribution of economies of 
scale to productivity and growth as accurately as scientists measure 
physical forces. That is not at present possible; assessing the 
contribution of economic forces is more akin to the practice of lawyers 
sifting evidence. Fortunately there is a wide range of evidence which 
corroberates the 'engineering' estimates indicating large economies of 
scale. 
International Comparisons 
Productivity in the US 
Trade 7.1 shows two comparisons of output per person in 
manufacturing industries for the US and European countries. Both 
comparisons were made by the National Institute of Economic Research 
which has made thorough studies of international differences in labour 
productivity. The Institute claimed that the first column 'extracted 
from the many in the ·papers (in their special productivity issue) can 
perhaps be taken as indicative of the central·findings'. The tables 
referred to showed estimates of output per person based on PPP. The 
National Institute has also made some comparisons of output per person 
for certain industries based upon measures of physical output. The 
second column shows an up-dated comparison. 
Labour productivity for manufacturing industries is shown to be 50 
percent higher in the US than in Germany in 1986. It may be that this 
estimate exaggerates the difference in productivity because insufficient 
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allowance is made for the high quality of German products. (I) Also the 
much higher US productivity is not consistent with its weak 
international trade performance for manufactures. Indeed the weak 
export performance of some US industries, including steel (compared to 
Japanese firms), motors (compared to Japanese and European car and 
truck manufacturers) and telecommunications (compared to some European 
producers of telecommunications equipment) in which, circa 1960, the 
leading US companies were far larger than their international rivals 
cautions against exaggerating the significance of economies of scale 
compared to other factors, wage levels, efficiency, technical progress, 
design and quality, which affect international competitiveness. 
Nevertheless US productivity is higher than the German level and it 
seems unlikely that differences in education and training account for 
the difference because German standards of education and particularly 
industrial training are reckoned to be high relative to other countries. 
Nor do differences in investment account for the difference in labour 
productivity. The main potential economic explanation is the advantage 
the US still obtains from its larger fully integrated market via 
economies of scale. The evidence does suggest that the scale of US 
firms, plants and outputs of products are greater than in Germany for 
most though not all industries. A knowledgeable American industrial 
economist suggested that an alternative explanation to America 
benefiting from greater economies of scale. He claimed that American 
(I) It is difficult to make international comparisons of productivity 
for Germany's important mechanical engineering industry because of 
its wide range of specialised products. 
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workers, on average~ work harder than their German counterparts.(!) 
Table 7.1 International Comparisons of Labour Productivity for 
Manufacturing Industry for 1980 and 1986 
Output per Output per hour 
employee 1986 
1980 
USA 100 100 
Germany 50-59 67 
France 60-65 69 
Italy 50-54 58 
U.K. 33-36 37 
Belgium 60-65 58 
Netherlands 76-83 77 
Japan 66 
Source: National Institute Review August, 1982, P• 11, and May, 1987, 
P• 
73. 
Japanese Competition 
The source of the most severe competition for some important 
European industries is Japan. Again the Japanese market is much larger 
than any single European national market. Japanese manufacturing 
industries seem intensively competitive. There are a significant number 
of Japanese firms competing in most markets. Generally there are more 
firms producing each group of products than in any one European country 
but far fewer than in Europe as a whole. The international competition 
(1) In 1960 Professor Jenkes suggested the same possible explanation 
for differences in productivity between America and Europe. E.A.G. 
Robinson, ed., 'Economic Consequences of the Size of Nations', 
London, 1960, p. 342. 
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for European firms generally comes from large Japanese firms. Even in 
industries where some of the Japanese competitors are smaller firms as 
in mechanical engineering, they are often supported by the giant 
'Zaibatus', and their exports are channelled through trading houses. 
The mainspring of Japanese industrial competitiveness has been the 
rapid assimilation of technical advances into products and for 
production processes. Another feature of Japanese competitiveness is 
that it is spearheaded by a small group of products for which there is a 
mass market. In 1986 cars accounted for 16 per cent of Japanese exports 
to the UK; trucks and vans, two per cent; parts for cars, trucks and 
vans, three per cent; motor cycles, one per cent; colour t.vs, one per 
cent, video recorders, three per cent; radio equipment, two and a half 
per cent. For each of these products some Japanese firms have greater 
output than European producers. In recent years Japanese competition 
has been led by very large organisations including Japanese motor 
vehicle and electrical companies which through control of their large 
home market and their exports to overseas markets have much larger 
outputs of many products than their European rivals. The strength of 
Japanese competition corroberates claims that the economies of scale are 
substantial and significant for competition. 
An expert on Japanese industrial policy suggested in discussion 
that MITI is now less concerned with economies of scale than in the 
earlier post-war period. Earlier policies for concentrating the steel 
and motor industries had operated. MITI's more relaxed attitude towards 
economies of scale reflects the fact that Japanese firms in many 
industries are now among the largest in the world. The reduction in 
trade barriers-has given Japanese firms access to world markets. In 
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the 1980s MIT! recognises the importance of fierce inter firm 
competition. Recent changes in exchange rates have led Japanese firms 
to adopt survival strategies. These strategies result in firms 
transferring some manufacturing operations overseas to take advantage of 
wages lower than those in Japan. These moves reduce the scale of some 
manufacturing operations in Japan. 
Sweden & Switzerland 
Sweden and Switzerland, two smaller European countries, have 
achieved high levels of labour productivity and output per head of 
population by world standards. Superficially their success conflicts 
with the evidence for the existence of large economies of scale. In 
fact, Sweden's industrial performance supports the view that there are 
large economies of scale. Since the development of the Swedish Match 
Corporation in the Cl9th, Swedish industrialists have been aware of the 
economic handicap imposed by the relatively limited size of their 
domestic market, and the opportunities available through exports and 
foreign investment to compensate for this. SKF, Alfa Laval, Atlas 
Copco, Ericsson, Sandvik and Electrolux are international companies 
which have reaped economies of scale at their Swedish plants through 
control of overseas markets by investing in other countries particularly 
the major industrial countries. Foreign investment has also played an 
important role in the development of Swiss manufacturing industry. 
Again there are alternative explanations of Swedish and Swiss 
industrial competitiveness. The high quality of education and 
industrial training contribute to this. 
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Corporate Strategies and Practices 
Take overs 
The strategies adopted by companies are generally consistent with 
the view that economies of scale in manufacturing industries are 
substantial and that the costs and effectiveness of administration and 
management do not necessarily rise with horizontal increases in scale. 
Throughout the post-war period there have been waves of horizontal, 
conglomerate and cross border mergers and takeovers. There are 
alternative explanations for these takeovers but they are consistent 
with management perceiving scope for achieving economies of scale 
through growth by take overs. (I) 
If it could be shown that mergers generally led to increases in 
efficiency that would provide further support for the theme that scale 
economies are large. In fact the results of studies of post-merger 
performance are not clear cut. Many reviews have been made of these 
studies and it is outside the scope of this report to delve into this 
muddy area of applied economies. (2) One piece of information the author 
of this report can add is, however, relevant to this review. Many of 
the studies of post-merger performance have used UK data from published 
accounts. These studies distinguished horizontal and conglomerate 
mergers, where horizontal mergers were defined as mergers between 
companies within the same industrial group or branch of manufacturing 
(I) The alternative explanations are that management want to take over 
competing firms to eliminate competition or simply to control more 
assets. 
(2) The most recent review is by Brian Chiplin and Mike Wright, 'The 
Logic of Mergers', Hobart Paper 107, London. 1985. 
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industry. This is a very broad definition; it means that two firms 
making any food products which merge are considered a horizontal merger. 
The same definition was used in a recent American study of post-merger 
profitability. The author made a survey of these so-called horizontal 
mergers in the UK and found that only about ten per cent were between 
companies for which there would be substantial scope for obtaining any 
technical economies of scale in production or for spreading the 
development costs of products. In 90 per cent of cases the products 
made by the merging companies were too distinct. Thus, even if average 
post merger profitability for widely defined horizontal mergers does not 
increase this is not evidence that there are no economies of scale for 
products. 
Sourcing components 
Vehicle and other companies generally source (buy) each component 
from one or a very small number of suppliers. Many companies recognise 
that single sourcing provides lowest costs via economies of scale. The 
main reason for dual sourcing where it occurs is to secure alternative 
supplies and/or to provide a check on quality and prices. 
Rationalization 
Particularly during recessions, firms rationalise their production 
facilities. Firms rationalize their production facilities because they 
develop or acquire excess capacity, intensified competition or because 
they reckon they will cut costs and increase their profits. Although the 
author is not aware of any comparative studies of rationalisation, the 
pattern of most schemes is to concentrate production. There is no 
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evidence that when firms are faced with a need to cut costs they rarely 
divide production. (l) This suggests that there are no effective 
managerial diseconomies of scale for increasing production of a limited 
range of products at an establishment. 
Focusing Businesses 
A fashionable management practice during the 1980s has been for 
large companies, especially large UK companies, to focus their 
activities on a small number of businesses in which they consider they 
have, or can achieve a competitive advantage. To achieve the focus, 
other activities are sold off and the businesses retained are often 
expanded by acquisitions. This practice is consistent with the 
existence of economies of scale. There are of course, other possible 
motives for the practice such as achieving large market shares for their 
monopoly advantages. 
Another feature of management practice is to delegate management 
responsibility for distinct activities. This suggests there are 
management or other diseconomies of scale for bundling together under a 
single operational management, activities of a distinct nature. 
(1) A recent example of a move to divide production was General Motors' 
decision to give its US car divisions greater control over their 
supply of components. Previously component production had been 
highly concentrated to take advantage of the economies of scale. 
In recent years these economies of scale had been offset by the 
higher wages per man paid by General Motors at its component 
manufacturing units compared to the wages paid by independent 
component manufacturers. 
- 134 -
2.122 
The important point suggested by corporate strategies and practices 
is that the costs and effectiveness of management does not impose 
increasing costs as horizontal scale is increased. 
The use of Census Data to estimate the MES and the Economies of Scale 
Bruce Lyons has proposed a neat method of estimating the minimum 
efficient scale of production. (I) In effect he argues that if a firm 
operates more than one plant then its output exceeds the minimum 
efficient scale of a plant. From a distribution of the number of plants 
operated by firms in size groups, he estimated the minimum efficient 
scale of production for plants •. 
Lyons recognised that there are qualifications to his method of 
estimating the MES for multi-product industries. Firms may operate more 
than one plant because they make a number of distinct products not 
because they have exhausted the economies of scale for any one product. 
All census trades are multi-product trades. Nevertheless Lyons' 
estimates are of interest because they draw attention to the great 
number of small plants. He analysed II8 trades. For 105 trades his 
estimate of the MES was below 250 employees, for ten it was between 250 
and 500, for one it was between 500 and I,OOO and for two trades it was 
above 1,000. Lyons' estimates indicate that many small plants are 
efficient, but his estimates are not inconsistent with there being 
technical economies of scale for large plants in segments of trades. 
For example, the existence of small plants making fasteners for cars or 
(I) Bruce Lyons, 'A New Measure of Minimum Efficient Plant Size in U.K. 
Manufacturing Industry', Economics Feb. 1980. 
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replicas of vintage cars is not inconsistent with economies of scale for 
large factories at which standard cars are assembled. 
Lyons acknowledged that his method provides estimates of the MES 
for only one dimension of scale, the size of plants. It does not 
estimate the economies of scale for products, production runs or firms. 
Griliches & Ringsjad 
The limitations to using Census data as a source for estimating the 
economies of scale are again illustrated by an elegant study made by Z. 
Griliches and V. Ringsjad. (I) Although their "principal finding is the 
evidence for increasing returns to scale ••• ", their estimates of scale 
coefficients imply generally small economies of scale for establishments 
in manufacturing and mining industries. This conclusion 
is reinforced by the fact that their study is based upon Norwegian data, 
and establishments in Norway are smaller than in the larger industrial 
countries. However, the results may not apply to industry in other 
countries Norwegian industry is concentrated on some industries for 
which economies of scale are limited, for example, food and fish 
processing and sawmills, where the manufacturing processes are 
relatively simple and the transport costs involved in concentrating 
production would be high. The Norwegian market is relatively small, so 
Norwegian firms have not developed industries, such as motor vehicles, 
requiring large scale. 
Griliches and Ringsjad obtained their estimates of the economies of 
scale by fitting data for 5,361 individual establishments to a Cobb 
(I) 'Economies of Scale and the Form of the Production Function', 
Amsterdam, 1971. This study was up-dated by V. Ringsjad in the 
Swedish Journal of Economics Vol. 80, 1978, No. 3. 
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Douglas production function. Their tests show that the estimates of 
scale effects are not very sensitive to the specification of the 
production function. Their main measures of labour input are in terms 
of hours worked at prevailing wage rates and for fixed capital, 
insurances values. 
The economic interpretation of a scale coefficient for data for 
establishments drawn from all of Norwegian manufacturing industry is not 
clear. In effect small businesses making, for example, bespoke products 
or breaking bulky consignments and repacking, are compared with paper 
mills making newsprint and bulk chemicals. One would expect approximate 
equality of value added per unit of (weighted) inputs across this 
spectrum. The scale coefficient perhaps measures the effects of the 
greater barriers to entry in the trades with large plants. On a more 
positive note, the estimates do indicate that large is not inevitably 
best. If large establishments were much more efficient than small ones 
whatever the combination of products produced in the large 
establishments, Norwegian industry would be organised with fewer small 
units and the scale coefficient would be larger. 
The authors also provide estimates for individual industries. But 
many of these industries are amalgamations of different trades (subject 
to varying market conditions in 1963). For example, besides grouping 
pulp and paper mills together, small mills making high quality special 
papers are grouped with large mills making newsprint and packaging 
paper. The problems of comparing different kinds of business applies 
within many industries as well as to all manufacturing. The authors 
recognise this problem. They also recognise other sources of 
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qualifications which may bias the results to an unquantifiable 
extent. (I). 
Baldwin and Gorecki(Z) 
The attempt by Baldwin and Gorecki to measure the economies of 
scale from Canadian Census data is the most ambitious so far. They 
focus on the results obtained by fitting data for Canadian manufacturing 
establishments in 1979 to a Cobb Douglas production function. Again 
their results indicate that economies of scale apply. Their results 
indicate that the increase in unit costs for each halving in the size of 
establishments would be about ten per cent. They also fit data for 
each industry to a Cobb Douglas production function. The median result 
for estimates for individual industries also indicates that unit costs 
would rise by about ten per cent with each halving of scale. These 
results suggest larger economies of scale than the estimates made by 
Griliches and Ringsjad using Norwegian data. Their estimates indicated 
(I) The authors admit that 'there is a great deal of variability in 
their micro-data which is not explained by the variables at their 
command'. They say that the bias 'is just as likely to result in 
estimates that are too low as too high'. They do not examine the 
economic justification for this claim. Where large economies of 
scale exist small establishments will have been forced out of 
business or the value of their capital stock will have been 
lowered. (The use of insurance policy replacement values may not 
get around this problem of valuation because values may in part 
reflect expectations of profits. For example, a firm might not 
insure at full replacement value if it would not replace a small 
scale unit in the event of fire because a new plant would not be 
profitable at full replacement cost). The authors mention the 
likelihood that if economies of scale exist prices of the output 
of large establishments could be lower. 
(2) John R. Baldwin and Paul K. Gorecki 'The Role of Scale in Canada-US 
Productivity Differences in the Manufacturing Sector', Toronto, 
1986. 
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that costs would rise by about four per cent with each halving of scale. 
However both sets of estimates are qualified for the reasons outlined. 
Baldwin and Gorecki give estimates of scale coefficients for 
industry groups in their Table 4.1. Industry groups were ranked 
according to the scale coefficients calculated for 1979. There was a 
weak correspondence with the ordering given in table 5.3(b); the rank 
correlation coefficient was 0.09. The Baldwin and Gorecki estimates 
showed clothing manufacture, knitting, leather and textiles to have low 
economies of scale, similar to the assessment based on industry studies. 
Chemicals were ranked fifth; printing, sixth; and paper, seventh. But 
tobacco was ranked first; non-metallic mineral goods, second; and food 
and beverages third, much higher positions than in Table 5.3(b) and 
machinery was lower at fifteenth. Apart from tobacco these industry 
groups include a very wide range of products. The estimated scale 
coefficients may reflect differences between sub sectors of these 
industry groups not the existence of economies of scale for firms making 
similar products. 
Studies of Costs and Prices 
Owen 
Nicholas Owen has used price and cost data to check engineering 
estimates of the economies of scale for the car, truck and consumer 
durables industries. ( 1) Owen shows there was a decline in real costs 
per car through time as European car producers increased their output. 
The average reduction in costs was in line with the expected effects of 
(1) Nicholas Owen, 'Economies of Scale, Competitiveness, and Trade 
Patterns within the European Community', Oxford, 1983. 
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increasing scale based on engineering estimates of the economies of 
scale. However, the reduction in unit costs estimated by Owen was 
attributable to technical progress as well as scale increases. For the 
other industries Owen studied, cost data did not conflict with 
engineering estimates of the economies of scale. 
Conclusions 
International comparisons and the conduct of industrialists 
supports the view that there are economies of scale where scale is 
increased horizontally and that the costs and effectiveness of 
management do not impose a limit on these economies. The results of 
studies based on census data costs and prices certainly do not conflict 
with the existence of economies of scale, but the quantitative estimates 
produced by these methods are marred by serious qualifications. 
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Section 8. The Resurgence of Small Firms 
Mrs. Thatcher's origins as the daughter of a one-shop grocer and 
her promotion of small and new businesses have drawn attention to the 
role of small businesses in Britain. Other reasons for the current 
emphasis on small businesses in Britain are that the small business 
sector accounted for relatively less output in Britain than in other 
developed industrial countries by the 1970s, and high levels of 
unemployment. 
The extent to which small businesses in Britain have outperformed 
larger firms in terms of the growth of employment is, however, not 
settled. 1be collection of statistics for small businesses is not 
comprehensive and estimates of employment and changes of employment in 
small businesses are unreliable.(!) Nevertheless there is strong 
evidence that small businesses in the USA are an important source, 
perhaps the main source, of net new jobs in recent years and that the 
decline in the proportion of people who are self-employed has been 
reversed. (Z) 
The resurgence of, and emphasis on, small firms is common to the 
developed industrial countries. Superficially at least this trend 
counters the view that the economies of scale are large. In this 
section the paradox of the resurgence of small firms and the existence 
of large economies of scale is considered. 
(1) P.E. Hart, 'Job Generation and Size of Firms', National Institute 
of Economic and Social Research Discussion Paper No. 125. 
(2) David M. Blau, 'A Time-Series Analysis of Self-Employment in the 
United States', Jnl. of Pol. Econ. June 1987. Blau refers to 
evidence of the reversal of the long-run declining trends in 
non-agricultural self-employment. 
- 141 -
2.129 
Technical Change 
It is clear that in the many important industries including steel, 
automobiles, and engineering, technical developments such as the 
speeding up of processes, new techniques for shaping metal, the 
substitution of electronic for mechanical devices, the use of plastic 
instead of metal components and the introduction of computers and robots 
have greatly increased labour productivity. These changes have 
certainly reduced the number of employees required to produce a given 
output of many products. They have also reduced the MES of plants in 
many industries where the size of plants is measured in terms of numbers 
of employees, but this is an unsatisfactory measure in any case. These 
changes have not necessarily reduced the economies of scale for large 
outputs of products. 
Technical change has worked in both directions. Numerical control 
of machine tools has reduced the cost penalty for producing repeated 
short batches of machined products and so reduced costs for firms which 
produce small batches. It has been argued that numerical control and 
computer aids for production also aid small firms because small firms 
are more flexible and have more informal management systems. In 
particular there is less polarization within small firms between 
operators and specialists such as programmers. The introduction and 
efficient use of numerical control and computer aids to production is 
facilitated by flexible working arrangements. (l) At the same time 
computer stock control systems, computer aided design, and the use of 
computers for production control have reduced the costs of small batch 
(1) A. Sorge et al. 'Microelectronics and Manpower in Manufacturing'. 
Berlin, 1983. 
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production at large plants. For example, one of the handicaps of a 
large footwear factory producing a range of styles, sizes and fittings 
is the problems of organising production to fully utilize capacity. 
Computer systems provide firms with an important aid for organising such 
production efficiently. 
Generally the substitution of plastic for metal components has 
reduced the economies of scale for products, but the substitution of 
plastic for leather and wood has tended to increase the economies of 
scale for producing large outputs of products because the quality of 
synthetic materials is more standardised and this facilitates cutting 
etc. Computer type setting has reduced the scale of operations required 
for type setting for books to the point where outworkers are used. On 
the other side, economies of scale for non-woven fabrics are generally 
greater than for woven fabrics which they are replacing. Also the 
manufacture of carpets by tufting in place of weaving has increased the 
economies of scale in that trade. 
Faster Technical Development 
The explosion in technical development has presented many 
opportunities for the invention of radically new products and processes. 
Many of these inventions have been pioneered by small and new firms. 
Throughout industrial history there has been a tendency for many 
existing and new firms to enter new industries. One relatively new 
source of advantage for some of the small firms in the engineering/ 
electrical/instrument industries is that they have skilled staff who can 
develop efficient software to control the operation of the machines or 
instruments. This is critical for the development of many products in 
these trades. Of course, large firms have software experts and 
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consultants can be hired, but shortages of these skills limit the range 
of products for which large firms compete and this leaves gaps for small 
firms to exploit. For some new products made by small firms the UK 
market alone is too small to achieve competitive scales of production. 
This applies to other EEC countries. The firms have to export into 
foreign markets to increase output and move along the scale curve for 
their products. The hand calculator and domestic computer markets 
provide obvious illustrations of this point. The UK market did not 
enable firms in these trades to achieve the scale necessary to reap 
sufficient economies of scale to be competitive with Japanese and 
American producers. In some segments of trades the domestic market is 
sufficient because, so far, foreign firms have not attempted to compete 
or domestic buyers, such as universities when buying instruments, prefer 
to buy locally. 
Increase in the Output of Skilled Staff 
Technical change may have worked in a different way. The merging 
of national markets and speeding up of technical change have combined to 
increase the value of the output of those employees who can affect the 
international competitiveness of firms. The return for developing and 
marketing new products is increased by the enlarged market to which the 
products can be sold, and increased competition in developing new and 
improved products puts pressure on firms to innovate and introduce more 
new products. 
The output of skilled staff may have increased, but the pay 
structures of large companies are rather rigid and in many cases it is 
difficult for large firms to target increased pay to the staff 
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responsible for new developments to fully reflect their contribution. 
Also large companies do not give their employees a major share of the 
property rights in the innovations they create. Skilled staff set up 
their own firms in order to identify and secure a higher proportion of 
their output. The incentive to do this has increased with the increase 
in the output of the skilled staff. 
Economic Forces 
The emphasis on small firms does not reflect technical developments 
alone. Demand for the products of the motor vehicle and domestic 
appliance industries which are dominated by large firms and economies of 
scale have reached maturity in European countries. The slowing growth 
of these industries has been further depressed by intensified 
international competition. In part the focus on small and new firms is 
to replace the growth of these mature industries. 
Another development which has transferred employment from large to 
small firms is the move by many large companies to focus their business 
and operations on products and processes for which they have a 
competitive advantage. One aspect of this process is to buy out 
services and manufacturing operations from other firms instead of 
performing the services in-house. This trend has been reinforced by the 
perceived need of managers to increase flexibility to meet fluctuations 
in total demand and changes in demand for products. Also the recession 
circa 1980 led managers to search for ways of reducing costs, and buying 
out reduces overhead costs such as commitments for pensions and may free 
firms from labour restrictive practices and wage and other agreements 
with trade unions. The increasing importance of information or 
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knowledge services for firms may have led them to look for more 
efficient ways of procuring the services. Earlier hiring experts as 
full-time employees was not too expensive. Now with the increase in the 
relative salaries and the proliferation of the expert services a company 
requires because of faster technical progress and the integration of 
national markets, it is important to hire experts in the most efficient 
way, which may be from an independent business. In this way 
fluctuations in demand for experts from individual firms through time 
may be evened out and expert knowledge may be selected for tasks more 
precisely. Finally once a market for firms supplying expert services 
develops, the firms supplying the expertise may have the advantage of 
wider experience than the internal experts of firms. Increases in 
unemployment have weakened the bargaining position of trade unions, but 
the wages paid by most firms have continued to rise. Buying out 
services may in effect enable firms to reduce wages because the 
employees of the firms from which goods or services are bought pay lower 
wages. 
Examples abound; many companies buy out computer software and the 
services of consultants, instead of employing specialised staff, and at 
a more mundane level use contract cleaners instead of employing 
cleaners. Some firms have also increased the manufacturing operations 
they buy out. Firms now buy out steel, castings, and machining 
operations which earlier they made or performed in-house. These trends 
have certainly opened opportunities for many small, new and specialised 
firms. They do not, however, reduce the real economies of scale for 
products. 
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The growth of international trade has changed the competitiveness 
of both small and large firms. Perhaps the main advantage for small 
scale firms in manufacturing industries from the growth of trade is that 
they can buy components from suppliers in other countries. This often 
takes away the scale advantage of larger domestic manufacturers who 
could make the components in-house on a large scale. The small firms 
use the scale advantage or low costs of suppliers in other countries. 
On the other side only large firms with an international marketing 
network may be able to gain a large enough share of world markets for a 
new product to be competitive. But again a small firm may be able to 
market its products in other countries in collaboration with a large 
company with an international sales network. 
The 'Cambridge Phenomenon' 
The technical and economic forces listed have contributed to the 
mushroom growth of small firms in the Cambridge area since 1970. Many 
of the firms provide consultancy services; firms which make hardware buy 
out components from the UK suppliers and buy many important components 
overseas. The new products and services they supply to niche markets 
result from technological developments. These rather obvious points are 
listed because they lead to another explanation for the 'Cambridge 
Phenomenon' which has been given wide publicity. Success leads to 
success. Employees of small and new firms serving niche markets learn 
how it is done and themselves set up new firms. An infrastructure of 
firms supplying the new firms with a great range of services and finance 
emerges and facilitates the growth of more new firms. 'Agglomeration 
economies no longer result from manufacturing in a single industry such 
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as cotton or steel, but relate to the output of a highly skilled 
research, development and production-oriented workforce that can adapt 
to totally new technical innovations and production concepts'. (l) 
Purchases of a Leading UK Manufacturing Company. 
To check on the conclusions of this section the director of a 
leading UK manufacturing company responsible for buying was asked if 
he had noted any shift towards buying from smaller firms. He answered 
with the comments 
'There has not been any detectable transfer of business from 
large companies to small ones, but some of the new products such as 
software and consultancy are bought from very small organisations'. 
'The company has been following a policy of supplier 
reduction. The idea is that a smaller number of companies enjoying 
higher volumes will be better able to afford the research and 
development, the investment and the introduction of new production 
and management systems that are necessary to meet our quality and 
productivity objectives'. 
'So, alongside the industrial giants we have always done 
business with~are hundreds of companies with employment levels 
measured in hundreds and sometimes tens. These small companies are 
more numerous in the provision of services to our offices and 
factories, such as cleaning, construction maintenance and low 
volume quick service engineering products'. 
Conclusion 
In brief, the resurgence of small firms is not evidence that the 
economies of scale have disappeared or even diminished. For the most 
part the estimates of economies of scale for technical and development 
costs given in Section 5 stand. New and small firms have not made 
(1) R. Oakey, 'High Technology and Small Firms' London, 1984. 
- 148 -
2.136 
inroads into the markets for cars, advanced aeroplanes, tractors, or 
combines. They have developed some new products and have found some 
niches in markets. 
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Section 9. The Community's Exports of Manufactures and the Economies of 
Scale 
In this section the pattern of the EC's export trade is related to 
the estimates of the economies of scale reported in this survey. 
Table 9.1 records the distribution of value added, production and 
exports by EC manufacturing industries. The final column of the table 
shows the ordering of industry groups according to the magnitude of 
economies of scale developed in Table 5.3(b). The ordering is intended 
to give a general indicator of the importance of the economies of scale 
for industries. 
The unweighted average indicator of scale for industry groups is 
10.5. When value added by industry is used as weights for the economies 
of scale indicator, the average is 8.8. This variation from the 
unweighted average is explained by some of the industry groups such as 
leather and leather goods with relatively small economies of scale 
having relatively small output. Motor vehicles for which scale 
economies are largest has a larger than average weight. 
The weighting by exports is more interesting. When the scale 
indicators are weighted by 'Extra Community Exports', exports to 
countries outside the community, the average falls from 8.8 to 7.4. For 
'Intra Community Exports' the weighted average was 7.8. Another 
statistic used to illustrate the relationship between the variables 
included in Table 9.1 is the rank correlation coefficient. The rank 
correlation between extra community exports and scale,0.641 is shown to 
(1) be closer than that between value added and scale, 0.47. The 
(I) The industry with the greatest value added is ranked 1, the 
industry with the second greatest value added is ranked 2 and so 
on. 
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correlation between the magnitude of value added and the economies of 
scale indicator, again shows that the large manufacturing industries 
tend to have larger than average economies of scale. The rank 
correlation coefficient is higher for both extra and intra Community 
exports than for value added. The share of community exports is taken 
as a percentage of the share of production value for each industry in 
columns (4) and (6) to eliminate the effects of large industries tending 
to have larger than average economies of scale. Columns (4) and (6) 
indicate the export intensity of industries. The rank correlation for 
extra community exports and economies of scale of 0.161 and for intra 
community exports and economies of scale of O.ll~indicate the extent of 
the concentration of EC exports from industries with larger than average 
economies of scale. 
The results are in the direction expected. The Community tends to 
export relatively more of products for which the economies of scale are 
relatively large. However the result for extra EC exports is very weak 
and is not as decisive as the author expected. There are several 
explanations: 
1. The extra and particularly intra Community exports of food and 
textiles for which economies of scale are modest are substantial 
relative to the contribution of the industries making these products to 
value added. One explanation for the large trade in these products is 
the wide variety of products. The contribution of vehicles, chemicals 
and mechanical engineering - the industries with large economies of 
scale - to exports is greater than their share of value added but the 
difference in weighting is not very great. 
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2. The results reflect in part the failure of EC electronic 
industries. The share of electrical engineering exports is less than 
for its share of value added. Japanese and US companies have benefited 
from economies of scale in these industries. 
3. The weighting may understate the relationship between exports 
and scale economies because within each industry group exports may be 
concentrated upon products for which economies of scale are greater than 
average for the industry group. 
The fact that EC exports are not more heavily concentrated on 
industries with large economies of scale could be explained in another 
way. Trade is created by differences in products produced in different 
countries to satisfy consumers'_quest for variety and change and/or 
differences in efficiency. Exports originate from efficient producers 
and reduce the output of inefficient firms. Either way there are gains 
from trade. 
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Section 10. Economies of Scale for the Service Sector 
Estimates of the economies of scale for the service sector are 
scarce. This reflects the difficulty of making such estimates and, 
possibly, that economies of scale for service trades are lower than for 
manufacturing industries. 
Methods of Measuring Economies of Scale for Services 
The methods of measuring economies of scale which apply to 
manufactures can be used for services, but the engineering method is 
less reliable for services. The industrial processes used in 
manufacturing trades for which engineering estimates are made do have 
counterparts in the service trades. The aeroplanes used by an air line 
or the computer systems used by a bank spring to mind. But for many 
service trades capital equipment comes in quite small units relative to 
national output. The largest hotel, shop or retail banking premises is 
small relative to the national markets in which they operate. This 
replication of units doing the same kind of business means that 
comparisons of actual cost for units of varying size is a possible 
method of estimating economies of scale for some services. However, 
because there is much replication within national markets, the scope for 
economies of scale through completion of the EC is likely to be limited 
in these trades. 
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Sources of Economies of Scale for Services 
Completion of the market will have two sets of effects via the 
economies of scale for service trades. Firstly, for service trades in 
which trade between member countries increases, there will be scope for 
economies of scale. The second set of effects will be generated by the 
increase in income in the EC which will be caused by completion of the 
market and which will increase demand and output of the service and 
other industries. In this section, the service trades which will be 
affected by increased trade in services between member countries are 
considered first. 
The groups of services which are distinguished in the UK balance of 
payments statistics are listed in Table 10.1. The first column of the 
table which shows UK exports in 1984 provides a rough and ready 
indicator of the importance of the headings. Financial and other 
services are a relatively important source of exports for the UK and so 
UK exports provide an exaggerated measure of these services for total 
Community exports. 
In the second column an assessment of the impact of completion of 
the EC for trade in each group of services is attempted. The services 
directly affected by the completion of the EC are insurance, banking, 
trading and consultancy. 
The final column of the table comments on the sources of economies 
of scale for each service. One general source of economies of scale 
will be that transactions and deals increase in size and lead to a 
reduction in costs because costs which are fixed or semi-fixed relative 
to the size of transactions and deals can be spread over a larger 
output. The broad picture is that there are economies of scale in 
providing services, but that they are perhaps not as great as for 
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manufacturing. As noted earlier there are obvious limits to the size of 
lorries, aircraft, ships, hotels and shops. Increased business will be 
met by duplication of facilities. The structure of the service trades 
supports this conclusion. There are more firms and establishments 
providing most individual services than manufacturer plants or factories 
producing most individual products. 
It is outside the scope of this report to consider the sources of 
economies of scale in other service trades, including retailing and 
other channels of distribution, which will be affected by the increase in 
income generated by completion of the EC. The main sources of economies 
here are in the scope for spreading fixed and semi-fixed costs, for 
example, the costs of public administration, from the increased density 
of traffic in the post and telecommunications services, (l) and for large 
transactions in the retail trade both for buying and selling. 
(1) An example of a semi fixed cost for the postal service is the cost 
of postmen. Delivery of more mail to each household would not 
increase costs proportionately. 
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THE EVIDENCE 
Industry Studies: 
Banking and Financial Institutions 
Sources: P.M. Horvitz, 'Economies of Scale in Banking' in 'Private 
Financial Institutions', for the 'Commission on Money and Credit', 
Englewood Cliffs, N.J. 1963. 
J. Pacolet and A. Verheirstraetan, 'Concentration and 
Economies of Scale in the Belgian Financial Sector', in A. 
Verheirstraeten ed., 'Competition and Regulation in Financial Markets', 
New York, 1981. 
J. Johnston, 'Statistical Cost Analysis', New York and London, 
1960. (Section 5. Building Societies and Life Assurance Companies). 
The sources describe studies of costs and scale and provide 
evidence of economies of scale at least over certain ranges of scale, 
but there are qualifications to the conclusions. Apparent scale effects 
are often later shown to reflect differences in the type of businesses 
done by large and small banks. The qualifications relate to the 
dimensions of scale. For example, the extent to which banks obtain 
deposits from a branch network or in the wholesale money markets varies. 
In the USA some banks operate branches while others do not. Small 
branches of banks tend to be sited in isolated communities. The 
existence of higher costs for such branches may influence a comparison 
of costs for the size of branches. Also there are problems relating to 
the measurement of costs. Horvitz shows that large banks in the USA pay 
higher salaries than small banks. The costs of buildings vary greatly 
according to the price of property in each locality and large banks tend 
to have headquarters sited in the centre of large towns where property 
prices are high. 
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No general estimates of the MES or scale gradients have been 
published for financial institutions. 
Air Transport 
Sources: D. Sawers, 'The Trouble with Big Airlines' Financial Times, 
August 24th, 1987. 
P. Forsyth, R. Hill and C. Trengove, 'Measuring Airline 
Efficiency', Fiscal Studies, February 1986. 
The sources refer to estimates that show that an airline's costs 
are not affected by the size of its route network. The marketing 
advantage of a large network is to be able to offer more through 
journeys without passengers having to change airlines. There are 
economies associated with density of traffic; high density allows an 
airline to use large aircraft on a route, and large aircraft have lower 
operating costs per passenger seat mile. Also staff and facilities on 
the ground at terminals can be used more efficiently where traffic on a 
route is dense. Extensions to a route network will increase the density 
of traffic on the airline's existing network. 
Studies of Labour Productivity 
In Section 7 we claimed that higher labour productivity in the USA 
supports the argument that economies of scale apply in manufacturing 
trades. Unfortunately the measurement of labour productivity for service 
trades is even more hazardous than for manufacturing trades. For what 
they are worth, the National Institute's estimates of productivity 
differentials between America and Europe show a smaller gap for 
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services than for manufacturers. (l) This is compatible with economies 
of scale being less important in service trades. But it is weak 
evidence only.as there are other possible explanations and the estimates 
are subject to a wide margin of error. 
Conclusions on the Economies of Scale for Services 
There are reasons for expecting the economies of scale for services 
to be less than for manufacturing and the evidence does not conflict 
with this assessment. Plainly every European country cannot make 
commercial aircraft, motor cars or many other manufactured products 
efficiently, but each country does have a range of banks, insurance 
companies, stock brokers, shops,. hotels, etc. There are market niches 
where there may be economies of scale, for example, banks arranging 
large corporate deals and re-insurance markets, but these are 
exceptions. In addition, as completion of the EC raises income and 
output, there will be some economies of scale in the service trades 
stemming from larger transactions and the economies of scale related to 
the size of bank branches, etc. 
(1) National Institute Economic Review, August, 1982 p. 29. The gap 
for services is about two-thirds that for manufactures. 
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Section 11. Conclusions 
The Completion of the EC and the Economies of Scale 
Completion of the EC will have three groups of effects via 
economies of scale. Where completion of the market results in 
substantial changes in the conditions of trade, for example, by changing 
the rules for public procurement, there will be direct effects on 
industries, inter country trade will increase, structural change will 
occur in the industries and firms will benefit from economies of scale. 
If the national electricity authorities open their tendering to all EC 
manufacturers of equipment, trade in generating equipment between member 
states will increase, some firms will increase their share of EC markets 
and w!ll gain economies of scale for the development and manufacture of 
this equipment. These effects of completing the EC can only be assessed 
on a case by case basis. 
The second effect of completion of the market will be the 
widespread reduction of impediments to trade, increasing trade in all 
sectors, causing structural change in industries and generating benefits 
from economies of scale. This result will be reinforced by the third 
effect of completion of the market which will be to increase the growth 
of income within the community through achieving economies of scale and 
through the pressure of more intense competition. The increase in 
Community income will increase demand, output and inter-community trade, 
leading to further gains through economies of scale. 
For reasons given in this report, estimates of the economies of 
scale are elusive and many of the estimates which are available are 
hedged around with qualifications. Nevertheless the evidence reported 
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in this paper does support the hypothesis that economies of scale are a 
widespread feature of manufacturing industries and to a lesser extent of 
service trades. 
The important result of this survey is to focus attention on the 
effects of changes in output of distinct products and production runs on 
costs. Economies of scale are usually associated with the size of 
establishments and firms. This is too limited a view. The main effects 
of completion of the market will result from many firms being able to 
increase their output of particular products, without necessarily 
increasing the average output of their establishments. This survey 
shows that there are substantial scale effects for products and 
production runs to be obtained ~n a wide range of manufacturing 
industries. The sources of these economies are technical economies of 
scale for production processes and the spreading of product development 
costs over the output to which they relate. 
The competitiveness of EC Industries 
The second question concerning the effects of completion of the EC 
is the impact on competitiveness of EC industries in third markets. A 
conclusion of Section 5 was that economies of scale continue 
indefinitely for complex products made by the vehicle, mechanical and 
electrical engineering and instrument industries. These are important 
EC export industries. Completion of the market will facilitate the 
restructuring of firms in these industries so that they increase their 
output of products and increase their competitiveness. 
In Section 6 the advantages of large firms for R & D were 
described. Completion of the market will lead to the emergence of 
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larger firms which can reap these advantages and cut the duplication of 
R & D within the EC. More efficient use of R & D personnel could have a 
multiplier effect on employment through job creation because R & D 
personnel are scarce. 
Industrial Distribution of the Effects 
Column 1 of Table 11.1 lists the manufacturing industry groups in 
order of the importance of economies of scale as in Table 5.3(b). This 
classification was based upon economies of scale for production and 
development. A noteworthy feature of this ordering is that the 
industries most subject to the economies of scale are the most 
concentrated in terms of the share of output produced by the largest 
companies. The vehicles, chemical, man-made fibres, metals and office 
machinery industries are all highly concentrated. Mechanical 
engineering is not concentrated but that reflects the immense range of 
products produced by that industry. At the other end of the list other 
manufacturing, textiles, timber, furniture, clothing and footwear and 
leather goods are all fragmented in part because of the diversity of 
their products. 
The fact that the industries subject to the largest economies of 
scale are the most concentrated suggests that economies of scale are 
more fully exploited in these industries. The car, truck and aircraft 
industries have re-structured within the EC to take advantage of the 
economies of scale. It therefore seems unlikely that the economies of 
scale effects of completion of the EC will be concentrated on industries 
subject to especially large economies of scale. The effects will be 
spread right across manufacturing industries and service trades. The 
exceptions where the economies of scale will be substantial are the 
industries affected by changes in public procurement policy and national 
regulation of markets. These trades are pinpointed in column 3 of Table 
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CHAPTER. 3 
Economies of Scale and Intra-Community trade 
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I. Introduction 
It has been argued that industrial plant sizes are on average 
larger in the United States than in Europe.l As a consequence, 
European plants are considered to be too small to realize all 
significant scale economies in production, suffering a competitive 
disadvantage with respect to their American counterparts. Several 
reasons have been mentioned to account for why plant sizes differ 
between nations: 
"For one, some markets my be too small to support even a 
single plant of minimum optimal scale. And if buyers and 
govern1nent policymakers prefer some diversity of supply 
sources, two or more independent plants may survive m small 
markets, each plant too small to enjoy all economies of scale . 
...... Dynamics also matter. The smaller the market is for any 
given (positive) growth rate, the more time it takes to 
accumulate a demand increment sufficient to absorb the 
capacity of a lumpy new MOS plant. Also, in markets small 
relative to the minimum optimal scale, oligopoly is likely, and 
the resulting concern for pricing interdependence and strategic 
position can aggravate propensities toward investment m 
inefficiently small plants." (Scherer et al., 1975, pp. 92-93). 
It was generally expected that with the creation of a European 
Common Market existing gaps between current and cost efficient 
i See Bain (1966) and Scherer et al. (1975), chapter 3. 
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plant sizes would diminish over time. If no tariff barriers hinder 
trade flows between national markets, producers choice of plant sizes 
are less limited, leading to an adjustment process towards larger 
plants and, consequently, toward a fuller exploitation of scale 
economies in production. If, in addition, most non-tariff barriers 
within the European Community can be removed, plant size 
differences between Europe and the United States should disappear, 
taking with it European cost disadvantages. 
This study tests the hypothesis that the removal of trade 
barriers within the European Community had the effect of increasing 
plant sizes, enabling plants to realize all significant scale economies. 
The hypothesis will be tested by applying two very different data 
sets on a group of manufacturing industries for the Federal Republic 
of Germany and the United Kingdom. The study is organized as 
follows: Section II provides some background information on the 
development of trade and firm s1zes within the European 
Communities. Sections III and IV explain the deviation of observed 
plant sizes and the minimum efficient sizes (MES) at different points 
in time. In Section Ill, engineering and cost estimates provide 
information on the MES and the elasticity of the average cost curve 
of selected product-lines. And in Section IV, alternative measures are 
employed for estimating MES on the four-digit industry level. Section 
V evaluates the main results and provides forecasts about the effects 
of further removals of trade barriers on the degree of cost efficient 
increase of plants. 
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II. Development of Intra-Community Trade and Firm Sizes 
According to our hypothesis, we expect that the creation of a 
European internal market would increase intra-Community trade 
flows and, therefore, lead to an increase in plant and firm sizes in 
industries where there are significant unexploited scale economies. 
Table 1 gives a first impression about intra- and extra-
Community trade flows, summarizing import flows over time. Table 1 
shows that since 1963, both intra- and extra-Community import 
flows have increased over time. A closer look at Table 1 also shows 
that, until about 1975, intra-Community imports were more intense 
than extra-Community imports. After 1975, extra-Community 
imports became more important in the majority of industries. By 
1982, in only nine industries were intra-Community imports larger 
than extra-Community imports: metal, means of transportation, 
foods, textile, and paper industries. Jacquemin and Sapir (1987) 
analyzed the relative slowdown of intra-Community trade in detail 
and concluded that after the initial period of European integration 
(which spans from 1958 to about 1972 for the founding six member 
countries) the dynamics of intra-Community trade seems to have 
diminished particularly in consumer and investment goods industries 
partly because of industry-specific deficiencies as well as still 
existing non-tariff barriers within the European Common Market. 
The relative slowdown, instead, encouraged imports from the rest of 
the world. 
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With increasing overall trade flows we expect an mcrease m 
plant and firm sizes as well. Table 2 summarizes the data available to 
us and shows the development of average firm sizes in the European 
Community in selected two-digit NACE industries. Columns (1) and 
(2) in Table 2 show the average number of employees in European 
firms in the years 1975 and 1982, whereas column (3) shows the 
slope of the time trend in the period 1975 to 1982. Table 2 clearly 
demonstrates that there exists the expected tendency towards larger, 
less labor-intensive firms for nearly all industries. Tables 1 and 2 
together, then, are jointly consistent with our basic hypothesis, 
although, of course, other factors may be at work. 
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III. Determinants of Plant Sizes on the Product-Line Level 
In this section we test our hypothesis that scale economies and 
intra-Community trade flows can explain deviations of plant sizes 
from minimum efficient plant Sizes (MES) by using data on the 
product-line level. The analysis relies on a regression model, similar 
to the one adopted by Scherer et al. (1975) and Muller and Owen 
( 1985) in which the dependent variable is the deviation of the 
representative plant size from the MES. Independent variables are 
the cost increase associated with sub-MES plants and export/import 
intensities. The model can be specified as follows: 
where 
Is the observed plant size deviation from MES, measured 
as the ratio of the average plant size and MES. 
is the size of the product market, measured as the ratio of 
domestic production and MES. 
is the cost increase associated with one-third of MES 
output. 
Eit IS the export intensity, measured by 1 +exports/domestic 
production. 
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is the import intensity, measured by 1-imports/domestic 
consumption. 
11 is the error term, reflecting all other factors which effect 
,...it 
plant size deviations. 
aot• ..... ,a4t are regression coefficients 
Indices 1 represent product-lines and 
t stands for the time periods. 
Equation (1) shows the expected direction of causality. The 
bigger the market in relation to MES output, the bigger the 
representative plant size is, therefore, the smaller is the SIZe 
deviation. Thus, we expect a1 >0. A steep unit cost curve might g1ve 
rise to larger plants since there are considerable cost differences 
between small and large plants. Hence one would expect that in this 
case firms build larger plants and this would be reflected in a higher 
PSD-value. Thus, a2>0. International trade can have various effects on 
the deviation of actual plant sizes from MES. Export opportunities 
extend the relevant market and might give firms the change to work 
off excess capacity and to add new capacity to its plants. A larger 
export share in a market might, therefore, lead to larger plant sizes 
and so to higher PSD values. Thus, a3>0. Imports, on the other hand, 
intensify domestic competition and encourage firms to invest in 
larger, more efficient plants. This investment behavior might be 
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expected in markets in which the required market share to operate a 
MES plant is high. As a result, one expects to observe a plant size 
increase if import shares are significantly high. Thus, a4<0. 
The hypothesis will be tested for the periods 1965 and 1982. 
While we expect ai>O, i=1,2,3 and a4<0 for both periods, we wish to 
test the additional hypothesis that the effect of trade on plant size 
has increased over time. Thus, ait<ait+l• i=1,2,3 and a4t>a4t+l• which 
means that we expect a more significant influence from exports and 
imports in 1982 than in 1965 due to increasing trade liberalization 
within the European Community. 
The data sample consists of MES and unit costs curve estimates 
on a product-line level. Some of the estimates come from various 
published sources and were performed by scholars using engineering 
and cost analysis approaches. The rest were made exclusively for this 
study by using the same estimation method. The result is shown in 
Table 3. The estimates in Table 3 suggest that, in most industries, 
MES output as well as cost disadvantages of sub-MES plants have 
increased over time. Technological change is the main cause of 
increases in the minimum efficient plant size. New production 
processes led to both lower unit costs and an increase in plant sizes 
required to take full advantage of the cost reduction potential. The 
technological development of recent years appear to be most 
significant in product-lines like beer brewing and cement in which 
cost disadvantages by sub-MES plants are particularly intense. 
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The remaining data on domestic production, exports, and 
imports were gathered from statistical sources for 1965 and 1982 for 
the Federal Republic of Germany. For the United Kingdom data were 
only available for 1982. 
Re~:ression results 
Table 4 summarizes the regression results for the Federal 
Republic of Germany (FRO) and the United Kingdom (UK). The usual 
statistical tests were performed. The functional form of the 
regressiOn equation was tested by applyi 'lg a Lagrange multiplier 
test suggested by Godfrey and Wickens ( 1981 ). Heteroskedasticity 
was not detected, but multicollinearity was observed to be severe 
between the import- variable ·and all other independent variables in 
the 1982 German sample. The stepwise regression results will show 
the impact of collinearity on the estimated coefficients. 
The results in Table 4 show that market size in the FRO has an 
increasingly positive effect on plant size development over time. The 
coefficients are statistically significant but their values are very 
small. Thus, the positive effect on market size on the choice of larger 
plant sizes is still limited, e.g. a 100 percent increase in market size 
would lead to an 0.07 percent increase in RSD only. For the UK, the 
results show the opposite sign but the coefficient is statistically not 
significant, therefore we should not attach too much importance to it. 
However, it is interesting to speculate on how a negative sign could 
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be interpreted. One obvious possibility is that the extent of 
diseconomies of scale, which restrict the expansion of plants, are 
relatively important. Such diseconomies are often transportation 
costs which are particularly intense in product-lines like beer 
brewing and cement, and lead to a fragmentation of markets. Other 
causes of diseconomies of scale may be product variety since a large 
variety increases changeover costs and reduces lot-size economies in 
production thereby raising the unit cost curve. In the UK, the 
diseconomies of scale seem to be overcompensated by scale 
economies. 
The cost gradient coefficients have the expected positive sign 
for the FRG, although they are not statistically significant. Thus they 
give only moderate support for the hypothesis that the steeper the 
unit cost curve, the greater the incentive is to build larger plants. For 
the UK, the hypothesis is not confirmed since the effect is not 
significant. This suggests that diseconomies of scale may be more 
important in the UK than in Germany and may, therefore, lead to 
smaller plant s1zes. 
The results in Table 4 show that international trade plays an 
important role in determining plant size deviations from cost 
efficient plant sizes. In particular, exports provide the opportunity to 
enlarge plants. The results are highly significant for the FRG in both 
periods and for the UK in 1982. For the FRG, the export coefficient is 
larger and shows stronger significance in 1982 than in 1965, which 
suggests that exports have become more important over time as a 
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determinant of plant capacity decisions. In the UK, the plant size 
expansion effect from exports seems to be stronger than in the FRO. 
Imports, on the other hand, also had a positive effect on plant size 
development in both countries. This effect was not significant m 
1965 in the FRO and in the UK, but it was significant for the FRO in 
1982. The results also indicate that the aforementioned 
multicollinearity between the imports variable and the other 
variables is particularly severe for the German data in 1982 between 
imports and exports. In sum, the results on trade show quite clearly 
that exports and imports had a simultaneous positive effect on the 
creation of larger plants. This observation and the positive 
association between exports and imports support the theory of intra-
industry trade which shows that increasing differentation of 
products and services increase intra-industry trade. This effect on 
trade is enhanced if,. in addition, trade barriers are low. 
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IV. Determinants of Plant Sizes at the Industry Level 
In this section, we explain the deviation of observed plant sizes 
from minimum efficient plant sizes at the four-digit industry level 
and therefore at a slightly more aggregate level than in Section III. 
With the analysis on the industry level we are able to set up a larger 
data base which provides the opportunity to test the stability of the 
regression results on the product-line level in Section III. This 
stability test is important since the results in Section III might be 
very sensitive to an increase in the number of observations. 
Furthermore, the industry analysis enables us to select a richer set of 
explanatory variables. 
By moving to the industry level we sacrifice the quality of the 
MES estimates. Since MES estimates are not available for a large 
number of industries, we have to apply alternative measures of MES. 
Alternative measures have been proposed in the literature and 
empirical tests have shown that two measures in particular are good 
substitutes: the 'Top 50 percent' index and the 'Midpoint' plant size 
index.2 The first index II ..... .is found by moving down the plant size 
distribution starting with the largest plants, until enough plants have 
been included to encompass 50 percent of total industry employment 
or output. The average plant size of those plants which account for 
the top half of the cumulative employment or output size 
distribution is then calculated. II The other index II estimates the 
2 See Scherer et al. (1975), chapter 3. 
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employment or output of that individual plant which is located at the 
50 percent point of the cumulative size distribution." (Scherer et al., 
1975, p.66). 
With the two alternative MES measures at hand we are able to 
provide a first look at the plant size deviation from MES and its 
development over time at the industry level. For this purpose we 
grouped 102 German four-digit industries into its corresponding 16 
two-digit NACE industries for the time period 1979-1985. The ratio 
between average plant size and MES will show whether plants are 
large enough to realize all scale economies and how plant sizes 
developed over time relative to the MES. 1:tble 5 summarizes the 
calculated average ratio of average plant size to MES for the years 
1979 and 1985, where the average plant size is measured in terms of 
the number of employees and the MES is represented by the TOP 50 
percent index of total industry employees.. The first impression we 
get from Table 5 is that actual plants are on average smaller than 
MES. In 1979, for instance, plants in the mineral oil refining industry 
are on average only 40 percent of MES and in 1985 about 60 percent. 
The deviation across industries varies which means that in the 
chemical industry we observe the largest deviation from efficient 
plant sizes while in the extraction of minerals industry the average 
plant is close to a cost efficient plant. Table 5 also shows that in 1985 
plants on average exceeded the MES in two industries, namely in the 
extraction of minerals and the motor vehicles industries. In 1985 
plants in these industries reached a cost efficient size. In the other 
industries one observes the same general pattern that the plant size 
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deviation decreased over time. The adjustment process towards more 
cost efficient plants can be clearly seen in Table 5 and this process 
was relatively fast if one takes into account that the time period 
1979-85 under consideration is relatively short. 
Based on the results in Table 5, how can one explain the 
variance of plant size deviations across industries? Various factors 
explain the deviation, which can be labeled as industry-specific and 
trade-specific factors. If one considers the extration of minerals and 
the motor vehicles industries, in which the average plant size is close 
to the MES, one finds different factors explaining the small deviation. 
In the extraction 0f minerals industry the structure of the market 
consists of various local markets which are determined by the 
location of the ·inputs and the transportation costs. These local 
markets are protected from trade by natural entry barriers and are 
large enough to exploit scale economies. In the motor vehicles 
industry, on the other hand, international competition is the main 
force for driving plants toward a cost efficient size. In general, plant 
size deviations from MES exist mainly because markets are too small 
in relation to MES, trade barriers hinder the extension of markets, 
demand growth is not high enough to reduce excess plant capacity, 
and shipment costs as well as product variety lead to a 
fragmentation of markets which are smaller than MES. 
A more systematic insight into the importants of factors 
explaining the plant size deviation, is provided by the regression 
- 184 - 3.17 
analysis which we want to perform now. The regression model is 
specified in a similar fashion than in Section III as follows: 
PSDit = bot + blt MSit + b2t Eit - b3t 1it + b4t CRit 
+ bst GRit + b6t PRit - b7t EMit + !lit (2) 
where 
is the ratio of the average plant size and MES, which is 
represented by the· TOP 50 and MIDPOINT indices, re-
spectively. 
MSit Is the market size, measured as the ratio of domestic 
consumption and TOP 50 and MIDPOINT, respectively. 
Eit is the exports intensity which is measured in two ways: 
ETt is the exports intensity based on total exports (=intra 
+ extra-Community exports) and measured by 1+exports/ 
domestic production. 
Fft is the intra-Community exports intensity, measured 
by 1 +intra-Community exports/total exports. 
lit is the imports intensity which is also measured in two 
ways: 11 t is equal to 1-total imports/domestic con-
sumption and I~t is equal to 1-intra-Community im-
ports/total imports. 
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Is the seller concentration ratio, measured by the five-
firm ratio for the UK and the Herfindahl index for the 
FRG. 
GRit is the percentage growth of production. 
PRit Is the productivity ratio, measured by the ratio of 
domestic production and the number of employees. 
EMit is the extent of multi-plant operation, measured by the 
average number of plants operated by firms m the 
industry. 
bOt' ...... ,b7t are regression coefficients. 
J.lit IS the error term, representing all other factors which 
determine plant size deviations. 
Indices I represent three-digit industries in the UK and four-digit 
industries in the FRG and 
t stands for the time periods 1979, 1985 for the FRG and 
1979, 1983 for the UK. 
Equation (2) shows that seven explanatory variables were 
selected for which data are available. Expected signs of the causal 
relationship between the endogenous variable and the exogenous 
variables are shown in the regression model. The core variables are 
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the market size, exports, and imports variables. With respect to these 
variables we expect that market size has a positive influence on 
plant size development. Markets which are large in relation to MES 
output might have a favorable effect on plants' capacity expansion 
decision. Thus, we expect bu>O" Exports and imports (total as well as 
intra-Community) influence plant size decisions positively. Exports 
increase the relevant market and open the opportunities to build 
larger plants. Imports put pressure on domestic firms' decision 
makers to increase their plant sizes toward the most cost efficient 
size. Thus, b~1 and b~1<0. In addition, the impact of Intra-Community 
trade on plant size decisions might be even higher. Therefore, we 
expect more cost efficient plants in industries in which the ratio of 
· · I 0 I intra-Community to total trade IS higher. Thus, b21> and b31<0. 
From the additional variables we expect explanatory power as 
well. Among them the concentration variable, since concentrated 
markets might have larger plants due to the fact that large market 
shares by dominant sellers provide the chance to build larger plants. 
Thus, we expect b41>0. If, however, markets are fragmented, we 
might expect even large sellers to favor a multiple plant structure. 
The average number of plants operated by firms is therefore a good 
indicator of the existence of local markets. We therefore might expect 
a negative association between plant size deviations and the extent 
of multi-plant operation, I.e. b71<0. Market growth might have a 
positive effect on plant size decisions. Indivisibilities in physical 
production capacity lead to a certain extent of excess capacity at a 
time when new capacity is set up. This risk of holding excess capacity 
- 187 -
.3.2U 
permanently will be reduced if demand growth is be expected, thus 
b st>O. Finally, the productivity of the labor force might also have 
positive effects on plant size decisions. The higher the labor 
productivity will be, the more firms will be inclined to operate larger 
plants, thus b6t>0. 
Regression Results 
Tables 6 and 7 summarize the regression results for the sample 
of up to 105 four-digit industries in the FRG and of 103 three-digit 
industries in the UK.3 For the FRG, we were able to run regressi,)ns 
for the periods 1979/1985 and for the UK for 1979/1983. 
Furthermore, the data samples for the FRG and the UK differ slightly 
in two respects: for the FRG , the data on trade flows allow to make 
the distinction between intra-Community and total trade flows, 
whereas for the UK, only total trade flow data were available. In 
addition, for the UK we only have access to the TOP 50 measure of 
minimum efficient plant s1ze. And finally, separate regressions were 
performed for the producer and consumer goods industries in the 
FRG. 
The results in Tables 6 and 7 for the total sample show that 
nearly all coefficients of the explanatory variables have the expected 
3 The usual statistical tests were performed. The test of the functional form 
showed a linear specification to be preferable. No heteroskedasticity was 
detected. Also no severe multicollinearity is present. 
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s1gns. The coefficients of all exports variable (total and intra-
Community) are highly significant for the German sample, but not for 
the UK in both time periods. We can conclude that the convergence 
towards more efficient plant sizes is significantly affected by total 
exports as well as intra-Community exports in the FRO, and the 
importance of exports has increased over time. For the UK, we find 
slight support for the proposition that total exports are a increasing 
force driving plant size developments, but this support is not 
statistically significant. If we divide the sample into producer and 
consumer goods industries, we · find that only in producer goods 
industries are exports an important determinant of plant sizes in the 
FRO. In consumer goods industries, by :~ontrast, exports do ·not seem 
to play any role . at all, even over time. 
Imports, on the _other hand, also have a positive impact on 
plant sizes but we cannot put to much weight on it since the 
coefficients are not statistically significant in both countries and both 
periods. Additionally, we observe an increase in the coefficients over 
time which suggests that the positive influence of imports on plants 
size developments became more important over time. 
Market size and demand growth are both powerful explanatory 
variables. In both countries, larger and faster growing markets 
provide the opportunity to build larger and more cost efficient 
plants. The size of the market in the UK seems to be the dominant 
factor affecting plant size decisions. If one takes the significant effect 
of the concentration variable into account as well, one is inclined to 
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argue that large markets in the UK are well protected by. entry 
barriers, maybe because of cost efficient production. Entry barriers 
may also explain why intra-industry trade flows are less pronounced 
between the UK and other countries. 
Seller concentration is a powerful explanatory factor in both 
countries, and also in both subgroups of industries. However, the 
significance of concentration is more pronounced in the UK. The 
results suggest that large sellers in concentrated industries in the UK 
seem to operate with larger plants, whereas in the FRG a higher 
extent of multi-plant operation is preferred. The regression results 
on the extent of multi-plant operation support this view: the more 
important the concentration variable is in explaining plant sizes, the 
larger the plants are and the smaller the number of plants operated 
by large firms. 
Labor productivity has no explanatory power in either country. 
The coefficient shows in most regressions the expected sign but the 
effect is not statistically significant. This result is somewhat 
surprising since we would expect cost efficient plants to have a 
higher labor productivity. 
If we compare the results on market size, exports, and imports 
with the one in Section III, we see that the signs of the regression 
coefficients remain stable. However, the values of the coefficients are 
different. At the industry level we receive lower values which seems 
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to be the consequence of moving from the product-line level to a 
more aggregate industry level analysis. 
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V. Evaluation of the Overall Results and Comparative Static 
Analysis 
The results show positive and increasing effects of exports and 
imports on plant size developments towards more cost efficient plant 
stzes in the FRG and the UK. The results can be used to speculate to 
what extent trade flow changes affect plant sizes and cost efficiency 
of plants. For this purpose we experiment with the average values of 
the regression variables and their estimated coefficients in Section 
III. First of all, we are interested in the plant size effect of trade flow 
increases. For simplicity, we assume that exports and imports flows 
increase by 10 perce.\t. If we calculate the growth rate for each 
period and each country separately we receive the following results: 
FRG 
UK 
1965 
1982 
1982 
Exports 
4.7% 
8,5% 
19.4% 
Imports 
7.3% 
16.5% 
4.1% 
These numbers tell us that a 10 percent increase in exports and 
imports would increase average plant size in the FRG in 1965 by 4.7% 
and 7.3%, respectively. And in 1982 the increase would be 8.5% and 
16.5%. In the UK, the increase in average plant stze would be even 
19.4% if exports increase by 10% and 4.1% if imports increase by the 
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same amount. This seems to be a rather strong response to changing 
trade flows. 
In comparison with the above speculative results we are able 
to calculate the actual overall trade effect for the FRO. Taking the 
actual average mcrease of 73 percent in exports and 107 percent m 
imports during the period 1965 to 1982 in to account, we rece1 ve an 
average plant size growth by 97 percent. Therefore, trade flows 
basically doubled plant sizes within the observed time period. 
Our second exercise will be to speculate about the impact of a 
plant size increase on the improvement on the cost efficiency of 
plants. If plants increase in size due to increasing trade flows one 
should expect an increase m cost efficiency as well. To what extent 
this improvement in cost efficiency can be depends on the increase 
of trade flows. Three scenarios are worth considering: First, exports 
increase by 100 percent. Second, import flows double m s1ze and 
third, both exports and imports increase each by 100 percent. For 
each scenario we will be able to calculate the expected effect on cost 
efficiency under the additional assumption that total consumption 
remains unaffected by trade flow increases. 
If exports increase by 100 percent, the export share on total 
domestic production increase from its level in 1982 of 36.6 percent 
to 53.6 percent at a later point in time. As a consequence, average 
plant size increases should have a decreasing effect on unit costs. 
Prior to the export increase, actual average plant size had 14.94 
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percent higher unit costs than a MES plant. After doubling of exports, 
the disadvantage by sub-MES plants diminished to 12.49 percent. As 
a result, the increase of cost efficiency is about 16.4 percent. 
If imports increase by 100 percent, we expect an increase m 
cost efficiency as well, since imports have also a positive effect on 
plant size development in the FRO and the UK. Actual import share 
on total domestic consumption was in 1982 about 32.1 percent and it 
would be twice as much after the import increase by 100 percent. 
The corresponding cost efficiency improvement is about 26.5 percent 
which leaves the average plant size with 10.98 percent higher costs 
than a MES plan~. The cost efficiency increase by imports is therefore 
higher than the effect of increasing exports flows. 
If exports and imports increase in magnitude and total 
domestic consumption still remains unchanged, domestic production 
has to decrease. The overall effect will be a rise in cost efficiency of 
about 55 percent. This efficiency increase is considerable taking into 
account that average plant size is now larger than one half (0.518) of 
a MES plant which leaves a cost disadvantage of only 6.72 percent. 
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Table 1 Trends in Community Imports Trade 
Manufacturing 
Industry 
M anufacturlng Industry 
lneral oil refining M 
Prod 
me 
uctlon and preliminary processing of 
tala 
Iron and atMI • N on-metallic mineral proc:lucta 
• 
• Ch 
Concrete, cement, plaster proc:lucta for 
construction 
Glasa and gluaware 
emlcala and man·made fibres 
Bulc Industrial chemicals 
Pharmaceutical proc:Jucta • • M etal artlclu 
Toole 1nd finished metal goods • M echanlcaJ engineering 
Machln•toola for wortlng metal • 
• Off 
Plant for mlnH, Iron and steel, etc. 
Ice and data-procualng machinery 
E lactrlcal engineering 
• 
• 
• 
Electrical machinery 
Telecommunications equipment, etc. 
Radio, television, etc. 
• Domestic type elactrtc appllancu 
1.4otor vei'IICIU 
)tiler means of transport 
• Shipbuilding 
• Aerospace equipment manufacturing and 
repairing 
natrument englnMrlng 
:ood, drink, and tobaCco 
rextlle 
.eather 1nd leather goode 
~ua-proc:lueed footwear 
ileedy-made clothing 
1mber and wooden furniture 
'ulp, paper and paper proc:lucta 
lrfntlng 
tubber proc:Jucta 
'laatlc proc:lucta 
I 
1983 .I 1970 I 
Jntra•Communlly 
Import a 
8,5 23,3 
3,9 10,6 
11,0 28,7 
14,9 33,2 
8,7 24,0 
-12,7 31,2 
8,8 28,1 
8,2 19,7 
5,7 17,3 
5,4 24,8 
8,5 25,0 
9,1 24,2 
11,4 28,3 
15,5 35,9 
10,5 29,8 
5,8 25,8 
8,3 25,2 
9,0 27,3 
8,0 24,1 
8,4 25,2 
9,0 25,0 
8,8 21,7 
13,0 23,9 
13,7 35,3 
13,3 20,7 
7,3 20,8 
9,5 22,8 
25,8 57,1 
13,2 25,5 
5,5 17,1 
8,1 20,8 
8,3 18,5 
8,1 21,9 
8,0 24,1 
8,8 21,0 
5,1 18,9 
Industries 
1975 I 1981 I 1982 
I' 
1983 I 1970 I 
Extra-community 
lmporta 
49,8 105,1 120,5 10,8 22,2 
38,5 95,0 101,4 4,6 3,8 
47,0 89,6 95,9 13,0 38,4 
52,9 91,8 99,7 13,3 38,0 
47,2 99,9 108,8 9,4 22,9 
62,2 92,0 97,9 15,9 28,3 
48,2 102,1 113,7 7,8 19,0 
45,1 111,3 123,2 10,4 25,1 
42,4 110,0 121,0 10,8 25,2 
50,9 119,9 134,8 8,3 23,2 
52,1 99,7 107,7 7,3 19,4 
48,4 100,5 111,8 8,8 17,7 
53,3 99,0 108,8 11,9 28,4 
55,3 100,2 101,9 13,7 28,5· 
55,8 94,0 97,7 13,3 28,5 
48,8 121,8 150,2 4,1 21,4 
52,4 105,0 117,7 8,0 17,3 
49,8 99,9 110,8 8,8 24,1 
52,7 109,2 125,4 7,0 20,4 
55,2 107,0 118,1 4,8 14,8 
59,9 107,9 119,8 4,1 12,3 
4<&,4 108,3 128,1 2,5 7,9 
55,3 130,7 188,8 4,5 17,8 
85,5 91,1 82,3 4,8 32,8 
43,8 152,4 215,7 4,7 15,3 
47,8 105,1 113,1 5,9 14,9 
58,7 115,9 133,2 31,8 38,0 
104,5 105,2 230,3 19,7 35,5 
158,8 103,7 123,0 7,5 15,2 
42,1 99,8 117,3 3,8 10,8 
50,5 103,0 114,8 - .3.8 10,8 
45,2 102,1 107,2 18,1 28,7 
47,8 114,7 127,0 17,8 33,8 
49,3 108,3 115,7 8,4 25,1 
51,2 109,1 115,2 8,3 18,8 
43,1 108,4 121,0 - 7,7 19,5 
Source: Yearbook of Industrial Statistics, 1984, pp. 118-119. 
in 
1975 1 1981 I 1982 
41,5 105,9 120,5 
22,7 109,5 145,1 
4<&,8 79,8 87,2 
49,7 74,0 109,2 
43,2 109,1 112,7 
70,3 109,9 114,8 
38,9 105,5 118,8 
45,1 113,5 128,3 
45,1 112,4 123,8 
48,3 120,8 138,8 
4<&,9 104,3 112,9 
42,0 107,0 111,5 
50,4 112,1 ~24,8 
40,7 101,1 103,8 
54,1 108,8 118,8 
35,3 127,8 157,2 
38,9 124,0 143,2 
43,2 115,8 131,1 
43,5 120,9 141,4 
38,7 129,1 150,7 
38,9 132,2 134,8 
28,3 112,0 124,7 
34,8 108,0 103,7 
83,4 88,2 100,3 
27,5 108,9 101,9 
39,0 118,8 125,4 
!58,4 111,8 124,0 
77,5 114,3 221,2 
43,1 107,1 123,8 
31,9 109,8 117,5 
43,3 .114,1 125,9 
38,3 85,3 85,8 
80,9 118,5 122,5 
47,3 118,2 130,8 
40,4 104,2 118,8 
41,0 115,7 133,0 
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T~ble 2: Average Firm Size in the European Community's 
Manufacturing Industries 
Average Number of Employees in Firms 
NACE 
No. Industries 
22 Production of preliminary 
processing of metals 
23 Extraction of minerals 
24 Manufacture of non-metallic 
mineral products 
25 Chemical industry 
3 1 Manufacture of metal articles 
32 Mechanical engineering 
3 3 Manufacture of office machinery 
and data processing machinery 
34 Electrical engineering 
3 5 Manufacture of motor vehicles 
3 6 Manufacture of other means 
of transport 
37 Instrument engineering 
41 Food industry 
43 Textile industry 
44 Leather industry 
45 Footwear and clothing industry 
46 Timber and wooden furniture 
industry 
4 7 Manufacture of paper and paper 
products; printing and publishing 
48 Processing of rubber and plastics 
49 Other manufacturing industries 
Years Slope of Trend 
1975 1982 1975-82 
548.2 
84.8 
132.7 
326.3 
110.6 
175.1 
977.5 
405.3 
704.7 
477.2 
134.9 
163.1 
150.7 
72.5 
104.5 
75.7 
128.3 
158.3 
93.7 
486.4 
89.2 
127.9 
327.3 
100.8 
158.5 
748.1 
339.2 
697.8 
492.7 
116.8 
163.1 
132.3 
66.8 
99.1 
72.4 
117.0 
145.3 
83.9 
-6.486 
0.426 
-1.540 
-0.235 
-1.460 
-2.576 
-27.156 
-10.642 
2.030 
1.374 
-2.581 
-0.694 
-3.507 
-0.827 
-1.385 
-0.514 
-1.510 
-2.045 
-1.458 
Source: Own calculation from 'CRONOS SEF VISA' 
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Table 3: Estimates of Economies of Scale 
NACE Industry Minimum Efficient Unit Cost Year Source 
No. Scale Increase 
(MES) 1/3 1/2 
MES MES 
140.1 Mineral oil 10 million tons/year <5% 1982 DIW 
refining 10 million tons/year 5% 1969 Pratten 
5.95 million tons/year 3% 1967 Weiss 
10 million tons/year 4.8% 1965 Scherer 
221 Steel 9.6-12 million tons/y >10% 1982 DIW 
(integrated 4.1 million tons/year 8% 1969 Pratten 
plants) 3.6 million tons/year 10% 1967 Weiss 
3.6 million tons/year 11% 1965 Scherer 
241 Bricks 35 million a year 30% 1982 Schwalbach 
25 million a year 25% 1969 Pratten 
242.1 Cement 1.3 million tons/year 39.9% 1982 Schwalbach 
1.0 million tons/year 38.2% 1972 Schwalbach 
2.0 million tons/year 9% 1969 Pratten 
1.2 million tons/year 26% 1965 Scherer 
247.2 Glass Bottles 133,000 tons a year 11% 1965 Scherer 
180,000 tons a year 13% 1982 Schwalbach 
251 Basic industrial chemicals 
... Ethylene 500,000 tons/year 5-10% 1982 DIW 
* Sulphuric 350,000 tons/year 5-10% 1982 DIW 
acid 1 million tons/year 1% 1969 Pratten 
... Ammonia 550,000 tons/year 5-10% 1982 DIW 
* Synthetic 60,000 tons/year 15% 1969 Pratten 
rubber 
... Synthetic 40,000 tons/year 7% 1969 Pratten 
yam 
* Synthetic 80,000 tons/year 5% 1969 Pratten 
polymer 
255 Paint 38 million litre/year 4.4% 1965 Scherer 
258.1 Soap and 70,000 tons/year 2.5% 1969 Pratten 
detergents 
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Table 3 , cont. 
260 Man-made fibres 
* Acrylic 19,278 tons/year 9.5% 1967 Weiss 
fibres 
* Polyester 18,144 tons/year 10% 1967 Weiss 
fibres 
* Cellulosic 31,752 tons/year 5% 1967 Weiss 
fibres 
321.1 Combine 20,000 units/year 10% 1982 DIW 
harvester 
321.2 Tractors 90,000 units/year 6% 1982 DIW 
330 Electronic 500,000 units/year 5-10% 1982 DIW 
typewriters 
343.2 Auto 1 million units/year 4.6% 1965 Scherer I batteries 345.1 T.V. sets 1.3-2.2 million units/y 5% 1982 DIW 
346 Fridges 800,000 units/year 6.5% 1965 Scherer 
machines 500,000 units/year 8% 1969 Pratten 
1.5 million units/year 12% 1982 DIW 
Washing 500,000 units/year 8% 1969 Pratten 
machines 800,000 units/year 7.5% 1980 MUller/ 
I Owen 351 Cars 500,000 units/year 15% 1982 DIW 
Trucks· 200,000 units/year 12% 1982 DIW 
363.1 Bicycles 100,000 units/year 4% 1969 Pratten 
427.1 Beer 2.8 million hi/year 18% 1981 Schwalbach 
brewing 2.0 million hi/year 14% 1974 Schwalbach 
3.0 million hi/year 7% 1980 Cockerill 
' 1.6 million hi/year 9% 1969 Pratten 
~ ,. 
I 5.3 million hi/year 5% 1965 Scherer I 
2.4 million hi/year 10% 1967 Weiss I 
I 429 Cigarettes 70 billion units/year 3% 1982 DIW 
36 billion units/year 2.2% 1965 Scherer 
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Table 3. cont. 
451 
481.1 
Source: 
Footwear 4,000 pairs a week 1.5% 1980 Muller/ 
Owen 
Leather shoes 1 million pairs/year 1.5% 1965 Scherer 
Shoes 300,000 pairs/year 2% 1969 Pratten 
Car tyres 9 million units/year 5-10% 1982 DIW 
16,500 units/day 5% 1967 Weiss 
DIW (1985), Empirische Untersuchung von industriellen Gr<>Ben-
vorteilen (Economies of Scale) nach der Methode der 
Ingenieurschatzungen, Berlin. 
Muller, J. and Owen, N. (1983), Economic Effects of Free Trade in 
Manufacturing Products within the EC, Berlin. 
Pratten, C.F. (1971), Economies of Scale in Manufacturing Industry, 
Cambridge. 
Scherer, F.M. et al. (1975), The Economics of Multi-Plant Operations, 
Cambridge. 
Schwalbach, J. (1984), AusmaB und Entwicklung von Gr<>Benvor-
teilen in der deutschen Bier- und Zementindustrie, 
Berlin. 
Schwalbach, J. (1987), Gr<>Benvorteile im verarbeitenden Gewerbe, 
mimeo, Berlin. 
Weiss, L.W. (1976), Optimal Plant Size and the Extent of Suboptimal 
Capacity, in: R.T. Masson and P.D. Qualls (eds.), Essays on 
• Industrial Organization in Honor of Joe S. Bain, 
Cambridge, pp. 123-141. 
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Table i: Regression Results on Plant Size Deviation and Inter-
national Trade 
Dependent variable: Ratio of average plant size and minimum 
efficient plant size 
Regression Coefficients 
Number Market Cost 
Country Year of cases Constant size gradient Exports Imports R2 
FRO 1965 22 
1982 20 
UK 1982 19 
0.181*** 0.0004 0.042 
(5.05) (0.94) 
0.194*** 0.0004 0.125 0.047 
(3.32) (0.86) (0.29) 
-0.382* . 0.0007* 0.182 0.443** 0.240 
(-1.39) (1.58) (0.44) (2.14) 
-0.225 0.0007* 0.219 0.425** -0.166 0.250 
(-0.52) (1.56) (0.51) (1.98) (-0.48) 
0.217*** 0.002** 0.156 
(4.66) (1.83) 
0.262*** 0.0014• 0.372 0.182 
(3.37) (1.65) (0.73) 
-0.574** 0.002*** 0.115 0.562*** 0.438 
(-1.81) (2.67) (0.25) (2.70) 
-0.079 
(-0.14) 
0.0016** 0.257 0.353 -0.319 0.478 
(1.73) (0.53) (1.24) (-1.07) 
0.653*** 
(4.94) 
-0.105*** -0.133 
(-3.36) (-0.43) 
-0.510*** -0.198 -0.887 
(-3.29) (-0.61) (-0.79) 
-0.221 ••• -0.145 -0.422 0.714** 
(-3.39) (-0.45) (-1.10) (2.34) 
-0.599*** 0.365 
(-3.21) 
0.011 
0.048 
0.303 
-0.201*** -0.143 -0.417 0.724** -0.056 0.303 
( -3 .06) ( -0.43) ( -1.07) (2.05) ( -0.06) 
Significance levels: ••• 1%, •• 5%, * 10%, two-tailed test. 
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Table 5: 
NACE 
No. 
14 
22 
23 
24 
25 
31 
32 
34 
35 
37 
41/42 
43 
45 
46 
47 
48 
3.34 
Plant Size Deviation in Manufacturing Industries 
in the Federal Republic of Germany, 1979-1985. 
Industries 
Mineral oil refining 
Production and preliminary 
processing of metals 
Extraction of minerals 
Manufacture of non-metallic 
mineral product 
Chemical industry 
Manufacture of metal articles 
Mechanical engineering 
Electrical engineering 
Manufacture of motor vehicles 
Instrument engineering 
Food, drink, and tobacco 
Textile industry 
Footwear and clothing 
Timber and wooden furniture 
Manufacture of paper and 
paper products; printing 
and publishing 
Ratio of Average Plant Size and 
Minimum Efficient Plant Size (MES) 
1979 
0.40 
0.44 
0.60 
0.53 
0.28 
0.45 
0.35 
0.33 
0.53 
0.44 
0.50 
0.54 
. 
0.63 
0.62 
0.50 
1985 
0.60 
0.62 
1.20 
0.82 
0.37 
0.54 
0.42 
0.50 
1.08 
0.58 
0.68 
0.64 
0.78 
0.75 
0.59 
Processing of rubber and plastics 0.46 0.56 
- 202 - 3.35 
Table 6: Empirical Results on the Determinants of Plant Sizes 
in the Federal Republic of Germany 
Dependent variables: D 1 = Average plant size/MIDPOINT plant size 
D 2 = Average plant sizetrOP50 plant size 
Independent 1979 
variables 
Industries 
A 11 Producer Consumer 
Dl Dl D2 Dl Dl 
Exports, total 0.015*** 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.0014 
(3.07) (5.28) (2. 76) (0.17) 
intra 0.320*** 
(3.15) 
Imports, intra -0.060 
( -0. 77) 
Seller concentration -0.0006*** -0.0007** -0.0001 -0.001 * -0.001 ** 
( -1.98) ( -2.05) ( -0.61) (-1.41) (-2.84) 
Market size 0.00009** 0.00008* 0.00005 0.0002*** 0.00002 
(1.73) (1.32) (0. 70) (2.42) (0.29) 
Demand growth 0.105 0.071 0.095** -0.028 0.113 
(1.26) (0. 78) ( 1. 98) (-0.23) (1.12) 
Labor productivity 0.00001 -0.00001 -0.00001 0.00005 -0.00004 
(0.22) ( -0.28) (-0.17) (0.08) ( -0.05) 
Multi-plant operation 0.007 0.012 0.004 0.002 0.037* 
(0.48) (0. 72) (0.50) (0.09) (1.65) 
Constant 0.332*** 0.283** 0.092** 0.406** 0.372*** 
(3.73) (2.51) ( 1. 80) (3.34) (3.11) 
R2 0.215 0.184 0.282 0.381 0.212 
No. of cases 102 102 102 49 53 
Significance levels: *** 1%, ** 5%, and * 10%, two-tailed test. 
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Table 6: cont. 
Independent 1 9 8 5 
variables 
Industries 
A II Producer Consumer 
goods goods 
Dl Dl 02 Dl Dl 
Exports, total 0.039*** 0.020*** 0.043*** -0.0019 
(4.83) (4.12) (3 .41) (-0.16) 
intra 0.655*** 
(3.91) 
Imports, intra -0.055 
( -0.82) 
Seller concentration -0.00001 0.000007 0.00001 -0.00002 0.00004 
(-0.19) (0.18) (0.28) (-0.41) (0.97) 
Market size 0.0002*** 0.0003*** 0.0001* 0.0004*** 0.0001 
(3.91) (4.47) (1.61) (4.84) (1.28) 
Demand Growth 0.267*** 0.374*** 0.144*** 0.112 0.161** 
(2.86) (3.68) (2.60) (0.66) ( 1. 77) 
Labor productivity 0.000003 -0.00004 0.00002 -0.00004 -0.00001 
(0.08) ( -0.80) (0.95) ( -0.68) (-0.17) 
Multi-plant operation -0.101** -0.083* -0.198*** -0.436** -0.078** 
( -2.28) ( -1.64) ( -2.58) (-1.71) ( -2.09) 
Constant 0.240*** 0.006 0.094** 0.244** 0.480*** 
(3.17) (0.042) (2.09) (2.00) (5.39) 
R2 0.438 0.390 0.539 0.691 0.177 
No. of cases 105 105 105 52 53 
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Table 7: Determinants of Plant Size Deviation in the United 
Kingdom 
Dependent variable: Average plant size/TOP50 plant size 
Independent variables 1979 1983 
Exports, total 0.006 0.020 
(0.23) (0. 76) 
Imports, total -0.002 -0.001 
( -0.65) (-0.23) 
Seller concentration 0.124** 0.151** 
(2.33) (2.32) 
Market size 0.0006*** 0.0005*** 
(7 .92) (8.00) 
Demand growth 0.181** 0.080* 
(2.63) (4.52) 
Labor productivity 0.0002 -0.002 
(0.08) (-0.73) 
Multi-plant operation 0.005 0.149* 
(0.35) (1.33) 
Constant 0.194*** -0.038 
(2.62) ( -0.28) 
R2 0.466 0.424 
No. of cases 103 103 
- 205 -
4.1 
CHAPTER 4 
Economies of Scale and the integration 
of the European Economy: 
the Case of Italy 
Rodolfo Helg, Pippo Ranci 
Istituto per la Ricerca Sociale 

- 207 -
r. 
II. 
L 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
4.2 
Contents 
The Extent of sub-optimal capacity at the 
plant level 
Introduction 
Problems of data and specification 
Regression results 
Further analysis 
Elasticities 
Conclusions 
Appendix A: Data 
Appendix B: Discussion of the model 
References 
Case Studies 
L The approach adopted 
2. Pharmaceutical industry 
References 
3. Telecommunication industry 
References 
4. Railways equipment industry 
References 
4.6 
4.7 
4.7 
4.10 
4.12 
4.15 
4.16 
4.17 
4.20 
4.29 
4.30 
4.31 
4.33 
4.46 
4.47 
4.64 
4.65 
4.77 
- 208 -
4.3 
Tables 
I. The extent of sub-optimal capacity at the plant 
level 
Table 1: 
Table 2: 
Table 3: 
Table A1: 
Table A2: 
Table A3: 
Correlation matrix 
Regression analysis of determinants 
of relative plant size: trade variables 
defined on a world basis 
Regression analysis of determinants of 
relative plant size: trade variables 
defined on an EEC basis 
List of the sectors entering the sample 
Values of the variable 
Regression results: dependent variable 
DIMRL 1 4.19 
II. Case Studies 
Pharmaceutical products 
Table 1: 
Table 2: 
Table 3: 
Table 4: 
Table 5: 
Manufacture of pharmaceutical products 
(NACE 257) Size distribution: plants and 
firms 
Manufacture of pharmaceutical products 
(NACE 257) - 1981. International 
comparison of size distributions: firms 
Share of domestic market controlled by 
foreign capital 
Market share of Italian firms in some 
foreign countries 
Exposure to international competition 
4.9 
4.11 
4.13 
4.18 
4.19 
4.19 
4.40 
4.41 
4.42 
4.42 
4.43 
- 209 -
Table 6: 
Table 7: 
Table 8: 
Table 9: 
Table 10: 
4.4 
Exposure to international competition 
Private and public expenditure of 
prescription drugs in pharmacy 
Incidence of pharmaceutical public 
expenditure on GDP (%) 
Composition of public consumption 
for finished drugs 
Analysis of sales according to 
nationality of firms and to groups 
of PTN - 1981 
Telecommunications Equipment 
Table 1: 
Table 2: 
Table 3: 
Table 4: 
Table 5: 
Table 6: 
Table 7: 
Table 8: 
Table 9: 
Manufacture of telecommunications 
equipment, electrical and electronics 
equipment (NACE 344.2) - size 
distribution: plants and firms 
Shares of switching technologies 
(1 January 1985) 
Manufacture of telecommunications 
equipment, electrical and electronic 
equipment - 1981. International 
comparison ~f firm size distribution 
Public switches: shares of the market 
generated by SIP's purchases 
European market in public switches. 
Market shares - 1987 
Distribution of Italian market for 
Transmission Equipment - 1984 
Distribution of the market generated by 
SIP purchases of transmission equipment 
- 1985 
Distribution of Italian market for 
terminal equipment - 1985 
Foreign trade and production 
4.43 
4.44 
4.44 
4.45 
4.45 
4.57 
4.58 
4.58 
4.59 
4.60 
4.61 
4.61 
4.62 
4.62 
- 210 -
Table 10: 
Table 11: 
4.5 
Italian foreign trade in TCL narrowly 
defined (SITC 764) (million$) 1985 
Italian export intensity and import 
penetration 
Railways Equipment 
Table 1: 
Table 2: 
Table 3: 
Table 4: 
Table 5: 
Table 6: 
Table 7: 
Table 8: 
Table 9: 
Percentage distribution of the market 
according to its segments 
Manufacture of railway equipment 
Manufacture of railway equipment (NACE 
362). International comparison of the 
firm aize distribution: 1981 
Products characterized by mechanical 
technology. Share of total employment 
Products characterized by electrical 
technology (traction). Share of total 
employment 
Electrical fixed installations. Share 
of total employment 
Exposure to international competition 
Share in the export of the 9 largest 
producing countries 
Export market share of the principal 
European exporting countries (average 
for years 1975 - 81) 
4.63 
4.63 
4.71 
4.72 
4. 73 
4.73 
4.74 
4.74 
4.75 
4.75 
4.76 
- 211 - 4.6 
I. The extent of sub-optimal capacity at the plant level 
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1. Introduction 
Ther·e are three main possible sources of economic gain arising 
from the adoption of the Internal Market Programme: increased 
specialization in accor·dance with the law of comparative advantage, 
changes in economic efficiency brought about by increased competit1on, 
and increased production levels due to a better exploitation of 
economies of scale made possible by the increase in the size of the 
market. 
The aim of the work by Muller and Owen (1985) is to analyze the 
last sour·ce. More precisely they consider the effect of trade on the 
deviation of the representative plant size from the minimum efficient 
technical scale <METS> at the industrial level. 
2. Problems of data and specification 
In our analys1s for Italy we have followed the type of 
speciflcation proposed by Muller· and Owen (1985). The sample adopted 
consists of 14 industrial sectors <see Appendix A, table Al>. 
The sector·s consider·ed in the sample are only 14 because of the 
problem of matching the engineering estimates 
official data on production, trade and number 
A general problem with this type of data is 
of METS with the 
of plants. 
the highly detailed 
disaggregation with which METS estimates are supplied. We have adopted 
the highest available disaggregation level <NACE 4 or J digits>. 
When official data wer·e more aggr·egate than METS estimates, the 
1mplicit assumption was that these estimates are representative for 
the whole sector. 
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Muller and Owen define the1r dependent var·iable as the ratio 
between CAPS <the average size of the largest plants accounting for 50 
per· cent of industry output> and METS. 
Such definition, although preferable in principle, has been found 
to be inapplicable because we lack physical output distributions by 
size of plant for most industries. The problems arise in variuos 
European countries. We had to redefine the numerator in a way that 
corresponds to available data. 
Our first choice was the average plant size, simply defined as 
the ratio between total industry output and the number of plants in 
the 1ndustry. The results reported in Section II, 2 are referred to 
such def1n1tion of the dependent variable <we called it: DIMRL>. 
The independent variables are: 
the increase in unit costs at 1/3 of METS <COST>; 
domest1c market size, measured by the ratio between domest1c 
disappearance and METS <SIZE>. Domestic d1sappearance <or apparent 
consumption> is defined as Production + Impor·ts Exports 
- export intensity measured by one plus the ratio between exports 
and production <ESP> 
import penetration measured by one minus the r·atio between 
imports and domestic disappearance <IMP>. 
All the variables are 1982-83 averages. 
As a. first step, it is useful to analyze the correlation matrix 
<see Table 1>. Ther·e is a strong positive carrel ati on between relative 
plant dimension <DIMRL> and domestic market size <SIZE> <r=0.79>. 
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Tab. 1 - Correlation matrix 
DIMRL COST SIZE ESP ESPEEC IMP IMPEEC 
DIMRL 1 
COST 0.10 1 
SIZE 0.79 -0.02 1 
ESF' 0.55 -0.51 0.63 1 
ESF'EEC 0.63 -0.40 0.64 0.87 1 
IMF' 0.33 0.42 0.20 -0.06 -0.03 1 
IMF'EEC 0.33 0.09 0.21 -0.12 -0.17 0.53 1 
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Relative plant dimension is also directly correlated with export 
intensity (r=0.55). Further, DIMLR shows a very low positive 
cor·relation with import penetration CIMF') and a negligible correlation 
with the cost gradient (COST). 
The correlation matr·i:< also gives us some information about the 
degree of multicollinearity among our variables. The evidence in Table 
1 suggests that multicollinearity is a problem in our sample: there is 
a high positive correlation between relative domestic market size and 
export intensity and a negative correlation between the cost gradient 
and export intensity. 
This feature of our sample will have an influence on our ability 
to disentangle the contribution of the various independent variables 
in the "explanation" of the variance of the dependent variable. 
3. Regression results 
The results of regres~ion analysis are presented in Table 2. We 
have chosen an additive linear specification with all the variables 
specified in their natural level. In eq. 2.1 all estimated 
coefficients are, as expected, positive. The positive sign of the 
impor·t penetration coefficient cor·responds to the "mar·ket reducing 
effect" hypothesis. However·, only for· the market size variable we can 
reject the hypothesis that the coefficient is zero at a significance 
level of 90~. The overall explanatory power· of the r·egressione is 
good for a cross-section analysis (the determination coefficient is 
0.69). 
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Tab. 2 - Regression analysis of determinants of relative plant 
size*: trade variables defined on a world basis. 
Dependent variable: DIMRL 
Constant SIZE COST ESP IMP R2 adj-R2 
eq. 2.1 -0.219 0.003 0.002 0.149 0.073 0.69 0.56 
(-1. 14) (2.20) (0. 81> ( 1. 03) (0. 79)! 
eq. 2.2 0.030 0.004 0.61 0.58 
( 1. 27> (4.37) 
eq. 2.3 -0.486 0.004 0.369 0.090 0.53 0.39 
(-2.77) (1. 43) (2.97) (0. 83> ! 
* F1gures in brackets are t-statistics 
F 
5.09 
19.13 
3.73 
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To understand whether multicollinearity creates problems in the 
interpretation of the results, it is useful to compare eq. 2.2 (in 
which all independent variables but SIZE have been excluded) and eq. 
2.1. If the excluded variables had an explicative power independently 
from SIZE, we should obser·ve a reduction in the adjusted R-squared of 
the new regr·essi on. The comparison of the two regr·essi ons reveals that 
this is not the case and, hence, that in our model all the explicative 
power is captured by the domestic market size variable. 
This in not to say that there is a lack of relationship between 
the other independent variables and relative plant size. We have 
alr·eady noted fr·om the correlation matrix that there is, for example, 
a relatively good positive simple correlation between export intensity 
and relative plant size. Moreover, eq. 2.3 shows that when relative 
domestic market size is omitted from the analysis, the other variables 
have some explanatory power. The conclusion is that variables like 
export intensity explain the same portion of the variance of the 
dependent variable as domestic market s1ze; in other words, ESP seems 
not to capture elements different from those already taken into 
consideration by SIZE. 
4. Further analysis 
The conclusion exposed above seems to be in contrast with the 
find1ngs of Owen (1983> and Muller· and Owen <1985> concer·ning the role 
of export performance in increasing the market facing the firm through 
displacement of marginal competitors in the exporter's own industry. 
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Tab. 3 - Reg~ession analysis of dete~minants of ~elative plant 
size*: t~ade va~iables defined on a EEC basis. 
Dependent va~iable: DIMRL 
Constant SIZE COST ESPEEC IMPEEC R2 adj-R2 
eq. 3.1 -0.743 0.002 0.004 0.429 0.013 0.79 0.70 
(-2.58) ( 1. 48) ( 1. 86) (2.45) ( 1. 94) ! 
eq. 3.2 -0.115 0.004 0.001 0.151 I 0.65 0.55 
(-0.72) (3.96) (0.60) (0. 83) ! 
* Fi gLtr·es in br-ackets a~e t-statistics 
F 
8.62 
6.33 
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In order to explore the role of international trade in a more 
complete way, we have substituted the two trade variables <ESP and 
IMP> with two analogous variables constructed on the basis of trade 
flows with the EEC <ESPEEC and IMPEEC>. The results <Table 3, eq.3.1) 
show a clear· improvement in the explicative power of the regression 
<the deter·mination coefficient rises from 0.69 to 0.79>. What is even 
more relevant is the increased role played by the two new trade 
variables; their estimated coefficients are significantly different 
from zero at a significance level larger than 90%. 
A possible explanation of this result lies in the different 
determinants of Italian foreign trade according to the different 
geographical destination or origin of trade flows. Mor·e precisely, 
intra-EEC trade, being mainly of the intra-industry kind, finds one of 
its determinants in economies of scale. This characteristic is 
certainly less evident at the level of total Italian world trade, 
since part of it (especially trade with less developed countries> is 
explained by the 
between eq. 2.1 
principle of comparative 
and eq. 3.1 stresses 
advantage. The compar·i son 
the relationship between 
relative plant size and export intensity based on economies of scale. 
In relation to the other independent variables in eq. 3.1, it 
should be noted that the estimated coefficient of relative domestic 
market size loses significance with respect to eq. 2.1. This is a sign 
of multicolhnearity, since in eq. 3.2, where the ESPEEC variable has 
been omitted, the significance level of the estimated coefficient of 
SIZE is substantially increased. Moreover, contrary to the results in 
Table 2, the omiss1on of ESPEEC causes a drop in the explicative power 
of the regression <the adjusted R-squared falls from 0.70 to 0.55). 
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Ther·efor·e, the role of the export var·iable is str·engthened in our· 
second set of results, implying a relationship between a larger 
European market and the size of industrial plants. 
5. Elasticities 
Finally, we present tha values of the trade elasticities. These 
have been computed at the average level of the relevant variables. The 
elasticities tell us the percentage increase of relative plant size 
when the relevant trade variable varies by 1 percent (and all other 
independent var·i abl es remain constant). 
Computing these elasticities both for eq. 2.1 <trade flows with 
the rest of the world) and for eq. 3.1 (trade flows with the EEC) we 
obtain the following results: 
Trade flows with 
wor·l d 
Ceq. 2. 1> 
EEC 
Ceq. 3. 1) 
elasticity relative to: 
export intensity import intensity 
2.12 - 0.58 
5.45 - 3.10 
Combining these results and assuming balanced growth in trade 
flows, so that both export and import intensities grow by 1~, relative 
plant size would increase by 1.54~ when we consider Italian trade with 
the rest of the world, and by 2.35~ when we consider Italian trade 
with the EEC. 
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6. Conclusions 
Th1s study has analysed the relationship between relative plant 
size and a set of variables compr1sing relative domestic market size 
and trade variables. 
The results have confirmed the importance of relative domestic 
market size in shaping the extent of suboptimal plant capacity. The 
trade variables, when defined relatively to Italian world trade, don't 
have an explicative role independent from the domestic market size 
variable. However, when defined relatively to Italian trade with the 
EEC, they tend to assume an autonomous role: the extent of suboptimal 
plant capacity tends to be inversely correlated to the Italian 
export 1ntensity with the EEC and directly to the import penetration 
from the EEC. 
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Appendix A - Data 
The main statistical sou~ces a~e: 
fo~ the METS estimates : Pratten (1987> 
fo~ the number· of plants : 1981 Census (JSTAT> 
fo~ p~oduction data 
(I STAT> 
Annuario di Statistiche Indust~iali 
for t~ade va~iables: Annua~io di Comme~cio Este~o CISTAT>. 
The secto~s considered are l1sted in table A.l. The values of 
variables a~e reported in table A.2. 
We wer·e awar·e of a majo~ weakness connected with the adoption of 
the ave~age plant size as a measu~e of the rep~esentative plant size: 
the Census p~ovides us with a number of plants which is greater than 
the numbe~ which can be considered economically meaningful. Fo~ this 
~eason we have t~ied a fi~st ~ough adjustment; we have computed the 
number of plants in which a~e enrolled the higher 90~ of the 
employees. Simila~ly we have taken into conside~ation 90~ of 
p~oduction and t~ade va~iables. The regression results ~elative to 
this set of "adjusted" va~iables ar·e presented in Table A.3, wher·e the 
dependent va~iable, defined as indicated above, is called DIMRLl. The 
results a~e not very satisfacto~y: the explanatory powe~ is lower than 
that of the ~eg~essions in Table 2 and 3 and the coefficient of 
relative domestic market size disappears. 
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Tab. A.1 -List of the sectors entering our sample (in brackets 
ar·e the corresponding NACE Group): 
1 • Mineral Oil Refining ( 140. 1) 
.., 
..... Steel (221) 
3. Cement (242) 
4. Glass bottles (247.2) 
5. Paint (255) 
6. Ball bearings (326.2) 
.., 
r • T.V. sets (345.1) 
8. Fridges and washing machines (346) 
9. Cars and trucks (351) 
10. Byci c:1 es (363) 
11. Beer· brewing <427> 
12. Ci gar·et tes (429> 
13. Leather· shoes (451) 
14. Tyres (481. 1> 
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Table A. 2 - Values of the variable 
==================================================================== 
obs DIMRL SIZE COST ESP IMP 
--------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------------1 0.076950 8.447546 
2 0.018320 4.887607 
3 0.199820 30.52772 
4 0.079192 12.62783 
5 0.031180 30.36715 
6 0.106839 1.031556 
7 0.001572 4.628425 
8 0.014728 11.24129 
9 0.019133 4.278750 
10 0.243052 17.22676 
11 0.120192 4.888236 
12 0.009375 4.988617 
13 0.369171 75.28520 
14 0.040928 1.870389 
--------------------------------
--------------------------------
obs ESPEEC IMPEEC 
--------------------------------
--------------------------------
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
1.071853 
1.052878 
1. 000234 
1.102610 
1.080464 
1.175213 
1.194701 
1.192782 
1. 231858 
1. 338946 
1.002955 
1.005451 
1.531160 
1.004201 
0.959930 
0.931055 
0.998286 
0.957359 
0.822852 
0.792949 
0.768975 
0.988244 
0.596886 
0.973909 
0.909688 
0.922388 
0.939696 
0.994773 
================================ 
5.000000 1.203405 
10.00000 1.108328 
39.90000 1. 013013 
11.00000 1.158928 
4.400000 1. 322770 
9.000000 1.327744 
5.000000 1.307634 
9.700000 1. 275459 
14.70000 1. 354893 
4.000000 1.474682 
18.00000 1. 007383 
3.000000 1.009719 
1.500000 1.841860 
7.500000 1.404775 
Tab. A.3- Regression results. dependent var1able DIMRL 1• 
0.732884 
0.902384 
0.994892 
0.944145 
0.757259 
0.686707 
0.274220 
0.992585 
0.541265 
0.941284 
0.878635 
0.238210 
0.697140 
0.729379 
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Constant SIZE COST ESF' IMF' R" adJ-R2 F .:... 
-0.657 
-0.002 0.006 0.572 0.080 0.34 0.05 1.18 (-1. 61) (-0.78) (1.12) ( 1 . 89) (0.43) 
• Fig•Jl~es in bra,:kets a1~e t-shtisti,:s 
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AppendiK B - Discussion of the model 
The appr·oach adopted by Muller· and Owen is derived from the .work 
of Scherer et al. (1975>. They try to explain the differences between 
observed and optimal plant sizes by taking into consideration 
location (theoretic) variables, market size var1ables and market 
imperfections variables. All the analysis relies on the assumption 
that plant/cost curves show increasing returns up to some min1mum 
efficient scale, and constant returns afterwards. 
Location theoretic variables 
Scherer et al. <1975) show that, if unit tr·anspor·t costs ar·e 
included in the standard cost minimizing problem, the plant size 
chosen will be greater the less steep is the upward slope of the unit 
distribution cost curve and the steeper is the downward slope of the 
unit production cost curve. 
Assuming evenly d1str-ibuted demand, circular· markets and uniform 
costs of shipping one unit of output one rad1al mile, it can be shown 
that the slope of the unit distribution cost curve increases with 
fre1ght rates and decreases w1th geographical demand density and with 
plant's share of market. 
Hence a steeper slope of the un1t product1on cost curve, lower 
transport costs, a higher demand density, and a higher concentration 
<as a proxy of market share> bring about a greater relative plant 
s1 ze. 
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Market size variables 
Domestic market size can explain why plant size can be smaller 
than METS (minimum efficient technical scale>. 
First, some markets may be too small to support even a single 
plant of METS. 
Second, even 1f a small market is large enough for a METS plant, 
on the demand side the buyers might exhibit a preference for having at 
least two alternative supply sources. The rational beh1nd th1s 
preference l1es in the security against total interruption of suppl1es 
and in the "bargaining power· conferred by being able to play one 
producer off against the other·". 
Third, dynamic considerations should enter the analysis."The 
smaller the mar~et is for any given growth rate, the more time it 
takes to accumulate a demand increment sufficient to absorb the 
capacity of a new METS plant". 
Moreover, in an oligopol1stic market, if firms attempt to 
maintain their market share in the face of a limited growth in demand, 
they face a trade-off between carrying excess capacity for· a 
protracted period and sacrificing scale economies. They would be 
readier to carry excess capacity if METS is small relative to the 
market, market shares are large, and demand growth is fast. 
Muller and Owen (1985) criticize the share maintenance hypothesis 
(also "spher·es of influence" hypothesis) when refer·red to European 
business, claiming that it contrad1cts the observed fast growth of 
intra-EEC trade. In fact one of the implications of that assumpt1on 
is that intra-EEC trade should have been lower in those industr1es 
where industrial concentration was higher. On the contrary, Owen 
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(1983) found that intra-EEC trade for most manufacturing industries 
was weakly positively associated to industr·ial concentration. As a 
consequence, accor·ding to Muller and Owen, ·seller concentration should 
not enter as an explicative factor· in the dynamic consideration. 
The domestic market doesn't represent the actual market facing 
the plant; also the export market should be taken into consideration. 
The relationship between the export market and relative plant size 
is similar to that between domestic market and plant size. In 
addition, however, Owen ( 1983) and Muller· and Owen < 1985> str·ess 
that, if an aggressive business behavior is assumed, export 
performance has an influence on the displacement of smaller plants in 
the exporting industry and not only in the importing one. The idea is 
based on the observation that, in a given industry, plants of 
different size coexist. This may be partly explained by the costs of 
driving out smaller high cost competitors; these costs are determined 
"by the shor·t ter·m penalties which arise fr·om the need to oper·ate 
larger capacity at below full utilization during the period prior to 
the withdr·awal of the high cost competitor, more especially if the low 
cost competitor feels it necessary to reduce prices prior to the 
retirement of the smaller competitor" <Owen (1983>, p.18). On the 
other side of the balance, there are "the additional profits which 
will accrue to the larger, low cost producer over the life of its 
plant as a result of driving out smaller· competitors". The 
opportun1ties offered by international trade raise the expected gains 
of predatory act1ons: as a consequence the mar·gi nal producer becomes 
more vulnerable in both the export and the domestic market. 
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Import penetration may have, on an apriori ground, two 
contrasting effects. On the one hand, imports may spur firms to build 
plants of efficient size to meet or beat competition. On the other· 
hand, imports may indicate sector·s in which a country has comparative 
disadvantage. 
Tariffs might have a residual role in explaining suboptimal 
plants. In this case a negative relationship between tariff levels 
and relat1ve plant scale is predicted. 
A further element connected with market size, is the diversity of 
plant's output mix. As underlined by Caves et al. <1980) and by 
Baldwin and Gorecki (1986>, if the market for a particular product 
lim1ts a specialized plant to suboptimal scale, a possible response 
for the manager is to diversify the plant's output mix. 
The importance of considering this element stems both from recent 
developments in the theory of industrial organization <which specify 
rigorously the conditions under which production of many products in 
one plant is more efficient than production in many plants> and by the 
fact that firm's decisions as to the number of products, length of 
pr·oduction run and number· of plants are taken jointly. 
Unfor·tunatel y, with the exception of Baldwin and Gor·ecki <1986), most 
of the empirical literature has only taken into consideration the 
plant size dimension. 
Principal Results 
The regression analysis performed by Scher·er et al. is based on a 
pooled sample of 12 sectors and 6 countries with data referring to the 
mid-sixties. 
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An idea of the results they obtained for the pooled sample is as 
follows: 
TOP 50 = 
METS 
.59 SIZE+ .14 COST- .17 TRANS- .07 DENS+ .82 MS3 
( • 41> ( • 11) ( • 06 ) ( • 06) ( • 1 0) 
+ .13 <1-IMPORT> + 3.78 (1+EXPORTl 
(. 18) (. 86) 
(all variables in logl 
(standard errors in parentheses) R2=.81 
where Top 50 = average size of the largest plants accounting for 50% 
of industry employment or output, METS = minimum efflcient tecmcal 
scale, SIZE = ratio of domestic disappearance to the estimated METS, 
COST = percentage by which unit cost rises building at 1/3 METS, TRANS 
= transport cost per dollar of product value, DENS = product of 
adjusted population densities and the indices of real national income 
per capita, MS3 = three fir·m concentration r·atio, IMPORT = raho of 
1mports to domPstic consumption, EXPORT = exports as a percentage of 
domest1c product1on. 
International and inter1ndustry variations in relation to METS 
are associated with market size, sales concentration and a set of 
variables reflect1ng the cost minimising decisions of firms serv1ng 
spat1ally dispersed markets. 
From these results two possible contrast1ng indications arise. 
On one s1de, the positive and significant estimated coefficient of MS3 
(seller concentration measure) might be consistent with the market 
share maintainance hypothesis. On the other side, as noted by Owen 
(1983,p.31l and by Muller-Owen <1985) the elasticity of the dependent 
var1able with respect to export performance was nearly four: this 
h1gh f1gure cannot be explained by export performance alone. It is 
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suggested that this figure is consistent with aggressive business 
behaviour·: "The sensitivity of the change in representative plant 
size to export performance could only have been accounted for by the 
displacement of smaller plants in the exporter's own industry, taking 
place at the same time as the drive towards 
(Muller-Owen, p.481 
export mar·kets" 
It is difficult from this type of analysis to distinguish among 
these competing hypothesis. 
Muller· and Owen r·epeat the same type of analysis for· West Ger·many 
alone. They don't take into consideration any location theoretic 
var1ables. Moreover assuming aggressive business behaviour, they 
don't consider any concentration measure. 
For 1965 the result of their r~gression on the basis of a sample 
of 12 industries are: 
TOP 50 = -0.22 + .60 SIZE + 0.43 COST + 1.44 <1 + EXPORT> + 
<all 
METS (6.31) 
+ 1.84 (1 - IMPORT> 
( .82) 
variables in 1 ogl 
<t - ratios in parentheses) 
(1.34) ( 1. 13) 
R2=.86 
Problems of multicollinearity create d1ff1culties in identifying 
the role of all independent variables with the exception of SIZE. 
In a separ~te regression with only two ind1pendent variables 
<SIZE and EXPORT> the export performance measure is significant. 
The same analysis is repeated for 1980. The regression results 
with METS at 1980 level is: 
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TOP 50 = -3.48 + • 59 SIZE - • 33 COST + 6. 58 < 1 + EXPORT> + 
(all 
METS (6.16) 
+1.21 (1 - IMPORT> 
(5.01) 
var·i abl es in log) 
<t - ratios in parentheses) 
( -1. 08) (3.89) 
R2=.79 
In this case the multicollinearity problem seems less severe: 
both domestic and foreign markets effect are positive. The effect of 
imports on plant size suggests that the mar·ket reducing effect 
dominates the competitive pressure effect. 
At this stage of the analysis Muller· and Owen per·for·m a 
simulation and compute the difference between the actual average plant 
size in the sample 1n 1980 and the plant size that one would expect in 
case the EXPORT and IMPORT variables had remained equal to their· 
values. The result suggests that trade had the effect of doubling 
plant size, and that the gains in efficiency were equivalent to 20% of 
the original increase in trade. 
Some considerations 
The descr1ption above suggests us to illustrate some weaknesses 
of this type of empirical e:<er·cise. 
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Fi~st, as we have al~eady noted, the~e is no st~ong theo~etical 
backg~ound to these exe~cises. Howeve~ this is a gene~al p~oblem with 
most of the empi~ical exercises in the field of indust~ial 
organisation. 
Second, the elements of theo~y available suggest no clea~ causal 
link between two va~iables. An example is the ~elationship between 
concent~ation and relative plant size. It can be held that the causal 
link goes f~om concent~ation to ~elative plant size. Howeve~, 
the~e is a la~ge body of literatu~e suggesting that plant size is a 
dete~minant of concent~ation. 
In the empi~ical exe~cises, the possibility of a bias in the 
estimated coefficient caused by this double causation link, shoul be 
evaluated. 
Simila~ p~oblems a~ise for the causation link between ~elative 
plant size and export intensity. 
Thi~d, as al~eady mentioned, most of the studies don't conside~ 
that a firm takes jo1nt decisions ~ega~ding the numbe~ of p~oducts, 
the length of production ~uns pe~ p~oduct and multiplant ope~ations. 
This a sou~ce of possible misspecification of the ~elationship to be 
estimated. 
Finally, the use of engineering estimates of economies of scale 
is pr·obabl y the best appr·oach to measur·e economies of seale; however, 
fo~ thei~ natu~e, they impose a lot of constraints on the availability 
of a ~epr·esentative sample of industr·ies. Fo~ example Sche~er et al. 
(1975> adopted a sample of 8 only sectors and Muller· and Owen <1985) 
adopted a sample of only 12 secto~s. 
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Furthermore, the low number of obser·vations relative to the 
number of independent variables, reduces 
freedom, creating inferential problems. 
the number of degrees of 
All the weakness descr·i bed are common to the body of economic 
literature existing on the topic we are dealing with. There is no 
shor·t and easy way out of them: only the gr·adual improvement in the 
general availabilitu of basic informatiom will help. In the meantime, 
we have perfomed our exercise, providing some evidence. We feel great 
caution is needed in interpreting our results, as well as those of 
similar· studies. 
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II. Case studies 
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1. The approach adopted 
Our analysis could stop here. However, there are two reasons for 
adding a few paragraphs. 
In the first place, we have expressed motives for great caution 
in interpreting the Muller-Owen results; furthermore, our application 
of the Muller-Owen approach to Italy has been severely limited by the 
scarcity of the data available. 
In the second place, recent literature expresses the opinion that 
scale economies at the plant level are less important than believed 
previously. The relevant economies of scale and scope in the large 
corporation are to be found mainly in R&D and in the distribution 
business (Including advert1singl; possibly also in finance. This 
belief moves the core of the argument in favour of trade 
liberalization from the traditional variables examined by Muller-Owen 
and by us to a much larger set of variables. 
We are not here in condition to tackle such a larger view of the 
benefits from integration. On the other side, even the narrow view of 
economies of scale in production has a widely variable validity among 
sectors. In a few sectoral cases, where non-tariff barriers have been 
maintained at a very high level, the effects of trade liberalization 
can be quite important. This is mainly the case of sectors dominated 
by public pr·ocur·ement. We have gathered some additional information on 
three such sectors: pharmaceuticals, telecommunications equipment, 
railways equipment. 
The general conclusions from the three short sectoral studies are 
the following: 
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the sectors considered show peculiar signs of weakness with 
respect to the rest of Italian industry and to the same sectors 1n 
other countries, 
such weakness is somehow related to the role played by the 
public authorities in controllind demand, 
and goes with fragmentation at the firm level, sometimes also 
at the plant level. 
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Pharmaceutical products 
1. Introduction 
In Italy, like in other countries, the government has played an 
active role in both the supply and 
pharmaceutical industry. 
the demand side of the 
On the supply side, the areas of government intervention are 
ma1nly related to the controls over introduction of new products, the 
controls over drug prices and the attitude towards patent protection. 
On the demand side, the government is the largest buyer of 
pharmaceutical products. 
Befor·e considering these two aspects, we introduce synteti call y a 
p1cture of the pharmaceutical industry in Italy. 
2. Dimension and internationalization : some evidence 
In relation to the size distribution, in the period 1971-1981 
there is an increase of 17.1% in the representative <1> plant size and 
of 5.4% in the representative firm size. 
Among the dimensional classes, the largest relative increase is 
obser·ved in the class from fr·om 500 to 999 employees, while there is a 
decrease in the per·centage of employees in the 1 ar·gest dimensional 
class <table 1>. 
The top 50% index shows an increase of 9.5% at the plant level 
and a decrease of 7.7% at the firm level. 
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For· an international comparison the avai 1 able data are refer·r·ed 
to firms with more than 20 employees. Table 2 shows that in 1981 the 
average firm dimension was smaller in Italy than in the United 
~~ingdom, in West Germany and in Danemar·k; it was similar to the one in 
France and larger than in Belgium. 
While technical scale economies ar·e irrelevant in the 
pharmaceutical industry, firm level scale economies in R-D 
activities and marketing activities>are important. As a consequence 
the evidence that average firm dimension is lower in Italy th~•l in two 
of the lead1ng countries can be interpreted as a signal that Italian 
f1rms do not reach on average an optimal dimens1on. 
In relation to the internationalization, we first consider the 
role of foreign direct investment. 
In 1986 the share of foreign controlled firms in the Italian 
finished drug market was 58.5% <table 3>. It increased in the last few 
years, but it has not yet reached the level it had in 1975. 
The importance of foreign capital in terms of market share is 
high 1n almost all developed countries (for example, in U.K. it is 65% 
and in Fr·ance 50%>. 
What differentiates Italy from other developed countr1es is the 
low profile of Ital1an production abroad: the share of major wor·ld 
markets held by Ital1an companies is lower than one percentage point, 
except 1n such markets as Spain, Brazil and Argentina <table 4>. 
Fore1gn trade is not very important for Italian pharmaceutical 
industry. In 1985 export intensity <measured as the ratio between the 
value of e:-:por·ts and the value of sales> was 18.41 and impor·t 
penetrat1on <measured as the ratio between the value of imports and 
domestic disappearance> was 21.4% <Table 5>. When we consider only 
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finished drugs, the two ratios are even lower (14.1 the former and 
16.6 the latter) even if they shows an lncrease with respect to their 
1975 level. 
For· a compar·i son with other developed countries we consider· data 
for 1982 in table 6 <2>. 
Export intens1ty of the italian pharmaceutical industry is 
clearly lower than the average for the EEC <15.8~ compared to 31.7~). 
Such a gap is not observed for import penetration (in Italy it is 
15.0% and on average in the EEC it is 21.8%>. 
In summary, Italian pharmaceutical industry, w1th respect to 
other advanced countries, has a lower average firm dimension, and 
lower values for export intensity and production abroad. 
The two aspects are likely to be related, and to be at least 
partially due to a pecul1ar behaviour of the publ1c authorities. 
3. Public eKpenditure 
Up to the end of the seventies there has been a continue increase 
1n the public component of pharmaceutical expenditure. More precisely 
public expenditure for prescription drugs sold in pharmacy <which 
account for the largest part of total consumption) has continuosly 
increased its share of total expenditure up to 1978; after that year 
the share has rema1ned approximately costant. 
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The incidence of Italian pharmaceutical public expenditure on GDP 
was, in 1986, 0.78%: this figure is lower than the one for France 
<0.95%) and West Germany <0.94%), but higher· than the one for U.K. 
(o.54%) (Table 8). Moreover in Italy it is decreasing after 1975, 
while in the other three countries there is an increasing trend. 
In Italy, similarly to other countries, a new pharmaceutical 
product requires an official approval. In general, a new drug has to 
pass a test concerning its safety and its effectiveness. 
When compar·ed to those of other· advanced countries, in Italy the 
standards required to pass the registration test have been very low. 
However·, in the 1 ast few years ther·e has been an unofficial 
adoption of the EEC standards. 
Generally, after a product has obtained official approval, firms 
wait for its admission in the Prontuario Terapeutico Nazionale <PTNI, 
i.e. the list of products that the doctor can prescribe within the 
framework of the Serv1zio Sanitaria Nazionale [SSN, i.e. National 
Health Service J. 
In theory, the admission to PTN is an instrument for the 
government to control the composition of public expenditure. However, 
almost all the products that obtain the registration are also included 
into PTN; being the selectivity of the registration very low, the PTN 
becomes an unexploited instrument for that objective. 
One consequence of this state of affairs is that in 1981 3/4 of 
public consumption for finished drugs is for pr·oduct classified as 
"less effective" <i.e. the second group> in the PTN <Table 9). 
This lack of selectivity has clearly favoured national f1rms, 
which have been char·acter·ized by a low innovatlve content of theH· 
production. 
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Two other factors have favoured the maintenance of this 
situation. Firstly, until 1978, in Italy there has been an absence of 
patent protection. Secondly, the regime of administrative prices has 
not been qualitatively selective; the methodology adopted in setting 
prices didn't take into consideration the innovativeness and the 
therapeutic value of the product. After 1978, the new system included 
allowances for research contents of new products. 
The approach adopted has been to favour the R-D activit1es 
localized in Italy: in setting the price an increase of 12% IS 
recognized for· innovative contents to firms which have R-D activities 
in Italy, while an increase of 10% is accorded to firms with R-D 
activities located abroad. 
All these elements underline that, while government attitude 
favoured national companies, this didn't happen within a framework of 
industrial policy aimed at strengthening the ability of Italian firms 
to compete on international markets. 
Even if in 1978 there has been some indication of change in 
government attitude, in 1981 the largest share of drugs produced by 
Italian firms was composed of products belonging to the second group 
of PTN; on the contrary, foreign firms had their production mainly 
composed by the more innovative products belonging to the first group 
of PTN <Table 10). 
Italian firms don't have R-D laboratories able to produce a 
sufficient number of new products with some innovative content. This 
is a consequence of the delay with which some Italian firms started to 
devote resources to R-D activities during the 70's. Th~ introduction 
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in 1978 in Italy of patent protection, required a change of strategy 
by Italian firms. For this reason Italian firms started to look for 
products to sell under license. 
The results of a research conducted by Irs in 1983 on the basis 
of firm interviews, show that in 1975 only 32% of innovative products 
sales by Italian firms were based on innovations developed by others 
and that in 1981 that percentage rose to 61%. There are many reasons 
that create an incent1ve for the multinational firms to sign these 
agr·eements. Fi r·st, it is not tr·ue that two or mor·e sellers shar·e a 
static market. In fact the summation of more marketing strategies 
produces an expansion of unespected dimension in consumption. This 
outcome is also one of the reasons behind the "cross-licensing" 
phoenomenon at international level. Second, the licensing agreement 
is in some cases, just a first step in a merger process. Finally, but 
not less impor·tant, Italian fir·ms have a better· knowledge of the 
Italian market so that they are more able to speed up the successful 
introduction of a new product. 
4. Final comments 
Although the pharmaceut1cal industry is not subject to public 
procurement, the government relied on other instruments to protect the 
domestic i ndustr·y: r·egi str·ati on of new drug, admission to 
prescription w1th1n the National Health System, patent recognition 
and price controls. 
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While economies of scale at the plant level are very low, the 
abolition of barriers can increase firm size. This can favour an 
increase in the number of specialised R-D laboratories, possibly 
bearing an increase in the amount and productivity of innovative 
expenditure. 
It is not clear how Italian firms, with their actual inabil1ty to 
compete at an international level, can exploit the potential gains of 
a less fragmented European market. 
On the contrary, the question is whether Italian firms will still 
be able to cbnclude license agreements with foreign multinationals in 
a market characterized by a free access to information and by more 
1mpartial registration systems. 
Notes 
(1) Defined as the Florence median or Midpoint plant. This measure 
(2) 
is the median of the first moment distribution (i.e. it measures 
the dimension of the plant which divides the population so that 
half of the employment comes from larger and half from smaller 
plants>. 
The figures presented in table 5 and in 
comparable because of the different definitions 
industry>. 
table 6 are not 
of the relevant 
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Tab. 1 - Manufacture of pharmaceutical products <NACE 257) 
Size distribution: plants and firms 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
1971 1981 
---------------------------- ------------------------------
Employees Plants Employees Plants 
N. % N. % N. 
' 
N. % 
1 - 5 627 1. 0 219 25.7 602 .9 213 27.4 
6 - 9 731 1.2 102 11.9 659 1.0 90 11.7 
10-19 2126 3.5 153 17.9 1322 2.0 96 12.3 
20-49 4854 8.0 157 18.4 4443 6.8 137 17.5 
50-99 5377 8.9 79 9.2 6464 9.9 9'> ..:. 11.7 
100-199 9035 14.9 62 7.2 8362 12.8 58 7.4 
200-499 19307 31.8 61 7. 1 18887 28.9 63 8.0 
500-999 12156 20.0 17 2 19894 30.4 28 3.6 
mor·e than 1000 6467 10.7 5 .6 4763 7.3 3 .4 
TOTAL 60680 855 65396 100.0 783 100.0 
M=71. 0 Me=317.5 Top50%=514 M=B3.5 Me=371.7 Top50%=562.8 
1971 1981 
---------------------------- ------------------------------
Employees Firms Employees Fir·ms 
N. % N. % N. % N. % 
1 - 5 415 .6 134 21.4 313 .4 95 18.4 
6 - 9 536 .B 75 12.0 427 .6 58 11.2 
10-19 146(1 ,., ,., -'•.._ 104 16.6 1040 1.5 75 14.4 
20-49 3913 5.8 131 20.9 3170 4.6 97 18.7 
50-99 3979 5.9 61 9.8 4779 7.0 69 13.3 
100-199 6090 9.1 43 6.9 6052 8.8 43 8.3 
200-499 15892 23.8 50 8.0 16006 23.3 50 9.6 
500-999 1046:2 15.7 15 2.4 15504 22.6 22 4.2 
mor·e than 1000 24079 36.0 12 1.9 21413 31.2 10 l.CJ 
TOTAL 66826 625 68704 100.0 519 100.C 
M=106.9 Me =554.0 Top50%=1315.5 M=132.4 Me=583.9 Top50%=1213. 
M = average size 
Me = Florence Med1an 
Top 50% = average size of the largest plants (flrms> 
cover1ng 50% of the employees 
Source !STAT, Census 
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Tab. 2 - Manufacture of pharmaceutical pr·oducts CNACE 257> - 1981 
International comparison of size distributions: firms 
Employees 
I I I 
20-99 100-499 mor·e than 500 
Italy 
West Ger·many 
France 
Belgium 
United Kingdom 
Denmark 
Italy 
West Ger· many 
France 
Belgium 
United Kingdom 
Denmark 
8.9 
n.a 
9.6 
15.3 
4.7 
5.0 
Fir·ms 
51.2 
n.a 
45.6 
60.8 
42.9 
41.2 
Note: M = average firm size 
Source : Eurostat 
34.6 
n.a 
44.8 
34.1 
16.6 
24.4 
36.6 
n.a 
41.8 
29.4 
34.3 
35.3 
56.6 
67.7 
45.7 
50.6 
78.7 
70.6 
12.2 
13.7 
12.6 
9.8 
22.9 
23.5 
N. 
Total 
64336 
86376 
63205 
9960 
68432 
7229 
254 
270 
261 
51 
140 
17 
M 
253.3 
319.9 
242.2 
195.3 
488.8 
425.2 
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Tab. 3 - Shar·e of domestic: market c:ontroll ed by for·ei gn c:api tal 
<S sales of finished drugs) 
1975 1984 1985 
!tal~' 63.9 56.0 57.1 
Franc:e 46.2 
West Germany 31.8 
United Kingdom 63.0 
USA 21.6 
( 1) 1985 
Sourc:e: Farmindustria, "lndic:atori Farmac:eut1c:i" 
Tab. 4 - Market share of italian firms in some foreign c:ountr1es 
Mar·ket 
West Germany 
Fr·anc:e 
Un1ted Kingdom 
Spain 
USA 
Canada 
Japan 
Br·asi 1 
Ar·genti na 
Messic:o 
Sour·c:e Luc: 1 on i ( 1983 > 
1973 
.2 
• 1 
• 1 
2.7 
4.6 
n.a 
2.7 
1983 
.8 
.2 
.3 
3.5 
.4 
.2 
3.4 
2.3 
n.a 
1986 
58.1 
50.0 
35.0 
65.0 
(1)22.0 
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Tab. 5 - Exposur'e to i nter·nati onal competition 
Total Finished Dr-ugs 
1985 1986 1975 1985 
Expor-t Intensity 18.4 17.0 8.8 14.1 
Impor-t penetr-ation 21.4 22.0 9.1 16.6 
Sour-ce : our- elaborations fr-om data in Far-mindustr-ia, 
"Ind1cator-i Far-maceutici" 
Tab. 6 - Exposure to inter-national competition 
ltal y 
Ger-many 
UK 
Fr·ance 
EEC 
expor·t 
intensity 
1982 
15.8 
30.4 
37.9 
23.8 
31.7 
impor·t 
penetr·at ion 
1982 
15.0 
19.5 
19.0 
12.3 
21.8 
Sour-ce our· elabor·ation fr-om data 1n Bur·stall C1985> 
1986 
11.9 
16.7 
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Tab. 7 - Private and public expenditure of prescription 
drugs in pharmacy 
1965 
1975 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1982 
Total 
expenditure 
(billions lire) 
473 
1539 
2224 
2474 
3190 
5150 
Source Luciani (19861 
Public 
exp. 
60.9 
64.7 
80.7 
75.8 
82.0 
83.6 
Tab. 8 - Incidence of pharmaceutical public 
expend1ture on GDP (ll 
Private exp. 
I 
ticket 
3.7 
11.3 
9.9 
7.1 
out of 
the pocket 
39.1 
35.3 
15.6 
13.5 
8.1 
9.3 
Italy France West Germany U.K • 
1965 . 74 .83 .46 .41 
1970 .79 .84 .66 • 41 
1975 .91 .89 • 86 .43 
1980 .67 .77 .84 .50 
1985 .86 .90 .90 .53 
1986 .78 .95 .94 .54 
Sour·ce Far·mi ndustr·i a 
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Tab. 9- Composition of public consumption for finished drugs 
Share of pr·oducts 
- belonging to 
I group 
- belonging to 
II group 
Sour·ce Luci om < 1983) 
1978 
18.8 
81.2 
1979 1980 1981 
21.2 23.7 25.0 
78.8 76.3 75.0 
Tab. 10 - Analysis of sales according to nationality of 
firms and to groups of PTN - 1981 
Share of products 
sold belonging to 
- I gr·oup 
_ II group 
Source: Lue1oni <1983> 
Italian 
fir·ms 
38.7 
61.3 
Foreign 
firms 
22.7 
77.3 
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Telecommunications Equipment 
1. Introduction 
It is widely recognized that in Italy there is a fragmented and 
overlapping set of telecommunications institutions. 
The government has a legal monopoly of the provisions of basic 
networ~ serv1ces. Actually, the services are provided in part directly 
by the M1n1stry of Posts and Telecommunications <PTl and partly by 
licensed private, but government-owned, companies <SIP, Italcable and 
Telespaz1ol. 
The distribution of duties among the various firms reveals a very 
complicated structure. With1n the Ministry of PT there are two main 
organizations, each one with its own budget. The Posts and 
Telecommunications Adm1nistration provides all domestic and part of 
the 1nternat1onal telegraph and telex services; the ASST <Azienda di 
State per i Serviz1 Telefonicil provides international telephone 
services with all European and part of the Mediterranean countries; it 
also handles the domestic trunk services between 37 districts. The 
largest licensee, SIP, provides all local telephone services and part 
of the domestic trunk services. Italcable handles international 
telegram services and intercontinental telephone, telegram and telex 
services. Finally, Telespazio provides the installation and operation 
of the ground equipment of telecommunication via satellite. 
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2. Public procurement 
From a technical point of view only the purchasing activities of 
the government-owned firms should be considered as public procurement. 
However, it would be misleading to consider the activities of a firm 
like SIP, which is a licensee by the government, is organized into 
a state holding group <STET> and is the 1 ar·gest buyer of the sector, 
as pur·el y pr·i vate oper·ati ens <Pontaroll o < 1983)). 
SIP's purchasing system is based on a Memorandum, released at the 
beginning of every year·, which includes the plan of the total value of 
annual purchases and an updating of the price level. In its purchasing 
policy SIP has generally respected the "h1storical market shares" 
princ1ple. This kind of behaviour has been favoured both by structural 
characteristics of the industry and by technological characteristics 
of the products. In relation to the former, the monopsonistic 
structure of the industry, together with the right of the monopsonist 
to set technical sta."'dar·ds, creates an incentive towards cell usi on 
among the producers to riequilibrate the balance of power. Also 
technological factors have favoured a stable relationship between the 
suppliers and the buyer; electromechanical switches, for example, are 
usually installed for· a given capacity, which can be increased at 
decreasing costs. As a consequence, once the original contract is 
assigned to a firm, the works of expansion are assigned to the same 
firm. 
An impor·tant feature of SIP's attitude has been the constant 
attention to the evolution of Ital tel, which is a manufacturer· 
belonging to the same state holding as SIP. An example is the decision 
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by SIP to slow down the conversion of the networ·k fr·om 
electr·omecha.ni cal to electronic technology, wa.i ti ng for· I tal tel to 
produce its own system. In fact Ita.ltel <wh1ch has the largest market 
share for public switches) was rather slow in developing the necessary 
skills for the electronic technology in public switches. 
The second largest buyer in Italy is ASST. Differently from SIP, 
it is required by law to call for competitive tenders for the supply. 
of telecom equipment and systems. Usually, the invitation to tenders 
is made to companies operating in Italy. However, this kind of 
protection has not been accompanied in Italy, differently from other 
countries, by the elaboration of detailed technical standards. 
3. Some characteristics of industry structure and performance 
3.1. Dimension: plants and firms 
Table 1 shows the evolution of plant size distribution between 
1971 and 1981. During this period there has been a. reduction in 
a.ver·a.ge plant dimension (fr·om 153.1 to 105.4 employees). In ter·ms of 
size distribution the largest relative decr·ease can be observed 1n the 
highest dimensional class, while the largest relative increase is for 
plants of 200 to 499 employees. 
This evolution is a sign of the restructuring in the industry 
fell owing the progr·essi ve introduction of new technologies which are 
less 1 abour intensive (for· example the passage from the 
electromechanical to the electronic technology in public switches>. 
In r·elation to economies of scale at the plant level, recent 
estimates reported in the survey paper· by Pr·atten <1987) show how the 
increase in unit costs below minimum efficient scale <MES> for the 
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production of exchanges are not very high (5-10% at 1/3 MES in West 
Germany and 4. 5" at 1/2 MES in the United Kingdom). At a mor·e 
qualitative level, it has been suggested that until recently "because 
the processes 1 nvol ved assembling a 1 ar·ge number· of component par·ts to 
produce the final product, the design and organization of the 
manufacturing and assembly process may have improved as cumulative 
output increased, so that unit costs declined with scale of 
pr·oduction" <DECO, 1983 pg.34). The technological evolution which has 
characterized almost all product segments of th1s sector, has shifted 
the main source of economies of scale at the firm level to R-D 
activities. The evolution of R-D expenditures has been characterized 
by the strong increase in fixed investments for the acquisition of the 
basic pr1nciples of the new technology and by the necessity to pr·oduce 
continuous and sistematic innovations 
tr·ajector· i es. 
along given technological 
The 1ntroduction of new technologies has started in different 
countr·ies at d1ffer·ent per·iods. For· example, West Ger·many and Italy 
ar·e cl ear·l y 1 atecomer·s 1 n the i ntroductl on of electronic technology in 
public switches, when compared to Fr·ance, the United Kingdom and the 
United States <Table 2). 
As a consequence, an i nter·nat i anal comparison of firm dimension 
should be interpreted taking into consideration these elements. The 
fact that in 1981 aver·age firm dimension was in Italy and West 
Germany, higher than in the United Kingdom and in France <Table 3>, is 
partly explained by the delay in the substitution of electromechanical 
<more labour-intensive) with semielectronic and digital technologies 
in the former countries. 
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3.2. Concentration 
In the production of public switches, Italy has an anomalous 
supply structure characterized by a high number of manufacturers 
relatively to domestic market dimension <Table 4> (1). 
In 1984, Italtel (part of the state holding IRI-STET> had a 
market share of 50.3%, Telettra (part of the FIAT group> had 2.6% 1 GTE 
Italy (Siemens) had 12.6%, Face <Alcatel Nv> had 14.2% and Fatme 
<Ericsson) had 20.3%. It can be also observed how market shares of the 
f1ve firms fluctuated only marginally dur1ng the last ten years; this 
evidence is in line with the already discussed "historical market 
shares" principle. 
Evidence on the fragmentation of Italian industry of public 
switches relatively to that of other countries, is presented in Table 
5. Italy is the only countr·y hav1ng four suppliers, each one with a 
share of more than 10% of the market. Moreover, in Italy the producers 
offer three different switching systems <UT, Axe, 1240>, while in most 
other European countries only two switching systems are allowed. 
This situation is in evolution because of the decision in 1982 by 
CIPE Cthe gover·nment Committee for Economic Planning) to reduce the 
number of suppl i er·s of digital switches to two. As a consea•Aence, 
Italtel, GTE and Telettra decided to set up the so-called National 
Pole for the unification and development of switch1ng systems. 
Successively, Italtel and Telettra decided a process of merger with 
the cr·eati on of a new company, Tel it; the agr·eement coil apsed in 
November· 1987. 
Whenever· the reduction to two switching systems should take 
place, either Fatme of Face would be the second supplier. The result 
would depend on the configuration of the inter·national agr·eements 
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concluded by the National Pole. What is certain, neither wants to exit 
from the market. Actually, both of them are operating with mor·e 
manpower than is really requ1red; the aim of this behaviour is partly 
linked to the desire to maintain their bargaining power. 
A fur·ther· element revealed by Table 5 is the strong penetration 
of foreign capital in Italy in comparison to what has happened 1n 
countries like France, West Germany and the United Kingdom. Rather 
than a signal of openness, is the result of the 
technological backwardness of 
it 
the countr·y. 
The market for transmission equipment is characterized by a 
similar fragmentation on the supply side, but this 
with respect to the experience of other countries. 
is not anomalous 
The largest supplier 1s Telettra (34% of the market) followed by 
Italtel <24%) and GTE < 15%) <Table 6). In compar·i son to public 
switches there is a new large supplier: the British company, Marconi 
110%). Also in this market there is a large presence of foreign 
capital. 
In terms of the attitude of SIP towards Italtel, it is 
i nter·estl ng to compar·e data for· the whole mar·ket of tr·ansmi ssi on 
equ1pment in Table 6 with data referred to that portion of the market 
generated by SIP purchases <Table 7). It is evident how larger is the 
share of the latter market detained by Italtel. 
For the term1nal equipment market, indications are similar to 
those for the previous markets in terms of fragmentation and the 
presence of fore1gn compan1es. The evidence in 1985 for three products 
of this segment of the industry is presented in Table 8. 
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3.3. Foreign trade 
Telecommunication industry is characterized by a positive trade 
balance <Table 9). This result is in line to what happens in other· 
United States countries with the notable exception of the 
(Cozzi-Genco, 1987). 
Disaggregating the flows of international trade by ar·ea of 
origin and destination, it can be observed that the origin of Italian 
trade surplus is due to the high surplus with non-Deed countries which 
more than compensates for the deficit with Deed-countries (Table 10>. 
A f1nal useful information can be obtained from Table 11: export 
intensity for the whole industry (defined by the ratio of the value of 
exports to the value of production> has been around 20% during the 
penod 1980-1984. Impor·t penetration during the same period has 
fluctutated between 12% and 14.5%. However, when we consider· data at 
the f1r·m 1 evel, we can observe ver·y disparate performances: for· 
example, ltaltel has a very low export intensity (around 6%>, while 
Telettra has a very strong exposure to international competition 
(export intensity is more than 50S>. 
4. Final comments 
The completion of the internal market will affect the 
telecommunication industry, mainly in opening up competition in the 
publ1c procurement area and in the homogeneization of technical 
standards. 
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These measures imply an enl ar·gement of the market actually fac1 ng 
the firm. Given the existence of scale economies, particularly in R-D 
activities, this evolution should bring about an increase in 
efficiency at the EEC level. 
Mor·eover, integr·ation can have two other· positive effects at the 
EEC level <2>. The first effect relates to allocative efficiency; it 
is likely that the passage from a protected to a liberalized situation 
will increase competition. 
Secondly, the completion of the internal market can be also 
interpreted as a strategic trade policy (defined as a policy "aimed at 
securing national advantage in oligopolistic industries"> at the EEC 
level. In fact, additional benefits can be obtained by the 
strengthening of the compet1tiveness of European firms vis-a-vis US 
and Japanese rivals. 
The liberalization of the telecommunication market is also 
favoured by the autonomous evolution of the industry. The distribution 
of wor·ld demand between systems and equipments for· public networks and 
private systems and terminals should gradually shift in favour of the 
latter. According to Dataquest in the period 1986-1990 the average 
incidence of private systems and terminals will be 37.4~; it will 
increase to 44.9% during the per·iod 1991-1995 and to 55.1~ during the 
period 1996-2000. 
This means a shift towards a segment which is already 
char·acter·ized by a high degree of liberalization. 
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The evolution in Italy is similar to the one for the world as far 
as the general tendency is concerned. However, public switches, while 
1 osi ng some gr·ound, should maintain the 1 argest share of the market in 
the next ten years. This is mainly due to overlapping between 
additional demand (which is far from saturation) and renewal demand. 
Considering the effects of the completion of the internal markP~ 
at the Italian level a clear benefit will arise from the increase in 
competition. 
However, one important element to consider is the ab1lity of 
Italian firms to survive international competition. In fact, the 
tel ecommuni cation industry can be considered a "strategic sector·" 
because of the generation of external economies mainly via spillover 
effects of R-D activities. 
As we have already seen, some Italian firms are already competing 
successfully in some segment of the industry (for example, Telettra in 
transm1ssion equipment); other firms, on the contrary, have had a 
very low exposure to international competition because of the 
protection they received. However, it is difficult to draw conclusions 
on th1s point because of the fast evolution in the oligopolistic 
configuration of the industry at the world level. 
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Note 
(1) Data in Table 4 are relative to purchases by SIP which is the 
largest buyer. The remaining part of demand is covered by ASST 
(150 bn lire in 1984> and by Italcable. 
<2> -Krugman (1986>. 
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Tab. 1 - Man. of telecomm. equipment, electrical and electronis eguipment 
CNace 344.2) - Size distribution: plants and firms 
1971 1981 
----------------------------
-----------------------------
Employees Plants Employees Plants 
N. I N. I N. s N. s 
1 - 5 254 .6 99 37.2 477 .I:) 202 36.5 
6 - 9 238 .6 32 12 489 .8 68 12.3 
10-19 606 1.5 43 16.2 1188 2.0 88 15.9 
20-49 1162 2.8 36 13.5 2156 3.7 70 12.7 
50-99 1336 3.3 18 6.8 2957 5.1 41 7.4 
100-199 2546 6.2 17 6.4 4650 8.0 33 6.0 
200-499 1874 4.6 6 2.3 8503 14.6 28 5.1 
500-999 4013 9.8 5 1.9 5340 9.2 9 1.6 
more than 1000 28692 70.4 10 3.8 32530 55.8 14 2.5 
TOTAL 40721 266 58290 553 
M= 153.1 M=105.4 
1971 
-----------------------------
Employees Firms Employees Fir·ms 
N. I N. I N. s N. s 
1 - 5 221 .5 84 38.5 400 .7 172 43.4 
6 - 9 201 .4 27 12.4 383 .7 54 13.6 
10-19 5:27 1. 2 37 17.0 830 1.5 61 15.4 
20-49 936 2.1 30 13.8 1347 2.4 43 10.9 
50-99 1152 2.6 15 6.9 1621 2.8 23 5.8 
100-199 2188 4.9 15 6.9 3031 5.3 21 5.3 
200-499 359 .8 1 .6 4642 8.2 14 3.5 
500-999 2583 5.7 4 1. 8 784 1. 4 1 .2 
more than 1000 36727 81.8 5 2.3 43750 77.0 7 1. 8 
TOTAL 44894 218 56788 396 
M = 205.9 M=143.4 
M = aver· age plant size 
Source : ISTAT, Census 
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Tab. 2 - Shares of switching technologies (1 Januar·y 1985) 
Technology Italy France United West Usa 
Kingdom Germany 
Electromechanical 96 63 79 
Semi -el ectrom c 1 15 20 
Electronic (dlgital) 3 22 1 
Total 100 100 100 
Source Ital tel 
Tab. 3 - Man. of telecomm. equipment, electrical and 
electronic equipment - 1981 
97 
2 
1 
100 
International comparison of firm size distribution 
Employees 
mor·e 
20-99 100-499 than 500 Total M 
% % % number· 
Italy 5.3 13.8 80.9 59035 493.9 
West Ger·m.;~ny 4.6 10.6 84.8 358398 613.7 
France 12.4 15.3 72.3 105239 257.9 
United Kingdom 6.4 21.3 72.2 228820 370.3 
Denmark 13.6 33.2 53.2 12289 204.8 
Firms 
Italy 57.4 34.4 8.2 122 
West Ger·many 60.3 28.9 10.8 584 
Fr·ance 73.3 19.9 6.9 408 
United Kingdom 50.8 34.5 14.7 618 
Denmar·k 61.7 28.3 10.0 60 
Note: M = average firm size 
Source . Eur·ostat . 
38 
50 
12 
100 
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Tab. 4 - Public switches: shares of the market generated 
by SIP's purchases 
Cbn.lira> 
ITALTEL IT 179.4 
TELETTRA IT .3 
GTE D 30.5 
FACE F 55.6 
FAT ME sw 60.5 
TOTAL 326.0 
Other·s 34.6 
TOTAL 360.9 
Sour·ce SIP 
/ 
1976 
55.0 
• 1 
9.4 
7.0 
18.5 
90.4 
9.6 
100.0 
1984 
Cbn.lir·a> 
609.2 
32.1 
53.0 
171.3 
246.3 
1211.9 
246.9 
1458.8 
50.3 
2.6 
12.6 
14.2 
20.3 
83.1 
16.9 
100.0 
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Tab. 5- Eur-opean mar-ket in public switches. 
Mar·ket shar-es - 1987 
Countr-y 
Austr-ia 
Belg1um 
Danemar-k 
EIRE 
Finland 
Fr·ance 
Gr·eece 
Italy 
Nether· I ands 
Nor· way 
Por·tugal 
Spain 
Sweden 
Swi tzer-1 and 
United Kingdom 
West Ger·many 
Europe 
Siemens Ericsson Alcatel 
NV 
26.3 26.3 
20.0 80.0 
38.9 50.0 11. 1 
50.0 50.0 
27.8 27.8 
85.2 
40.7 
11.4 19.0 14.3 
19.4 13.9 
42.9 57. 1 
50.0 50.0 
29.6 70.4 
88.5 
33.3 33.3 33.3 
16.2 
75.1 24.8 
20.0 15.0 35.0 
Sour·ce our· el abora.ti on fr·om Zanetti ( 1987) 
Plessey Italtel ATT/ 
and GEC Philips 
18.5 
55.2 
66.6 
68.4 
10.0 7.0 3.0 
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Tab. 6 - Distribution of Italian market for· 
Transmission Equipment (excluding 
mobile radio) - 1984 
Telettr·a 
Ital tel 
GTE 
Mar· coni 
Face 
Fat me 
SIAE 
Selenia 
Philips 
Source Estimates by Telettra 
34 
24 
15 
8 
2-3 
3-4 
2 
less than 2 
3-4 
Tab. 7 - Distribution of the market generated by SIP 
purchases of transmission equipment - 1984 
Telettra 35 
Italtel 33 
Marconi 17 
GTE 11 
Fatme 2 
Selenia 2 
Source estimates by Telettra 
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Tab. 8 - Dist~ibution of italian ma~ket fo~ 
te~minal equipment - 1985 
Telephones Modems 
Sales 
(bn. li~a) 170 54 
Ma~ket sha~es 
(%) 
I tal tel 40 A~e 
Face 20 Moto~ola 
Fat me 10 Italtel 
Other·s 30 IBM 
Philips 
Othe~s 
Sour·ce Zanetti <1987) 
31.2 
20.6 
18.8 
9.4 
6.5 
13.5 
Tab. 9 - Foreign t~ade and production (bn li~a) 
1980 1981 1982 1983 
Pr·oduction 1577 2041 2593 3094 
Impor·t 214 231 294 3480 
Expor·t 317 366 561 576 
T~ade Balance 103 135 267 228 
Sou~ce : Campo dall'O~to-Mariotti (1986) 
PBX 
380 
I tal tel 32.2 
Safnat 13.0 
Fat me 11.8 
Telettr·a 7.2 
01 i vetti 6.8 
GTE 5.1 
Face 3.9 
Othe~s 20.0 
1984 1985 
3733 
464 544 
628 756 
164 211 
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Tab. 10 - Italian foreign trade in TLC narrowly defined 
<SITC 7648> and broadly defined <SITC 764> 
C mi 11 ion $ > • 1985 
SITC 764 
Import Expor·t <X-M> 
World 598 831 233 
DECO 533 347 -186 
EEC 252 184 -68 
NON-DECO 59 484 425 
Sour·ce DECO Ser· i es B 
Tab. 11 - Italian export intensity and 
import penetration 
1980 1981 1982 
E>:port 
Intensity 20.1 17.9 21.6 
Impor·t 
Penetration 14.5 12. 1 12.6 
Source Elaborations from Tab. 9 
SITC 7648 
Impor·t Export 
105 229 
93 34 
41 12 
11 195 
1983 1984 
20.5 17.6 
12.4 13.0 
<X-M> 
124 
-59 
-29 
184 
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Railways equipment 
1. Introduction 
Until 1985, approximately 4/5 of the demand facing the firms 
operat1ng in th1s sector was due to Ferrovie delle State (F.S., the 
government owned railway company). 
If we partition the sector, on one side, in terms of the 
functional and technological characteristics of the products 
<mechanical and electrical> and, on the other side, in terms of type 
of utilizat1on of the product <heavy and light>, we observe <Table 1> 
that the largest part of the market is covered by the heavy segment. 
The demand for this product is almost entirely due to F.S. 
This characterist1c has strongly shaped Italian industry. No firm 
1n th1s 1ndustry was born or has developed independently from the 
demand of F.S. Variou5 elements characterize th1s dependence from F.S. 
F1rst, F.S.'s purchasing decisions are linked to the financing 
laws approved by the Parliament. This has created uncertainties 
surrounding both the t1ming and dimension of demand. As a consequence, 
the 1ndustry has suffered periods of excess capacity <on average in 
the last few years utilization has been around 701 of total capacity>. 
Second, firms had F.S. as the1r main po1nt of reference for the 
development of industrial products. Moreover, F.S. had, especially in 
the past, an act1ve role in project formulation and development of 
products w1th the consequence of not stimulating autonomous innovative 
ab1l1ty in the f1rms. 
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A final element is the high protection guaranteed by public 
procurement. To each tender only those firms recogn1zed as off1c1al 
suppliers of F.S. are adm1tted . This guarantees a protection from new 
entries in the industry. Moreover, this {s re1nforced by the existence 
of historical shares on the basis of which the purchasing orders are 
par·t i ti oned. 
2. Fragmentation and international competitiveness 
This s1tuat1on has favoured the shaping of an industry 
characterized by a h1gh degree of fragmentation and a law ability of 
competit1on on international markets. 
In relation to fragmentation, Table 1 shows the size 
distribution. In 1981 the representative plant had 633.2 employees; 
and the representat1ve firm had 715.0. Between 1971 and 1981 there has 
been a strong increase in dimension: representat1ve plant s1ze 
increased by 78.8% and representative firm size increased by 51%. 
Similar indications ar1se when we cons1der average s1ze of the largest 
plants (firms) employing 50% of employees. 
Notwithstanding this increase in dimension, 1n 1981 Italian 
industry was still more fragmented than the one in the other major 
countries in the EEC. Infact, Table 2 shows that 1n 1981 the average 
dimension of fi r·ms with more than 20 employees was smaller than 1n 
France, in West Germany and in the United Kingdom. 
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The public sector is strongly involved in this sector also on the 
supply side. Two state holding groups operate in this sector: EFIM and 
IRI. The former is mainly involved in products characterized by 
mechanical technology, the latter in products of electrical 
technology, diesel engines and steel products. 
To understand the role played by the firms belonging to publ1c 
groups, it is useful to analyze the distribution of employment among 
the firms 1n the various segment of the industry characterized by the 
d1fferent technological feature of the product. 
Table 3 shows the employment distr·ibution among gr·oups supplying 
products characterized by the mechanical technology. The EFIM group 
has the largest share of blue collars in this segment (26.2%) and it 
is followed by the private group FIREMA (21.1%). The only presence of 
foreign capital is represented by Brown Boweri with 1.3% of total blue 
collar·s. 
In the electric-traction segment the largest share is held by IRI 
143.7% of total blue collars>, followed by Brown Boweri with 19.2% 
<Table 4). 
F1nally, 1n the segment characterized by fixed electrical 
1nstallat1ons, the h1ghest concentration of blue collars is in the IRI 
group 135.9%1, followed by foreign groups like Brown Boweri and 
Encsson C11.3% and 11.8% r·espectively> <Table 5). 
The last three tables show a strong presence of the public sector 
on the supply s1de. 
The degree of concentration is lower than 1n other countries. 
Only one segment of the industry shows a four-firm concentration ratio 
comparable to the one prevailing in other countries Cabout 90%): 
products based on electrical-traction technology. Other segments have 
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lower· degrees of concentr·ation: both product1on of electr1cal fixed 
installations and production of mechanical-traction products show a 
four-firm concentration ratio at about 70%. In France, for example, 
the least concentr·ated segment shows a four-fir·m concentration raho 
of about 85%. 
The exposure to international markets of Italian f1rms 1s very 
low: in 1982 the ratio of exports on sales was 5.1% (Table 6). 
The low competitiveness of Italian firms on international markets 
1s presented 1n Table 7: Italy has the lowest share in the exports of 
the largest produc1ng countries (3.5% in the period 1973-77 and 4.4% 
in the period 1979-831~ Moreover a low export market share is also 
characteristic of most of the products in this sector <Table 81. 
The results of a research cit~d in Mercurio <1985l, analyz1ng the 
differences in the determinants of good performance on the domestic 
and on the international market, show that the differences are l1nked 
to the divergent characteristics of a closed and protected market 
relatively to an open market. These divergences characterize the 
rea1lway equipment sector in all industrialized countries with an 
autonomous domestic industry. Moreover, in Italy, differently from the 
other countries, the special kind of relationship existing between the 
demand and the supply side of the market have reduced the firms' 
ability to compete on international markets. For e~ample, as already 
mentioned, autonomous 1nnovative ability has never been stimulated by 
F.S •. An indirect indication of the protection of the domestic market 
is presented in Table 6. In fact, from the inability, on average, of 
Italian firms to compete at an international level, one should expect 
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a strong penetration of impor·ts on the domestic mar·ket. However, this 
is not the case: in 1982 imports were only 2.81 of domestic 
disappearance. 
Moreover, foreign production is represented with a significative 
market share only by Brown Boveri in the traction segments of the 
industry <Tables 3 and 4). In the electrical fixed installations 
segment of the industry, there is a strong presence of foreign 
pr·oduction. 
The synthetic discussion of the industry presented in the 
pr·evi ous sections has under·l1 ed the fragmentation and low 
international competitiveness of the Italian industry. 
The completion of the internal market can have positive effects 
because of the enlargement of the market actually facing the firm and 
the consequent better exploitation of economies of scale. 
However, since the incr·ease in competition will also have the 
effect of marginalize the inefficient producers, one should also ask 
whether Ital1an fir·ms will be able to survive fore1gn competition. We 
have already noted that the exposure to foreign competition has been 
on average very low. 
However·, the indication at the firm level are less pessimistic. 
An e::ample is g1ven by Br·eda whose share of exports on sales has been 
around ~5% in the last few years. Moreover, an analysis of the 
strategies of the leaders in the two segments of this industry (i.e. 
Breda and Ansaldol, shows that they are or1ented towards international 
compet1tlon CMercur·1o <1987)). 
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Even if these elements don't provide a clearcut answer to the 
original question, 1t 1s poss1ble to say that a progressive 
liberali=ation of European markets will reduce the degree of 
fragmentation of the Italian industry and offer Italian firms the 
opportunity of a better explo1tat1on of scale economies. 
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Tab. 1 - Percentage d1stribution of the market according 
to its segments : 
Heavy 
Tr·action 
Light 
Tr·action Total 
Mechanical 61 3 64 
Electrical 29 7 36 
- Traction 19 2 21 
- F1xed installation 10 5 15 
Total 90 10 100 
Sour·ce Mercurio <1987) 
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Tab. 2 - Manufacture of railway equipment <NACE 3621 
Size distributions : plants and firms 
1971 1981 
------------------------- ---------------------------
Employees Plants Employees Plants 
N. % N. % N. % N. % 
1 - 5 53 .3 16 15.6 56 .2 23 18. 1 
6 - 9 77 "' • ..J 10 9.7 84 .3 11 8.7 
10-19 323 "') ..., ........ 23 2~.3 146 .5 11 8.7 
20-49 478 3.2 14 13.6 564 2.0 18 14.:2 
50-99 503 3.4 ..., 6.8 636 2.3 10 7.9 r 
100-199 1282 8.6 9 8.7 1787 6.5 1: 9.4 
200-499 5750 38.6 16 15.5 7284 26.4 21 16.5 
500-999 466: 31. ::. 7 6.8 12213 44.2 17 13.4 
mor·e than 1000 1776 11.9 1 1.0 4863 17.6 4 3.1 
TOTAL 14904 103 27633 127 
M=144.7 Me=354.1 Top 50%=475.2 M=217.6 Me=633.2 TopS0%=842.5 
1971 1981 
------------------------- ---------------------------
Employees Fi r·ms Employees Fi r·ms 
N. % N. % N. % N. % 
1 - "' ..J 30 .3 7 10.3 25 • 1 9 12.5 
6 - 9 43 .4 6 8.8 61 .3 8 11. 1 
10-19 249 2. 1 18 26.5 134 .9 10 13.9 
20-49 402 3.5 11 16.2 396 2.3 13 18.0 
50-99 340 2. 7' 5 7.3 327 1. 9 5 6.9 
100-199 119 1.0 1 1.5 496 2.8 3 4.2 
200-499 4711 40.7 13 19. 1 4052 23.3 11 15.3 
500-999 4582 39.6 6 8.8 7430 42.7 10 13.9 
mor·e than 1000 1083 9.4 1 1.5 4463 25.7 3 4.2 
TOTAL 11559 68 17384 72 
M=169.9 Me=491.6 Top 50%=791.7 M=241.4 Me=715.0 TopS0%=999.1 
Sour·ce : ISTAT, Census 
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Tab. 3 - Manufacture of railway equipment CNACE 362) 
International comparison of firm size distribution: 1981 
Di str·i buti on 
20-99 100-499 
of Employment by Firm Size 
Italy 
West Ger·many 
Fr·ance · 
Um ted Kingdom 
Italy 
West Ger·many 
Fr·ance 
United K1ngdom 
% % 
4.9 
n.a 
6.1 
1.7 
40.0 
n.a 
43.2 
47.2 
25.7 
n.a 
27.4 
5.0 
Di str i butl on 
31. 1 
n.a. 
36.4 
33.3 
Note: M = average for firm size 
Source : EUROSTAT 
more than 500 TOT 
% N. 
69.4 15906 
n.a 11270 
66.5 16624 
93.2 46509 
of Fi r·ms by Size 
28.9 45 
n.a 25 
20.5 44 
19.4 36 
Tab. 4 - Products character1zed by mechanical technology 
Share of total employment 
Employees Blue coil ar·s 
% % 
EFIM 25.6 26.2 
IRI 2.5 2.3 
FIAT 11. 1 8. 1 
FIREMA .,...., C" .:..:. • ..J 21.1 
BROWN BDVERI 1.4 1.3 
OTHERS 36.5 40.8 
Compos1t1on of var1ons groups : 
M 
353.5 
450.8 
377.8 
1291.9 
EFIM Breda C.F., Imesi, Sofer, Omeca, Ferrosud, Offic1ne Reggiane 
IRI Isotta Frasch1n1 
FIAT F1at Ferroviar1a Sav1gliano 
FIREMA : Officine Fiore, OMC, Officine Stanga, Off1cine Cittadella, 
Off1c1ne Casaralta 
BROWN BOVERI : Tecnomasio Italiano Brown Boveri 
Sour·ce Mer· curio ( 1987) 
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Tab. 5 - Products characterized by electrical technology 
<tractian>. Share of total employment 
Employees Blue call ar·s 
% % 
IRI 57.0 43.7 
BROWN BOVERI 11.0 19.2 
FIREMA 19.3 15.6 
FIAT-PARIZZI 7.8 8.3 
OTHERS 4.9 13.2 
Compos1t1on of varions groups 
IRI : Ansaldo Trasporti 
BROWN BOVERI : Tecnomas1o Italiano Brown Boveri 
FIREMA Ercole Marelli Trazione, Metalmeccan1ca Lucana 
FIAT : Elettromeccanica Par1zzi 
Source Mercur1o <1987) 
Tab. 6 - Electrical f1xed installations 
Share of total employment 
IRI 
BROWN BOVERI 
ERICSSON 
ITT 
CIR 
WESTINGHOUSE 
OTHERS 
Employees 
% 
40.6 
12.3 
8.7 
8.0 
3.4 
15.9 
11. 1 
Composition of varions groups 
IRI : Ansaldo Trasporti 
Blue coll ar·s 
% 
35.9 
11.3 
11.8 
9.3 
4.5 
10.2 
17.0 
BROWN BOVERI : Tecnomasio Italiano Brown Bover1, S.A.E. 
ERICSSON-SETEMER: Fatme, Scarp1n1, S1elte 
ITT : Siette, Par1sini 
CIR : Sasib 
WESTINGHOUSE : Wabco Westinghouse Segnal1 
Source Mercur·io <1987) 
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Tab. 7- Exposure to inter·national competition 
Expor·t 
intensity 
Impor·t 
penetration 
1981 
1982 
8.0 
5.1 
Sour·ce : our el abor·atl on on data from I STAT 
Tab. 8 - Share in the export of the 9 largest 
producing countries 
Italy 
France 
West Ger·many 
United Kingdom 
USA 
Canada 
Japan 
TOTAL 
aver· age 
1973-77 
3.5 
24.9 
16.4 
4.3 
24.0 
5.0 
21.9 
100 
Sour·ce ONU cited in Mercurio (1987) 
4. 1 
2.8 
aver· age 
1979-83 
4.4 
19.8 
18.3 
10.1 
14.7 
10.1 
22.6 
100 
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Tab. 9 - Export aarket share of the principal European exporttng countries 
(average for years 1975-811 
6eraany 
France 
S•i tz er land 
Austria 
Total 
Italy 
Others 
Electrical Parts of Other 
locoaotive locoaotive locoaotives 
18.5 
27.7 
27.0 
83.2 
1.0 
15.8 
37.7 
17.4 
6.4 
2.8 
64.3 
3.4 
32.4 
40.9 
7.0 
2.6 
50.5 
2.2 
47.3 
Source: OCDE, cited in ~rcurio 11985l 
Passengers 
raihay-
cars 
17.4 
0.6 
0.1 
0.1 
18.2 
1.5 
80.3 
Freight llorkshop 
car 
30.0 
45.3 
4.4 
0.9 
80.6 
1.4 
18.0 
car and 
railway 
equipaent 
11.4 
3.1 
18.7 
38.7 
71.9 
9.3 
18.8 
Signal 
instal-
lations 
28.7 
15.9 
8.3 
5.2 
58.1 
1. 4 
40.5 
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.. Int.r.Q.dUC..t.i.QD 
The aim of the work reported here is to assess the likely 
economic effects of reducing barrier~ to trade within the 
European community in a range of industries in which there may 
be significant economies of scale. The projections are based 
on a formal partial equilibrium model of international trade in 
imperfectly competitive markets. A model of this nature may 
capture two effects of completing the internal EC market: 
increased exploitation of economies of scale, and the potential 
effects of market liberalisation on competition. 
The next section presents a simple example of a model of 
international trade under imperfect competition, in an attempt 
to give a reasonably simple account of the essential nature of 
the more complex model used to produce the projections in this 
report. A full description of the actual model used (which is 
a development of the model described in Venables and Smith 
(1986)) is provided in a technical appendix. 
Section 2 then describes the data to which the model is 
applied; and section 3 the ''calibration" of the model to the 
data. 
In section 4 the results of one policy experiment are 
described: a reduction in intra-EC trade barriers equivalent to 
a reduction in the cost of intra-EC trade of 2.5%. The effects 
on trade, output, production costs and economic welfare are 
determined. Section 5 considers the sensitivity of the results 
to changing our assumptions about firms' behaviour. 
Section 6 describes the results of a more dramatic change 
in the intra-EC market structure, where in addition to the 
reduction in trade barriers, it is assumed that firms are no 
longer able to charge different prices in different national 
markets within the EC. This shift to an "integrated" market 
produces substantially larger economic effects than the earlier 
policy experiment . 
.1 .................... MQde.ll.in.o ...... t.r..ad.e ..... un.d.e.r ...... imP.e.r.f.e.c..:t ...... .c..o.mp.e.t.i.ti.oD 
The full model on which this exercise was based is set out 
in the technical appendix. It may, however, be helpful to see 
some of the essential economic features of that model displayed 
in a simpler example. Accordingly, as an introduction to the 
modelling exercise, in this section we present an artificially 
simple example of trade under imperfect competition. We also 
discuss some further aspects of the modelling of imperfect 
competition. 
suppose that there are two countries with identical 
demands for a particular homogeneous good. Let the demand y in 
either country be given by the following function of the 
consumer price p (in $) 
y = lOOOOp-2 
- 292 - 5.5 
which implies that the elasticity of demand is 2. The inverse 
demand function is 
p = 100y-1/2 
Let the cost of producing quantity x of the good be 
c = 7x + 111 
which implies that the average cost is a decreasing 
function of output, so there are economies of scale. Suppose 
that a firm receives the consumer price P1 in respect of sales 
in respect of sales in its home market, but receives P2(1-t) 
from a unit sold in its foreign market, where the fraction t 
represents the cost of selling across the border. Then the 
profits of a firm which sells x1 at home and x2 abroad will be 
If the firm chooses x1 and x2 in the belief that the sales 
to both markets of all other firms are fixed, then 
differentiation of its profit function gives rise to two 
equations describing its optimal sales decisions in the 
respective markets 
P1(1-s1/2) = 7 
(1-t)p2(1-s2/2) = 7 
where the left hand side of each equation is the marginal 
revenue in the respective market, the right hand side is 
marginal cost, and Si is the firm's share of the respective 
market. Note how marginal revenue depends both on the 
elasticity of demand and on the market share. 
If t=0.2 and there are two firms in each country, then the 
outcome of profit maximising behaviour by the four firms will 
be a price of $9 in both countries, production of 5000/81 units 
of output by each firm, of which 8/9 is sold in its home market 
and 1/9 exported. Each firms then has 4/9 of its home market 
and 1/18 of its export market. It is easily checked that the 
firms' profit-maximising equations are satisfied and that 
supply equals demand in both markets at this price. It is also 
the case that firms' profits are virtually zero, so this is a 
long-run equilibrium. 
If now t were reduced to zero, it is easily checked that 
if the four firms remain in existence, the price charged will 
fall to $8, and production of each firm will rise to 5000/64, 
of which half is sold in each market (so firms' shares of their 
home market falls from 4/9 to 1/4 and of their export markets 
rises from 1/18 to 1/4). There is a gain of consumer surplus 
of almost $139 in each of the two countries as a result of the 
price reduction, and each of the four firms suffers losses of 
almost $33; so in aggregate the reduction in trade costs brings 
about a rise in welfare. The price reduction is very much 
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greater than the reduction in trade costs because the main 
effect of the change is that increased competition from imports 
considerably reduces the market power that firms have in their 
home markets and drives down prices. 
The fact that firms are making losses implies that they 
will wish to exit from the industry. It is easily checked that 
if one firms exits (and since there are now no trade costs, the 
nationality of the exiting firm is irrelevant) then the 
remaining three firms increase their output to approximately 
5000/53, enjoy lower costs, and make positive profits of just 
over $21 each. The price to consumers is higher at $8.40 than 
with four firms, and the consumer surplus gain is therefore 
lowered to a little over $79, and the aggregate welfare gain at 
approximately $222 in total exceeds the welfare gain of $146 in 
the previous case. 
This example, simple though it is, illustrates some of the 
main features of the empirical model which follows. However, 
there is more involved in what we do below than a 
straightforward generalisation of the above example to 
encompass six countries, larger numbers of firms, and real 
world data. 
The principal feature of the model we have used which is 
not illustrated in the above example is product 
differentiation: consumers having preferences between different 
varieties of the same product. This introduces two features 
into the model (both of which are discussed further in section 
3 below): firms have to choose the number of varieties to 
produce; and their ability to set prices for individual 
varieties means that their marginal revenue now depends not 
just on market share and on the elasticity of demand for the 
product as a whole (as in the above example), but also on the 
elasticity of demand for the individual variety. 
casual empiricism suggests that product differentiation is 
an important feature of the markets for many manufactured 
products, and (as is explained in section 3 below) the data we 
use in our modelling give strong support to this view. The 
introduction of product differentiation thus enriches as well 
as complicates the model. 
There are two further distinctions which play a role in 
the paper but are not explicitly illustrated in the example 
above. 
The first is the distinction between "Cournot" and 
"Bertrand" competition. In the example we assumed that each 
firms supposed that other firms.' s. .. a.l.e..s. were given when it 
decided how much to sell; and this is the Cournot hypothesis. 
An alternative, the Bertrand hypothesis, would be to assume 
that firms set their prices on the assumption that other firms 
P.r .. i.c..e.s. are given. It is not very illuminating to look at the 
Bertrand hypothesis in the above example because, in the 
absence of product differentiation, Bertrand pricing 
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degenerates to pricing at marginal cost. However, in models 
with product differentiation, Bertrand behaviour is compatible 
with imperfect competition, though it still leads to 
substantially more competitive pricing than does Cournot 
behaviour. We suggest below that the cournot hypothesis may be 
the more attractive in the weight that it places on market 
shares as a determinant of firms' behaviour. 
The second distinction plays a more crucial role in our 
results. In the example above, the removal of trade barriers 
had a very dramatic effect on the competitive structure of the 
model. We shifted from an equilibrium in which each market was 
dominated by two domestic firms with a small fringe of 
importers to an equilibrium in which all four firms (or after 
exit, all three firms) had equal market shares. Effectively 
the two markets, which previously were . .s..e..gme.n.t.e..cl, now behave as 
if they were a single .. in.t.e..g.r..a.t.e..cl market. In the presence of 
product differentiation, removal of trade costs might not be 
sufficient to produce this outcome (consumers might, for 
example, have genuine preferences for home-produced varieties 
which give firms larger shares of home markets than of foreign 
markets). Further, without product differentiation, it is not 
possible to make the market integrated other than by setting 
trade costs to zero. In the model with product 
differentiation, however, it is possible without setting trade 
costs to zero to consider the effect of imposing on firms the 
requirement that they do not price discriminate between markets 
and charge the same factory-gate price to all consumers (though 
consumers in foreign markets still have to pay the trade cost 
on top of the uniform factory-gate price). This sort of policy 
has the same sort of strongly pro-competitive effect, even with 
positive trade costs, as did the removal of all trade costs in 
the example above, and for essentially the same reason: once 
firms look on the market as being a single integrated market, 
the market power that was conferred on them by asymmetrically 
large home market shares is diminished. The single most 
striking result that we describe below is that a policy which 
succeeded in making firms act on an EC-wide integrated market 
basis is likely to have much larger welfare effects than a 
policy which simply reduces border barriers . 
. 2 ........................ Mo.de.l ..... c.o.:v.e.r.age ........ and ...... d.a.t .. a ..... .s.o..:w:.c..e..s 
The model treats the world market for a product as being 
divided into six "countries": France, the Federal Republic of 
Germany, Italy, the UK, the rest of the EC, and the rest of the 
world. The model has been applied to the following selection 
of three digit NACE industries: 
242 cement, lime and plaster 
257 pharmaceutical products 
260 artificial and synthetic fibres 
322 machine tools .. 
330 office machinery 
342 electric motors, generators, transformers, 
346 electrical household appliances 
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351 
438 
451 
5.8 
motor vehicles and engines 
carpets, carpeting, oilcloth, linoleum, .. 
footwear 
These sectors were chosen as a relatively heterogeneous 
group of industries, for all of which some estimates of 
economies of scale are available, and some of which might be 
relatively strongly affected·by the completion of the European 
market, e.g. because of the role of public procurement or 
technical standards. 
Data on bilateral international trade flows between these 
"countries" in each of the ten sectors listed above was 
obtained from the Eurostat NACE-CLIO trade tables for 1982. 
Domestic production statistics for the EC countries were 
obtained from the Eurostat Annual Industrial survey. 
Unfortunately, production data for the rest of the EC seem 
quite unreliable and for the rest of the world are unavailable. 
For each industry, therefore, values were chosen for production 
in these "countries" that gave them approximately the same 
ratio of production to total exports (for the rest of the EC) 
or to exports to the EC (for the rest of the world) as the 
average for the four individually identified EC countries. 
These numbers were required to complete the model; and the fact 
that they were estimated in a fairly arbitrary way means that 
great caution should be exercised in interpreting results 
relating to the rest of the EC or the rest of the world. 
(Data for exports by the rest of the world to the EC were 
not available in the NACE-CLIO export tables and values were 
derived from the import tables, adjustments being made for 
observed systematic discrepancies between export and import 
data.) 
Even though the trade data are classified by nace-clio, 
and even after the above adjustments, there remained evident 
problems in reconciling the trade and production data, 
presumably largely arising from the fact that the trade data 
refer to commodities classified to the relevant nace-clio 
groups while the production data refer to firms (though the 
treatment of re-exports is another potential source of 
discrepancies). Apparent domestic consumption of domestically 
produced goods was calculated by subtracting the value of 
exports from the value of production, but in three cases 
(office equipment (330) in the UK, and carpets (438) ·and 
footwear (451) in Italy) this gave a negative number. An 
arbitrary adjustment was made to the domestic production figure 
to bring domestic consumption into approximately the same 
relation to trade flows as for the other countries. 
The first table in each section of Table 1 gives the six-
by-six matrix of trade and consumption flows derived for each 
of the ten industries from the 1982 data. Each row of the 
matrix refers to the production of a country; and each column 
to the consumption of a country. 
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The model requires an estimate of the number of firms in 
each sector in each country. The Eurostat . .S.:t.r.uc.t.ur.e. ....... and 
A.c .. t .. i.v.:.i.t . .Y. ...... o .. f ....... .F. .. r..Q.du.c .. t.i.Qn data on the size distribution of firms 
was used to calculate a Herfindahl index of concentration on 
the basis of which may be calculated the number of 
"representative•• firms in each country. This is the number of 
equal-sized firms which would give rise to the same effective 
degree of market concentration as the observed distribution of 
unequal-sized firms. These numbers are reported for each 
industry in Table 1. Again, numbers for the rest of the EC and 
the rest of the world have had to be assumed, to make firm size 
equal to the average in the four ind"ividual EC countries. 
It is evident that many of the ten nace-clio classes are 
too aggregated to be sensibly regarded as covering a single 
industry and in most cases we have modelled the industry as 
being divided into a number of equal-sized subindustries. For 
example, in electrical household appliances there are assumed 
to be five subindustries. Effectively this amounts to 
describing each subindustry by a commodity flow matrix and a 
set of firm numbers that are one fifth of the numbers reported 
in Table 1. 
The model requires information on economies of scale, and 
we have used the information provided by Pratten (1987), 
summarising much of that information into two numbers for each 
industry: the effect on average cost of changing the output of 
each of the individual product varieties of a firm of minimum 
efficient scale while keeping the number of varieties constant; 
and the effect on average cost of changing the number of 
product varieties, keeping output per variety constant. The 
minimum efficient scale is taken to be the size of the average 
"representative" firm in the EC; and where Pratten provides 
independent information on this, it seems to suggest that this 
is not an unreasonable assumption. There is an additional 
aspect of scale economies to consider: the form of the cost 
function. The simplest form of cost function giving rise to 
economies of scale is the "linear" function in which there are 
fixed costs and constant marginal cost. However, in many 
industries it seems possible that economies of scale would take 
a form in which marginal cost as well as average cost falls 
with output, and the simplest form of function with this 
property is the "loglinear" function, which is a linear 
function of the logarithms of the variables. In our model we 
have used a cost function which is a weighted average of these 
two forms and the weights (based partly on Pratten•s 
information, and partly on casual empiricism) are reported 
together with the other two scale economy numbers in Table 1. 
Finally, we require an estimate of the elasticity of 
demand for the product of each industry. Here our sources are 
Piggott and Whalley (1985), Deaton (1975), Houthakker (1965) 
and Houthakker and Taylor (1970), and the numbers we use are 
reported in Table 1. 
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1982 was chosen as the base year for the projections 
because of the fact that industrial survey data for later years 
is incomplete. Even though from a macroeconomic viewpoint, 
1982 was an atypical year for the European economy, we do not 
think that this fact will have any significant impact on the 
general nature of the results we obtain . 
.. 3 ......................... C.a.l.1b..r.a:t.i.o.n 
The process of model "calibration" consists of finding a 
set of numerical parameters for the model which are consistent 
with the information presented in the previous section. 
The first requirement is that firms' output decisions 
satisfy the condition that marginal revenue in each of the six 
markets equal the marginal cost of producing the good. The 
simplified model of section 1 shows how marginal revenue 
depends on market share and on the elasticity of demand for the 
product. The pattern of production and trade reported in Table 
1 cannot, however, be described by such a simple model, for it 
would seem that firms are not exploiting their scale economies 
to the extent that they should. The model used (and described 
in more detail in the technical appendix) introduces an element 
not present in the model of section 1: consumers are supposed 
to distinguish between the different varieties of the same 
product. Now firms choose their sales levels taking account not 
only of the effect of their decision on total supply of the 
product and therefore on the price level of the product in 
general, but also of the effect that a change in sales has on 
the price that the firm can charge for its own specific variety 
of the product. Thus for each industry we calculate an 
elasticity which would make the data consistent with the 
hypothesis that the firms were maximising profits in a market 
with differentiated products. 
our central case is based on a "Cournot" version of the 
model and the relevant elasticities are reported in Table 1 
imm~diately below "Cournot calibration". The larger the 
elasticity the less is the degree of product differentiation, 
and infinite elasticity corresponds to the case of no 
differentiation where consumers are indifferent between 
different varieties. Note the contrast between, say, 
pharmaceutical products (257) and artificial and synthetic 
fibres (260): the former has a much lower elasticity indicating 
a higher degree of product differentiation: the difference 
simply reflects the fact that pharmaceutical products has many 
more firms in spite of having stronger economies of scale. In 
most cases, the elasticities take intuitively appealing values, 
though office machinery (330) has an implausibly low degree of 
apparent product differentiation. (This may be related to the 
fact that in this industry the data for the UK are not very 
satisfactory and the skewed distribution of firm size in Italy 
may be affecting the estimate of "representative" firm size.) 
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Not only will different firms' products be differentiated, 
but one firm can produce different product varieties. There is 
then the issue of the extent to which we treat large firms as 
selling large numbers of product varieties or as having long 
production runs of individual varieties. ·In calibrating the 
data, having no information on this issue, we let all the 
variation in firm size be accounted for by the number of models 
produced by firms rather than by l.ength of model run, so as to 
minimise the extent to which differences between firms are 
introduced into the model without being based on good evidence. 
In our central policy experiments, we suppose that firms do not 
change the number of models that they produce, but there are 
some experiments in which we do let· firms vary their model 
numbers. In this event we need to have firms' model numbers 
explained by profit-maximising choice: where firms compare the 
cost of introducing a new model with the extra revenue that 
will be obtained in .all of the markets in which it is sold. 
When one firm makes this decision it is assumed to anticipate 
that other firms will react to a change in its number of 
models, and the "model conjectures" reported in Table 1 are the 
values of these assumed reactions which are consistent with the 
data; so, for example, in the case of artificial and synthetic 
fibres, in the cournot calibration each firm assumes that a 1% 
change in the number of its models would bring about a 0.02% 
change in the number of models produced by all other firms. 
Finally, we have to find model parameters which are 
consistent with the large observed differences in firms' share 
of different national markets, the share of home firms 
typically being very much greater than that of foreign firms. 
These differences may be the result of non-tariff trade 
barriers such as differences in national regulations, of 
transport costs, of differences in distribution networks, or of 
consumer preference patterns. We suppose that transport costs 
are at an .. a.d ... Jl .. al.Ql.:.e.m level of 10% and attribute the rest of the 
difference to differences in demand functions whose effect is 
described in the "tariff equivalent" tables within Table 1. 
These tables describe the tariff-equivalent values that non-
tariff barriers would have to have if the underlying consumer 
demands for goods were uniform across different national 
producers and .a.ll of the national bias in the observed trade 
pattern was attributed to trade barriers. (See the technical 
appendix for further details of the method of calculation.) 
A "Bertrand" version of the model was calibrated also, and 
the elasticities and model conjectures are reported in Table 1, 
though not the tariff-equivalents (which are different from 
those of the cournot calibration, but not remarkably so). 
Invariably, the model elasticity is lower in this case than in 
the Cournot case, simp.ly because the Cournot version of the 
model gives more weight to market shares in the determination 
of marginal revenue. Bertrand behaviour by firms is inherently 
more competitive and the observed failure of firms fully to 
exploit their economies of scale has to be explained by a 
higher degree of product differentiation (lower model 
elasticity) and by more pessimistic model conjectures. In the 
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cases of cement (242) and artificial fibres (260), the Bertrand 
calibration produces an implausibly high degree of product 
differentiation. We choose the Cournot case for our central 
projections because, even if it is based· on too simplistic a 
model to capture all of the complexity of real world 
competitive interaction, it does give an intuitively appealing 
weight to market shares in describing firms' behaviour . 
. 4 ....................... .S . imul.a.t.ion ..... of ...... :r.e.d:u~.e.d ..... t..r..ade .... ..b . .ar.:r..ie..r.s 
our first set of policy experiments is based on a very 
conservative interpretation of what is involved in "completing 
the internal market": the intra-EC implicit trade barriers are 
reduced equiproportionately so as to reduce trade costs by 2.5% 
of the value of intra-EC trade. Thus in the case of artificial 
fibres, all the tariff equivalents were reduced by 13.5%, while 
in electrical household.appliances, where the tariff 
equivalents were calibrated to be much higher, a 6.6% reduction 
in their value reduced trade costs by 2.5%. (In the case of 
footwear, where the calibration suggested the implicit barriers 
are already quite low, a 2.5% reduction produced implausible 
effects, and we have modelled the reduction as being 1%.) 
The figure of 2.5% could be defended on the basis of 
Winters's estimate (Pelkmans, Wallace and Winters, 1988) that 
removal of border measures affecting intra-Ec trade should 
generate direct cost savings of between 1% and 3% of trade. 
However, Winters also notes the existence of other distorting 
influences on trade, such as public procurement policies, 
subsidies and national standards, so our figure of 2.5% could 
be interpreted as taking a pessimistic view of the 
possibilities of substantial progress in reducing such 
distortions. It should, though, be noted that our results can 
be scaled proportionately to provide approximate estimates of 
the effects of changes in trade barriers different from the 
2.5% reduction. 
The effects projected by our model of this policy change 
are summarised for each of the ten industries in Table 2. 
cournot behaviour is assumed and it is also assumed that firms 
do not change the size of their model ranges. Two sets of 
projections are reported: one for the case in which the number 
of firms is unchanged by the policy; and the second for the 
case in which entry and exit of firms is assumed to take place 
so as to restore profits to the levels in the base case before 
the policy change. 
Consistently across industries, as one would expect/ the 
first effect is to increase the volume of intra-Ec trade/ 
whether or not the number of firms is constant. With a given 
number of firms, the increased import penetration makes markets 
more competitive and reduces prices, expands sales, raises 
consumer surplus and (except where there is a large increase in 
output) reduces profits. The effect on national output is to 
reinforce existing differences in trade patterns, so, for 
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example, in pharmaceuticals (257) the UK expands and Italy 
contracts, while in electrical household appliances (346) Italy 
expands and the UK contracts. The consistent effect of the 
output changes is to reduce the EC average value of the average 
cost of production in each industry. 
When the number of firms is allowed to vary in response to 
profit changes, the usual outcome (with the exception of office 
machinery (330) in which there are substantial apparent 
differences in the degree of concentration in different 
countries) is for there to be a reduction in the total number 
of EC firms, so that average cost falls further as remaining 
firms increase in size. Thus in most industries (260, 330, 
346, 350, for example), the average EC price falls by more when 
the number of firms is variable. The effect on consumer 
surplus is not necessarily as one would expect from looking at 
prices alone, because consumer surplus is affected also by the 
variety of products available, and that changes with the number 
of firms. 
Exit of firms tends to raise concentration, but in the 
version of the model used to generate the projections presented 
here, the price-cost markup is calculated with the number of 
firms unchanged. The rationale for this procedure is that, 
although the model treats all firms in a country as identical, 
in reality firms differ in size and efficiency, and exit of the 
least efficient firms should have little effect on the 
remaining firms' perception of the intensity of the competition 
they face. (When the model is run with the alternative 
assumption that exit is fully reflected in the surviving firms' 
markups the results differ in some details in some industries, 
but the overall pattern of results is not greatly changed.) 
Both with firm numbers fixed and variable, there are 
effects on extra-EC trade in all industries: extra-EC imports 
are replaced as the direct costs of intra-EC trade are reduced 
(trade diversion), while the reduction of EC costs and increase 
in competitivity reduces EC prices, expands extra-EC exports (a 
form of trade creation) and further reduces extra-EC imports. 
The key effect on the EC as a whole of the policy change across 
the ten sectors are summarised in Table 3 which reports for 
both variants of the model the percentage change in·output, the 
percentage change in average cost, the change in aggregate 
welfare (consumer surplus plus profit) as a fraction of the 
value of total consumption in the base case, and the ratio of 
welfare gain to intra-EC trade creation. For each industry, 
Table 3 also reports some key characteristics of the industry. 
e, the calibrated value of the individual model elasticity, is 
high where different varieties of the product are close 
substitutes (as in 242 and 451) and low where there is strong 
product differentiation (as in 257 and 342). RS gives the 
increase in average cost when production runs are reduced to 
half their minimum efficient scale, so that high values 
indicate the existence of strong economies of scale, as in 257 
and 350. TS gives the share on intra-EC trade in EC consumptior 
and is low in those industries (242 and 342) which seem to· have 
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high transport costs. H is the EC average Herfindahl index, and 
is high in concentrated industries such as 330 and low in 
industries with many firms such as 342 and 451. DC is the 
direct cost saving associated with the policy change, expressed 
as a percentage of base consumption. 
Table 3 shows the changes in average cost and the changes 
in welfare as a proportion of base consumption that result from 
the policy change. These changes are largest in industries 260, 
330, and 350, which all have significant returns to scale .. arui a 
high proportion of output traded within the EC. only in those 
industries, with free entry/exit, do welfare gains exceed 1% of 
base consumption. It should also be noted that the cost 
reduction and welfare gain are larg~st when there is entry and 
exit, but the effect of entry and exit is significant only in 
the more concentrated industries and is negligible or negative 
in 322, 342 and 451. comparison of the welfare gain with DC 
shows to what extent the welfare gains are "indirect", in the 
sense of resulting from adjustment in the market to the policy 
change, and to what extent they are simply the direct 
consequence of the reduction in trade costs. 
The results of Table 3 show finally that the ratio of 
welfare gain to trade creation is strongly associated with the 
degree of returns to scale, exceeding 18% in the free entry 
case in the four industries, 242, 257, 342 and 350, with the 
greatest economies of scale, and dropping below 2% in footwear, 
where scale economies are least. (The fact that trade 
liberalisation generates welfare losses in the cement industry 
with a fixed number of firms is a reflection of the very high 
transport costs in this sector, so that the gains to consumers 
of increased competition are more than wiped out by the losses 
to firms.) 
The ratio of welfare gain to trade created is a useful 
statistic to summarise the results of the models because it is 
not directly dependent on the precise nature of the policy 
experiment being modelled and can be used to compare our 
results with those of other studies. owen (1983, pp.144-147 1 
reports welfare gains of the order of 50% of the value of trade 
creation, in a study of the effects of the EC that takes 
account of economies of scale, in contrast with the numbers in 
our Table 3 which are mostly in the range of 8% to 25%. There 
seem to be three principal sources of the difference between 
our results and those of owen: he assumes a much greater degree 
of economies of scale; he supposes that industries expand 
through expansion of existing firms but contract through exit; 
and he confines attention to uni-directional trade creation, 
ignoring intra-industry trade. our results are closer to those 
generated by the modelling exercise of Harris and Cox (1984, 
p.114) who estimate in a model with scale economies a welfare 
gain of 17.5% of trade created by multilateral liberalisation 
of Canadian trade with the rest of the world. 
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.. 5 .. .a. ................. S.e.ns.it.iY..i.t.y 
The preceding section assumed Cournot behaviour and a 
fixed number of models per firm. While we regard this as our 
central case, in this section we report the effects of 
replacing cournot behaviour by Bertrand, and of removing the 
assumption that the number of models is fixed. 
The difference between cournot and Bertrand behaviour is 
that the latter is more competitive in the sense that each 
firm's actions have less impact on the industry price indices. 
As noted in section 3 this implies that the calibrated 
elasticities are lower in the Bertrand case than in the cournot 
case, these being reported in table 4 as eB and ec. Notice 
that for industries in which the Herfindahl index is very smal] 
(for example 322) the two elasticities are similar. Where the 
Herfindahl index is large the elasticities may be very 
different. Thus in the cement industry (242) the cournot 
elasticity is 35.5, and the Bertrand 8. It seems likely that 
Bertrand behaviour overestimates the level of competition in 
this industry, and consequently attaches more weight to produc1 
differentiation than is plausible. 
What difference does Bertrand behaviour make for the 
effects of the reduction in trade barriers? The policy works 
by increasing import penetration, and hence reducing firms' 
shares in their domestic markets, and so increasing 
competitiveness. With Bertrand behaviour these changes in 
market share have less effect on price (as price-cost margins 
are largely accounted for by product differentiation); the 
policy therefore leads to smaller price reductions. The 
smaller magnitude of price reductions means that demand and 
output increase by less than in the cournot case, this being 
accentuated by lower price elasticities. Smaller output change1 
lead to smaller reductions in average costs (table 4). 
However, despite the smaller savings in production cost, we se1 
that, when the number of firms is fixed, the welfare gains fror 
the policy are greater in the Bertrand case then in the Courno• 
case. This is because the increase in trade (which incurs 
transport costs) is less in this case. 
A second consequence of the smaller price reduction in th• 
Bertrand case is that the policy reduces profits by less. When 
the number of firms is variable there is therefore less exit 
from the industry (and may be entry as total industry output 
rises), so leading to smaller reductions in average cost. The 
welfare gains are now also smaller, on average, although this 
difference is ambiguous due to lower trade costs and increased 
product variety, with more firms remaining in the Bertrand 
case. 
The second dimension of sensitivity analysis explored in 
table 4 is to let the number of product varieties produced by 
each firm change. This experiment is meaningful only if there 
is a significant degree of differentiation in consumer demand 
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between products varieties, or there are significant economies 
of scope. Table 4 therefore does not report results fo.r the 
"models variable" case for the four industries (242, 260, 438, 
and 451) where a high value of e indicates little product 
differentiation, and our information on economies of scale 
implies that there is little cost reduction obtained by 
expanding the number of models produced at given output per 
model. For the six industries in which this is a meaningful 
experiment, table 4 shows that the results of the policy are 
affected in three ways. First, changes in output are now 
generally (but not invariably) larger, due to the fact that 
firms have an additional instrument with which to respond to 
the policy change. second, the fall in average costs is now 
generally (but not invariably) smaller. Firms shorten their 
production runs as they expand their model range. There are 
economies of scope, but these are smaller than returns to scale 
in production of a particular model. Third, the welfare gains 
from the policy are now generally (but not invariably) larger, 
as the smaller average cost reductions are compensated for by 
the benefits of increased product variety. The welfare 
difference is particularly marked in two industries, electrical 
household appliances (346) and motor vehicles (350); these both 
being industries in which economies of scope are assumed to be 
relatively significant. 
overall, we regard the variation in results across 
different variants of the model as surprisingly small. From 
the theoretical literature we know that it is possible to 
construct examples where assumptions on market structure 
reverse the effects of policy. A sign change of this type is 
observed in the cement industry (242), but this is readily 
explicable in terms of the high transport costs in this 
industry. Apart from this, not only the sign, but also the 
order of magnitude of the welfare gains, and the ranking of 
industries by welfare gain are fairly stable across industries. 
We have not undertaken formal sensitivity analysis with 
respect to parameters of the model such as the returns to scale 
parameters or the overall product demand elasticity. In the 
former case, the comparison of results for different industries 
gives a fairly clear indication of how changes in assumptions 
about scale economies would affect the conclusions (see the 
discussion of Table 3 in the previous section). In the latter 
case, it is evident from the formal structure of the model that 
variations in this elasticity within plausible ranges are most 
unlikely to have significant or systematic effects on the 
results of the model, being swamped by the efffects of 
differences in the model elasticity. 
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Table 5 reports the results for the ten industries of a 
much more dramatic interpretation of what is involved in 
"completing the internal market". It is assumed that trade 
costs are reduced as in the previous case, but also that firms 
treat the whole EC as a single integrated market and have no 
ability to price discriminate between different "national" 
markets. 
The key to understanding the effect of this change in the 
market is to recall the role that market share plays in giving 
firms market power, especially in the cournot version of the 
model. When different countries are treated by firms as being 
different markets, then the large share that firms typically 
have in their own domestic markets gives them the ability to 
charge higher prices to home consumers. With EC market 
integration, shares in "national" markets are no longer of 
economic significance, and all firms have quite small shares oj 
the whole EC market, even in the more concentrated industries. 
Thus the change being modelled here is much more strongly pro-
competitive than the earlier policy experiment. 
The results of the change are reported industry-by-
industry in Table 5 and are summarised and compared with the 
previous, "segmented market", case in Table 6. 
In several industries, the shift to integrated markets 
leads to a reduction in intra-EC trade, reported in the fourth 
row of each part in Table 6. This is the natural consequence o 
the reduction in firms' market power in their home markets 
leading to a reduction in their prices in those markets. More 
important, in most industries there are much more substantial 
loss of profits and in all industries much greater gains of 
consumer surplus in this experiment than in the experiment 
reported in Table 2. When in Table 6 we compare the two sets o 
Cournot experiments we find that in the more concentrated 
industries where firms had significant market power (242, 257, 
260, 330, 346, 350) the increase in the competitivity of the 
market as a result of integration leads to welfare gains quite 
significantly larger than those in the segmented market case: 
the impact on economic welfare in these industries of the 
reduction in trade costs .~.Q.Il\h1ne.d with the shift to integrated 
markets is typically (with fixed numbers of firms) _fQur .times 
the size of the welfare gain from the reduction in trade costs 
alone and in most of these industries the welfare gain is in 
the region of 1%-4% of base consumption. 
The consequence of the profit change is that if entry anc 
exit are permitted there is greater exit in most industries ir 
the integrated market experiment, and again this implies that 
the welfare gains are much larger than in the free entry case 
when markets are segmented. The welfare gains are not 
invariably larger with free entry than they were with fixed 
numbers of firms, and most of the gains for concentrated 
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industries are still in the range of 1% to 4% of base 
consumption but the gain rises to 12% in the motor industry 
when-exit is permitted. 
In the segmented market policy experiment, we reported 
welfare change as a fraction of intra-EC trade creation, but 
this is not now a meaningful statistic since a reduction in 
intra-EC trade can be the result of the policy change. 
Table 6 also shows that mar·ket integration has little 
effect in those industries where concentration is low (machine 
tools and footwear) and has little effect in the Bertrand 
version of the model. This simply reflects the fact that market 
shares give little market power in these cases, so that a 
change in market structure which changes effective market 
shares has little real effect . 
.. C.onc.lus.ions 
It is appropriate to precede our conclusions with a note 
about the limitations of the kind of exercise that we have 
undertaken here. We believe that the facts of industrial 
concentration, economies of scale, and intra-industry trade 
provide a strong case for modelling many markets as being 
imperfectly competitive; and only a modelling exercise based, 
as this one has been, on imperfect competition can hope to 
capture in a consistent fashion many key effects of policy 
changes in such markets. It will be clear from the earlier 
sections of the paper that we have more confidence in the 
"Cournot" versions of our model, since it seems to give an 
appropriate weight to market shares in describing equilibrium. 
Even this model, however, is at best a crude approximation to 
the complexity of imperfectly competitive behaviour in the real 
world. 
All of the results reported above are of a partial 
equilibrium nature in that the analysis is conducted on an 
industry-by-industry basis. There are three possible important 
effects which are left out of such an approach. one is the 
effect of price changes of intermediate goods used as inputs in 
other industries; the second relates to changes in the prices 
of primary factors of production as different sectors compete 
for these factors; and the third is the possible effect of 
exchange rate changes resulting from the projected changes in 
trade patterns. We have not modelled such interactions, and 
our judgement is that including the latter two effects is 
unlikely to have a major impact on our results: there might be 
important changes in exchange rates and in factor prices, but 
the feedback effects into the goods markets are likely to be of 
second-order importance. The possible effects of intermediate 
goods price changes are harder to guess without actually 
developing a formal model that distinguishes between 
intermediate and final goods, and models the appropriate 
general equilibrium interactions. It is possible that the 
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omission of such interactions leads to a significant 
.. underestimate of the effects of policy change. 
What degree of confidence then should one have in our 
results? Different versions of the mod~l produce fairly 
similar projections for the EC .aa_a_~Q~ and this is 
encouraging. There is some reason to have greater confidence 
in our results for the EC as a whole than in our allocation of 
these results .a.~J.:.Q..S..S. ... ..C..Q.un.t.r..i.e.s. For example, in the free entry 
case we see that increased competition causes exit of firms in 
the EC as a whole, and the consequent changes in firm scale and 
average costs are very similar for firms in all countries. 
Which countries does the exit occur in? The results derived by 
the model come essentially from projection of existing patterns 
of trade, with the positions of net exporters being 
strengthened. However, if the actual effect of the reduction 
in intra-EC barriers was different from the equiproportionate 
reduction in tariff equivalents that we have modelled, the 
distribution between countries of the changes in output would 
be different, and it should be recalled that we have no 
information on the extent to which the apparent barriers 
represented by the tariff equivalents are the result of genuine 
differences in tastes as opposed to potentially removable 
artificial barriers. 
In interpreting the results, one also needs to recall that 
they have been produced by assuming a reduction of 2.5% in 
intra-EC trade costs. If one believed that the scope for 
actual cost reductions were different from this, the projected 
effects on welfare and costs should be adjusted accordingly. 
Also we have reported above the figure for the welfare gain as 
a fraction of trade created, because this figure may remain a 
reasonable estimate even if trade is created by methods other 
than the reduction in tariff-equivalent barriers which we have 
modelled. 
We have examined two interpretations of what is involved 
in "completing the internal market in the EC". The first 
treated the policy as a quantitative change, involving small 
reductions in barriers to trade. This change resulted in 
increased import penetration in each country, so increasing 
competition, and raising welfare, by modest though significant 
amounts. our projections could be rescaled to provide 
approximate estimates of the effects of barrier reductions of a 
different size from the one we have modelled. 
The second policy change involved a qualitative change in 
firms' behaviour: forcing firms to act on a European-wide 
"integrated market" basis, so removing firms' ability to 
exploit their domestic market power. This policy yields large 
welfare gains. It also causes large reductions in profit (and 
in the long run in the number of firms), and it is not clear tc 
what extent there exist feasible changes in EC trade policy anc 
competition policy that could actually being about such a 
change. 
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The gains from "completing the internal market" differ 
substantially therefore according to whether the phrase means 
simply moving the EC closer to being a true common market, or 
whether it is to be interpreted as the creation of a genuinely 
unified market on a scale greater that the u.s.A. The policy 
implication of our results is that a ma)or aim of EC 
competition policy should be to remove the sources of price 
differences between different national markets within the EC. 
Successful policy of this nature would have more effect on 
economic welfare in the long run that policies aimed only at 
barriers more directly and obviously affecting international 
trade. 
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Table 1; 
2ll2 gement, lime and plaster 
Production/Consumption matrix, 1982 mECU. 
Fr G It UK RoEC RoW 
Fr 1860.32 33.12 7.1!5 1. 97 11!.50 114.54 
G 4.35 1932.2ll 0.89 3.19 79.38 68.75 
It 1. 57 0.32 2138.09 0.02 o.ll3 41. 17 
UK 1. 20 0.37 0.16 1212.33 4.20 26.1ll 
Ro!!:C 1Ll.52 29.50 2.41 12.59 7369.62 302.66 
RoW 0.28 12.73 7.ll1 1. ll7 4.76 1208.68 
Number or firms= 
13 17 19 10 60 10 
Number or sub-industries= 1. 
Returns to scale. 
~ increase in average cost at 1/3 output per model; 20% 
~ increase in average cost at 1/2 number or models; o~ 
Linear/loglinear weights; 0.5, 0.5; 
Elasticit.v 
- 0.6 
E ls $' t: i e i t:J.' 
Tariff' equivalents: 
F 
G 
It 
UK 
RoEC 
F G 
o.oo 0.19 
0.27 0.00 
0.29 0.30 
0.28 0.28 
0.27 0.23 
Model Conjectures (%), 
w - -6.8 -6.8 
Bertrand Calibration 
Elasticit.v = 8.01. 
Model Conjectures (%), 
w -6.8 -6.9 
It 
0.22 
0.27 
o.oo 
0.29 
0.28 
-6.8 
-6.8 
UK 
0.32 
0.31 
o.ll1 
o.oo 
0.31 
-6.6 
-6.8 
Ro!!:C 
0.15 
0.11 
0.21! 
0.17 
o.oo 
-7.1 
-6.9 
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?:_5..7...._fh a~~ tic al _ _IT_Q_<!_u c t ~. 
Production/Consumption matrix, 1982 mECU. 
Fr G It UK RoEC RoW 
Fi-:. 5275-79 16ll.31 52.71 71.03 167.37 821.89 
G 59.10 491ll.07 1ll0.17 110.ll8 266.93 1138.ll5 
It ll5.52 67.50 ll015.36 20.4ll ll5.82 ll87.57 
UK 8ll.29 87.27 92.64 3399.65 267.02 1119.32 
RoEC 117.ll7 23ll.8o 71.16 138.07 2016.25 78ll.ll9 
RoW 237.99 llo9·. 20 2ll3.117 206.25 ll26.09 18558.51 
Number of firms= 
135 71 88 ll6 50 298 
Number of sub-industries= 5-
Returns to scale. 
% increase in average cost at 1/2 output per model; 22% 
% increase in average cost at 1/2 number of models; 5% 
Linear/loglinear weights; 1.0, 0.0; 
Elasticitv = 0.8 
Cournot Ca}jbrationL 
Elastic! tv = 5.8 
Tariff equivalents; 
F G 
F 0.00 0-53 
G 0.61 0.00 
It 0.61 0.58 
UK 0.55 0.56 
RoEC 0.119 0.112 
Model Conjectures (%), 
w - -0.6 -0.6 
Bertrand Calibra~tQn 
Elastic! tv 
- ll.72. 
Model Conjectures (%), 
It 
0.611 
0.55 
o.oo 
0.56 
0.56 
-0.6 
w - 17.9 17.9 17.9 
UK RoEC 
0.62 0.51 
0.59 o.ll6 
0.69 0.60 
o.oo 0.112 
0.50 o.oo 
-0.6 -0.6 
17.9 17.9 
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Production/Consumption matrix, 1982 mECU. 
Fr G It UK RoEC RoW 
Fr 288.66 81.53 79.05 27-38 80.23 152.95 
G 177.92 432.34 175.12 153-30 323-55 649.07 
It 100.28 83.25 779.21 67.17 119.26 307.33 
UK 6.98 26.63 19.ll2 822.01 63.62 84.73 
RoEC 106.47 186.113 79.ll7 121.18 612.ll8 127.15 
RoW 90.57 140.18 110.96 172.77 172-38 1524.21 
Number of firms= 
5 13 10 7 8 15 
Number of sub-industries= 1. 
Returns to scale. 
% increase in averaKe cost at 1/2 output .Per model; 10" 
% increase in average cost at 1/2 number of models: 3" 
Linear/loglinear weights; o. 5. 0.5; 
Elasticity ... 0.5. 
Co~rnot Calibration~ 
Elasticity = 21.54. 
Tariff equivalents; 
F G It UK RoEC 
F o.oo 0.06 0.16 0.28 0.111 
G 0.17 0.00 0.17 0.2ll 0.11 
It 0.19 0.10 o.oo 0.27 0.16 
UK 0.29 0.1ll 0.211 o.oo 0.17 
RoEC 0.17 0.03 0.19 0.23 o.oo 
Model Conjectures (%), 
w - -2.0 -2.1 -2.0 -1.9 -2.0 
l§rtrand Calibration 
IUasticity 
- 8.71. 
Model Conjectures ("), 
w ... 25.9 30.0 25.9 25.9 
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.J.g_?__l1a~hine ,1'ools. 
Production/Consumption matrix, 1982 mECU. 
Fr G It UK RoEC RoW 
Fr 580.27 88.60 35.87 33.77 57.5ll ll95-95 
G 330.86 2ll56.86 1611.38 2111.00 350.09 2519.82 
It 135.111 123.93 1171.60 116.37 52.12 63·5· 68 
UK 119.86 62.82 211.51 758.110 88.77 713.311 
RoEC 70.71 132.02 19.81 53.02 621.86 298.21 
RoW 298.112 653-72 18ll.o4 358.78 270.7ll 8899.08 
Number of firms= 
79 204 115 186 62 556 
Number of sub-industries= 1. 
Returns to scale. 
% increase in average cost at 1/2 output per model; 7" 
% increase in average cost at 1/2 number ot models; 1" 
Linear/loglinear weights; 0.8. 0.2; 
Elasticitv = 1.1 
Elasticitv = 13.55. 
Taritt equivalents; 
F G It UK RoEC 
F o.oo 0.13 0.21 0.20 0.18 
G 0.15 0.00 0.21 0.18 o. '16 
It 0.111 0.111 o.oo 0.21 0.21 
UK 0.19 0.17 0.25 o.oo 0.16 
RoEC 0.15 0.09 0.211 0.16 o.oo 
Model Conjectures (")· 
w = 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
Bertrand Calibration 
Elasticitv 
- 13.25 
Model Conjectures (")· 
w - 1ll.3 1ll.3 1ll.3 111.2 
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~J9 Office Machine~ 
Production/Consumption matrix, 1982 mECU. 
Fr G It UK RoEC RoW 
Fr 3642.39 392-97 141.28 227.18 242.39 646.68 
G 682.03 3022.19 293.57 436.08 433.08 1203.24 
It 293.86 208.78 2473.85 168.27 154.96 469.18 
UK 387.60 372.85 194.51 1431.41 381.00 990.72 
RoEC 317.24 lt36.91 111.30 551.71 2889.95 665.7ll 
RoW 1431L 56 1659.24 551.99 1828.86 13lt8.03 17123.55 
Number of firms= 
9 17 6 20 lit 70 
Number Of sub-industries• 2. 
Returns to scale. 
% increase in avera~e cost at 1/2 output per model; 10% 
% increase in averaee cost at 1/2 nuanber of models: 5" 
Linear/loelinear weiehts; 0.8, 0.2: 
Elasticit~ • 0.90. 
~rnot Calibration: 
Elasticit~ 
- 32.77-
Tariff equivalents: 
F G 
F o.oo 0.10 
G 0.16 o.oo 
It 0.16 0.11 
UK 0.16 0.10 
RoEC 0.18 0.10 
Model Conjectures (%}, 
It 
0.30 
0.28 
o.oo 
0.28 
0.30 
w • -2.4 -2.5 -2.lt 
Btrtrand Cal!bration 
Elaaticitv • 10.90 
Model Conjectures (%}, 
w • 40.4 40.3 40.4 
UK RoEC 
0.10 0.10 
0.08 0.12 
0.10 0.14 
0.00 0.11 
0.07 o.oo 
-2.5 -2.5 
40.2 
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.J..l! .. g_ . J~J.ectric motors~nerator.L_~ 
Production/Consumption matrix. 1982 mECU. 
Fr G It UK RoEC RoW 
Fr 7106.81 218.95 110.10 90.06 174.80 1361.29 
G 449.10 15428.51 247.86 2311.17 553.78 25110.118 
It 117.51 92.39 2170.80 37.78 51.95 789.58 
·UK 80.25 96.911 38.02 2219.60 165.111 1516.68 
RoEC 105.06 190.88 115.59 88.66 3559.12 548.73 
RoW 3ll1.112 794.oll 2ll1. 08 519-711 llll5.86 28778.40 
Number of firms= 
65 186 46 121 53 362 
Number of sub-industries• 3. 
Returns to scale. 
% increase in average cost at 1/2 output per model: 15% 
% increase in average cost at 1/2 number of models; 5% 
Linear/loclinear weights: 0.8, 0.2; 
Elasticitv 
- 1.1 
Cournot Calibrationi 
Elasticitv 
- 7-35 
Tariff equivalents: 
F G It UK RoEC 
F 0.00 o.ll2 o.ll9 0.48 0.46 
G 0.44 o.oo 0.48 0.46 o.ll2 
It 0.39 0.40 o.oo 0.46 0.117 
TJK 0.44 0.41 0.50 o.oo 0.38 
RoEC 0.43 0.36 0.50 o.ll1 o.oo 
Model Conjectures (%). 
w • 3.0 3.0 3.0 3-0 3.0 
Bertrand Calibration 
Elasticitv .. 6.77-
Model Conjectures (%), 
w - 27.5 27.4 27.3 27.3 
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.3..Y6 __ Domestic Electrical Appliances. 
Production/Consumption matrix, 1982 mECU. 
Fr G It UK RoEC RoW 
Fr 2660.211. 93.211. 67.19 92.58 911..27 226.09 
G 286.74 2491.38 93.42 139.34 372.72 594.19 
It 260.22 214.14 1539.39 253.44 186.59 429.62 
UK 24.03 23. 3.8 8.72 1405.86 77.00 126.91 
RoEC 77.06 111. 64 8.16 85.64 1635.48 215.76 
RoW 187.55 192.49 41.26 200.89 175.59 3290.17 
Number ot tirms= 
22 34 27 36 22 1&2 
Number ot sub-industries• 5. 
Returns to scale. 
~ increase in average cost at 1/2 output per model; 10~ 
~ increase in average cost at 1/2 number ot models; 5~ 
Linear/lo~linear wei~hts; 0.5, 0.5; 
Elasticity 
- 1.75. 
Cournot Calibration; 
Elasticity 
- 10.77. 
Taritt equivalents; 
F G 
F o.oo 0.31 
G 0.27 o.oo 
It 0.25 0.23 
UK 0.36 0.33 
RoEC 0.32 0.25 
Model Conjectures (~). 
It 
0.34 
0.33 
o.oo 
o.ll.o 
o.llll 
w - 6.5 6.3 6.11. 
Bertrand Calibration 
IUastici tv 
- 7.78. 
Model Conjectures (~), 
w - 62.6 62.0 62.1 
UK RoEC 
0.34 0.311 
0.33 0.211. 
0.25 0.27 
o.oo 0.28 
0.31 o.oo 
6.3 6.1l 
61.7 
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ll38 Carpets, linoleum etc. 
Production/Consumption matrix, 1982 mECU. 
Fr G It UK RoEC RoW 
Fr 477-79 27.71 13.91 13.29 25.28 65.02 
G 72.31 591.81 34.60 34.27 131.85 237.66 
It 45.13 32.70 151.78 18.95 17.32 81L.32 
UK 19.69 32.58 6.15 969.97 52.50 130.80 
RoEC 232.12 382.06 37.02 213.31 3201. IL7 392.93 
RoW 88.15 536.111 65.52 123.87 102.06 IL71L1.82 
Number of firms• 
25 30 15 52 165 210 
Number of sub-industries- 1. 
Returns to scale. 
% increase in average cost at 1/2 output per model; 6~ 
% increase in average cost at 1/2 number of models; 3~ 
Linear/loclinear weights; 0.5, 0.5; 
Elasticity .. 0.95. 
Cournot Calibration; 
Elasticity .. 21." 
Tariff equivalents: 
F G 
P' o.oo 0.11 
G 0.13 o.oo 
It 0.09 0.08 
UK 0.18 0.13 
RoEC 0.32 0.25 
Model Conjectures (~), 
It 
0.16 
0.15 
o.oo 
0.22 
o.llll 
w - 1.0 1.0 1.0 
Bertrand Calibration 
Elasticitv 
- 17.59 
Model Conjectures (~). 
w - 36.6 36.6 36.5 
UK RoEC 
0.17 0.13 
0.16 0.09 
0.13 0.12 
o.oo 0.13 
0.31 o.oo 
1.0 1.0 
36.6 
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J2.Q __ Motor Vehicles 
Production/Consumption matrix, 1982 mECU. 
Fr G It UK RoEC RoW 
Fr 22702.28 1342.23 1644.29 858.53 1397.31 lt834.67 
G 3136.92 23571.78 1988.86 2877.10 lt932.93 15737.12 
It 1028.58 625.97 8873.40 311.21 333.78 2057.77 
UK 1178.23 639.63 305.56 10053.23 817.55 3lt86.90 
RoEC 1223.58 2108.70 615.11 1533.90 11507.32 1237.59 
RoW 1908.76 1696.23 887.25 1855.la9 2618.98 3503la.30 
Number of firms= 
2 5 2 3 2 
Number of sub-industries= 1. 
Returns to scale. 
% increase in average cost at 1/2 output per model; 16% 
% increase in average cost at 1/2 number. of models; 8% 
Linear/lo~linear weights; 0.5. 0.5; 
Elasticit~ = 1. 63 
Cournot Calibration: 
Elasticit~ = 13.32. 
Ta.rif'f' e~uivalents; 
F G It UK RoEC 
F. 0.00 0.24 0.32 0.32 0.31 
G 0.34 o.oo 0.35 0.27 0.25 
It 0.30 0.21 o.oo 0.31 0.32 
UK 0.36 0.22 0.37 o.oo 0.28 
RoEC 0.32 0.15 0.35 0.23 o.oo 
Model Conjectures (%), 
w = -5.1 -4.6 -lt.8 -lt.6 -IJ.8 
Be~trand Calibration 
Elasticitv 
Model Conjectures (%), 
w - 33.0 35.0 33.0 35.0 
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Table 2; Reduction in Trade Barriers 
Segmented Market. 
242 Cement, lime and plaster: (Cournot: mod~ls p~r firm ~onstant) 
Production and w~lfare ~hange by country 
--------- ----·-----·-·-- --·-- ------- ------vuiabi~ .;:-of tk101 Fixed no. of fir101 
A output A COIIS1UheH' A profit A output A C01111111ners' Anamber 
% surplus, mBCU mBCU % surplus, mBCU of firms 
France 1.75 12.2 -15.4 2.33 24.0 -1 
GermaiiJ -1.01 10.4 -15.2 18.6 51.7 -4 
Ualy -0.99 1.7 -3.7 -0.81 9.8 -1 
U.K. -4.0 9.5 -17.4 -2.16 17.9 -1 
RofEC -1.10 10.2 -7.6 -3.66 -8.8 1 
EC 0.24 43.9 -59.3 0.58 94.5 -7 
EC 
A intra-EC A extra-EO A aYerace A welfare% 
trade% expods% imporb% costs% consumption 
Fixed no. of firms 128.5 0.4 -10.7 -0.03 -0.1 
Variable no. of firms 180.6 0.0 -33.6 -0.93 0.64 
257 Pharmaceutical products: (Cournot; models per ftrm constant) 
Production and welfare chaqe by country 
Fixed no. of firms Variable no. of firms 
A welfare% 
A int-EC trad 
-5.0 
22.1 
------ _A_o_u-tp--u-t--A--c-o_n_s_u_me_r-s'--A--pr-o_ft_t-+-A-o-u-tp_u_t __ A._c_o;.Um;;s-,-A;umb;;-
% surplus, mBCU mBCU % surplus, mBCU of ftrms 
France 0.46 12.3 1.40 0.60 14.4 0 
Germany 0.42 19.5 -3.4 0.44 16.8 0 
Italy -0.22 16.2 -8.2 -0.42 7.9 -1 
U.K. 0.52 18.3 -6.3 0.30 13.2 0 
R of EC 0.68 20.8 -2.7 0.42 17.8 0 
EC 0.37 87.2 -19.1 0.30 70.0 -1 
EC aggre ales 
A intra-EC A extra-EC A extra-EC A price% A aYerace A welfare% A welfare% 
trade% expods% imports% EC ave) costs% consumption A lnt-ECl '"" 
Fixed no. of ftrms 13.3 0.0 -2.0 -0.16 -0.08 0.29 21.8 
Variable no. of firms 13.3 -0.3 -1.6 -0.16 -0.16 0.30 22.5 
----- -------------
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.!!2..~ Footwear 
Production/Consumption matrix, 1982 mECU. 
Fr G It UK RoEC RoW 
Fr 1964.10 107.87 21.51 42.53 102.85 260.93 
G 42.76 1238.02 ·to. 22 15.25 126.07 239.68 
It 535.04 864.89 1264.111 358.25 1111.6.59 111.89.36 
UK 10.62 11.01 7.25 11311.15 83.63 911.811. 
RoEC 20.00 87.31 2.111 30.77 689.88 103.60 
RoW 291.47 581. 110 78.56 350.28 211.6.99 11298.87 
Number of firms= 
94 71 1165 65 388 
Number of sub-industries• 1. 
Returns to scale. 
% increase in average cost at 1/2 output per model; 2% 
% increase in average cost at 1/2 number of models; 2% 
Linear/loglinear weights; 0.5, 0.5; 
Elastic! t~· "" 0.10. 
Elastic! tv = 53.29 
Tariff equivalents; 
F G It UK RoEC 
F o.oo 0.06 0.08 0.08 0.06 
G 0.07 o.oo 0.08 0.09 0.05 
It 0.03 0.02 o.oo 0.05 0.04 
UK 0.09 0.09 0.08 o.oo 0.05 
RoEC 0.07 0.04 0.09 0.07 o.oo 
Model Conjectures (%}, 
w - 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 
Bertrand Calibration 
Elastic! tv 
- 11.2.11.6 
Model Conjectures (%}, 
w - 99.3 99.3 99·3 
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Segmented Markets 
330 OfRce Machinery: (Cournot; modt'l~ pt'r firm t'On~tant) 
Production and welfare change by country 
------- - v~i~bie no. o( firms Fixed no. of firms 
6 output 6 consumer•' 6 profit 6 oatpat 6 CODnlllen' A aamber 
% lurplUI, anBCU anBOU % aurplul,anBOU o(firms 
Fra1u:e 3.31 112.4 -63.4 -21.3 91.4 -3 
GeriiUIIlJ 13.4 50.0 10.9 33.6 64.8 3 
ltal:r 4.37 148.9 -113.1 -25.0 129.0 -2 
U.K. -21.3 37.3 14.4 78.9 60.9 11 
RofEC 8.24 58.7 -17.3 -11.6 49.7 -3 
EC 10.4 407.4 -168.4 12.5 396.0 6 
EC aggre ates 
6 intra-EC 6 extra-EC 6 extra-EC 6 price% A aftRCe 6 welfare% A welfart''l 
trade% exports% import•% (EC aYe) co1l1% consumption A lat-EC tra 
Fixed no. of firllll 
Variable no. of firllll 
---44:5---5~9---=25:9----1~67~--o.98---c::o:·as::------8.o--
57.2 12.3 -27.5 -2.48 -2.48 1.45 10.7 
342 Electric motors, generators, etc: (Coarnot; models per firm constant) 
Production and welfare change by country 
Fixed do. of firms Variable no. of firms 
---- ·-----·-·-
---·-·---------6 output 6 consumer•' 6 profit A output 6 con•umer•' 6 number 
% 1urplus, mBOU anBCU % 1urpl01, anBCU o(firms 
France 0.09 26.6 -7.0 -0.02 19.9 0 
Germany 1.01 22.6 17.3 1.49 46.8 2 
ltal:r -0.56 19.3 -7.7 -1.98 10.1 -1 
U.K. -0.06 15.7 -1.5 0.04 14.4 0 
RofEC -0.86 30.0 -11.3 -2.26 14.8 -2 
EC 0.37 114.2 -10.2 0.31 106.1 -2 
----------- ---- ----
EC aggregates 
6 intra-EC 6 extra-EC 6 extra-EC 6 price% 6 averaae 6 welfare% 6 welfare~ 
Fixed no. o( firm• 
Variable no. of fimu 
trade% export.% import.% (EC ave) c01b% consamptioa 6 int-EC \21 
17.3 0.1 -2.3 -0.08 -0.05 0.29 19.8 
17.9 -0.2 -1.9 -0.09 -0.09 0.29 18.4 
------·-----------------------~-
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260; Artificial and Synthetic Rbretn (Cournot; models per firm constant) 
Production and welfare change by country 
... 
Fixed no. of firms Variable no. of firms 
d output d consumers' d profit d output d colli1Unefl' d number 
% surplus, mBCU mBCU % surplus, mBCU offimu 
France 2.37 18.7 -6.8 -56.3 16.1 -3 
Germany 14.6 8.0 11.4 87.9 15.9 10 
l&aly 1.77 22.7 -14.2 -13.6 21.1 -3 
U.K. -6.71 35.7 -30.7 -21.4 31.9 -2 
RofEC -0.14 20.8 -8.90 -41.7 20.0 -4 
EC 4.19 105.9 -49.2 6.61 105.0 -3 
EC aggregates 
d intra-EC A extra-EC A exha-EC A price% A aYerace A welfare% A welfare% 
trade% expor&s% imports% (EC ave) costs% consumption A int-EC bade 
Fixed;o. oi fir~--- --- 20.4·---2~0------:24:2-·----:f.29~---~0.5'-:-t-=----0.99 ____ i3.o·---··· 
Variable no. of firms 36.9 10.5 -23.2 -2.45 -2.45 1.84 14.0 
322 Maclaine Tools: {Cournot; models per firm constant) 
Production and welfare change by country 
Fixed no. of firms Variable no. of firms 
---- ---- --·-·- -----·-· ------A output A consumers' A profit A output A consumers' A number 
% surplus, mBCU mBCU % surplus, mBCU of firms 
France -0.58 16.8 -0.9 -18.4 11.9 -15 
Germany 4.1 J1.3 13.5 18.6 36.4 38 
Italy -0.02 12.2 -1.0 -4.49 9.7 -6 
U.K. -0.18 13.1 -0.5 -6.47 11.0 -13 
RofEC -2.30 17.8 -2.3 -29.6 8.9 -19 
EC 1.67 71.2 8.8 2.66 78.8 -15 
---
----
EC aggregates 
A intra-EC A extra-EC A extra-EC A price% A a•erace A welfare% A welfare% 
trade% exports% imports% (EC a•e) costs% consumption A int-EC trade 
Fixed no. of firms 27.1 0.3 -8.5 -0.05 -0.12 0.84 13.8 
Variable no. of firms 32.0 2.7 -9.4 -0.05 -0.05 0.82 11.4 
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SegmPnh:d Markets 
438 Carpets, linoleum etc:.: (Courno'; models per firm constant) 
--- ~··------ ~-------· Fixed no. of firms Variable no. of firms 
Production and welfare change by country 
A output A consumers' A profit A output A COMUIDers' A number 
% surplus, mBCU mBCU % surplus, mBCU of firms 
France -21.2 13.7 -5.8 -52.4 6.4 -15 
Germany 11.6 14.6 0.8 32.4 19.2 6 
Italy -0.37 6.2 -1.8 -21.3 4.8 -5 
U.K. -12.0 11.1 -5.6 -18.8 6.3 -15 
RofEC 7.66 16.2 2.7 10.6 22.0 11 
EC 2.51 62.0 -9.8 2.70 58.8 ·-18 
EC aggregates 
A inba-EC A extra-EC A extra-EC A price% A averace A welfare% A welfare% 
trade% exports% imports% (EC ave) costs% CORIU_!1lption A int-EC trade 
Fixed no~-;r firms 45.0 1.8 -16.7 -0.30 -0.17 0.67 8.0 
Variable no. of firms 53.7 2.3 -17.2 -0.49 -0.49 0.76 7.5 
451 Footwear: ( Cournot; models per firm constant) 
Production and welfare change by eounby 
Fixed no. of firms Variable no. of firms 
A output A consumers' A profit A output A consumers' A number 
% surplus, mECU mBCU % surplus, mBCU of firms 
France -0.32 11.5 -4.4 -24.1 8.6 -31 
Germany -5.46 12.2 -3.3 -62.7 8.0 -47 
lt~tly 15.9 4.2 4.6 72.0 13.7 311 
U.K. -15.0 10.6 -6.4 -57.2 6.2 -41 
RofEC -12.7 13.3 -4.6 -80.3 7.2 -35 
EC 3.21 .61.8 -14.0 3.44 42.8 167 
EC aggrega,es 
A intra-EC A extra-EC A exha-EC A price% A averqe A welfare% A welfuto% 
trade% exports% bnporLs% (EC ave) costs% consumption A int-EC trad< 
Fixed no. of firms 41.4 3.8 -21.3 -0.16 -0.03 0.35 3.1 
Variable no. of firms 92.7 17.9 -14.7 -0.03 -0.03 0.40 ••• 
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340 Electrical household appliances: (Cournot; models per firm constant) 
Production and welfare change by country 
---- -----· - -- ------ --- --- ·- -- . -- - -- - ------------- ·-- ---------------------------Fixed no. of firms Variable no. of firms 
A output A consumers' A profit A output A consumers' A number 
% surplus, mBCU mBCU % surplus, mBCU of firms 
France 0.75 33.2 -16.9 -0.44 25.1 -1 
Germany 4.32 24.4 -0.4 6.33 28.0 0 
Italy 6.40 18.6 0.5 8.89 21.8 0 
U.K. -4.93 20.3 -11.2 -8.14 10.6 -6 
RofEC -0.59 29.2 -13.6 -3.63 20.0 -2 
EC 2.09 125.8 -41.6 2.08 105.5 -8 
EC aggregates 
A intra-EC A ext.ra-EC A extra-EC A price% A average A welfare% 
trade% exports% imports% (EC ave) 
Fixe~f;;~-:-;;(i;;;-- ·--22:1 _____ i:r------_;f6 -0.62 costs % cons~ption 
-0.32---0.64 
Vtui~tLle no. of iinns 24.7 0.6 -5.8 -0.93 -0.93 0.81 
360 Motol' veltie!le11 (Cournot; model• per ftrm constant) 
Production and welfare change by country 
A welfare% 
A int-EC trade 
14jj--
16.7 
Fixed no. of firms Variable no. of firms 
------- L\-;utput--A-~;;;~;;.~;;;-A-profit · T;;utp~t"d~;;;;;;;r;;--·-A_n_um_b_e_r_ 
France 
G~rmany 
Italy 
U.K. 
R ofEC 
EC 
% surplus, mBCU ntBCU % surplus, mBCU of firms 
2.26 524.9 -315.3 1.36 482.3 0 
5.79 224.5 61.0 10.7 309.4 0 
1.26 307.4 -174.7 -3.10 257.1 0 
-0.46 234.1 -123.3 -4.76 185.0 0 
2.72 337.7 -125.6 -1.85 297.7 
3.36 1628.6 -678.0 3.64 1531.5 
EC aggregates 
0 
-1 
A intra-EC A extra-EC A extra-EC A price% A average A welfare% 
trade% exports% hnports% (EC ave) costs% conswuption 
Fixed no. o( firtns 18.7 1.2 -13.2 -1.07 -0.56 0.83 
Variable no. o( firms 21.2 1.4 -11.7 -1.51 -1.51 1.34 
A welfare% 
A int-EC trade 
17.9 
25.5 
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Tnble 3: Reduction in Tra<le Barriers 
All Industries (Couruot, models per firm constant) 
A output A averace A welfare% A welfare% 
% cost%, consumption A int-EC trade 
242; Cement, lime and plaster: 
E=35.5, RS=20%, TS=l.6%, H=0.066, DC=0.04% 
Fixed no. of firms I -0.24 -0.03 -0.1 -5.0 
Variable no. of firms 0.58 -0.93 0.64 22.1 
257; Pltarmaceutical products: 
E=5.8, R5=22%, TS=10.0%, H=0.050, DC=0.25% 
Fixed no. of firms I 0.37 -0.08 0.29 21.8 
Variable no. of firms 0.30 -0.16 0.30 22.5 
260; Artificial and synthetic fibres: 
E=21.5, RS=10%, T5=36.4%, H=0.050, DC=0.91% 
Fixed no. of firms I 4.19 -0.61 0.99 13.0 
Variable no. of firms 6.61 -2.45 1.84 14.0 
322; Macltine tools: 
E=13.6, RS=7%, TS=22.4%, H=0.004, DC=0.56% 
Fixed no. of firms I 1.67 -0.12 0.84 13.8 
Variable no. of firms 2.66 -0.05 0.82 11.4 
330: Office Machinery: 
E=32.8, RS=10%, TS=23.6%, H=0.120, 00:0.59% 
Fixed no. of firms I 10.4 -0.98 0.88 8.0 
Variable no. of firms 12.5 -2.48 1.45 10.7 
342: Electric motors, generators etc: 
E=7.-35, R5=15%, T5=8.8%, H=0.022, DC=0.22% 
Fixed no. of firms I 0.37 -0.05 0.29 19.0 
Variable no. of firms 0.31 -0.09 0.29 18.4 
346; Electrical Household Appliances: 
E=10.77, RS=10%, TS=19.6%, H=O.llO, DC=O . .f-Cf% 
Fixed no. of firms I 2.09 -0.32 0.64 14.8 
Variable no. of firms 2.08 -0.93 0.81 16.7 
350; Motor velticles: 
E=l3.32, R5=16%, T5=24.8%, H=0.199, DC=0.62% 
Fixed no. of firms I 3.36 -0.56 0.83 17.9 
Variable no. of firms 3.64 -1.51 1.34 25.5 
438; Carpets, linoleum etc.: 
E=21.4, R5=6%, T5=18.8%, H=0.031, DC=0.47% 
Fixed no. of firms I 2.51 -0.17 0.67 8.0 
Variable no. of ftrms 2.70 -0.49 0.76 7.& 
45 t! Footwear• 
E=53.3, R5=2%, TS:27.0%, H=0.010, DC=0.27% 
Fixed no. of firms I 3.21 -0.03 0.35 3.1 
Variable no. of firms 3.44 -0.03 0.40 1.6 
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Tnhlc i: Scullitivit;r Analysis 
Cournol Bertrand 
------
Models constant Models Yariable Models constant 
Fixed no. Var. 110. Fixnl no. Var. 110. Fixed no. Var. no. 
of firms of firms of firms of firms of firms of firms 
--
242: Cement, lime and piRstcr: tc = 35.5,to = 8.0, RS=20%, TS=l.6%, H=0.066 
6 EC output% 0.24 0.58 0.00 0.10 
-· .. ·-- -. 
A nYernge costs % -0.03 -0.93 
A welfnre%eonsttmptlon -0.1 0.64 
-0.00 
0.04 
-0.01 
0.04 
Models YRriahle 
Fixed Ito. Var. 110. 
of firms of firms 
I 
t. welfnre%A int-EC trade -5.0 22.1 11.1 11.1 
~--7 Pbarmac:eutic:al products: tc = 5.8,t8 = 4.7, RS=22%, T~S-=....,1"""0....,.0,...%=-, -=-=u=-=.....,0,....0.,..5=----L--------
A EC output% 0.37 0.30 0.45 0.42 0.22 0.25 0.27 
A a•erap eo1t1 % -0.08 -0.15 -0.02 -0.15 -0.05 -0.03 -0.02 
-
A wellare%contumptlon 0.29 0.30 0.31 0.44 0.33 0.34 0.36 
A wellare%A lnt-BC trade 21.8 22.5 23.1 32.6 29.2 30.1 31.8 
280; Artificial and synthetic: ftbres: Ec = 21.5,Es = 8.7, RS=10%, TS=36.4%, H=O. 050 
A EC output% 4.19 6.61 1.39 2.74 
-~~~~~e COlli_% -0.51 -2.45 -0.17 -0.14 
A wellare%con1umptlon 0.99 1.84 1.21 
-----·---· 
A wellare%A int-BC trade 13.0 14.0 21.4 
322; Machine Tools: Ec = 13.55, EB = 13.24, RS=7%, TS=22.4%, 8=0.004 
A EC output% 1.67 2.66 2.87 .2.79 1.60 
A a•er~se eo~~--- -0.12 -0.05 -0.05 -0.04 -0.12 
A wellare%contutnptlon 0.84 0.82 0.86 0.86 0.85 
A wellare%A lnt-EC trade 13.8 11.4 11.7 12.1 14.2 
330; Office Mac:hineryl cc = 32.8, fD = 10.9, RS=10%, TS=23.6%, 8=0.12 
A EC output% 10.4 12.5 13.3 12.4 2.64 
A averase costs% -0.98 -2.48 -0.49 -1.95 -0.25 
A wellare%eonsan•ptlon 0.88 1.45 0.62 1.65 0.92 
.:. welfaoc%.:. i11t-EC hade 8.0 10.7 5.4 13.2 17.1 
0.97 
9.3 
2.65 
-0.02 
0.83 
11.7 
3.80 
-0.10 
0.98 
16.2 .. 
2.92 
-0.06 
0.86 
11.0 
4.70 
-0.24 
1.14 
15.1 
342; Electric: motors, g~nerators, etc: fr, = 7.35,Es = 6.77, RS=15 , TS=8.8 , H=0.022 
A EC output% 0.37 0.311 0.41 0.46 0.29 0.a_j8 0.30 
A ..,.erace costs% -0.05 -0:09 · -0.02 -0.09 -0.05 -0.01 -0.01 
A welrare%eonsttmptlon 0.29 0.29 0.31 0.39 0.31 0.31 0.33 
~--~!lrare'!~·~~de 19.~ 18.4 ,..!'!:!__ 24.9 21.7 __ .!_1.1 __ 22.3 
340; Electrical Household Appliances: Ec = 10.7,Es = 7.8, RS=IO%, TS=19.6%, 8=0.11 
A EC output% 2.09 2.08 2.52 3.01 1.29 1.30 1.61 
A B\"erase costs % -0.32 -0.93 -0.32 -0.85 -0.20 -0.22 -0.26 
-------·----·- -----
A welfare%con•ttn•ptlon 0.64 0.81 0.69 1.37 0.72 0.71 0.79 
-----------A welrare%A lnt-EC trade 14.8 16.7 12.2 26.7 20.6 17.7 13.9 
. 350; Motor Velucles1 Ec = 13.3,Es = 7.2, RS=16%, TS=24.8%, H=0.199 
A EC output% 3.36 3.64 3.70 5.48 1.71 1.90 3.25 
A a\"erace cosh % -0.56 -1.51 -0.28 -1.83 -0.29 -0.41 -0.50 
A wellare%eonsumptlon 0.83 1.34 0.76 2.56 0.91 0.89 0.82 
A wellare%A lnt-EC trade 17.9 25.5 15.5 47.8 25.7 21.7 13.3 
. 438; Carpets, linolum, etc.t Ec = 21.4,Es = 17.6, RS=6%, TS=18.8%, H=0.031 
A ••erap cottt% -0.17 -0.49 -0.12 -0.06 
A welrare"contnmpUoa 0.67 0. 76 0. 71 0. 7 4 
A wellare"A lnt-BC trade 8.0 7.5 9.5 8.5 
0.27 
-0.03 
0.37 
32.7 
2.66 
-0.01 
0.84 
11.9 
4.06 
;.10 
1.09 
18.2 
0.31 
-0.02 
0.33 
22.5 
1.55 
-0.21 
0.88 
21.7 
2.42 
-0.41 
1.29 
32.1 
ABC ... ,.." 2.51 2.70 I 1.74 2.21 L 
451;--Pootwearlfc = 53.3,Es = 42.4, RS=2%:t§=27%, u;;o-:Qi -----··-· ... ···------ ----
A EC ontput" 3.21 3.44 1.93 2.53 
A 8\"ernce COlli % •0.03 -0.03 0.0 0.22 
A welrare"consamptloa 
~-----·-----·- -----·-------
A wellnre"A lnt·EC trade 
0.35 
3.1 
0.40 
1.6 
0.41 
4.0 
0.38 
2.0 
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Table S Reduction in Trade Barriers 
Integrated Mnrkcts 
242 Cement, Hme and )Jlnster: (Cournot; models per firm constant) 
Production and welfare change by country 
---- ---~--·· ---------------- --- ·----Fixed no. of firms Variable no. of firms 
A output A consumers' A profit A output A consumers' A number 
% surplus, mECU mECU % surplus, mBCU of firms 
France -0.59 66.9 -60.8 -4.37 -6.5 0 
Germany 2.45 88.3 -76.9 -3.73 -3.8 0 
Italy 1.39 33.2 -30.0 0.23 -0.3 0 
U.K. 3.76 60.4 -51.7 -3.66 -2.37 0 
RofEC 1.13 41.8 -38.4 2.48 9.20 0 
EC 1.32 290.6 -257.8 0.03 -14.4 1 
EC aggregates 
A intra-EC A extra-EC A extra-EC A price% A averase A welfare% 
trade% exports% intports% (EC ave) costs% consumption 
------Fixed no. o( firms -78.0 0.8 -56.9 -1.81 -0.12 0.22 
Variable no. o( firms -43.1 -0.01 5.9 0.09 0.09 -0.1 
257 Pltarmaeeutieal products: (Cournot; models per firm constant)· 
Production and welfare cltange by country 
Fixed no. o( firms Variable no. o( firtns 
-·----- 6--~~ip;&--A c~;;;~~;~~;---,\"pr~iit -A outP~~ -~~~;,.-.;~-;.•--ti n~~htt-
France 
Germany 
Italy 
U.K. 
RofEC 
EC 
% surplus, mECU mtlCU % surplus, mECU o( firms 
1.19 91.8 -68.4 1.59 33.9 -10 
3.10 182.7 -119.5 1.77 82.0 -10 
3.43 113.0 -75.5 3.46 44.7 -10 
3.74 234.5 -154.1 -0.41 123.3 -10 
7.21 104.7 -48.3 5.76 56.5 -5 
3.32 726.7 -465.7 2.13 340.3 -47 
----.L--------·· '----·--·-----------
EC aggregates 
A intra-EC A extra-EC A extra-EC A price% A averase A welfare% 
trade% exports% imports% (EC ave) costs% consumption 
Fixed no. o( Rrms -16.1 0.0 -15.7 -2.50 -0.63 1.10 
Variable no. o( firms -16.5 -11.5 -7.7 -0.83 -0.83 1.45 
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260; .Artificial and Synthetic flbress (Cournot; models per firm constant) 
Production and welfare change by counhy 
Fixed no. o( firms Variable no. o( firms 
A output A consumers' A profit A output A consumers' Anamber 
% surplus, mBCU mBCU % surplus, mBCU of ftrnu 
France 80.1 74.7 -0.7 33.7 36.4 1 
Germany -52.6 7.4 -41.4 -33.0 -12.8 -3 
Italy 13.1 80.2 -34.5 41.7 93.5 -2 
U.K. 53.1 132.4 -30.8 21.7 38.0 1 
RofEC 30.3 57.4 -8.9 4.63 10.4 1 
EC 9.60 352.2 -116.2 7.18 165.6 -1 
EC aggregates 
A intra-EC A extra-EC A extra-EC A price% A averace A welfare% 
trRde% exports% imports% (EC ave) costs% consumption 
Fixed no. o( Hrnu -56.5 -2.5 -57.8 -2.60 -1.77 4:i4--
Variable no. of firms -48.0 -2.2 -47.5 -1.04 -1.04 2.91 
322 Machine Tools: (Cournot; models per firm constant) 
Produetio" and welfare change by counhy 
Fixed no. o( firms Variable no. o( ftrnu 
A output A consumers' A profit A output A consumers' A number 
% surplus, mBCU mBCU % surplU., mBCU or ftrnu 
France 0.74 17.8 -1.40 -16.2 12.1 -16 
Germany 3.62 12.3 11.6 18.4 36.2 39 
Italy 0.98 15.9 -3.4 -5.57 10.0 -10 
U.K. 0.32 13.5 -0.90 -5.40 11.0 -12 
RofEC -0.10 19.6 -3.0 -28.2 9.3 -20 
EC 2.05 79.1 2.9 2.86 78.5 -18 
---- --------·--·----·---· -- ·-----
EC aggregates 
A intra-EC A extra-EC A extra-EC A price% A averace A welfare% 
trade% exports% imports% (EC ave) costs% consumption 
Fiud no. of ftrnu 24.6 0.3 -10.0 -0.14 -0.16 0.86 
Variable no. or ftrnu 29.4 2.6 -10.3 -0.10 -0.10 0.83 
------
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Integrated Markets 
330 Office Machinery: (Cournot; models per firm constant) 
Production and welfare change by country 
~--·--·-- -----Fixed no. of firms Variable no. of firms 
A output A conswners' A profit A output A conswners' A number 
France 
Germany 
Italy 
U.K. 
RofEC 
EC 
Fixed no. of firms 
Variable no. of firms 
% surplus, mECU mECU % surplus, mBCU 
44.2 389.6 -4.5 21.5 187.0 
19.5 145.1 -33.0 15.9 94.4 
15.3 373.3 -32.6 15.3 361.7 
21.3 59.4 -13.1 20.5 34.1 
33.1 213.5 -43.0 61.0 277.4 
27.3 1181.1 -126.2 27.2 954.6 
EC aggregates 
6 intra-EC 6 exlra-EC 6 exlra-EC 6 price% A averar;e 
trade% exports % import.s% (EC ave) costs% 
--:.-64.o·----ii:ir---:66...,.1 __ _,_____:i.i3~---2.7i 
-51.0 11.7 -68.2 -2.70 -2.70 
of firms 
1 
1 
0 
2 
-3 
0 
6 welfare% 
consumption 
3·.88--
3.43 
342 Electric motors, generators, etc: (Cournot; models per firm constant) 
Production and welfare change by country 
Fixed no. of firms Variable no. of firms 
----------
A output A consumers' A profit A output A consumers' A number 
% surplus, mECU mECU % surplus, mECU of firans 
France 2.21 144.4 -91.6 0.86 54.7 -8 
Germany 0.44 62.0 -32.2 1.54 51.4 -3 
Italy 4.32 77.4 -42.3 -1.08 29.0 -8 
U.K. 1.51 32.3 -14.5 1.09 18.5 -5 
RofEC 4.69 105.1 -53.1 0.89 37.2 -8 
EC 1.72 421.2 -233.7 1.06 190.8 -32 
EC aggregates 
A intra-EC 6 extra-EC A exlra-EC 6 price% 6 average 6 welfare% 
trade% exports% imports% (EC ave) costs% consumption 
Fixed no. of firms 2.5 0.4 -8.1 -0.83 -0.26 0.52 
Variable no. of firms 4.0 -4.4 -3.8 -1.3 -1.30 0.53 
--------- -----
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348 Electrical household llppliances: (Cournot; models per firm constant) 
Production and welfare change by country 
-- ------- ------
.. 
-- --------
- . 
----
-·· --- .... --- .. ··-·---· -- . -
.. 
. ------------------
Fixed no. o( firms Variable no. o( firms 
b. output b. consumers' b. profit b. output b. consumers' b. number 
% surplus, mBCU mBCU % surplus, mBCU of firms 
--Francf' 13.6 145.1 -63.3 25.3 185.7 -9 
Germany 1.49 81.9 -52.4 4.34 84.7 -14 
Italy -0.81 89.7 -62.6 -0.92 79.6 -13 
U.K. 13.6 52.6 -22.3 15.4 46.0 -14 
RofEC 20.2 100.5 -34.4 26.4 107.9 -8 
EC 8.08 469.9 -234.9 12.7 503.9 . -59 
EC aggregates 
b. intra-EC b. extra-EC b. extra-EC b. price-% b. average b. welfare% 
trade% exports% imports % (EC ave) costs% consumption 
·-Fix;.-no. of firms 
-23.0 2.4 -2-f4---2.88-----=t.i 1 
1.7_9 __ 
Variable no. of firms -24.5 -12.6 -23.6 -9.04 -9.04 3.85 
350 Motor nhicles: (Cournot; models per firm constant) 
Production and welfare change by country 
Fixed no. of firms Variable no. of firms 
--------- ---------------. ----.-------- ----- ------------------- -----------b. output b. consumers' b. profit b. output b. consumers' b. number 
% surplus, mBCU mBCU % surplus, mBCU of firms 
France 12.5 2172.4 -389.0 54.4 6105.9 -1 
Germany -9.7 555.4 -639.5 -12.3 1551.2 -3 
Italy 29.3 914.3 19.6 59.1 2118.9 -1 
U.K. 35.5 803.6 -86.4 44.2 1463.0 -1 
RofEC 33.0 1353.1 -44.8 57.4 2502.7 -1 
EC 10.5 5798.6 -1140.1 26.4 13741.7 -8 
---------------------------------------------------------
EC aggregates 
b. intra-EC b. extra-EC b. extra-EC b. price% b. averase b. welfare% 
trade% exports% imports% (EC ave) costs% consumption 
Fixed no. of firms -61.4 2.0 -40.7 -2.58 -1.72 4.09 
Variable no. of firms -61.0 -16.7 -63.5 -16.9 -16.9 12.1 
-----------
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438 Carpets, linoleum etc.: (Cournot; models per firm constant) 
Production and welfare change by country 
------------- ------------------------- ------------- --------------
Fixed no. of firms Variable no. of firms 
A outpul A consumers' A profil A oulpul A consunters' A number 
% surplus, mBCU mECU % surplus, mBCU of firms 
France 4.12 21.4 -8.0 -24.2 13.0 -18 
Germany 32.9 20.2 -1.1 30.8 21.6 -7 
Italy 25.9 11.0 -3.7 -3.73 8.0 -9 
U.K. 0.70 20.1 -10.0 -9.67 12.0 -31 
R ofEC -3.21 1.0 6.9 7.01 20.7 -43 
EC 4.46 73.7 -15.9 4.86 75.4 -109 
EC aggregates 
A intra-EC A extra-EC A extra-EC A price% A average A weHare% 
trade % exports % imports % 
Fixed no. of fi;;,-;,-- --26.7 ---5.9 ·----'-'""'24.3 
(EC a!e) cosls% consumption 
-0.50~--_-::-0~.3~0-----::0.7-5 --
v .. rlto~·~ !!0. ef firms 34.9 -4.5 -20.2 -2.79 -2.79 0.97 
451 Footwear: (Cournot; models per firm constant) 
Production and welfare change by country 
Fixed no. of firms Variable no. of firms 
------- ---··-·----- ·----·····-··. ---- ---- --------------·- --- ------· ----------. - ----------------------
A output A consumers' A profit A output A consumers' A number 
% surplus, mECU mECU % surplus, mBCU of firms 
France 16.4 22.2 -9.7 2.19 18.7 -57 
Gennany 26.7 17.0 -3.9 -2.58 14.7 -40 
I tilly -15.6 -2.1 1.1 12.2 6.0 -36 
U.K. 18.2 20.4 -9.6 -7.10 14.5 -46 
RofEC 31.9 20.1 -5.6 -6.82 14.9 -29 
EC 5.53 77.6 -27.6 4.00 68.7 -207 
----·--- ·---·--·- -----·-·-··----_,__ ---------------··--------
Fixed no. of firms 
Variable no. of firms 
EC aggregates 
A intra-EC A extrll-EC A utra-EC 
trad"% exports% imports% 
-0.1 -1.8 -34.7 
25.5 -3.2 -25.1 
_, ______ --- ----------------------
A price% A average A welfare% 
(EC av") costs% consumption 
-0.50 -0.26 0.46 
-1.36 -1.'36 0.64 
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Tnhle 6; Integrated Markets 
All Industries: (Models pt'r linn c:onslant) 
.. .. 
--- -- --
_, __ 
······- .. -- ----------·-·· ··-- ... ---
.. -Deri·.:~i;<i ---- - -- ---------· Cotmtot 
-
----
~e-~l~len~~d 
----·--
_lnl~~!!.~~d Segmented 
---· 
-!~~~~!'!~~d .. 
··-
Fixed 110. Var. no. Fixed no. Var. no. fo'ixed 110. Var. 110. Fixed no. Var. no. 
of firms of firms of firms of firms of linns of firms of firms of lirms 
-----
?.-t?.· c~ment, !:m;; and plaster: £c = 35.5,cs = 8.0, RS=20%, TS=l.6%, 11=0.066 
a EC output 'r. 0.24 0.58 1.32 0.03 0.00 0.10 0.01 0.02 
L\ nvernse COlli % -0.03 
A wel(nrerteontuntption -0.1 
'' int-EC trftde% 128 
A EC output% 0.37 
__ A _a~~~~-~!~!!.~---·------ -0.08 
A welfare%eon••mption 0.29 
A lnt-Be trade% 13.3 
-0.93 
0.64 
180 
0.30 
-0.15 
0.30 
13.3 
-0.12 
0.22 
-78 
3.32 
-0.73 
l.ll 
-16.1 
0.09 
-0.1 
-43.1 
2.13 
-3.43 
1.45 
-16.6 
-0.0 
0.04 
22.5 
0.22 
-0.05 
0.33 
ll.3 
-0.01 
0.04 
22.5 
0.25 
-0.03 
0.34 
ll.3 
-0.0 
0.04 
16.8 
0.24 
-0.05 
0.33 
6.7 
. . . 260; Artaftcaal and synthetac Rbres: £c = 21.0,£8 = 8.0, RS=10%, TS=36.4%, H=0.050 
--~~~output_~- 4.19 6.61 9.69 7.18 1.39 2.74 1.43 
A n'l'ernse co1b % -0.61 -2.45 -1.77 -1.04 -0.17 -0.14 -0.18 
A welf'nre%con1umptlon 0.99 1.84 4.14 2.91 1.21 0.97 1.21 
A lut-Be trade % 20.4 36.9 -56.5 -48.0 15.5 28.8 13.7 
. 322; Machane Tools: tc = 13.6, ts = 13.2, RS=7%, TS=22.4%, H=0.004 
-0.02 
0.04 
16.8 
0.28 
-0.02 
0.34 
6.7 
2.76 
-0.14 
0.97 
27.2 
A Be otttput % 1.67 2.66 j 2.05 2.86 J 1.60 2.65 1.60 2.65 
A nvernse cosh% -0.12 -0.05 -0.16 -0.10 -0.12 -0.02 -0.12 -0.01 
-; __ ~;:;;~~::~.·;~~~~~"- --- ~7~! _______ ;_~~~ ----~-~~---------~~~! ---~6~~: ________ ~·~~ ------~6~! -- ~~~: 
330; omce Macltinery: tc = 32.8,ts = 10.9, RS=IO%, TS=23.6%, 11=0.12 
A EC outpttt% 10.4 12.5 27.3 27.2 2.64 3.80 2.67 3.96 
A aYerase cosh % -0.98 -2.48 -2.71 -2.59 -0.25 -0.10 -0.26 -0.08 
.. 
__ ~-w~r~re%e~~~~~m~tio!__ 0.88 1.45 3.88 3.43 0.92 0.98 0.91 0.98 
A lnt·Ee trade% 44.5 57.2 -64.0 -51.0 22.8 25.7 17.5 21.0 
. 342; Elec:trac naotors, generators, etc: f.C = 7.35,£8 = 6.77, RS=15%, TS=8.8%, H=0.022 
_A_ ~c: Oltt, .. t _!-_____ . --- 0.37 0.31 1.72 1.06 0.29 0.28 I 0.30 0.30 
A amase cosh% -0.05 -0.09 -0.26 -1.30 -0.05 -0.01 I -0.05 -0.01 
A-;;if;;;%~~-;.~-;;ptio~- 0.29 0.29 0.52 0.53 0.31 0.31 j 0.31 0.31 
A iut-Be trade%_ 17.3 17.9 2.5 · 4.0 16.2 16.7 I 14.1 14.6 
3<46; E!eetricn.! ll.ouseltold Appliances: tc = 10.7,£8 = 7.8, RS=10%, TS=19.6%, H=O.ll 
A Be o"''''' <r. 2.09 2.08 8.08 12.7 1.29 1.30 
----- -------· ... - --
A a•erase cooh % -0.32 -0.93 -1.15 -9.04 -0.20 -0.22 
A welfare%consttn•ption 0.64 0.81 1.79 3.85 0.72 0.71 
A lnt-BC trade% 22.1 24.7 -23.0 -24.5 17.8 20.5 
. 350; Motor Velucles: £c = 13.3,ts = 7.2, RS=I6%, TS=24.8%, H=0.199 
A Ee oatput% 3.36 3.64 10.5 2 
A aYerase co1h % -0.56 -1.51 -1.72 -1 6.9 -0.29 -0.41 
A welf'are"con•umptloa 0.83 1.34 
-
4.09 1 .W 0.91 ~:§1L 
A lnt-Be trade% 18.7 21.2 -61.4 -6 1.0 14.3 16.5 
I 1.33 
-0.19 
0.72 
9.5 
1.67 
-0.27 
0.92 
0.8 
1.38 
-0.16 
0.72 
10.9 
1.95 
-0.13 
~:.9.-
2.7 
6i14 1.71 1.9u 
438; Carpets, linoleum, etc: £c = 21.4,£8 = 17.6, RS=6%, TS=J8.8%~ii;0.031 ---------- - . 
6 BC oat,.t% 2.61 2.70 4.46 4.86 1.74 2.21 1.75 2.22 
-~_!_~•rap c01!! !! ____ -0.17 -0.49 -0.30 -2.79 -0.12 -0.06 -0.13 -0.06 
--~-~-... ~~~c:.~~~!!..~. 0.67 0.76 0.75 0.97 0.71 0.74 0.71 0.74 
·A lnt-BC trade% 46.0 63.7 26.7 34.8 39.6 46.5 39.1 45.9 
451; Footwear: £c = 53.3,£8 = 42.4, RS=2%, TS=27.0%, 11=0.009 
A Be oatp111 % 3.21 3.44 5.53 4.0 I 1.93. 2.53 1.93 2.53 
·--------- ----- ---
A ••erase co•h % -0.03 -0.03 -0.26 -1.36 0.0 0.2!' .. 0.0 0.22 
A welrare,-_.onlttmptloa 0.35 0.40 0.46 0.64 0.41 0.38 0.41 0.38 
A ittt·BC ttade % 41.4 92.7 0.0 25.5 37.7 70.6 37.6 70.4 
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TECHNICAL APPENDIX 
The model underlying the projections presented in the paper 
is one of partial equilib~ium, operating at the level of a single 
industry. There are a number of countries, indexed by i=l, .. ,I, 
in which firms are located, and these countries also constitute 
separate product markets. Each firm is assumed to be located in 
only one country and the number of firms active in an industry in 
country i is denoted ni, all firms in country i being assumed to 
be symmetric. 
Product differentiation is permitted, and the number of 
product types produced by a single one of the country i firms is 
denoted mi. These products are tradeable, and xij denotes the 
quantity of a single product type produced by a firm in country i 
and sold in country j, at price pij' In addition to the 
industries under study, the economy contains a perfectly 
competitive sector producing a tradeable output under constant 
returns to scale; this is taken as the numeraire. 
Demands in each country are derived from an aggregate welfare 
function. It is assumed that each country's welfare function is 
separable between the numeraire commodity and the differentiated 
products, so that we may construct a sub-utility function over 
differentiated products, this sub-utility function representing 
th,e aggregate quantity of the product consumed. The sub-utility 
function for country j is denoted yj' and is assumed to be of the 
constant elasticity of substitution (CES) form, as in Dixit and 
Stiglitz [1977]. consumers in country j may consume products 
which are produced in each country, so the number of product types 
available for consumption is ~nimi.The sub-utility function, or 
I 
- 334 - 5.46 
aggregate volume index, is then 
[2 1je (c-1)/c]cj(c-1) . y.= a .. n.m.x.. (c>1,J=l, .. ,I) J i ~J ~ ~ . ~J 
( 1 ) 
where the aij are parameters describing the preferences of a 
consumer in country j for products produced in country i. It is 
then possible to show that the aggregate price level of the 
product is given by the function 
(j=l, .. ,I) 
( 2) 
Demand in country j for the aggregate product is assumed to 
be a function only of the aggregate product price level and to 
have constant elasticity of demand~ so that 
( 3) 
where bj is a parameter measuring the size of the market j, and it 
then follows that demand for individual product varieties is given 
by 
( 4 ) 
Each type of differentiated product is supplied by a single firms 
and all firms in a particular country are assumed to be 
symmetric. The profits of a single firm in country i may be 
expressed as 
( 5) 
where Tij and tij are ad valorem and specific costs associated 
with selling in market j. They may be interpreted either as 
taxes, or as transport costs. ci is the firm's production cost 
function; it is increasing in both output per model, xi = LXij' 
and in the number of model varieties produced, mi. 
In our base case we assume that markets are internationally 
segmented, so firms may choose sales in each national market 
separately. Profit maximisation with respect to xij gives first 
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rder conditions of the form 
1 p .. ( 1 - T .. ) ( 1 - -) - tiJ' 
1J 1J eij = (i,j=1, .. ,I) 
( 6 ) 
he perceived elasticity of demand, eij' depends on both the 
lasticity of demand for a single differentiated product, and the 
erceived effect of the firm's action on industry aggregate 
upply. The latter effect depends on the anticipated response of 
ther firms in the industry; if it is anticipated that other 
irms will hold their price constant when firm i alters its price 
the Bertrand hypothesis), then it follows from the equations (5) 
that 
( 7 ) 
sij is the share of a single representative firm from 
in market j. If the anticipated response is that other 
ill hold their sales constant when firm i changes its sales (the 
hypothesis), then the elasticity is given by 
= 
1 1 
= -& 
1 1 (- - -) s . 
& 1-i i] 
this elasticity being calculated from the inverse demand 
unctions corresponding to equations (5) in which the pij are 
ritten as functions of the x .. and of the y .. 1J J 
( 8 ) 
In some of the cases modelled, it is assumed that in addition 
o choosing sales of each model, each firm may choose the number 
f models it produces. If a firm introduces a model, then that 
odel will be sold in all countries. The first order condition 
or profit maximisation with respect to the number of models is 
hen 
6c. 
1 
6m. 
1 
(i=l, .. ,I) 
he form of eij depends on two factors. The first is the 
( 9 ) 
erceived reactions of other firms. we permit each firm to hold 
on-zero conjectures about the response of other firms to a change 
·n the number of models produced; that is, if a firm in country i 
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increases the number of models it produces by 1%, then it 
conjectures that other firms will increase the number of models 
they produce by wi%. S·econd, adding an extra model moves the 
demand curves for existing models; the value of this depends on 
whether this shift in demand effects price or quantity of existing 
models. If the output game is Bertrand, then we assume that price 
is held constant and quantity changes as new models enter. eij is 
then given by 
e .. 
1) = 
& - 1-l 
(10) 
If the output game is cournot, then we assume that quantities are 
held constant and price changes as new models enter, and eij takes 
the form 
& - 1-l e .. :e .. (c)= { ( 1-w. ) s i . +wi} ( 1 ) 1) 1) 1 J 1-l & -
(11 
This completes the characterization of equilibrium for cases 
in which the numbers of firms in each country are exogenously 
determined and markets are segmented. If there is free entry and 
exit of firms in each country then we have the additional industr~ 
equilibrium conditions that profits (equations (5)) are equal to 
zero. 
we also consider a case in which a subset of markets are 
integrated. In this case firms set a single producer price, 
although international differnces in consumer prices may remain, 
because of trade costs. This removes the ability of firms to 
price discriminate between different markets, and means that each 
firm has only one degree of freedom in its pricing. If pi denotef 
the price charged by a firm from country i in its home market, 
then export prices, pij must satisfy 
Pi(1- Tij) = pij(1- Tij) (i=1, .. ,I;j=1, .. ,K) 
(12) 
where the first K markets are integrated, and, for simplicity, we 
assume that tij=O. (For a detailed comparison of segmented and 
integrated markets see Markusen and Venables [1988]). 
With this restriction each firm has a single first order 
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cond'tion for its choice of sales in the K integrated markets; 
equa ions (8) are replaced by equations of the form 
= 
(13) 
haviour is Bertrand then firms set price pi given the price 
her firms, and the perceived elasticity Ei is a weighted 
ge of the elasticities of demand in the individual markets 
cons ituting the integrated market. If behaviour is Cournot, each 
chooses its total sales to the integrated markets given the 
tota sales of the other firms, and each firm's output is divided 
up b tween the individual national markets making up the 
inte rated market so as to meet demand, given the fixed price 
ivities. In this case the elasticity Ei is a complicated 
expr ssion which is not given here. 
There are two further technical points on which further 
elab ration may be helpful: the choice of functional form of the 
cost function, and the calculation of "tariff-equivalent" trade 
barr ers. 
The literature does not offer clear guidance on the 
appr priate functional form for the cost function. There are two 
natu al candidates. The first is a linear form (i.e., fixed cost 
plus constant marginal cost) in which case returns to scale become 
exha sted as firms become large. The second is log-linear, in 
whic case successive increases in output are associated with 
cont nued reductions in average and marginal cost. we employ a 
weig ted average of these functional forms so that costs are given 
by 
(14) 
Thus the linear component of the cost function has the weight z, 
and he loglinear component the weight 1-z. The values of the 
cipa ameters are selected so that average cost changes with 
chan es in xi and mi in ways consistent with the information 
prov ded by Pratten [1987]. 
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Finally, a note on the calculation of "tariff equivalents" of 
observed asymmetries in trade patterns. It follows from (4) that 
the ratio between expenditure in country j on goods produced in 
country i and those produced in country j is 
Pij xij 
Pjjxjj 
1-& 
= aijpij 
1-& 
ajj Pj j 
(15) 
The tariff equivalents are calculated simply as the tariff rates 
by which the prices pij would. have to be adjusted (in addition to 
the 10% transport cost assumed) to make the observed market shares 
consistent with aij=ajj. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
This study is designed to assess the likely effects of 
ucing intra-Community barr1ers to trade on innovation rates 1n 
opean industry. It exploits a relatively unique data base on 
ma·or 1nnovations in the UK, data wh1ch is not, unfortunately, 
1lable for the other countr1es of the Community. Although th1s 
lim1t the generality of the results somewhat, many of the most 
eresting properties of th1s data have also been detected in 
dies on US data. It is not unreasonable, therefore, to treat the 
ults discussed below as creating a presumption which is applicable 
oughout the Community in the absence of explic1t evidence to the 
trary. 
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II. THE POLICY ISSUES AND EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN OF THE STlDY 
The evidence suggests that there exist a number of obstacles 
ich inhibit trade within the Community, and there are good reasons 
think that removing them <or, at least, ameliorat1ng their 
e fects) may br1ng substantial gains to all member states. Several 
licy initiat1ves have been advanced to tackle these problems in 
ways, and there is little doubt that they are likely to 
prove the allocativ~ efficiency of the internal Community market to 
or lesser extent. They seem likely to achieve this 
e feet in one or both of two interdependent ways. First, many of the 
itiatives currently under active discussion will increase the size 
the market that firms operate in. For example, both reductions in 
riffs and/or non-tariff barriers to trade and new 1n1t1atives 
to open transportation services up to more competition will 
effect of reducing transportation costs (considered 
and so increase the market area open to a firm producing in 
given location. Second, many of the proposed policy 1nitiatives 
an effect on the degree of competition in markets. Thus. 
ves to strengthen competit1on policy and to open up public 
ocurement practices are likely to increase the competitiveness of 
particularly those inhabited by large dominant firms and/or 
p otected "national champions". 
p 
Not only is efficiency likely to increase if either type of 
takes effect, but, more importantly, the two types of policy 
a e likely to be mutually reinforcing. Reductions in tariffs and/or 
t not only increase the effective market area of any 
p rticular firm but, by doing so for all firms, they increase the 
n ber of effective competitors that any particular firm is likely to 
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face both 1n new-ly opened market areas as well as In for:nerlv closed 
home bases. Similarly. Increases 1n competition which lower prices 
and stimulate cost reducing or new product innovations are likely to 
widen existing markets. Such an effect might, perhaps, be expected 
from a loosening of constraints on defense related public procurement 
if it leads to a much higher level of technological spillages into 
the civilian sector, and so to a higher level of new product 
generation 1n consumer goods. More prosaically, airl1ne deregulation 
1n the US has made clear the tremendous widening of ~arkets that can 
be induced by eliminating restrictions on competition. 
Thus. the primary effects of reducing intra-community trade 
barriers will be an increase in market size and in the degree of 
competition In the newly enlarged market. These changes. in turn, 
are likely to affect the efficiency of firms and the performance of 
markets in several important ways. In tracing these effects, it is 
necessary to distinguish static efficiency, the effectiveness of 
exploiting given levels of technology, from dynamic efficiency, the 
effectiveness of efforts to push back technological constraints. 
The likely effect of increasing market size and the degree of 
competition on static efficiency is straightforward, and the only 
controversy that exists concerns its order of magnitude. As market 
size increases, whatever limitations that demand may have formerly 
put upon the realization of scale economies are removed, and firms 
will be able to move further down their average cost curves. Perhaps 
somewhat more substantively, increases in the degree of competiton in 
markets are likely to encourage firms to reduce levels of 
X-inefficiency, a movement from current cost curves towards the true 
long run average cost curve. These two effects - movements along a 
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cost cut·ve and movements between cost curves - clearly 
each other. and lead to an unambigious pred1ct1on that 
ts are likely to fall as market size and the degree of competition 
rease. 
The effects of market size and competition on dynamic 
ef iciency. however, are much less clear. Certainly it seems 
pl usible to believe that increases in market size will increase 
in ovativeness, particularly 1f there are any economies of scale or 
fi ed costs in the research and development process. However, the 
ef ect of competition on innovativeness is rather controversial. In 
pa ticular. Schumpeterian arguments suggest that at least some degree 
of monopoly power is conducive to innovativeness, and that large 
f1 s are likely to be the most fecund in this respect. If these 
Sc umpeterian assertions are correct, then it is no longer clear that 
re oving obstacles to intra-Community trade will improve dynamic 
ef Indeed, it is possible that the static efficiency gains 
ar'sing from such a policy will be more than outweighted by losses 
ar'sing from a reduction in dynamic efficiency. In short, it appears 
th t a rather crucial step in the argument for opening up internal 
Co unity markets is the link between the degree of competition and 
in vation. 
The crux of the matter is clearly Schumpeterian assertions 
firm size, monopoly, and the innovativeness of firms. There 
are, in principle, two types of effect that monopoly power can have 
on ·nnovative activity: a direct effect, or, the effect that monopoly 
r has on the response to any given level of expected 
-innovation returns; and an indirect effect, or, the effect that 
poly power has on expected post-innovation returns and thence on 
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1nnovative act1v1ty. It 1s widely believed that the 1ndirect efect 
of monopoly power on 1nnovation is positive li.e. that ~onopoly 
boosts expected post-innovation returns and so increases 
innovativeness), but that the direct effect may be negative (i.e. 
that monopolists respond more slowly than competitive firms to a 
given level of expected post-innovation returns). If the d1rect 
effect is relatively small or if it is positive, then it is hard to 
dispute Schumpeter1an assertions that monopoly power 1s conducive to 
innovat1on. If, on the other hand, the indirect effect is relatively 
small and the direct effect is negative, then it follows that 
monopoly inhib1ts innovativesness and that competition stimulates it. 
This, of course. would imply that the dynamic efficiency consequences 
of removing intra-Community barriers to trade will aug~ent and not 
offset the static efficiency gains that may emerge froc such a 
policy. 
Although it seems to be impossible to determine the size 
much less the sign of the total (direct plus indirect) effect of 
competition on innovation a priori, it is nevertheless worth 
exploring the a priori arguments in more depth. Given that indirect 
effects are likely to be positive (i.e. increasing monopoly or 
reducing competition increases innovativeness), it turns out to be 
the case that whether the total effect is positive or negative 
depends on whether an undoubtedly superior ability enjoyed by large 
firms with market power is more than offset by the weakening of 
incentives that market power gives rise to. Appreciating the force 
of the argument requires an understanding of the several factors 
which give rise to direct and indirect effects, and we shall consider 
them in reverse order. 
- 349 - 6.9 
The Indirect effect of monopoly on Innovation hinges on the 
that current monopoly has on expected post-innovation returns 
nd, of course, the effect that the latter has on innovative 
The most straightforward and plausible argument in 
pport of the proposit1ion that the indirect effect is positive is that 
which currently enjoy a substantial degree of market power will 
well placed to erect barriers to future entry. This, of course, 
·mits the degree to wh1ch rivals can imitate an innovation when it 
first Introduced, and thus raises the percentage of the total 
ins to Innovating which the initial innovator can appropriate for 
Hence, because a monopolist is likely to be in a position to 
propriate more of the expected gains arising from any given 
novation than a more competitive firm can, the monopolist is more 
1 kely to Innovate. 
The second reason to expect a positive indirect effect is 
ch more subtle. Positions of monopoly are, at base, founded on 
i novations of some sort, and thus the activity of those firms which 
c rrently enjoy market power depends upon exploiting their own 
p evious innovations. More competitive rivals and new entrants are 
1 kely to be, at best, imitators. and to enjoy only restricted access 
the original innovation. Thus, if the results of current 
i novative activity complement those innovations which have already 
en made by a firm with market power, then it will gain more from 
traducing the new innovation than will competitive rivals or new 
e trants.(l) It follows that if one observes a sequence of 
c mplementary innovations. then the whole sequence is likely to have 
en introduced by only one firm. and, in particular. by the firm 
ich introduced the first innoY?.~ion in the sequence. Since that 
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act 1s likely to g1ve r1se to at least some monopoly power. then, as 
a practical matter. one is likely to observe more innovations bv 
monopolists than by competitive firms (ceteris paribus). 
The direct effect of monopoly on 1nnovation (that is, the 
effect of market power on the response to a given level of 
post-innovation returns) depends upon several offsetting factors. The 
most controversial element of the argu~ent pits the positiv~ direct 
effects of var1ous "mater1al advantages" that monopolists may enjoy 
against several "behavioural disadvantages" that may weaken the1r 
perforrnance.< 2) Numerous types of material advantage have been 
suggested in the literature. Economies of scale in research or 
economies of scope within a portfolio of related research programmes 
may exist, complementarit1es between research and marketing may yield 
important comparative advantages to large firms with well established 
distribution networks or with advertising skills, and so on. Indeed, 
many of these advantages spring from the high profits that market 
power is likely to yield. Access to internal funds weakens a firm's 
reliance on external credit markets, and this may enable it to 
operate more flex1bly, to take a longer term view, and, perhaps, to 
act less cautiously than relatively poorly informed financiers may 
deem prudent. 
If they exist. all such material advantages undoubtedly give 
monopolists the ability to act more innovatively than more 
competitive firms. Whether monopolists exploit this potential and 
actual innovate more is another question altogether. The absence of 
competitive forces may enable managers to indulge in a preference for 
leisure or ~~~~w them to become sleepy. Levels of X-inefficiency may 
climb, and bureauocratic caution and inertia may come to dominate a 
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firm's actiVIties. paralyzing 1ts creativitY and 1n1t1ative. and 
atrophing its ability to respond flexibly to events. Thus, market 
power protects that possess it protects against competitive forces, 
but, if it is mainly the threat of competition which encourages firms 
to be innovative and efficient, then market power is likely to give 
rise to relativley slack behaviour, and so retard innovation 
rates. 
Whether the material advantages of monopoly overcome the 
possible behavioural shortcomings of monopolists is an open question 
a priori. There are, however, at least two good reasons to suppose 
that the direct effect of monopoly on innovative activity will be 
negative unless the possibly superior ability of monopolists to 
1nnovate more than offsets any weaker incentives they may experience. 
First, a more c:ompetitive environment means, inter alia, that more 
firms are likely to be searching for possible innovations, and this 
clearly raises the probability of observing an innovation by some 
time t either because the more firms there are searching, the more 
likely it is that one of them will find something worthwhile. or 
because the more there are searching, the harder each will search.()) 
Thus, the more competitive a market. the more likely it is that an 
innovation will be generated. 
The second reason for suspecting that direct effects, on 
balance, may be negative is that monopolists may not only generate 
less innovations than firms in a competitive market. they may also be 
less quick in adopting innovations which are produced elsewhere. This 
possibility arises whenever introducing a new innovation displaces 
part of the activities of the old one upon which the current 
monopoly position is based (roughly whenever successive innovations 
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are substltutes). The ga1n to 1nnovat1on 1n these c1rcumstances is 
the level of expected post-innovation prof]ts net of the profits on 
current activities which will be displaced by the innovation. Since 
these latter are likely to be enhanced by monopoly power. it follows 
that the incentive for a monopolist to adopt new technologies is 
lower than for a competitive firm not earning excess profits on 
current activities (ceteris paribus).(4) 
Since the 1nd1rect effect of monopoly on 1nnovation is likely 
to be positive, it follows that the persuasiveness Schumpeterian 
assertions ultimately hinges on the notion that the material 
advantages of monopolists at least roughly compensate for any 
behavioural disadvantages or other factors which might weaken the 
response of a monopolist to profitable 1nnovative act1vit1es. By 
contrast, the anti-Schumpeterian position asserts that the 
behavioural disadvantages created by monopoly not only overwhelm 
other positive direct effects of market power on innovation. but also 
more than compensate for positive indirect effects. In this case 
monopolists are less likely to innovate than firms in more 
competitive markets (ceteris paribus). and Schumpeterian assertions 
must be resisted. 
The policy implications of the relationship between 
competition and innovation are profound, and three are particularly 
relevant in the current context. First, many of the arguments which 
have led national governments to centre their public procurement and 
research activity in the hands of a small number of "national 
champions" are Schumpeterian in origin. The proponents of these 
arguments have stressed material advantages which, they have 
asserted, more than compensate for behavioural disadvantages and 
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other negative factors. If. however. the Schumpeter1an argument is 
invalid then the attractiveness of this type of pol1cv is much 
attenuated, and more competitive alternatives become important policy 
options. Second, Schumpeterian assertions have often been used as a 
caveat to proposals In favour of more vigorous anti-trust activity. 
What is asserted in such objections is a kind of dynamic economies vs 
( - ) 
monopoly power trade-off, ~. one that is non-existent if the 
Schumpeterian hypothesis is Invalid. Both a loosening of procurement 
policies and a strengthening ·of compeition policy are. of course, 
part of the broader range of policies discussed in the context of 
opening up internal Community markets. These are likely to affect 
both market size and the degree of competition. and the third policy 
implication of the relationship between competition and innovation is 
that, if the Schumpeterian hypothesis is correct, then these policies 
are liable to realize static efficiency gains only at the cost of at 
least some worsening of dynamic efficiency. If, however, the 
Schumpeterian hypothesis is invalid, then the static gains to opening 
up intra-Community markets will understate the total gains to such 
policies. The attraction of such policies then becomes difficult to 
resist. 
Thus, an examination of the Schumpeterian hypothesis is a 
major step in the argument in favour of policy initiatives to break 
down barriers to trade within the Community. In fact, the data 
provide almost no support for the Schumpeterian position, and thus 
suggest that there is little reason to believe that a trade-off 
exists between monopoly power and dynamic efficiency. We shall 
examine this evidence in two stages. First, in Section III, we 
explore the relationship between firm size and innovation, and, 
second, in Section IV, chat between the degree of competition and 
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Innovation. Section IV also puts the results in a somewhat wider 
perspective by exploring the 1nteractions between market size, the 
degree of competition, and innovativeness. Section V summarizes the 
report. 
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III. FIR.J.t SIZE AND IN~OVATION 
Although the Schumpeterian hypothesis is generally considered 
to be one which relates innovativeness to the degree of competition, 
it often also appears as a relationship between large firm size and 
innovation. The two types of arguments are by no means identical, 
but they are fairly similar at a broad level. The main case made for 
and against the hvpothes12ed finn size - innovation relationship is 
generally a variant of the "material advantages" versus "behavioural 
disadvantages" argument discussed above in connection with direct 
effects. However. it is also possible to detect at least one 
indirect effect of firm size on innovation which may be important. 
Let us briefly consider each type of argument in turn before 
examining the evidence. 
In the first place, size may have an effect on the efficiency 
with which research inputs process are transformed into the output of 
innovations. A possible advantage accruing from size is the ability 
to employ specialised equipment and personnel, and so extend the 
division of labour in r~search. In addition, researchers may be more 
productive when they have more colleagues to interact with, leading 
to an increased probability that unforeseen results will be 
recognised as important. Much the same effect may arise when 
several related research projects are run in tandem. On the other 
hand, large firms may experience problems in initiating or 
maintaining their research programme because of internal difficulties 
in coordinating their activities. This may arise because of.the 
sheer number of successive layers of hierarchy in the firm through 
which ideas are required to pass. Further, to the extent that it is 
administration rather than researrt> which tends to offer the most 
attractive prospects in terms of pay and status in large firms, then 
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the incent1ves fac1ng talented employees may dr1ve them a~ay from l 
research based activities. Thus, like monopolists, large f1rms 
potentially suffer from behavioural shortcomings which must be set 
against whatever material advantages they can command. The direct 
effect of firm size on innovat1on is, therefore, ambiguous. 
There is, however, at least one indirect effect which may be 
pos1tive, s1nce fi~ s1ze may have an effect on the magnitude of 
post-innovatlon returns. The point is simply that the total 
potential returns to an innovation may be higher the larger is the 
market to which it is appl1ed, and the returns net of costs can be 
larger for large firms able to pre-empt most of the total market and 
spread their fixed costs over a greater sales volume. For example, 
the potential returns to a process innovation Wlll vary directly w1th 
the level of output produced using the process. In perfectly 
functioning markets, this is not an important issue since innovations 
can be sold to other firms in the market, thus enabling the innovator 
to maximize the net gains from research and innovative act1vity. 
However, the market in innovations is liable to be an imperfect one, 
if only because it is frequently difficult for a seller to 1nform a 
potential buyer about the nature of the innovation without, at the 
same time, forfeiting his/her monopoly over the innovation (once a 
potential buyer knows what it is, there is no need to buy 1t), Hence, 
the major gains are likely to come from own use and, in this 
situation, a large firm may have more incentive to innovate than a 
small firm. 
Most empirical work on this issue has tended to focus on 
relating th~ tntensity of R & D input, measured either by expenditure 
or by the employment of research personnel, to firm size measured in 
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various ways. The evidence suggests that R&D 1ntens1tv tends to rise 
more than proportionately w1th firm s1ze initially, but, after some 
threshold of R&D intensity is reached, 1t remains constant or even 
declines. This threshold is likely to vary across industries, but 
there are indications that it may lie somewhere near the bottom 
range of Fortune's 500 industrials listing.(6) Although this would 
seem to suggest that large firms are more innovative, there are, 
however, at least two reasons for expressing doubt. First, smaller 
firms general.Ly do not have formal R&D programs and thus their 
research inputs are not picked up in official R&D statistics. This 
does not imply that such firms do no research, but rather that 
official R&D statistics are biased towards measuring the research 
activities of very large firms. Secondly, there may be systematic 
differences in the efficiency with which firms undertake a given 
amount of research, leading to different innovative output rat~s from 
a given set of inputs. 
Doubts about the relative efficiency with which large firms 
do research strike at the heart of Schumpeterian assertions about the 
benefits of large firm size. Direct evidence on this issue not only 
makes plain some of the hazards of using input data on R&D to measure 
innovative output rates, but also seems directly germane to the 
question of whether the direct effects of size are positive (large 
firm size increases innovativeness) or negative. Certainly the 
available evidence suggests that, in fact, smaller firms appear to be 
far more effjtcient than their larger rivals. For example, 
investigations of expenditure per patent and of comparable parallel 
product development efforts undertaken by firms of different sizes 
reveal that sn1aller firms incur lower costs, and produce far more 
output per untt of expenditure. Further, it is often observed that 
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small f~rms are quicker in br1ng1ng new products to the market. They 
often seem to eng1neer new products 1n up to 70 per cent of the time 
taken by large firms. develop prototypes twice as fast. establish 
production marginally faster, and start up sales in up to two thirds 
of the time taken by large firms. Finally, numerous studies suggest 
that large firms frequently produce rather minor innovations, relying 
heavily on small firms for ideas which they may improve and develop 
for commercial appl1cat1ons. (/l 
If, as seems to be the case, there is a real danger in using 
informat1on on R & D inputs to make ~nferences about the relationship 
between firm size (or, for that matter. market power) and 
innovativeness, then it· is important to concentrate on work which 
uses d1rect measures of innovat1ve output. Our major source of 
information derives from work done by researchers in S.P.R.U. at the 
University of Sussex, identifying 4378 major innovations introduced 
in the U.K. over the period 1945-83. By "major", one means that 
innovations ~n this data set have, in general, been deemed to be 
technically important and commercially successful. Although clearly 
but a sub-set of the total innovative activity in an economy, major 
innovations are at least the most important and, in our case, the 
most visible tip of the iceberg. 
Table I shows the proportion of total innovations originating 
from different sized innovating and ownership units. Column (1) 
reveals that small and medium sized innovating units make a major 
contribution to total innovations. For example, 85.3% of all 
innovations emerged from units of less than 10,000 employees (that 
is, from firms well below the size of those in Fortune's top 500 
list), 48.2% from those with less than 1000 employees and 23.4% from 
.. 
1 
1 
1 
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units with under 200 employees. At best, one can observe a verv weak 
V-shaped relationship between size and innovation, but even this does 
not hide the basic point that smaller firms are responsible for a 
share of total innovations which far exceeds their share of economic 
activity measttred in terms of sales, employment or value added. In 
fact, Table I partially conceals a significant rise over time in 
the share of Innovations introduced by units sized less than 1000 
employees. This share has more or less steadily risen from 36.7% in 
1945-49 to 39.9% (1950-54), 43.4% (1955-59). 40.4% (1960-64). 47% 
(1965-69), 50.7% (1970-74), 58% (1975-79), and to 59.9% in 1980-83, 
and has come largely at the expense of the share of firms in the 
· 1000-9999 employees size range. 
Although some of the theoretical arguments listed above are 
more applicable to the size of the innovating unit rather than the 
whole firm, it is the latter which is the main focus of our interest. 
Column (2) expresses the size of firms in terms of UK employment, and 
reveals that f'irrns with less than 10,000 employees accounted for 
56.1~ of all innovations, firms with less than 1,000 employees for 
33.2%, and finns with less than 200 employees for 17%. No matter how 
one looks at it, small and medium sized firms are clearly responsible 
for a significant proportion of innovations. What is not apparent 
from the table is that important changes appear to have taken place 
over time in the role played by both small and very large firms. In 
the last three years of the period, 43.2% of innovations emanated 
from firms with less than 1,000 employees, and 20.7% were accounted 
for by firms who employ over 50,000 workers. The share of firms less 
than 200 employees rose from 29.6% in 1945 to 43.2% in 1983, while 
firms of size 50,000 employees or more accounted for 17.7% in 1945 
and 20.7% in 1983. 
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Table I: 
Percent of Total UK Innovations by Size of Unit, 1945-83 
1-199 Employees 
200-999 Employees 
1,000-9.999 Employees 
10,000-49,999 Employees 
50,000+ Employees 
Source: adapted from Pavitt et al, 1987. 
(1} 
Innovating 
Unit 
23.4% 
24.8% 
3 7.1% 
11.0% 
3.7% 
(2} 
UK Ownership 
Unit 
17.0% 
16.2% 
22.9% 
23.0% 
20.9% 
Similar results have also emerged from two large scale U.S. 
studies. Feinman and Fuentevilla (1976) examined 500 important 
innovations which were first introduced in the U.S. during the period 
1953-73. Of the 319 which originated from U.S. firms. 23.5% came 
from firms with less than 100 employees,23.8% from firms employing 
between 100 and 1,000, 13.2% from firms with 1,001 - 5000 employees, 
5% from firms employing 5001 - 10,000 and the remaining 34.5% from 
firms with more than 10,000 employees. Edwards and Gordon (1984} 
studied 8074 innovations introduced into the U.S. in 1982, and 
found that small firms (less than 500 employees} innovated at about 
2.4 times the rate of large firms. 
The only conclusion that one can draw from Table I is that if 
there are any important material advantages to doing research and 
development, they fail to make themselves plain in the ~~~put of the 
research and development process. Small firms are far more 
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1nnovat1ve than the1r relative s1ze would, at first s1ght. 1nd1cate. 
Of course. this apparently major role played by med1u~ and small 
sized firms cllearly varies by industry, and Table II shows this 
inter-industry variation for the data on UK innovations. Finns of 
size less than 1000 employees are important in the Mach1nery and 
Instruments industries where they account for more than 45% of all 
innovat1ons. F'irms of more than 10,000 employees, on the other hand, 
acco.unt for more than 75/:. of all innovations in Mining. Food. 
Chemicals and Electric Products. In fact, 64% of all small firm 
innovations are concentrated in Machines, Mechanic Engineering, and 
Instruments, \olhlle 45% of large firm innovations are in Chem1cals. 
Electrical Engineering and Electronics (compared to 27% of all 
innovations). Thus, small firms not only made an important 
contr1bution to overall 1nnovation rates, but often do so 1n the 
most innovative sectors. 
In short, when one examines the relationship between 
innovativeness and firm size one finds no substantive reason to think 
that large firms are, in general. relatively innovative. While 
looking at crude counts of innovations 1s not a particularly 
compelling way to measure material advantages and behavioral 
disadvantages, they do at least give some useful insight into the 
net advantages of finn size. Perhaps the most important point to 
grasp from the evidence is that there apparently exist enormous 
differences in research efficiency between large and small firms. 
Because it is more than likely that official R&D statistics 
drastically understate the critical research inputs typically 
supplied by smaller firms, these differences in relative efficiency 
may be somewhat more apparent thar- ~~al. Nonetheless, the fact of 
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Table II: 
% of TOTAL INNOVATION PRODUCED BY FIRMS OF DIFFERENT SIZE 
No. Innovations 
PRODUCING SECTOR Produced 1-99 200-999 1,000- 10,000- 50,000+ 
9,999 49,999 
A.gricul ture 12 8.3 0 66.7 25.0 0 
Mining 126 0 2.4 0.8 12.7 84.1 
Food 112 3.6 5 . .:. 9.8 57. 1 2.::..1 
Chemicals 421 4.ts 7.4 9.7 31.4 46.8 
Metals 186 0.5 3.8 25.8 15. 1 54.8 
Machinery 573 26.2 27.1 33.7 12.4 0.7 
Mechanical 
Engineering 558 14.0 12.0 18.5 38.4 17.2 
Instruments 332 31.6 18. 1. 15.4 16.6 13.4 
Electrical 
Engineering 346 3.2 2.3 4.0 15.3 75.1 
Electronics 428 17.5 8.9 12.4 27.3 33.9 
Shipbuilding & 
Offshore 
Engineering 67 13.4 14.S 46.3 23.9 1.5 
Vehicles 212 9.4 8.5 28.8 27.4 25.9 
Aerospace 85 2.4 7. 1 17.6 29.4 43.5 
Textiles, Leather 
& Clothing 144 20.1 11.8 32.6 6.9 28.5 
Bricks, Pottery, 
Glass, Cement 157 14.0 7.6 18.5 48.4 11.5 
Paper 54 16.7 20.4 13 .o 38.9 11.1 
Printing 29 6.9 34.5 55.2 3.4 0 
Rubber & Plastics 91 15.4 27.5 1.1 15.4 40.7 
Source: Adapted from Pavitt et al 1987. 
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matter Is that there exists no real presumption that size Is a reaJOr 
advantage, except possibly in a few sectors which are probably more the 
exception than the rule. Size may matter, but it is by no means the 
case that "big is beautiful". 
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IV. THE DEGREE OF COMPETITIO~ A~D !~NOVATION IN MARKETS 
The Schumpeterian hypotheses about the determinants of 
innovation go well beyond propositions about firm size, and assert that 
an absence of rivalry in markets 1s also conducive to 1nnovativeness. 
The argument is controversial because there are, in principle, two 
channels by which market structure affects the incentives to innovate, 
and the two can offset each other. Thus. to examine the Schumpeterian 
hypothes1s about the role of market power, one would like to try to 
separately measure both the direct and the indirect effects of monopoly 
on innovativeness. The former can be detected in experiments which let 
industry market structure vary, holding the· level of post-innovation 
returns constant. Indirect effects are rather more complex. since they 
trace a causal channel from market structm·e to post-innovation 
returns, and thence to innovation. Measuring the size of indirect 
effects, then, requires examining the two partial correlations, and 
multiplying their effects together. The total, overall effect of 
monopoly on innovation is s1mply the sum of the direct and indirect 
effects. (8) 
Thus, we are interested in exploring two particular partial 
correlations between market structure and innovation. However, such 
work must be embedded in a full model; to measure these various partial 
correlations accurately, one must take care to "hold all relevant 
things" constant. In the context of multiple regression, this means 
that one must hold constant those factors correlated with the 
independent variable of interest lest their effects on the dependent 
variable be confused with those of the independent variable. Practially 
speaking, this creates a trade-off between the inclusion of irrelevant 
variables (which can lower efficiency in estimation) and the omission 
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of relevant variables twhich can create bias). In the current context. 
probably the most important factor that one must take account of Is 
variations in "technological opportunity" across industries. 
"Technological opportunity" refers to the fecundity of an industry's 
scientific and technological base, to those underlying, dynamic 
conditions of supply which affect the average productivity of research 
Inputs in producing research output. In the literature, 1t has been 
measured in numerous ways. Scherer (1967), Lunn and ~artin <1983) and 
Shrieves (1978) used subjectively chosen dummy variables for certain 
high technology industries (e.g. life sciences, electronics, aerospace, 
mechanical and electromechanical engineering, chemicals and so on); 
Waterson and Lopez (1983) used capital intensity and the rate of growth 
of net output per head as proxies; Hughes (1984) used data on R&D 
intensity 1n the U.S., France, Germany and Japan to indicating 
technological opportunity in the UK and, finally and perhaps most 
comprehensively, Levin et al (1985) used six proxies reflecting the 
sources of technical knowledge, industry maturity, and "closeness" to 
basic and applied science. 
The importance of correcting for variations in technological 
opportunity across industries arises from the oft made conjecture that 
industries in which technological opportunity is rich and promising are 
also industries which are highly concentrated. There are several 
variants to this argument, not all of which are equally persuasive. One 
might, for example, think that technological opportunity is enriched by 
Government defense related research support. Since this is generally 
channelled to a. small number of large firms in highly concentrated 
industries, it follows that high concentration and technological 
opportunity will go hand in hand. Alternately, technological 
opportunity might merely reflect the ease of appropriability, a factor 
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augmented tor. indeed. perhaps created) by strategic investments 1n 
barriers to entry made by leading firms in highly concentrated 
industries. Clearly. for these and other reasons. it seems likely to 
be the case that failing to correct for technological opportunity may 
bias the measured effect at least of industry concentration on 
innovation. The interesting consequence of introducing these various 
proxies for technological opportunity into regressions of market 
concentration on research input or output is that they generally cause 
the effect of 1ndustry concentration on innovativeness to diminish 
considerably. and estimates of this effect tend to become 
insignificantly different from zero. That is, omission of technological 
opportunity tends to overstate the effect of industry concentration on 
innovativeness. creating a distinctly pro-Schumpeterian bias in the 
results.< 9 ) 
Thus. two basic concerns must guide the construction of our 
empirical model of innovations. First. one must be able to measure 
both the direct and the indirect effects of market power on .innovation. 
and, as argued above. this requires that we correct for variations in 
expected post-innovation rates of return. This we shall do by 
including a variable in the regression measuring post-innovation 
price-cost margins. Since a zero level of expected post-innovation 
returns is likely to discourage firms from doing any research whatever 
the degree of competition. we introduce the profitability variable in 
log form. (lO) Second. one must correct for variations in 
technological opportunity across industries. The important point to 
grasp here is that while technological opportunity varies sector by 
sector, it is roughly constant over time. Hence. for each industry 
over time. it can be captured by a constant. but only tj une that 
varies in value across sectors. Thus, to correct for variations in 
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technolog1cal opportunity, we shall include a full set of 1ndustry 
specific "fixed effects". Finally, to these two concerns we shall add a 
third. Previous studies of the Schumpeterian hypothesis have focused 
on the role of market concentration in affecting innovation, hinging 
the entire test of the Schumpeterian hypothesis on a single partial 
correlation. This seems to be unduly restrictive, and, in what 
follows, we shall use six measures of rivalry. looking for a consistent 
pattern of signs rather than a single pos1tive or negative sign. 
Using the data on innovations discussed above. we have 
conducted tests of the Schumpeterian hypothesis for the U.K., 
1970-79. The basic model that we have used is: 
(1) I* = T + ~ log~ + ~ M_ + i i 1 i ry i (k z .+ ~ . 3 1 1 
where i=l, ••• ,N indexes industries, Ti =an industry specific constant 
reflecting i's "technological opportunity". log -wi = the log of 
post-innovation price-cost margins in industry i, Mi = the degree of 
monopoly, Zi = other observable factors affecting innovations, and ~i 
is a· residual. Ii may be positive or negative, and. indeed. if -wi -+0 
-~ 
then Ii-+ -oo. Observed innovations, Ii, are always non-negative and so 
the data must be described using a Tobit model, 
(2) { I. = 0 
1 
otherwise. 
If <k1>0, then expected post-innovation returns stimulate innovation. 
Holding log -wi constant enables one to observe the direct effect of 
monopoly on innovativeness. ~2 ; the indirect effect is ~ 1 times the 
effect that monopoly, Mi• has on -wi or, equivalently. log -wi. 
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To estimate the N•4 parameters in t2). one needs to use panel 
data (i.e. a times ser1es of cross-sections). The advantage of panel 
data is that tracking a single cross-section unit. 1, over time enables 
one to estimate Ti• and also enables one to bring more informatin to 
bear to the task of estimating all the parameters of (2) more 
efficiently. We have used two cross section samples of 73 M.L.H. (or. 
three digit) industries for 1970-74 and 1975-79 respectively. (ll) The 
dependent variable is the number of innovations introduced in each of 
the two five year periods. 
For the z1 , we have used five variables: the growth of industry 
sales (GROWi), industry size measured as the log of industry capital 
stock (SlZEi), the average industry capital output ratio (KAPi), 
Industry export intensity (EXPORTi)• and industry unionization measured 
as the percentage of the workforce covered by collective agreements 
(UNIONi). These variables are included to correct for omitted factors 
whose effects might otherwise mistakenly be attributed to market power, 
and were chosen for inclusion on the basis of previous appearance in 
the literature and a suspected correlation with the various measures of 
rivalry. 
Finally, we were able to measure various dimensions of 
competition and rivalry in markets much more extensively than hitherto. 
The six measures that we have used are: industry concentration (CON1 ), 
the percentage change in industry concentration within the period 
(6CONi)• industry import intensity (IMPORTi), the gross share of sales 
by new entrants and by exitors (ENTRYi and EXITi), and the relative 
number of firms sized 99 employees or less (SFIRMi). If rivalry 
stimulates i!'!:-::•:ativeness, then one expects to see IMPORT, ENTRY. and 
SFIRM positively correlated to innovativeness, and the other three 
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negat1vely correlated; the Schumpeterian hypothes1s that market power 
is conducive to innovation predicts exactly the opposite pattern of 
signs. Thus, if the coefficients on CON, 6CON and EXIT are negative 
wh1le those on IMPORT, ENTRY and SFIRM are positive, we conclude that 
market power h.~s a negative direct effect on innovation. If, on the 
other hand. on•e observed CON. 6CON and EXIT to have positive 
correlations with innovativeness and IMPORT. ENTRY and SFIRM to have 
negative ones, then this suggests a positive direct effect and, almost 
surely, evidence in support of the Schumpeterian hypothesis. Any other 
pattern of signs is uninformative on the hypothesis of interest. 
Table III shows the results of this test. The esti~ating 
equation is 
(3) I. a + a * log'i + a2 * CON. + a3 * GROW. + e4 * SIZE. 1 0 1 1 1 1 
+ es * 6CON. + e6*KAPi + e7*IMPORTi + e8 *ENTRY. 1 ' 1 
+ e9 * EXPORT. + e1o * SFIRM. + ell * EXIT. + el2 * UNION + ~-1 1 1 1 
The estimates reported in columns (i) and (ii) are OLS and Tobit 
estimates of (3), and provide evidence which is clearly inconsistent with the 
notion that there is a positive direct effect of actual monopoly on 
innovativeness. e2 is negative and significantly different from zero. e8 
positive and nearly significant, e10 positive and clearly signficant. e11 
negative and significant and e5 negative and significant. Only e7 is clearly 
insignificant, and it is also the only variable whose coefficient breaks the 
essentially anti-Schumpeterian pattern displaved on Table III. It therefore 
seems to be the case that highly concentrated industries and those in the 
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TABLE III 
Regression results for equation (3 ) 
Independent 
Variables 
( i) (ii) (iii) (iv) 
log"'i 4.204 1.16 1. 70 2.85 
( .8917) ( .176) ( • 295) ( .438) 
CON· l -50.87 -57.570 .824 -77.10 (3.05) i'2.274) (. 960) {2.44) 
ENTRYi 31.864 18.51 -2.512 85.07 
( 1. 94) (1.05) (. 597) (2.21) 
IMPORTi -2. 1 37 -3.80 -1 . 902 11.08 
( .239) (.122) ( -1.60) (.545) 
SFIRMi 12.462 3.165 -1.22 9.281 
(2.131) ( 1.09) (.886) ( 1.028) 
EXITi -18.0'25 -26.171 .775 -56.29 
{2.207> (-1.38) (. 225) \ 1. 59) 
6CONi -7.688 -9.734 -.078 -9.631 
(2.238) (2.02) (.073) ( 1. 22) 
SIZEi .0709 4. 271 1.22 -1.701 
(.016) (.625) (3.932) (. 182) 
GROWi 2.296 3.44 .668 -.879 
(2.06) (1.91) (1.44) (.328) 
KAYOi • 906 .835 -.366 2.642 
(1.75) ( 1. 25) (3.17) ( 1. 38) 
EXPORTi 4.008 6.987 4.64 -.1515 
(.916) (.883) (3. 27) (.019) 
UNIONi -7.77 -2.61 .243 -29.94 
(1.76) ( • 489) (.135) (3. 34) 
LogL -392.58 -309.823 -64.2955 -278.283 
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Notes to Table III 
All the equations include fixed effects; t-values (in absolute value) 
are given in brackets below estimated coefficients. The definition of 
the variables 1s: Ii = number of innovations; CONi = 5 firm 
concentration ratio; GROWi = % change in domestic production over the 
period; SIZEi =, log of industry capitalstock; DCONi = % change in 
Industry concentration; ~~Y01 = capital-output ratio; IMPORTi = imports 
as a % of sales; ENTRYi = market share of entrants in year of entry; 
EXPORTi = exports as a % of sales; SFIRMi = No. firms ~99 employees as 
a % of total nu~ber of firms; EXITi = market share of exiting firms in 
the year of exit; UNIONi = % workforce covered by collective 
agreements; and log~i = expected post-innovation price-cost margins. 
Column (I) presents an estimate of equation (3) using OLS. Columns 
(ii) and (iii) are Tobit and Probit estimates of the same equation, 
while column (iv) shows the regression in column (i) applied to the 
sample of industries for which Ii>O, with an appropriate censored 
sample bias correction. 
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process of becom1ng more concentrated are less 1nnovat1ve than more 
competitive looking ones. There is also a noticeable tendency for this 
to be true in industries subject to high entry rates. low exit rates, 
and in industries which have a large small firm sector. 
import competition on innovativeness is negligible. 
The effect of 
The sign pattern of the remaining six variables contains few 
surprises. e11 , the coefficient on log ~i· has a positive effect on 
innovativeness. but one that is extremely difficult to estimate with 
precision. Industry size (64), export intensity (69 ), and unionization 
(e 12 >. all appear to be relatively unrelated to 1nnovativeness, while 
growth <e3) and capital intensity (e6 ) are positively associated with 
innovativeness (albeit weakly). As remarked above, these variables 
have, in the main, been included in order to avoid generating any bias 
in the estimates of e2• es• 67, e8 , elO and e11 • However, it is worth 
noting that they do suggest that market size per se has no apparent 
effect on innovativeness, although, as expected, high growth rates seem 
to go hand in hand with more innovations. 
The results on Table III are extremely robust to a wide range 
of respecifications. They are more or less invariant to quite 
substantial changes in the specification of (the log of) 
post-innovation returns. Use of rates of return on capital rather than 
price-cost margins, specifying returns in terms of levels and not logs, 
and use of a rational expectations proxy for expected post-innovation 
returns rather than actual, observed returns all had little effect. 
The results are also quite insensitive to changes in the vector of 
exogenous variables. Dropping any one or any subsample produced very 
little effect on the remaining estimated coefficient, ~:~hough 
t-statistics often increased. Since it is reasonable to argue that 
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many of the SIX rivalry variables may be caused by Innovations. tests 
on the exogeneity of those SIX variables - collectively. Singly and in 
groups - were performed. In all cases. the null hypothesis that they 
are exogenous to the process generating innovations could not be 
rejected. The only variable for which these tests were at all close to 
rejecting that null was the level of industry concentration. CONi. Two 
stage least squares estimates allowing CON to be endogenous produced an 
estimate of its coefficient which was somewhat more negative than those 
displayed on Table III. indicating that the estimates of this 
coefficient reported on Table III are biased upwards if they are biased 
at all. Finally. estimating the model (3) across the two 
cross-sections taken separately (and neglecting the fixed effects) 
yielded virtually identical results for each taken separately. 
Columns (ii)-(iv) on Table III show further experiments with 
the regression reported in (i). Since about 25%-30% of the industry 
5-year periods reported no innovations. then (i) is. in principle, 
liable to be affected by a censored variable bias. A Tob1t estimator 
is appropriate for situations such as this. and Tobit estimates of (i) 
are shown as (Ii) on the Table. Clearly nothing of substance is 
affected by reestimating the model in this manner. although small 
biases are present. The Tobit model itself is. however. rather 
restrictive, for it assumes that the determinants of limit observations 
(Ii=O) are identical to the determinants of the density of non-limit 
observations. (Ii given that Ii>O). One can relax this assumption in a 
number of ways, but one of the. simplest and most straightforward is the 
so-called "double hurdle" model. 0 2) This is a two equation model in 
which the first step is a Probit estimate determining whether or not 
inovations occur (li=O or Ii>O) • .:!.~-~:! the second step is an OLS estimate 
determining the number of innovations that occur given that at least 
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one ~s reported. The rationale behind the model is stra1ghtfonvard. 
and hinges on there being effects conveyed through the independent 
variables which affect the ability to innovate (li=O or Ii>O) in a 
manner which differs from the intensity of innovation given that 
innovation occurs at all (Ii g~ven Ii>O). These equations are shown as 
(iii) and (iv) respectively on the Table. The Probit estimates suggest 
that the degree of competition has very little effect on the 
probability that an Innovation will occur. but the estimates in (iv) 
show that competition increases - and monopoly power reduces - the 
number of innovations introduced given that at least one is introduced. 
Thus. it appears to be the case that monopolists are not so much less 
likely to innovate as they are less likely to do so more intensively 
than firms in more competitive sectors. 
The estimates on Table III also cast some interesting light on 
the role played by "technological opportunity" in accounting for 
inter-industry variations in innovativeness. It is plausible to think 
that the conditions of technological opportunity are correlated with 
many of the twelve independent variables that we have used in the 
regressions on Table III. A regression of the estimated values of the 
fixed effects on the twelve independent variabless produced an R2 
slightly in excess of 50%. The results (not shown) suggest that 
industries with high technological opportunity are not only to be 
highly concentrated, but are also large, not very highly capital 
intensive, and rather more profitable than the rest. Given this, it is 
not very surprising to discover that failing to correct for variations 
in technological opportunity across industries (acheived by suppressing 
the fixed effects and forcing each industry to have the same intercept) 
leads to substantial bias. In particular, doing this makes 
concentration appear to be positively (but not significantly) 
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correlated to 1nnovat1ons. and to make both market s1ze and expected 
post-innovation profits posltively and significantly correlated to 
innovations. Large, profitable and highly concentrated markets appear 
to be more progresive, but this seems to be more or less entirely due 
to the fact that they have a richer "technological opportunity" than 
other sectors. Correcting for technological opportunity makes it plain 
that market size and prof1tability have little systematic effect on 
innovations, and that highly concentrated 1ndustries are significantly 
'l less progress~ve than the rest. Finally, a decomposition of the R' 
statistics for (1) on Table III suggests that variat1ons in 
technological opportunity taken alone account for at least 60% of the 
variation in innovations. while the twelve observables in (2) account, 
at best, for about 30%. Thus, technological opportunity appears to 
play a major role in explaining inter-industry variat1ons in rates of 
innovation. 
Thus far, we have established that the direct effects of 
monopoly power on innovation are negative; that is, that monopolists 
respond more slowly and less sensitively to a given level of expected 
post-innovation returns arising from any given innovat1on than more 
competitive firms. However, it is possible that these negative direct 
effects partially or, indeed, more than offset by positive indirect 
effects, leading to a positive total effect of monopoly on innovation. 
Thus, the next step is to calculate the indirect effects of monopoly on 
innovation. 
To calculate the indirect effect of monopoly on innovation, one 
needs to know how post-innovation returns are affected by monopoly, and 
how they affect innovative activity in turn. Estimates of the latter 
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\i.e. e1 i are shown on the first row of Table III. and are invar1ably 
positive but not signif1cant. To estimate the effects of monopoly on 
post-innovation profits. one needs to estimate an equation of the form 
(4) log ~i 
where log ~i = the log of actual price-cost margins, and the Wi are 
other exogenous var1ables. Using (4>. the indirect effect of monopoly 
on 1nnovation is 0 2e1 . We have specified (4) to include all twelve 
independent variables in (3), and also have included several further 
variables to identify the two equation system. (3)-(4). Table IV shows 
the results of these calculations. The first column is an estimate of 
(4), and, using (ii) on Table III, is combined to give an estimate of the 
total effect of monopoly on innovation in column (ii). Thus, for 
example, the direct effect of ENTRY is (from (ii) on III) 18.51; the 
indirect effect is (1.16) x (-.838) = -.972, and thus the total effect 
is= 17.54. 
Table IV tells a very simple and straightforward story. 
Equation (i) shows that rivalry (i.e. low CON, high ENTRY, high IMPORT, 
high SFIRM, low EXIT, and high 6CON) reduces price-cost margins, 
ceteris paribus. Thus, for an innovation which yields a given total of 
potential profits, one expects to observe monopolists appropriating 
more of it than would be managed by firms in more competitive sectors. 
And, since this higher realized profit has a positive (if statisticlaly 
weak) effect on innovativeness, it is clearly the case that the 
indirect effect of monopoly on innovation is positive. Since Table III 
suggests that the direct effects are negative, the size and sign of the 
- 377 - 6.37 
total effect of monopoly on inovativeness is uncertain. Putting 
together the estimates on Tables III and IV, it is clear that the 
trade-off which exists in principle does not amount to much in 
practice. In virtuallY. every case, the sign of the total effect of a 
variable on innovation is the same as the sign of its d1rect effect 
computed by holding unexpected post-innovation returns constant. What 
IS more, in most cases the sizes of the direct and effects are 
virtually the same. Thus, one concludes that the ind1rect feedback 
from market structure (and other variables) to innovation is weak and 
extremely uncertain in effect. The negative direct effects shown on 
Table III clearly suggest that monopolists are slower to respond to 
profitable innovative opportunities than are firms in more competitive 
markets; the very small indirect effects revealed on Table IV suggest 
that there is absolutely no systematic tendency for the higher 
post-innovation returns that monopolists appear to enjoy to compensate 
for their relative weaker response to such opportunities. 
Thus, it seems plain that there is virtually no evidence 
whatsoever in the data which support the view that monopoly or market 
power is conducive to innovative activity. Opening up most markets to 
more competitive forces - lowering industry concentration, raising net 
entry rates, .ind sustaining a large and vibrant small firm sector 
- seems likely to have a positive and healthy effect on innovative 
activity. 
One m:ight reasonably ask, however, what the longer run effects 
of innovative activity is likely to be. In particular, will higher 
levels of innovative activity make markets even more competitive, or 
does innovation have a centralizing effect on the structure of markets? 
If it is the case that innovation is decentralizing and so increases 
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TABLE IV 
Regress1on results for equation (4) 
(i) (ii) 
CON- .323 -58.919 1 ( • 2 70) 
ENTRYi -.838 
(2.56) 
17.54 
IMPORT1 -.0049 -.412 (.017) 
SFIRMi -.260 3.37 
(1.87) 
EXITi .445 -24.93 
( 1 . 48) 
6CON1 -.102 -10.241 ( 1. 20) 
SIZEi -.239 3.698 
(1.71) 
GROWi -.056 3.333 
(1.81) 
KAYOi -.017 .816 
( 1 . 30) 
EXPORTi .020 6.885 
(1.39) 
UION .040 -2.52 
(.234) 
Equation (i) has the log of price-cost margins as its dependent 
variable and also includes fixed effects. risk. an instrument for 
innovations. concentration squared and size squared. Column (ii) is1 
the total effects computed from (i) and (ii) on Table III. Indirect 
effects for CON were computed at sample mean values. CON= .517. 
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competition 1n markets, then the ba~ic relat1onship bet~een compet1t1on 
and innovation that we have identified is mutually reinforcing. 
Competition breeds innovative activity which, in turn, 1ncreases the 
degree of competition. If this is the case, then policies designed to 
increase the size of markets and increase competition will have a long 
run effect in excess of their short run effect. If, on the other hand, 
innovation is centralizing, then such policies will increase 
competition and innovativeness only in the short run. As the process 
gets under way, the increase in innovative activity will counteract the 
initial effects of the policy. Long run effects will be less than 
those observed in the short run and, indeed, may ultimately completely 
offset the initial policy actions. Thus, before finally concluding 
that competition stimulates innovativeness, one must check to see that 
short run eff,ects do indeed persist. 
To explore this question, one needs to know something about the 
feedback from innovation to market structure. The work on Table III 
uses. six measures of market structure or its changes. but most interest 
focuses on industry concentration. Hence, we shall specialize the 
question somewhat, and ask whether innovative activity tends to 
concentrate or deconcentrate markets.<lJ) The simplest and most 
straightforward way to investigate this question is to use a dynamic 
model which distinguishes short from long run movements in market 
concentration, and allows for partial adjustment to changes in the 
latter. The model was estimated across the same 73 industries in the 
two five year time periods 1970-74 and 1975-79 as the regressions 
reported on Table III. and yielded the estimated equation 
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( 5) 6CONt -1.083 CONt_1 + .0056 KAYOt -.003 SIZEt (23.28> tS.67> t2.51J 
+ .0035 6KAY0t + .0149 6SIZEt - .0011It 
(1.08) (.690) (3.59} 
plus industry specific fixed effects <R2 = .71), where It is an 
instrument for It, and where now 6CONt = CONt- CONt_ 1, and similarly 
with 6KAYOt and 6SIZEt. It is plain from (5) that innovations have a 
clear. statistically significant negative effect on market 
concentration, and thus that an increase in innovativeness will reduce 
long run levels of concentration. Further, the partial adjustment 
parameter implies that the effect of this change in long run 
concentration levels will be fully -incorporated into actual, observed 
levels of market concentration largely with1n "the period" (i.e. within 
about five years). Like those reported on Tables III and IV, the 
results reported in (5) are extremely robust. Letting It be endogenous· 
or lagglng it had no substantive effect on the results, and, similarly, 
the 1nclusion or exclus1on of SIZEt· KAYOt. 6KAYOt and ~IZEt sjnglv 
or in groups had no real effect. 
Combined with the estimates of (3) reported above, (5) suggests 
that increases in competition and in innovative activity are mutually 
reinforcing. A competitive market produces more innovations than a 
more monopolistic one, and the result of this innovative activity is to 
make markets more competitive. Hence. over time one expects to observe 
a gradually increasing spiral of innovation and decreases in market 
concentration (all other factors held constant), decreases which will 
further boost innovation rates. Clearly a one-off increase in 
competition. say as the result of policy initiatives to reduce 
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intra-Communitv barriers to trade, w11l hasten th1s e\·olutionary 
process. and produce long run effects in excess of those observed in 
the short run .. 
One f:mal set of remarks is in order. While it is clear that 
the degree of competition has an effect on innovative activity (and one 
that feeds ba<:k on itself) it is less than clear that market size per 
se has any impact on innovat1on. It appears to be true that markets 
which are rich in technological opportunity are also frequently rather 
large, but it is plain from Table III that once variations in 
technological opportunity across industries is held constant, then size 
per se plays very little role in affecting innovation rates. Whatever 
importance market size has is indirect, operating only to the extent 
that large markets are less concentrated, attract more entry, and so 
on. Regression (5) suggests that, at least with respect to movements 
in industry concentration, the effect of increased market size is 
minimal. Other studies in the literature have reported positive 
effects of size on entry rates and significant negative effects on 
concentation, but most studies seem to suggest that these effects are 
sma11.< 14> One emerges with the clear feeling that in1tiatives to open 
up the internal Community market will have a positive effect on rates 
of innovation only to the extent that they increase competitiveness. 
Measures aimed solely at increasing market size without affecting the 
degree of competition are unlikely to produce a discernable impact on 
dynamic effic].ency. 
- 382 -
6.42 
V. SUMMARY 
The basic argument and results of this paper are as follows. 
(1) Recent policy measures proposed in the context of efforts to 
reduce intra-Community trade barriers are likely to affect both the 
size of and the degree of competition in markets; 
(2) increases in market size are likely to yield static efficiency 
gains if economies of scale exist. and increases in the degree of 
competition will reinforce this to the extent that they lead to a 
reduction in X-inefficiency. 
(3) In principle, increases in market size ought to stimulate 
innovativeness and raise the dynamic efficiency of markets; 
(4) however. increases in the degree of competition could lead to a 
reduction in innovativeness· to the extent that large firm size and 
market power are necessary for innovation. 
(5) The data reveals that there are no obvious advantages to firm 
size or to market power in generating innovative activity in the short 
or in the long run. 
(6) It follows that moves to open up internal markets within the 
Community are unlikely to lead to any important trade-offs between the 
realization of static and dynamic efficiencies. The static gains to 
such policy proposals almost certainly understate the total gains to 
be realized from their implementation. 
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Notes 
1. This argument follows Gilbert and Newberry. 1982. If the initial 
monopoly 1s based on an innovation then, if it introduces a second 
innovation. the monopolist can coordinate the pncing of the goods 
associated with the two innovations. If, by contrast, an entrant 
introduced the second innovation, then competition would prevail 
between the two goods. The returns the entrant would earn are, 
therefore. less than the returns that the monopolist would get if 
it introduced both goods, and this means that the monopolist would 
have a g:reater incentive to introduce it, pre-empting the 
entrant. 
2. The terms are due to Rothwe 11 (1985); the debate that follows in 
the text 1s d1scussed at greater length in Scherer (1980. 
pp.423-38). 
3. This has been extensively discussed in game theoretic models of 
R&D; see, amongst others. Scherer 1967, Loury 1979, and Reinganum 
1982; fOJr good surveys, see Kamien & Schwartz, 1982, and Dasgupta, 
1986. 
4. This is the well known argument of Arrow, 1962; Fellner, 1951, 
also stressed that the foregone profits from the displaced line of 
activity can act as an opportunity cost slowing down the 
introduction of the new innovation. 
5. On the standard, static efficiency vs. monopoly power trade-off 
which is caused by economies of scale, see Williamson (1968). 
6. For good surveys, see Scherer (1980) or Kamien and Schwartz 
(1982); Fisher and Temin (1973) critically discuss how much can be 
inferred about the Schumpeterian hypothesis from regressions of 
firm size on R&D inputs. 
7. In addit1on to Scherer (1980) and Kamien and Schwartz (1982), see 
also Ergas (1984). In a recent study in the UK. Schott (1977) 
discovered that many large firms aim for extremely modest 
technical advances whose value depreciates extremely rapidly. 
8. Previous work in the literature has concentrated on simple partial 
correlations between market structure (as measured by 
concentration ratios) and measures of research inputs or 
innovative output. and have interpreted a positive correlation 
between t.he two as evidence consistent with the Schumpeterian 
hypothesis. Since this c~rrelation does not measure either the 
direct or the indirect effect of monopoly on innovation, it is a 
little difficult to interpret. For surveys of this literature, 
see Kamien and Schwartz (1982) or Scherer (1980). 
9. See, for example, Phillips (1966), Scherer (1967); Cohen et al 
(1987) ftnd much the same effect in firm size and R&D 
regressions. 
10. We also tried using rational·expectations proxies of 
post-innovation returns rather than observed post-innovation 
returns, but no significant differences emerged from this. The 
rational expectations proxy for expected post-innovation profits 
used a two equation structural model of profits and innovations to 
derive a reduced form expression linking profits to all the 
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exogenous var1ables in the system. Assuming that agents possess 
rational expectat1ons. one can then use the pred1ct1ons from this 
reduced form equation to proxy expectations, since these 
predictions are exactly what a rational agent who knew the 
structure of the model would use (for further discussion of the 
econometric issues associated with rational expectations models, 
see Wallis (1980) and Wickens (1982)). 
11. The innovations data base only provides 80 possible MLH industry 
classifications, and 7 further industries were eliminated because 
of holes in our capital stock series. Five year intervals were 
chosen to minimize the effect of any inaccuracies in recording the 
precise date of innovation. 
12. For a good discussion of limited dependent variable models, see 
Maddala (1983); Blundell and Meghir (1987) discuss the "double 
hurdle" model. 
13. We have done some simple reduced form regressions which indicate 
that increases in innovation increase entry and exit at a 
diminishing rate, and reduce imports. small firm activity and 
percentage changes in market concentration at a diminishing rate. 
None of these effects appear to be strong or significant. 
14. See Geroski and Masson (1987) and Curry and George (1983), 
respectively, for surveys of these studies. 
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Data Appendix 
li = number of major commercially successful innovations used in 
industry i. this data is based on a major study by SPRU, Univesity 
of Sussex. of 4378 major innovations in the U.K., 1945-83; for 
details see Townsend, 1981, and Robson and Townsend, 1984. The data 
was obtained from the ESRC Data Archive at Essex. 
"i = price-cost margins, defined as net output less the wage bill 
less net capital expenditure divided by gross output. Data was 
obtained from the Census. 
DCON and CONi = percentage change and level of the 5-firm 
concentration ratio, from the Census of Production. 
ENTRYi and EXIT1 = market share of all new (exiting) firms. The data 
was drawn from a special compilation made by ENTRY and EXIT for the 
1980-74 period were measured by 1974 values of the variables since 
data for 1970-73 was not available. 
IMPORTi and EXPORTi = import and export intensity, obtained from the 
DTI via the MICRODATA data based compiled at the OECD. this data is 
virtually the same as is available in the Business Monitor. 
SFIRMi = relative number of firms ~99 employees, from the Census. One 
or tow missing observations were filled using Order averages. 
SIZEi and KATOi = log of industry assets and capital stock output 
ratio, obtained from calculations made by D.· Allard for the OFT. 
UNIONi = % of workers covered by a collective agreement, from the New 
Earnings Survey. One or two missing observations were filled using 
Order averages. 
All other variables used were derived from these or directly obtained from the 
Census of Production; all market shares have been adjusted for imports and 
exports. 
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'PERFORMANCES DES FIRMES ET ANALYSE DES ECHANGES COMMERCIAUX 
DANS lA COMMUNAUTE EUR.OPEENNE 
RAPPORT FINAL 
Introduction 
La libre circulation des marchandises dans le Grand marche commu-
nautaii'e devrait apporter globalement de grands benefices aux Etats mem-
bres. l.e j eu combine d 1 une meilleure allocation des ressources par une 
specialisation accrue, d 1 economies d 1 echelle et d 1 une plus forte pression 
de la ·COncurrence devrait conduire a des gains d 1 efficacite dormant un 
nouvel elan aux entreprises europeennes et ameliorant le bien-etre dans 
la Communaute. 
Il va de soi que ce processus ne saurait se realiser qu 1 au prix 
de changements structurels au sein de la Communaute, qui seront plus ou 
moins accentues selon le pays, la region ou le secteur, et qui toucheront 
a la fois 1 1 organisation de 1 1 appareil productif et la structure des 
echangE~s commerciaux des pays membres. 
Or un diagnostic sur les effets de la realisation du Grand marche 
sur les structures de production et d 1 echange necessite une analyse ap-
profondie. Il faut en effet comprendre les differentes modalites 
d 1 insertion des economies des pays membres dans leur commerce extra et 
intra-communautaire, analyser les liens existant avec leurs structures 
productives, et mesurer les r6les respectifs de leurs conditions macro-
economlques collectives et des caracteristiques micro-economiques de 
leurs entreprises dans la determination de leurs performances 
exterieures. 
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L'objectif du pr6sent travail est double. Sur le plan des m6ca-
nismes du commerce, il s'agit, l travers l'6tude du cas fran~ais, demon-
trer l'existence de modalit6s diverse• d'insertion dans lea 6changes com-
merciaux a l'int6rieur de la Communaut6 et au niveau mondial. Nous cher-
cherons a les identifier, a mesurer leur importance quantitative et a 
presenter la disparite des performances exterieures selon chacune d'entre 
elles. 
Ducote de la production, l'analyse se centrera, a travers le cas 
de la France, sur les rapports qui s'etablissent entre les performances 
individuelles des entreprises et la composit:f.on de 1' echange au niveau 
national. Nous etudierons dans un premier temps les caracteristiques in-
dividuelles des entreprises, ainsi que leurs disparites sectorielles et 
leur dispersion a l'interieur de chaque secteur. Nous tAcherons par la 
suite d'etudier !'articulation entre les caracteristiques specifiques des 
entreprises et leurs types d' engagement a 1' ex·portation. 
Ce rapport contient done deux parties. La premiere partie est 
consacree a 1' analyse de la composition de:s echanges commerciaux de 
1' economie fran~aise et de ses modalites d' insertion dans le commerce 
mondial et le commerce intra-communautaire. La deuxieme partie porte sur 
l'analyse des caracteristiques individuelles des entreprises, et de leur 
liaison avec les performances et types d'engagement a !'exportation. 
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PREMIERE PARTIE 
ANALYSE DE LA COMPOSITION DES !CHANGES COMHERCIAUX DE LA FRANCE 
ET DE SES MODALITES D'INSERTION DANS LE COMMERCE MONDIAL 
ET DANS LE COMMERCE INTRA- COMMUNAUTAIRE 
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Les etudes dans le domaine du commerce ext,rieur disposent, de· 
puis longtemps dejA, de tout un ensemble d'outils et d'instruments analy· 
tiques qui ont servi A etayer des syst~mes et des mod~les explicatifs 
bien connus. Mais les configurations observees des flux de commerce entre 
les pays industrials en general, et A 1' interieur de la Communaute en 
particulier, ne paraissent pas repondre, pour le moins uniquement, aux 
schemas explicatifs traditionnels. Certains phenomenes semblent en fait 
se situer en dehors de la problematique retenue dans ces schemas. 
Les modeles qui decoulent des analyses traditionnelles decrivent, 
on le sait, des echanges univoques entre pays. En raison des differences 
de dotations factorielles, d' aptitudes technologiques, d' habitudes de 
product:ion et de consommation, certains pays se trouvent plus aptes A 
exerce1~ tels ou tels types d' activites plut6t que tels ou tels autres. 
Des formes de specialisation apparaissent selon des mecanismes 
d'avantages et de desavantages compares. La composition de l'echange au 
niveau d'une economie nationale montre alors un ensemble de biens expor· 
tes et un ensemble de biens importes. Dans ce cadre, un produit est soit 
exporte, soit importe, soit non echange. 
Or, le commerce intra-europeen est largement compose d'echanges 
intra-hranche. C'est-A-dire que les principaux pays de la Communaute se 
trouvent, dans les nomenclatures usuelles, 6tre A la fois exportateurs et 
importateurs des m6mes produits. La comprehension des ressorts du commer-
ce intra-branche est des lors une composante essentielle dans 1' analyse 
des modalites du commerce. Elle 1' est d' autant plus que les positions 
acquises dans ce type d'echanges ont quelques raisons d'6tre plus fragi-
les que les resultats obtenus dans le commerce univoque. 
Cette partie est composee de la maniere suivante : dans un pre-
mier temps nous introduirons le cadre d'analyse et definirons les diffe-
rentes modalites du commerce ; dans un second temps nous analyserons de 
maniere empirique 1' insertion de 1' economie fran~aise dans le commerce 
mondial et dans le commerce communautaire. 
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1.1. L1 identification des diff,rentes modalit'• du commerce 
Sur le plan analytique, le commerce univoque, o~ certaines acti-
vites sont uniquement exportatrices tandis que d 1 autres sont uniquement 
importatrices, ne semble pas poser trop de probl.mes. Conformement a la 
logique bien connue de la division du travail, les echanges univoques 
refl.tent des situations d'avantages et de desavan~ages compares claire-
ment definies. 
Le phenomene des echanges commerciaux dits intra-branche, en re-
vanche, a ete a 1 1 origine d'une multiplicite d'approches, qui temoigne 
des difficultes rencontrees dans 1' analyse de (:e sujet. 
Au premier plan appara1t la difficulte a cerner le concept lui-
meme. C'est un probleme de definition. Qu'entend-on par •commerce intra-
branche" ? 
Deux reponses, qui sont en meme temps le point de depart de deux 
approches differentes, sont donnees pour cette premiere question. 
a) La premiere approche retient une problematique de specialisa-
tion intra-branche. A l'interieur d'une meme branche, les pays se specia-
lisent, chacun, dans la production, et l'exportation, de tels ou tels 
biens. en echange. a 1' importation, de tels 0\l tels autres. Les produits 
exportes et importes, bien qu'appartenant a une meme branche, presentent 
des differences significative& de leurs caracteristiques techniques et de 
leurs destinations d'usage. Les branches etant definies conventionnelle-
ment a partir d 1 un agregat statistique compot·tant, chacun, un large en-
semble de produits, la composition du comme1:ce montre, compte tenu de 
1' existence des specialisation& intra-branche, des flux d 1 echanges qui 
s'effectuent a l'interieur d 1 une meme branche. C1 est un commerce intra-
branche qui reflete des phenomenes de specialisation fine, suffisamment 
fine pour ne pas pouvoir etre apprehendee par les nomenclatures statisti-
ques de branches. 
Pour cette approche, les ressorts du commerce intra-branche ne 
sont pas differents de ceux des mod.les class:Lques de specialisation, et 
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sa manifestation tient l la d~sagr~gation insuffisante ou inadapt~e des 
nomenclatures. 
b) La deuxieme approche considere que 1e commerce intra-branche 
traduit: des ~changes croids de produits similaires. 11 se manifeste par 
1a simu1tan~1te d'exportations et d'importations d'un produit donne dans 
1e commerce exte'rieur d' un pays avec 1' un de ses partenaires ou • 
1'interieur d'une zone. 
C' est cette deuxieme approche que nous approfondirons 1e plus 
dans la presente etude. C'est elle en effet qui pose le plus de questions 
l la theorie classique du commerce international. C'est done elle qui est 
susceptible de conduire l des conclusions differentes, aux plans analyti-
que et politique, de celles auxquels conduit cette theorie. 
Dans la plupart des etudes dans ce domaine, le phenomene du com-
merce intra-branche est considere a priori comme antagonique l l'egard du 
principe de la specialisation internationale. La simultaneite 
d1exportations et d1importations de produits similaires est consideree a 
priori comme incompatible avec le fonctionnement des avantages compares 
et avec les specialisations qui s 1 en degagent. Le debat sur ce point 
n 1est pas seulement theorique, il porte aussi sur les consequences econo-
miques d 1 une telle modalite du commerce. Le developpement des echanges 
croises de produits similaires 1 surtout l la suite des mesures 
d'allegement des barrieres douanieres l l 1interieur d'une zone economi-
que1 est-i1 benefique pour les economies nationales concernees et pour la 
zone dans son ensemble, ou, au contraire, presente-il des inconvenients 
pour les appareils productifs nationaux et pour les equilibres commer-
ciaux l l'interieur de la zone consideree ? 
En effet, les arguments avances en faveur du libre-echange sont 
fondes sur les gains qui reviennent aux partenaires engages dans le com-
merce international l la suite du fonctionement du principe des avantages 
comparatifs. L'existence de productivites comparatives differentes d1un 
pays l l'autre dans l'exercice de telle ou telle activite, la disparite 
quantitative de dotations factorielles entre les pays et 1' emploi des 
facteurs en proportions differentes entre les branches, les aptitudes 
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technologiques, les exp,riences et les habiletis acquises, etc. sont des 
6l,ments qui favorisent l'instauration d'une division international• du 
travail. Celle-ci n'est pas donn'• une fois pour toutes, maia l chaque 
moment elle conduit l une meilleure allocation des ressources productives 
et l des gains de productivit6 par des processus d'ajustement et de res-
tructuration. Les importations representent un gain d'opportunit' parce 
qu'elles lib~rent des capitaux et des hommes qui seront affect's dans les 
activit6s ou le pays b6n6ficie d'avantages comparatifs. 
Que reste-t-il des arguments en faveut· du libre 6change avec le 
developpement des echanges croises des produits similaires, si ce commer-
ce est contraire A la specialisation internationale et aux syst~mes eta-
bUs selon les avantages et desavantages compa:r6s 1 Si un pays est capa-
ble de produire et d'exporter, A des prix comp6titifs, tel ou tel pro-
duit, et que le meme produit figure en meme te1mps dans la liste des pro-
duits importes, ne vaut-il pas mieux, surtout si cet echange est defici-
taire, r6duire les importations pour liberer des parts de marche pour des 
entreprises nationales capables de produire et meme d'exporter A des prix 
competitifs ? Pour repondre A ces questions, il faut analyser les fonde-
ments du commerce intra-branche, pour bien comprendre que la constatation 
de son existence ne supprime pas toute validit.e A la th6orie des avanta-
ges comparatifs. 
1.1.1. Qu'est-ce que le commerce intra-branche 1 
Situer notre travail par rapport aux autres travaux dans ce do-
maine commence avec la definition du phenom~ne A traiter. Certains au-
teurs A l'instar de B. Balassa (1966, 1986), Grubel et Lloyd (1975), A. 
Aquino (1978), entre autres, s'interessent A des echanges "intra-
industriels• (intra-industry trade). Cette terminologie se refere A la 
definition anglo-saxonne courante de 1 1 indust:rie comme etant •un groupe 
de producteurs en concurrence pour la production d'un meme ensemble de 
marchandises "(Grubel et Lloyd, 1975, p. 5). La demarche adoptee par ces 
auteurs retient done comme probl6matique la simultan6ite d'exportations 
et d 1 importations entre des groupes de product:eurs sellblables, plut6t que 
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la simultaneite de 1' echange de produits similaires. Ce sont done les 
agents qui se trouvent au centre de cette demarche plut6t que le 
produit. 
D'autres auteurs, B. Lassudrie-Duch6ne et Mucchielli (1979), F. 
Claire, 0. Gaussens et Duc-Loi Phan (1984), abordent la question du com-
merce intra-branche du c6te du produit. C'est cette approche que nous 
privilegierons dans la presente etude. Le commerce intra-branche sera 
done aborde dans notre demarche comme le phenom~ne selon leguel apparais-
sent au niveau d'une economie nationale donnee une simultaneite 
d'exportations et d'importations de produits similaires dans ses echanges 
avec l'un de ses partenaires ou a l'interieur d'une zone. 
Cette definition de notre approche doit etre completee par les 
trois considerations suivantes 
a) Situer !'analyse au niveau du produit n'implique nullement que 
la logique sectorielle soit niee. Les firmes en concurrence pour la pro-
duction d'un meme groupe de biens, malgre la diversite de leurs produc-
tions, de leurs strategies et de leurs performances, obeissent toutes, a 
un moment donne, a des contraintes sectorielles collectives en mati~re de 
ressources humaines, de disponibilite des capitaux et de structures orga-
nisationnelles propres au secteur. Si nous disons •a un moment donne• 
c'est pour eviter, comme le souligne A. Jacquemin (1975), une vision sta-
tique selon des contraintes structurellement determinees. •Outre les po-
litiques adaptatives qui caractetisent generalement le court terme, une 
entreprise est capable d'agir sur !'evolution de son secteur industrial 
et de modifier, au fil du temps, ses conditions de demande et de cout• 
(p. 4). 
b) Situer 1' observation au niveau du produit necessite que le 
produit soit identifie avec le maximum d'objectivite possible. Ceci doit 
etre assure par la prise en consideration detaillee des caracteristiques 
techniques et qualitatives principales du produit. C'est la raison pour 
laquelle nous utilisons, dans un premier temps, et sans aucune agrega-
tion, les statistiques de base de la Nimexe a son niveau le plus detaille 
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(6 chiffres), qui contient pour l'ensemble de biens manufactur6s six mil-
le produits environ. Dans un second temps, nous consid4rons que si les 
statistiques de la Nimexe nous assurent une definition assez pr6cise des 
specificites techniques du produit, elles ne sont pas en mesure de lais-
ser appara1tre l'existence d'eventuelles differences qualitative& qui 
peuvent exister entre deux produits ayant les m6mes specifications tech-
niques de base. C'est pourquoi, dans l'analyse des echanges croises de 
produits similaires, le produit exporte et le produit importe ne seront 
consideres comme similaires que si, d'une part, ils correspondent tous 
deux A la meme rubrique de la Nimexe A 6 chiffres (similarite des speci-
fications techniques) (1), et si, d'autre part, et afin d'assurer une 
similarite qualitative, leurs prix (en fait leurs valeurs unitaires) A 
!'exportation etA l'importation sont proches. La valeur unitaire consti-
tue pour nous un indicateur de qualite. 11 est suppose que deux valeurs 
unitaires comparables A !'exportation et A !'importation pour un produit 
donne indiquent que le produit exporte et le produit importe sont de qua-
lites equivalentes. 
c) Situer !'observation au niveau du produit, pour deceler des 
echanges croises des produits similaires, conduit instantanement A 
s'interroger sur la nature des autres formes d'echanges. De maniere sim-
ple, si le commerce-au niveau d'un produit donne ne releve pas des echan-
ges croises des produits similaires, A quelles autres formes d'echanges 
peut-il correspondre ? Cette remarque posee avec beaucoup de simplifica-
tion vise A attirer l'attention sur le fait que les echanges croises de 
produits similaires ne peuvent pas etre apprehendes dans l'absolu, mais 
doivent l'etre de maniere conjointe avec les autres formes d'echanges. 
1.1.2. Comment evaluer !'importance quantitative du commerce croise ? 
Plusieurs auteurs considerent que le commerce intra-branche est 
par definition equilibre. En d'autres termes, les echanges A etudier dol-
vent etre de grandeurs egales. L' importance relative du phenomene est 
done evalue par 1' amp leur des exportations et des importations qui, A 
1' interieur de 1' echange, sont equilibrees. Les excedents des unes par 
rapport aux autres sont consideres comme etant un echange inter (et non 
I 
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pas intra) branche. C'est en particulier le cas de !'approche de Grubel 
et Lloyd, qui s'exprime par la formule bien connue : 
Bi - (Xi + Mi) - IXi - Mil x 100 
(Xi + Mi) 
ou Bi est l'indicateur de l'intensite du commerce intra-branche pour la 
branche i, et Xi et Mi les exportations et les importations 
correspondantes. 
Cette approche nous para1t indefendable. Si le concept A etudier 
se refere A !'existence d'echanges croises de produits similaires, pour-
quoi se limite-t-on A des fractions de ce commerce ? A supposer qu'un 
echange croise existe pour un produit donne et que cet echange est exce-
dentaire, comment peut-on concevoir qu'une partie des exportations de ce 
produit est un commerce intra-branche et qu'une autre partie des exporta-
tions du meme produit est inter-branches ? 11 est plus naturel de consi-
derer que le produit en question fait l'objet d'un echange croise et que 
cet echange est excedentaire. 
Les principes sur lesquels s'appuie notre methode de mesure sont 
les suivants : 
a) La similarite de produits implique que le produit exporte et 
le produit importe sont de meme specification technique et d'une qualite 
egale (meme categorie de gamme). 
b) Les echanges croises de produits similaires doivent etre ana-
lyses en lien avec les autres formes d'echanges au niveau du produit. 
c) L' observation de la composition du commerce a montre qu' au 
niveau de chaque produit Nimexe A 6 chiffres les flux d'exportations et 
d'importations entre un pays et !'ensemble de ses partenaires commerciaux 
pris individuellement peuvent correspondre A l'une ou A l'autre des trois 
modalites ci-dessous : 
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1) des echanges univogues : c'est la forme dana laquelle la cat'· 
gorie de gamma du produit, d'finie selon le niveau de sa valeur 
unitaire (2), est uniquement export'e ou uniquement import,e. 
ii) des 'changes de gamma : dans cette modalit,, una categorie de 
gamme du produit figure uniquement A 1' exportation ou • 1' importation, 
tandis qu'une autre cat,gorie de gamme donne lieu A un flux en sens 
inverse. 
iii) des 'changes crois's de produits similaires : dans ce cas, 
la meme cat,gorie de gamme du produit est A la fois export'e et 
importee (3). Les echanges croises de produits similaires peuvent 6tre 
bilat,raux si la simultaneite d'exportation et d'importation des pro-
duits similaires concerne le meme partenaire, ou triangulaires si les 
partenaires sont differents. 
En effet, il convient, A l'interieur de !'observation globale du 
commerce croise, de distinguer la part bilaterale et la part triangulai-
re, comme le montre le dessin illustratif suivant : 
Dans !'observation globale du phenomene, l'on constate, pour la 
France (F), un total d'exportation (Xa + Xc) portant sur des produits 
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pour lesquels existent en mAme temps des importations (Ma + Mb). Ce com-
merce repr,sente, dans sa totalite, des 'changes crois'• de produits si-
milaires pour la France. N1 emp6che que cette observation globale recou-
vre, d 1 une part, un commerce crois' bilat,ral (Xa + Ka) , et, d 1 autre 
part, un commerce crois' triangulaire (Xc + Mb). 
d) Une fois identifies au niveau de chaque produit Nimexe A 6 
chiffres, les flux correspondant A chaque modalite sont agreges A des 
niveaux intermediaires de nomenclature. Ceci a pour but d 1 apprecier 
l'ampleur relative de chaque modalite au niveau de ces agregats statisti-
ques qui n 1 ont ici qu 1 une fonction de presentation. Le poids relatif de 
chaque modalit' est parfaitement independant du niveau d 1 agregation au-
quel les r'sultats sont presentes, car 1 1 analyse est effectuee au niveau 
le plus fin. Contrairement A la demarche adopt'e par Grubel et Lloyd, et 
d'autres auteurs, ou le phenomene est evalue A des niveaux agreges et ou 
on cherche par la suite A verifier si celui-ci persiste A des niveaux 
moins agreges, nous partons, d'abord, d'un niveau d'analyse tres detaille 
pour ensuite agreger les resultats. 
1.1. 3. Comment situer le commerce croise par rapport aux mecanismes 
traditionnels de specialisation ? 
Notre analyse des echanges croises de produits similaires se fon-
de sur une problematique de competitivite. Celle-ci est apprehendee A 
deux niveaux, macro-economique et micro-economique. 
Le premier niveau est retenu dans les analyses traditionnelles en 
termes d'avantages et de desavantages comparatifs nationaux. L1 attention 
est alors souvent portee sur des caracteristiques collectives de superio-
rite et d'inferiorite relatives, saisies au niveau des branches 
d 1 activites. La disparite quantitative de dotations factorielles, les 
differences de niveaux technologiques, de modes de consommation, de ni-
veaux de d'veloppement et d 1 industrialisation, sont, entre autres, des 
elements macro-economiques qui expliquent que tel ou tel pays detient un 
avantage comparatif dans telle ou telle branche, et que tel ou tel autre 
pays beneficie d 1 un avantage, ou d 1 un moindre desavantage, dans telle ou 
telle autre branche. 
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M'me en relAchant les hypoth~ses simplificatrices de concurrence 
parfaite, dont l'infirmation justifie aux yeux de certains un rejet h4tif 
du corps analytique traditionnel, 11 existe entre pays des disparites des 
capacites d'offre en mati~res d'aptitudes technologiques, d'habitudes de 
production et de disponibilites en facteurs et en ressources naturelles. 
qui, ajoutees aux disparites de demande salon les modes et les habitudes 
de consommation, font appara1tre, A travers des constatations empiriques, 
des inegalites collectives de performance entre les pays selon les diffe-
rentes branches. 
Ainsi, meme dans des syst~mes de concurrence imparfaite, les 
avantages comparatifs nationaux existent. Ils sont collectifs, c'est-A-
dire qu'ils caracterisent l'environnement economique general dans le ca-
dre duquel les entreprises en concurrence pour la production A 
l'interieur d'une meme branche operent. 
L' introduction des conditions de concurrence imparfaite sur les 
marches des produits, des biens intermediaires et des facteurs de produc-
tion conduit A observer la competitivite A un deuxieme niveau qui est, 
lui, de nature micro-economique. 
Contrairement aux systemes de concurrence parfaite, ou les avan-
tages et desavantages comparatifs collectifs s'appliquent uniformement A 
l'ensemble des entreprises d'une branche donnee, ce qui conduit A ce que 
le produit de cette branche soit uniquement exporte (cas d'avantage com-
paratif generalise) ou uniquement importe (cas de desavantage comparatif 
generalise), les conditions de concurrence imparfaite offrent aux entre-
prises des elements concurrentiels supplementaires qui creent des effets 
de dispersion de performances entre les entreprises productrices d'un 
meme bien. 
Le concept selon lequel les firmes peuvent disposer, a leur ni-
veau, d'un avantage competitif specifique n'est guere nouveau. Cette pro-
blematique se trouve dejA dans des travaux de J.S. Bain (1956), S. Hymer 
(1960), C. Kindleberger (1969), entre autres. Face A des contraintes col-
lectives au niveau de la branche, les entreprises disposent, grAce aux 
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~l~ments de concurrence imparfaite, d'une latitude de strat4gies aboutis-
sant a des r~sultats diff~rents. De la phase de la conception du produit, 
en passant par les divers stades de sa fabrication jusqu'l la commercia-
lisation finale, les entreprises adoptent des techniques diff4rentes, 
elles ne s'approvisionnent ni avec les m6mes possib111Us ni aux. m6mes 
prix sur les march~s des ressources productlves et de biens interm~diai­
res. Elles n'ont nl la mAme tallle ni le m6me niveau de qualification de 
la main-d'oeuvre. Elles ne sont pas toutes situ~es au mAme nlveau sur la 
courbe d'apprentissage. Et elles n'ont pas toutes le m~me niveau 
d'autofinancement ni les m~mes possiblit~s d'acces aux. march~s financiers 
et de cr~dits. 
L'ensemble de ces elements concurrenciels micro-economiques sup-
plementaires, devant leur origine aux. conditions de concurrence imparfai-
te, font qu'A un moment donne, et par rapport a une norme collective de 
competitivite au niveau de la branche, certaines entreprises se trouvent 
dotees d'un avantage comp~titif specifique par rapport aux. autres firmes 
en concurrence pour la production d'un m~me bien. 
Ainsi, si nous reprenons les solutions finales des mecanismes 
d'avantages et des desavantages comparatifs qui, nous le savons tous de-
puis Gottfried Haberler, aboutissent A des specialisations incompletes, 
dans le sens ou, en raison de co~ts d'opportunite croissants, une produc-
tion domestique existe, aussi, pour les produits A desavantages compara-
tifs, 11 est aise de comprendre que m~me pour les produits normalement 
importes, certaines firmes domestiques sur-comp~titives par rapport a la 
norme collective parviennent a concurrencer les firmes etrangeres sur le 
marche domestique ou A !'exportation. Un tel echange croise de produits 
similaires sera forc~ment d~ficitaire. Plus precisement il sera constitue 
de flux majoritaires d'importation en conformite avec la situation domes-
tique collective de desavantage comparatif, d'une part, et de flux mino-
ritaires inverses d'exportation refletant des situations de sur-
competitivite micro-economiques specifiques au niveau de certaines firmes 
nationales. De fa~on symetrique, pour une production domestique caracte-
risee, A l'echelle nationale, par des conditions d'avantages comparatifs 
collectifs, les ~changes crois~s de produits similaires seront constitu~s 
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de flux majoritaires d'exportation et de flux minoritaires d'importation. 
Si les premiers sont le reflet de la situation d'un avantage comparatif 
collectif national, les deuxUmes sont 1 mettre en correspondance avec 
des phenomenes de sur-competitivite de firmes dans lea pays partenaires. 
11 ne faut pas avoir une vision statique des avantages et des 
desavantages comparatifs nationaux. Ces avantages et desavantages collec-
tifs ne sont exogenes qu 1 A court et moyen termes. Les avantages competi-
tifs specifiques de firmes peuvent, A plus ou moins long terme, 6tre ac-
cessibles A l'ensemble des entreprises de la branche. Le specifique peut 
devenir collectif, des avantages comparatifs peuvent se creer et d1 autres 
peuvent dispara1tre. 
1. 2. L1 analyse empirique de 1 1 insertion de la France dans le commerce 
international 
L'analyse portera sur les annees 1978 et 1984. Le choix des an-
nees a ete guide par la volonte, d 1 une part, d 1 etudier sur une periode 
assez longue le caractere structural des phenomenes consideres et 
d 1 observer leur evolution temporelle, d 1 autre part, d 1 eviter d 1 analyser 
des annees trop atypiques. 
Concernant. les sources statistiques, c 1 est A l 1 aide des statisti-
ques du commerce exterieur du Marche commun (Nimexe A 6 chiffres) que 
1 1 analyse des modal! tes d 1 insertion de i 1 economie fran~aise dans ses 
echanges commerciaux de biens manufactures est effectuee. 
L'analyse des modalites d 1 insertion de l'economie fran~aise dans 
ses echanges commerciaux exterieurs est organisee dans l 1 ordre suivant : 
d'abord un aper~u des modalites d 1 insertion de 1 1 economie fran~aise dans 
son commerce manufacturier avec le monde ; ensuite une analyse specifique 
du commerce manufacturier intra-communautaire de la France ; enfin un 
approfondissement de 1 1 analyse du commerce croise de produits similaires 
intra-europeen de la France. 
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1.2.1. Un aper~u des moda1ites d'insertion de 1''conomie francaise dans 
1e commerce mondial de biens manufactures 
L'analyse de la composition du commerce exterieur de la France en 
1978 et en 1984 revele !'importance des differentes modalites d'insertion 
de la France dans 1e commerce exterieur de biens manufactures. Les ta-
bleaux l.a et l.b montrent le poids relatif de chacune des modalites pre-
cedemment definies : echanges univoques. echanges de gamme. echanges 
croises bilateraux et triangulaires de produits similaires, pour 1978 et 
1984 respectivement. 
L' observation des resultats presentes dans les tableaux 1. a et 
l.b montre qu'en 1984 23 % des echanges exterieurs francais de produits 
manufactures au niveau mondial, correspondent A des echanges univoques. 
Le commerce, dans ce cas, porte sur des categories de produits qui figu-
rent uniquement dans la liste des exportations ou uniquement dans la lis-
te des importations. Par rapport A l'annee 1978, ou le commerce univoque 
n'entrait que pour 18 % dans le total des echanges exterieurs fran~ais de 
produits manufactures, la France montre, en 1984, une tendance vers plus 
d'engagement dans cette modalite du commerce. 
Aussi bien en 1978 qu'en 1984, les exportations univoques de 
biens manufactures de la France portent, dans leur plus grande partie, 
sur des categories de produits haut de gamme, si l'on en juge par leurs 
prix A !'exportation. En 1984, 45,3 \des exportations univoques fran~ai­
ses portent sur des categories de gamme ayant un prix (en fait une valeur 
unitaire) qui depasse de plus de 15 \ le prix moyen de ce produit dans le 
commerce total intra-CEE. Les exportations univoques portant sur des ca-
tegories de gamme moyennes (valeur unitaire = prix CEE ± 15 \) represen-
tent 38 %. Celles qui portent sur des categories de bas de gamme (valeur 
unitaire inferieure de plus de 15 % au prix CEE) ne representent, en 
1984, que 16,7 % des exportations univoques de la France. La comparaison 
avec la structure des exportations univoques de la France en 1978, ou les 
categories de produits haut de gamme, de gamme moyenne, et de bas de gam-
me, representaient, respectivement, 38 %, 32 % et 30 %, illustre que 
!'engagement de l'economie fran~aise dans les exportations univoques en 
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1984 par rapport A 1978, porte davantage sur les cat,gories de produits 
haut de gamme. 
Les importations univoques de la France sont r'parties, en 1984 1 
pour 46 1 5 t (43 \ en 1978) en cat,gories de gamme moyenne 1 pour 29 t 
(27 \ en 1978) et pour 25 \ (30 \ en 1978) en cat4gories de haut et de 
bas de gamme respectivement. 
Les structures observ4esl en 1978 et 1984 1 des 4changes univoques 
fran~ais montrent done une sp4cialisation assez marqu4e dans les cat4go-
ries de produit haut de gamme. 
Les regroupements par secteur r4velent une forte intensit4 
d' 4changes univoques dans le commerce exterieur des biens des mines et 
des carrieres 1 ainsi que dans le commerce des mat4riels de transport 
lourds (construction navale 1 aeronautique et materiel ferroviaire rou-
lant). Tres faibles sont les echanges univoques dans le commerce fran~ais 
de biens d'equipement professionnels 1 de biens de consommation courante 1 
de biens interm4diaires industriels et dans le secteur automobile. 
L'analyse par partenaire montre que la France est le plus engagee 
dans des echanges u~ivoques avec les pays de l'OPEP 1 les pays en voie de 
developpement hors OPEP et les NPI d'Amerique latine. 
Une autre modalite d'insertion dans les 4changes exterieurs est 
representee par les echanges de gamme. Au niveau du produit (Nimexe A 6 
chiffres) certaines categories de gamme I identifiees par leurs valeurs 
unitaires 1 sont uniquement exportees 1 en echange A !'importation d'autres 
categories de gamme du meme produit, uniquement importees. 
Les echanges exterieurs de la France correspondant A cette moda-
lite representent 1 comme le montrent les tableaux l.a et l.b 1 30 \ en 
1984 (35 \ en 1978) du total du commerce exterieur de la France dans le 
champ des biens manufactur4s. Encore une fois 1 la France montre 1 dans 
cette modalite d'insertion, une specialisation A !'exportation dans les 
categories de haut de gamme. Son taux de couverture dans cette cat4gorie 
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(134 en 1984 et 128 en 1978) est largement superieur 1 celui correspon-
dant 1 son commerce dans la categorie de gamme moyenne (75 en 1984 et 116 
en 1978), et nettement plus eleve que le taux de couverture realise dans 
le commerce des categories de bas de gamme (64 en 1984 et 84 en 1978). 
Les echanges de gamme sont relativement importants dans le com-
merce exterieur fran~ais des biens de consommation courante (43 t en 1984 
et 40 t en 1978) et des biens d'equipement professionnels (40 t en 1984 
et 38 t en 1978). Leur part est tres faib1e dans le secteur automobile, 
surtout en 1984 ou elle ne representait que 11 t du total du commerce 
dans ce secteur (26 ten 1978). 
Quant aux echanges croises de produits similaires, l'etude montre 
que la France a effectue en 1984 des flux simultanes d'exportations et 
d' importations de produits ayant les memes specificites techniques de 
base (meme rubrique Nimexe A 6 chiffres) et des qualites comparables A 
!'exportation et A !'importation (ecart de prix inferieur A 15 t), d'un 
montant total de 534 milliards de francs. Ceci represente 45,5 t du total 
du commerce fran~ais de biens manufactures. La part que representent les 
echanges croises dans le total du commerce fran~ais dans le champ indus-
triel en 1984 est sans changement par rapport A 1978. 
Il est A noter qu'en 1984, tout comme en 1978, le commerce croise 
fran~ais de produits similaires est, au niveau mondial, essentiellement 
triangulaire. Pour un tiers seulement, ce commerce est bilateral (les 
partenaires 1 !'exportation etA !'importation sont les memes). Pour deux 
tiers, il est triangulaire (les partenaires A !'exportation et a 
!'importation sont differents). 
Dans sa totalite, le commerce croise de produits similaires (bi-
lateral et triangulaire) semble plutot concerner les categories de gamme 
moyenne. 54 t de ce commerce en 1984 (57 t en 1978) portent sur des pro-
duits appartenant A cette categorie. La part des produits haut et bas de 
gamme dans le total du commerce croise represente 34 t et 12 % en 1984, 
et 29 % et 14 % en 1978 respectivement. 
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L''tude par secteur montre une forte intensit' du commerce croise 
dans le secteur automobile et dans le secteur des biens inte~diaires 
industriels. Tr•s faibles sont les echanges croises effectues dans le 
commerce des biens interm,diaires des mines et des carri~res, et dans le 
commerce des materiels de transport lourds. 
L' etude par partenaire montre que le commerce croise bilateral 
est principalement effectue avec la Belgique-Luxembourg et avec la RFA. 
Le groupe de partenaires A !'importation dans les echanges croises trian-
gulaires comporte principalement la Belgique-Luxembourg, la RFA et 
l'Italie. Le groupe de partenaires A !'exportation integre principalement 
les pays de l'OPEP et les PVD hors OPEP. 
1.2.2. L'analyse du commerce manufacture intra-communautaire de la France 
L'application du meme type d'analyse au commerce intra-
communautaire de la France dans le champ de biens industriels a donne les 
resultats presentes dans le tableau 2 .·a pour 1' annee 1978 et le tableau 
2.b pour l'annee 1984. La Communaute est prise telle qu'elle etait aux 
dates choisies, c'est-A-dire A neuf en 1978 et A dix en 1984. 
La comparaison entre les tableaux 1 et 2 fait apparaitre 
d' importantes differences de modalites d' insertion et de performances 
exterieures entre !'engagement de l'economie fran~aise dans son commerce 
intra-communautaire et son engagement dans le commerce mondial (4). 
Concernant les modalites d'insertion, il est aise de constater la 
part relativement faible des echanges univoques dans le commerce avec les 
partenaires europeens (17 \en 1984), comparee au poids de cette modalite 
d'insertion (23 \) dans le commerce fran~ais avec !'ensemble du monde en 
cette meme annee. En 1978, la part des echanges univoques dans le commer-
ce exterieur de la France etait pratiquement egale dans ses echanges 
intra-CEE et dans son commerce mondial (18 \). L'evolution entre 1978 et 
1984 montre done que !'augmentation du poids relatif des echanges univo-
ques fran~ais s'est realisee en dehors de la zone europeenne. 
Cette faiblesse des echanges univoques est A 1' avantage des 
echanges de gamme, dont le poids relatif (35 \ en 1984) est superieur A 
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son importance relative dans le commerce France-monde en cette mAme ann~e 
(30 \). Ceci repr~sente une ~volution par rapport 1 l'ann~e 1978 ou la 
part du commerce de gamme 'tait plus faible dans les ~changes France-CEE 
(32 \) que dans les ~changes France-monde (35 t). 
Si, dans sa totalit,, le commerce croise de produits similaires 
effectu' par la France represente un poids comparable dans ses echanges 
intra-communautaire et au niveau mondial (49 % et 46 \ en 1978, et 48 % 
et 46% en 1984 respectivement), la composition de ce commerce en bilate-
ral et en triangulaire differe significativement entre les deux. Dans le 
commerce France-CEE, !'importance relative des echanges croises bilate-
raux (25 % en 1978 et 23 % en 1984) est largement plus elevee que dans le 
commerce fran~ais tous partenaires confondus (16 \ en 1978 et 15 % en 
1984). 
L'insertion de l'~conomie fran~aise par un commerce croise trian-
gulaire est visiblement moins importante dans les echanges communautaires 
(24 % en 1978 et en 1984) que dans le commerce total de la France (30 % 
en 1978 et 31% en 1984). 
Toujours dans le domaine des echanges croises de produits simi-
laires, il faut remarquer que le total mondial du commerce croise bilate-
ral de la France (81 milliards F.F. en 1978 et 175 milliards en 1984) est 
pratiquement concentre dans ses echanges avec ses partenaires communau-
taires (73 milliards F.F. en 1978 et 148 milliards en 1984). Environ 90% 
en 1978 et 85 % en 1984 des echanges croises bi1ateraux de la France sont 
realises avec d'autres pays de la Communaute europeenne. 
Les differences ne sont pas moindres sur la performance exterieu-
re dans chaque modalite. 
Le taux de couverture eleve que la France realise dans ses echan-
ges univoques A l'echelle mondiale ne se retrouve pas dans son commerce 
intra-CEE. Le commerce de gamme reussit moins A la France dans ses echan-
ges intra-CEE. 11 en est de meme· pour le commerce croise triangulaire. 
- 420 -
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C'est au contraire dans son commerce crois' bilateral de produits simi-
laires A l'interieur de la CEE que la France semble montrer le plus de 
competitivid. 
1.2.3. Les echanges croises de produits simi1aires de la France A 
l'interieur de 1a CEE 
En 1984, 1e commerce croise de produits similaires entre la Fran-
ce et 1es autres pays membres de la CEE, dans 1e champ des biens manufac-
tures, a attaint un montant total de 303,4 milliards de francs (141,2 
milliards en 1978) soit 47,6% (49,1% en 1978) d'un total d'echanges de 
biens manufactures de 637,5 milliards (287,4 en 1978). 
Dans l'ensemble, en 1984, le commerce croise de produits similai-
res dans les echanges fran~ais intra-CEE de biens manufactures concerne 
principalement des produits de gamme moyenne. 63,6 % (66,9 % en 1978) de 
ce commerce portent sur des produits ayant une valeur unitaire proche de 
la moyenne europeenne pour chaque produi't Nimexe a 6 chiffres. Le commer-
ce croise de produits similaires dont la valeur unitaire est superieure a 
la moyenne CEE plus 15 % (categories de produit haut de gamme) represente 
24,7% (22,1% en 1978). Quant au commerce croise de prod~its de bas de 
gamme (valeur unitaire inferieure Ala moyenne europeenne moins 15 %), il 
ne represente que 11,7% (11% en 1978) du total des echanges croises de 
produits similaires. 
La comparaison entre les taux de couverture realises par la Fran-
ce dans son commerce croise intra-CEE de produits haut de gamme, de gamme 
moyenne et de bas de gamme, laisse apparaitre une competitivite superieu-
re dans la premiere categorie. Le taux de couverture dans le commerce 
croise haut de gamme s'eleve en 1984 A 94,4. Cette competitivite est sen-
siblement inferieure dans le commerce croise de produits similaires de 
gamme moyenne (taux de couverture egal a 87,4), elle est encore plus fai-
ble dans le commerce croise de produits bas de gamme avec un taux de cou-
verture egal a 69,5. 
Les echanges croises de produits similaires de la France dans son 
commerce intra-CEE de biens manufactures montrent une intensite variable 
- 421 - 7.31 
d'un secteur d'activites l l'autre. Lea tableaux 3.a et 3.b illustrent ce 
constat pour les ·deux annees 1978 et 1984. 11 y apparalt l'intensite par· 
ticuli•rement elevee du ph,nom•ne dans le secteur automobile : 69,1 ' en 
1984 (73,7 'en 1978) du commerce fran~ais intra-CEE dans ce secteur sont 
constitub de flux simultan's d' exportations et d'importations de pro· 
duits similaires. Le deuxUme secteur, apres 1' automobile, dont les 
echanges fran~ais intra-CEE sont caracterises par une intensit' elev'e du 
commerce croise, est le secteur des biens intermediaires industriels. 
52,2 % en 1984 (49,9 ' en 1978) du commerce fran~ais intra-CEE dans ce 
secteur sont des echanges C·roises de produits similaires. Le commerce 
croise, en 1984 et en 1978, est faible dans le secteur des biens interme-
diaires des mines et des carrieres. 
En ce qui concerne la decomposition des echanges croises de pro-
duits similaires en commerce bilateral et en commerce triangulaire, nous 
constatons qu'en 1984, le volume total du commerce croise effectue par la 
Fance dans ses echanges de biens manufactures avec ses partenaires de la 
CEE (303,4 milliards F.F.) se repartissait pour 148,3 milliards en echan-
ges bilateraux (48,9 %) et pour 155,1 milliards en echanges triangulaires 
(51,1 %) en provenance et A destination de partenaires differents. En 
1978 cette repartition s'effectuait pour 51,5 % et pour 48,5 % en bilate-
ral et en triangulaire respectivement. 
Si nous descendons au niveau des secteurs, comme le montrent les 
tableaux 4.a et 4.b pour 1978 et 1984 respectivement, on constate que 
1' on ne peut pas vraiment parler de disparite d' importance relative du 
bilateral et du triangulaire d'un secteur A l'autre. Aussi bien en 1978 
qu' en 1984, exception faite des deux secteurs des biens intermediaires 
des mines et des carrieres et des materiels de transport lourds pour les-
quels le commerce croise est d'ailleurs faible, la repartition entre le 
bilateral et le triangulaire est assez stable autour de 50 ' chacun dans 
!'ensemble des secteurs. 
Le peu de disparite entre les secteurs de la repartition des 
echanges croises de produits similaires entre le bilateral et le triangu-
laire donne tout son poids au partenaire de l'echange en tant que facteur 
explicatif. En d'autres termes, si le type d'activites economiques ne 
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paralt pas jouer un r6le discrlllinant dans la dpartition du commerce 
crois4 entre la partie bilat,rale et la partie triangulaire, nous de-
vrions nous attendre 1 ce que cette r4part1tion soit un phtinom~ne relie 
au partenaire de l'echange plut6t qu'au produit 4chang4. 
Done, 1' identification des partenaires dans le commerce croise 
bilateral, d' une part, et des partenaires origine des importations et 
destinataire des exportations dans les echanges croids triangulaires, 
d'autre part, prend ici une importance toute particuliere. 
Les tableaux 5.a et 5.b presentent, pour 1978 et 1984 respective-
ment, l'intensite du commerce croise bilateral entre la France et chacun 
de ses partenaires europtiens. Ce tableau contient : 
1. Le volume total du commerce fran~ais de produits manufactures 
avec chaque partenaire (colonne n• 1). 
2. La part du partenaire dans le commerce fran~ais intra-CEE de 
produits manufactures (colonne n• 2). 
3. Le volume du commerce crois4 bilateral effectue avec le parte-
naire (colonne n• 3). 
4. La part du partenaire dans le commerce croise bilateral intra-
CEE de la France (colonne n• 4). 
5. L' importance relative du commerce croid bilattiral avec le 
partenaire dans le total du commerce avec le meme partenaire (colonne 
n• 5). 
6. Le taux de couverture dans le commerce manufacturier avec le 
partenaire (colonne n• 6). 
7. Le taux de couverture dans le commerce crois4 bilateral avec 
le partenaire (colonne n• 7). 
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8. La colonne n• 8 montre un indice d' intensit' relative des 
echanges croises bilateraux de produits similaires avec chaque partenai-
re. 11 s'agit de la colonne n• 4 divisee par colonne n• 2. Un indice 
d' une valeur superieure A 1 indique que la part du partenaire dans le 
commerce croise bilateral de la France est superieure A sa part dans le 
total du commerce fran~ais toutes modalites confondues. 
Avec un indice d'intensite relative d'echanges croises bilateraux 
de produits similaires egal A 1,22 en 1978 et A 1,30 en 1984, la RFA 
vient en tete comme etant le premier partenaire avec lequel la France est 
engagee dans cette modalite de commerce. En 1984, 30 t des echanges com-
merciaux de biens manufactures avec l'Allemagne (31 t en 1978) sont cons-
titues de flux simultanes d'exportations et d'importations de produits 
similaires. A lui seul, le commerce croise bilateral avec 1' Allemagne 
represente, en 1984, 46,2 \ (meme proportion en 1978) du total des echan-
ges croises bilateraux effectues par la France dans son commerce intra-
CEE de biens manufactures. Aussi bien en 1978 qu'en 1984, le taux de cou-
verture dans le commerce croise bilateral avec la RFA est largement supe-
rieur au taux de couverture industrial (toutes modalites confondues) avec 
ce partenaire. 
Toute proche de l'Allemagne, la Belgique-Luxembourg apparalt, en 
1984, comme le deuxieme partenaire en importance dans les echanges croi-
ses bilateraux de la France. Son indice d'intensite relative dans cette 
modalite est egal A 1,27, ce qui represente une evolution par rapport A 
la valeur de cet indice observee en 1978 legerement superieure A 1 
(1,02). Les flux correspondant Ace type du commerce representant 30 ten 
1984 (26 t en 1978) du total des echanges commerciaux de biens indus-
trials avec la Belgique. 
Mais contrairement au cas de la RFA, 1' evolution du commerce 
croise bilateral avec la Belgique montre, en 1984, des echanges tres de-
ficitaires. Le taux de couverture correspondant (62) est inferieur a ce-
lui realise dans le commerce total avec la Belgique (70). 
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C'est avec l'Irlande et le Danemark en 1978, l'Irlande, le Dane-
mark et la Gr~ce en 1984, que la France est, de loin, le moina engag4e 
dans des echanges croises bilateraux de produits similairea. 
L'identite, dans les echanges croises triangulairea, des parte-
nairas origines des importations et des partenaires destinataires des 
exportations, est presentee dans les tableaux 6.a et 6.b pour les annees 
1978 et 1984 respectivement. Ces tableaux montrent la repartition des 
flux d'exportations et d'importations des echanges croises triangulaires 
effectues par la France l l'interieur de la Communaute europeenne. 
Bien evidemment, dans !'observation produit par produit des 
echanges croises triangulaires, un partenaire donne se trouvera unique-
ment en tant qu'origine d'importations ou uniquement en tant que destina-
taire d'exportations. Mais, apr~s agregation, on obtient, pour chaque 
partenaire, une part l l'exportation et une part l !'importation dans les 
echanges croises triangulaires de la France, tout simplement parce que le 
meme partenaire peut figurer en tant qu'origine d'importation pour cer-
tains produits, et destinataire l l'exportation pour d'autres. 
C'est en fait la comparaison entre les deux parts (colonne n• 5) 
qui peut faire apparaitre la situation exacte de chaque partenaire, soit 
en etant majoritairement origine d'importations ou majoritairement desti· 
nataire d'exportations, dans les echanges croises triangulaires de pro-
duits similaires effectues par la France. 
Avec 1' observation des resultats obtenus pour les deux annees 
1978 et 1984, il semble en fait aise de constater 1' existence de deux 
groupes distincts de partenaires de la France dans son commerce crois4 
triangulaire. Un premier groupe est constitue, en 1984, par la RFA, la 
Belgique-Luxembourg et les Pays-Bas, qui apparaissent plutat (colonne 
n• 5) comme les origines des importations. La Belgique et la RFA fai-
saient aussi partie du meme groupe en 1978. Un deuxieme groupe compose 
par le Royaume-Uni, l'lrlande, le Danemark et la Gr~ce entre dans le com-
merce croise triangulaire de la France en tant que destinataire des ex-
portations. Le Royaume-Uni, l'Irlande et le Danemark faisaient egalement 
partie du meme groupe en 1978. La Gr~ce ne comptait pas parmi les membres 
l 
I 
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Tableau 6.a 
Partenaire 
7.41 
La repartition des flux d'exportations et d'importations 
des echanges croises triangulaires de la irante a lrinterieur 
de la CEE (1978) 
Milliards F .F. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Exportations % Importations % (4) /(2) 
Belgique-Luxembourg 8,0 22,~ 8,3 25,0 1 '2 
Pays-Bas 5,4 15,3 2,9 8,7 0,57 
RFA 8,5 23,8 9,8 29,6 1,24 
l.talie 6,1 17,0 7,8 23,7 1 '39 
Royaume-Uni 6,4 18,0 3,7 11 '2 0,62 
Irlande 0,4 1 ' 1 0,2 0,5 0,50 
Danemark 0,8 2,4 0,4 1 '3 0,53 
Total CEE a neuf 35,5 100 33,0 100 1 
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Tableau 6.b La repartition des flux d'exportations et d'importations 
des echanges croises triangulaires de la France a 
l'interieur de la CEE (1984) 
Milliards F .F. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (.S) 
Partenaire Exportations % Importations % (4)/(2) 
Belgique-Luxembourg 10,2 14,3 14,3 17 1,20 
Pays-Bas 5,4 7,7 8, 7 10,4 1 t 35 
RFA 16,5 23,2 33,4 39,7 1, 71 
ltalie 15,6 22,0 18, 1 21,4 0,97 
Royaume-Uni 18,1 25,3 7,0 8,3 0,33 
Irlande 1' 1 1 t 7 1, 1 1 '3 0,76 
Danemark 2,1 3,0 0,9 1 ,.1 0,37 
Crece 2,0 2,8 0,8 0,9 0,32 
Total CEE a dix 70,9 100 84,2 100 1 
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de 1a CEE. L'6vo1ution entre 1978 et 1984 se traduit par 1e passage des 
Pays-Bas d'un partenaire destinataire 1 1'exportation en 1978 1 un parte-
naira origine d'importation en 1984 et par le fait que l'Ita1ie, parte-
naira origine d'importations en 1978, semble, en 1984, se situer au m6me 
niveau que la France. Sa part dans les importations est pratiquement 6ga-
le A sa part dans les exportations dans les 6changes crois6s triangulai-
res de produits similaires de la France. 
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DEUXIEME PARTIE 
ANALYSE DES LIENS ENTRE LES CARACTERISTIQUES INDIVIDUELLES DES 
ENTREPRISES ET LES MODALITES D'INSERTION DE LA FRANCE 
DANS LE COMMERCE INTERNATIONAL 
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7.45 
L'examen de la composition du commerce et des diverses modalit~s 
d'engagement effectue dans la premi.re partie visait l fournir les ele-
ments descriptifs necessaires et pr~alables A des ~veloppements analyti· 
ques plus approfondis. 
Nous savons, l ce stade, qu'au niveau de l'economie nationale, 
!'insertion dans les ~changes commerciaux exterieurs prend des modalites 
variees, et que la performance exterieure varie egalement d'une modalite 
du cemmerce A l'autre. Ceci conduit A s'interroger sur les determinants 
des types d'engagement A !'exportation au niveau de l'unite exportatrice 
elle-meme, c'est-A-dire au niveau de l'entreprise. 
11 est certain que les performances d'une entreprise ne sont pas 
independantes de son lieu d' implantation, ce qui signifie que 
l'environnement economique collectif, identifie par des conditions gene-
rales d'offre, de demande et de concurrence, dans le cadre duquel 
l'entreprise exerce ses activites, joue un role dans la determination de 
ces performances. D'un autre cot~. l'entreprise elle-meme, par ses choix 
strategiques et ses decisions de gestion au cours de la conception, la 
fabrication et la commercialisation de ses produits, influe directement 
sur le niveau de sa performance. 
Notre objectif, dans cette partie, consiste A eclairer le role 
joue par la dispersion des caracteristiques individuel.les des entrepri-
ses, face aux conditions collectives de superiorite ou d'inferiorite na-
tionale, saisies au niveau des secteurs, dans !'explication des modalites 
d' engagement dans le commerce exterieur. Cette partie est organisee en 
trois sous-parties de la maniere suivante. 
A titre preliminaire, nous rappelons !'influence primordiale de 
l'appartenance sectorielle dans !'explication de la performance exterieu-
re dans chaque mondalite du commerce consideree separement. Nous souhai-
tons A ce stade verifier que les effets des conditions collectives de 
performance, qui caracterisent l'environnement economique sectoriel, sont 
bien effectifs dans chaque modalite de commerce. 
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Vient ensuite 1 1 ~tude des caract~ristiques individuelles des en-
treprises et des rapports qui lea lient avec le type d 1 engagement A 
1 1 exportation au niveau de 1 1 entreprise. Les caracUristiques retenues 
dans le cadre de la pr,sente 'tude sont la productivit,, le taux de marge 
et la taille. L1 analyse porte, dans un premier temps, sur les relations 
d' interdependance entre les caracUristiques 'tudUes des entreprises. 
Dans un second temps, nous essayerons de distinguer les entreprises ex-
portatrices sur le marche communautaire des entreprises non exportatrices 
sur ce marche, nous verifierons 1 1 existence de differences entre ces deux 
groupes d'entreprises en termes des trois variables retenues, en prenant 
toutefois en consideration l'appartenance sectorielle des entreprises et 
les conditions d'avantages et de desavantages comparatifs 
correspondantes. 
Nous arriverons enfin A ·l 1 analyse, au sein du groupe des entre-
prises exportatrices, du lien entre le type d 1 engagement a !'exportation 
de l'entreprise (exportations univoques •. de gamme ou croisees) d'une 
part, et ses caracteristiques individuelles (taille, productivite et taux 
de marge) d'autre part. 
2.1. Le r6le de l 1 appartenance sectorie11e 
Aux differentes modalites de l'echange identifiees dans la pre-
miere partie correspondent des performances ex~erieures, mesurees par les 
taux de couverture correspondants, qui varient d' un produit A 1' autre, 
comme le montre le tableau 7. 
Les performances realisees dans les echanges exterieurs sont de-
terminees, selon l'approche que nous adoptons, conjointement par des con-
ditions collectives d'avantages et de desavantages comparatifs nationaux 
et par des phenomenes d'avantages et de desavantages specifiques au ni-
veau de 1' entreprise, qui trouvent leur origine dans des conditions de 
concurrence imparfaite sur les marches de facteurs, de biens intermediai-
res et de produits finals. 
Avant de passer au niveau de l'entreprise, nous avons voulu veri-
fier la pertinence des effets sectoriels collectifs de performance dans 
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Niveau 
A01 
A02 
B01 
B02 
B03 
B04 
BOS 
B06 
B07 
:808 
B09 
810 
811 
C01 
C02 
C03 
C04 
I 
7.47 
Tableau 7 Taux de couverture sec'toriel et taux de couverture realises 
dans chaque modalite du commerce par produit (produits 
manufactures, France-CEE, 1984) 
Produit Total Coumerce Coumerce 
sectoriel univoque de gaume 
Minerais ferreux et non-ferreux 98 71 117 
Sable, materiaux concasses, 
pierres de cons true tion, argile ••• 88 103 68 
Siderurgie et'preciere 
transformation de l'acier 85 106 94 
Metaux et demi-produits non-
ferreux 92 20 173 
Verre 107 118 112 
Chimie minchale 46 31 57 
Chimie organique 69 21 64 
Fils et fibres synthetiques 
et artificels 47 2 31 
Fonderie et travail des metaux 63 21 64 
Papier-carton 81 36 76 
Caoutchouc 125 17 63 
Matieres plastiques 49 7 46 
Produits de construction 
et ceramique 59 31 67 
Machines agricoles 42 19 45 
Machines-outils 46 8 54 
Equipements industriels 59 33 65 
Materiel de manutention, pour 
les mines, la siderurgie et le 82 40 55 
genie civil 
Commerce 
croise 
124 
139 
79 
109 
98 
58 
112 
119 
85 
102 
163 
72 
88 
46 
55 
67 
120 
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Tableau 7 {suite) 
Niveau Produit Total Commerce Coumerce CoDIDercE 
sectoriel univoque de gamme croise 
cos Instruments et materiels de 
precision 70 43 70 86 
C06 Machines de bureau, materiel de 
traitement de !'information 65 6 78 85 
C07 Materiel elect rique 94 42 92 115 
cos Materiel electronique 
professionnel 76 4 110 68 
001 Materiel electronique menager 35 0 63 43 
002 Equipement menager 61 24 88 89 
EOI Auto, moto, cycle 101 28 260 89 
F01 Construction navale 115 >£00 105 88 
F02 Construction aeronautique 12S >500 494 14 
F03 Materiel ferroviaire roulant 137 15 264 85 
G01 Parachimie-pharmacie 104 110 125 84 
G02 Textile 79 122 61 82 
G03 Habillement 93 153 82 96 
G04 Cuir et articles en cuir 45 3 101 81 
GOS Chaussures so 31 45 65 
G06 Bois, meubles 49 31 47 74 
G07 Presse, imprimerie, edition 45 0 52 45 
G08 Jeux et jouets 45 5 44 70 
G09 Articles de sport et de campement 109 150 84 112 
G10 Bateaux de plaisance 210 >500 141 155 
RES Aurres·produits manufactures 67 59 62 79 
Total industriel 76 35 88 87 
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les resultats de l'echange obtenus au niveau de chaque modalite du com-
merce consideree separement. Cette v'rification est effectuee a l'aide du 
calcul des coefficients de correlation entre les performances sectoriel-
les, exprimees en termes de taux de couverture, dans le commerce total 
France-CEE toutes modalites confondues, d'une part, et dans les echanges 
France-CEE correspondent a chaque modalite du commerce d'autre part. Nous 
considerons que des coefficients de correlation positifs et significatifs 
entre le taux de couverture sectoriel realise dans chaque modalite, et le 
taux de couverture du secteur, impliquent !'existence d'un effet secto-
rial dans la determination de la performance exterieure observee au ni-
veau de chaque modalite de 1' echange. Les coefficients de correlation 
obtenus sont presentes dans le tableau 8. 
Tableau 8 Coefficients de correlation de rang entre le taux de 
couverture du produit et les taux de couverture dans chague 
modalite du commerce (produits manufactures, France-CEE, 
1984) 
Commerce 
croise 
Commerce 
de gamme 
Commerce 
univoque 
Commerce total 0,58 
** 
0,74 0,67 
** ** 
** significatif au seuil de 1 \ 
Les coefficients positifs et significatifs presentes dans le ta-
bleau 8 confirment la pertinence d'un effet sectoriel collectif dans la 
determination de la performance exterieure s 'etendant a 1' ensemble des 
modalites de l'echange. Les coefficients obtenus pour le commerce de gam-
me et pour le commerce univoque sont plus eleves que le coefficient cor-
respondent au commerce croise. Ceci suggere que 1' influence de 
l'appartenance sectorielle est plus marquee dans le commerce de gamme et 
dans le commerce univoque. L'on peut meme penser que la performance exte-
rieure dans ces deux modalites correspond A des situations claires 
d' avantages et de desavantages comparatifs sectoriels. Un coefficient 
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moins 'lev' dans le cas du commerce crois' semble indiquer que la perfor-
mance ext,rieure dans cette modalit' ne d'pend que partiellement des con-
ditions collectives d' avantages et de d'savantages comparatifs sec to-
riels. Ceci conforte notre hypoth~se du travail selon laquelle lea r'sul-
tats obtenus dans le commerce crois' d'pendent aussi fortement des per-
formances individuelles des firmes. 
2.2. Les caract,ristigues individuelles des entreprises 
L'analyse couvre l'ensemble des entreprises fran~aises produisant 
des biens manufactur's recens,es selon 1' Enquete Annuelle d' Entreprise 
(E.A.E.) du ministere de l'Industrie et qui emploient un effectif de 20 
personnes et plus (23.220 entreprises en 1984). En effet, les entreprises 
ayant un effectif de 10 A 19 personnes re~oivent un questionnaire simpli-
fie qui ne nous permet pas d''valuer les variables retenues dans cette 
etude. Les entreprises ayant un effectif inferieur A 10 ne sont pas in-
terrogees. Sur les 23.220 entreprises de l'E.A.E. en 1984, les variables 
'tudiees ne sont pas disponibles pour 946 d'entre elles. 11 faut noter 
que pour ces dernieres l'effectif employe est d'ailleurs tr~s proche de 
20. Le nombre d' entreprises qui en trent directement dans notre analyse 
est done de 22.274 entreprises, employant un effectif total egal A 
3.619.254 personnes. 
L'ensemble de ces entreprises a 't' class' selon le d'coupage en 
38 secteurs pdc,demment utilid. Pour chaque entreprise les variables 
suivantes ont 't' calculees 
a) Le taux de marge : 11 s'agit de l'exc,dent brut d'exploitation 
rapport' A la valeur ajoutee de l'entreprise, qui indique en fait la part 
du revenu disponible pour la remuneration des capitaux internes et 
externes. 
b) La productivite 
l'entreprise par tete. 
il s'agit de la valeur ajout'e de 
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e) La taille de l'entreprise mesuree par l'effeetif employe. 11 
est egal a la moyenne des effeetifs salaries en fin de trimestre, eorri· 
gee pour les entreprises employant au moins 100 personnes du solde des 
effeetifs pris en location et donnes en location. 
Afin d'etudier les liens d'interd,pendanee entre taux de marge, 
produetivite et taille de l'entreprise, tout en prenant en consideration 
les conditions speeifiques a ehaque seeteur, nous avons 'tudi,, d'une 
part, les relations de corr,lation entre les trois variables, au niveau 
de l'entreprise, a l'interieur de chague secteur, et, d'autre part, les 
relations de correlation entre les moyennes sectorielles des variables 
retenues d'un secteur a l'autre. 
Le tableau 9 pr,sente p~ur chacun des 38 secteurs eonstituant le 
champ des biens manufactur,s, le nombre d'entreprises dans ehaque seeteur 
ainsi que les coefficients de correlation Rpm (produetivit' · marge) Rpt 
(productivite - taille) et Rmt (marge - taille). 
Les resultats obtenus montrent de maniere claire le lien etroit 
entre le taux de marge r'alise par l'entreprise et sa productivit,, dans 
le cadre d'un environnement sectoriel donn,. Les coefficients de correla-
tion sont positifs et signifieatifs au seuil de 1 ' dans 32 secteurs sur 
les 38 couvrant le champ de biens industriels. L'on peut done eonelure a 
une forte dependance, gen,ralisee a la grande majorite des secteurs, du 
taux de marge de l'entreprise a l'egard de sa productivite. D'autre part, 
le taux de marge ne semble pas 6tre affecte par la taille de 
l'entreprise. Les coefficients de correlation obtenus pour ces deux va-
riables ne sont significatifs que dans 3 secteurs sur 38. Dans la grande 
maj ori te des secteurs, il semble done qu' une entreprise de plus grande 
taille n'est pas synonyme d'une entreprise a fort profit. 
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Niveau 
A01 
A02 
B01 
B02 
B03 
B04 
BOS 
B06 
B07 
BOS 
B09 
B10 
.811 
COl 
C02 
C03 
C04 
I 
7.52 
Tableau 9 Coefficients de correlation entre les variables : taux de 
marge, productivite et taille de l'entreprise par secteur 
(production industrielle, France-1984) 
Produit Nombre R!>m P.pt 
d''erttepr~s 
Minerais ferreux et non-ferreux 65 0,26 u 0 08 ·-
' 
Sable, materiaux concasses, ~ L 
pierres de construction, argile ••• 438 0,31 0,02 
Siderurgie et premiere ~ L 
transformation de l'acier 183 0,47 o,oo 
Metaux et demi-produits non- l- L-
ferreux 108 0,18 -o,03 
Verre 148 0,57 lM 0 321ti 
' 
Chimie minerale ~ 0 16 L 104 0,66 
' 
Chimie organique 195 0 30 LU. 
' 
o,oo L--
Fils et fibres synthetiques ltt L__ 
et artificels 8 0,79 -0,17 
Fonderie et travail des metaux 3.576 0~09 ~ -o 01 .__ 
' 
Papier-carton 602 0,51 U.t 0,26 Lti:. 
Caoutchouc 166 0,58 .Lti o o2L-
' 
Matieres plastiques 936 0,35 LM o, 1ol-ti 
Produits de construction LM. l.ti 
et ceramique 747 0,22 0,17 
Machines agricoles 266 
l22 0 04..1--0 58 
' ' 
Machines-out its 413 0,13 ~ -0 OS L , 
0 08 ~ lM Equipements industriels 1. 894 o, 15 
' 
Materiel de manutention, pour w L 
les mines, la siderurgie et le 390 0,30 o,os 
genie civil 
~mt 
-0 10 L 
' 
L 
0,00 
L 
-0,11 
L., 
0,06 
o,o7 L 
-0 01L 
' 
0 02 L 
' 
L 
-o,20 
0 04l.XA 
' 
0 12ltt 
' 
-0,07 L, 
0 021_ 
' 
L! 
0,01 
-0 04 L_l 
' 
-o 06 '--
' 
0,00 '--. 
L 
-0,01 
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Tableau 9 (suite) 
Niveau Produit l~ombre !'.pm Rpt kmt ~en treptises 
et materiels 
~ 
'-
.L 
cos Instruments de 444 -o,o2 0,06 precision 0,00 
Machines de bureau, materiel de 
L..li!.l 1.213 l 
C06 
traitement de !'information 54 0,45 0,43 o, 11 
Materiel elect rique 699 0 27rJS.JS.. 0,08 u. 0 00 L C07 
' ' 
cos Materiel electronique l.tt l.tt L 
professionnel 834 o, 18 0,09 0,02 
001 Materiel electronique menager 40 o, 75*-*- o, 12 L o 09 L 
' 
Equipement menager 
~ L.. L 
002 97 o, 77 -o,o1 -o,o7 
Auto, moto, cycle 
L_ L- L 
EOt- 639 0,01 0,04 -o,o3 
Construction navale 
~ L!. 
-o 21 I-F01 82 0,37 -o,24 
' 
-J:tt L F02 Construction aeronautique 82 l..tt 0,33 0 46 0,03 
' 
Materiel ferroviaire roulant '·- L L F03 42 -0,03 
-o, 11 -0,17 
Parachimie-pharmacie 0,03L ·L 1 001 774 0,05 o,oo 
G02 Textile _l.tt L -1. 725 0,23 -o,o1 0,00 
G03 Habillement 1.801 JM .... 0,09 -o,os u.. 0,00 
G04 Cuire et articles en cuir r- C t 328 0,7 0,04 0,00 
~ ~ 0 11 l GOS Chaussures 405 0,51 0 15 
' ' 
Bois, meubles _lti. t_ 
- l 
G06 1. 577 0,08 0,01 0,06 
G07 Presse, imprimerie,- edition 1. 681 o, 1 r 0 02 J__ '· 
' 
0,00 
G08 Jeux et jouets 105 "~ 0,03 I_ 0,02 0 60 
' 
... ~ L.tt. ' G09 Articles de sport et de campement 88 0,63 0,31 0,03 
G10 Bateaux de plaisance 60 0 48'r!!.!:._ 
' 
o o6 L 
' 
0,06 
RES Autres produi~s manufactures 478 0 57!!!!!_ L.... 0,04 
' 
0,02 
Total industriel 22.274 
Cii significatif au seuil de 1 % 
~ significatif au seuil de 5 % 
c:l non significatif 
- 445 - 7.54 
En revanche, une certaine liaison apparalt entre la productivit' 
et la taille de l'entreprise. Les coefficients de corr,lation sont posi-
tifs et significatifs dans 10 secteurs : Verre, Papier et carton, Kati•-
res plastiques, Produits de construction et c'raaique, Equipements indus-
triels, Machines de bureau, mat,riel de traitement de !'information, Ka-
t,riel 'lectronique professionnel, Construction a'ronautique, Chaussures, 
Articles de sport et de campement. 
En r'sum,, les r'sultats obtenus tendent A montrer que la produc-
tivit' de 1 'entreprise est un element certain dans la determination de 
son taux de marge, que le taux de marge est independant de la taille de 
l'entreprise, et, enfin, gue dans un certain nombre de secteurs la pro-
ductivit' de l'entreprise augmente avec sa taille. 
Nous allons A present · 'tudier les rapports qui s' 'tablissent 
entre les trois variables consider,es A travers les differents secteurs 
d'activites. Nous voulons en effet apprecier les liens d'interdependance 
dans la variation des indicateurs retenus d'un secteur A l'autre. Pour ce 
faire nous avons calcule pour chaque secteur la productivit' moyenne (to-
tal de la valeur ajoutee rapport' au total des effectifs), le taux de 
marge moyen (total EBE rapport' au total de la valeur ajout,e) et la 
taille moyenne (effectifs totaux rapport's au nombre d'entreprises). Les 
resultats obtenus sont pr,sentes dans le tableau 10. 
Les coefficients de corr,lation, au niveau des 38 secteurs consi-
deres, entre la productivit,, le taux de marge et la taille moyens sont 
les suivants 
Productivit' - Taux de marge : 0,65, significatif au seuil de 1 % 
Productivit' - Taille : 0,44, significatif au seuil de 1 % 
. Taux de marge - Taille : - 0,05, non significatif. 
Ces r'sultats viennent en fait confirmer ceux que nous avons ob-
tenus auparavant. Aussi bien dans l''tude A l'ir.terieur de chaque secteur 
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Niveau 
A01 
'A02 
B01 
B02 
B03 
B04 
B05 
B06 
B07 
B08 
B09 
B10 
B11 
C01 
C02 
COl 
C04 
I 
7.55 
Tableau 10 Productivite, taux de marge et taille moyens des entreprises 
par secteur (produits manufactures, France 1984) 
Not!lbre Pro~uct,i,vite Taux de Taille 
.Jecteurs ~entr~ses (Y~~~) mar~e (%) movenne de 'tfl3 moy: n 1' e~treprl;e 
Minerai& ferreux et non-ferreux 65 245 30,0 254 
Sable, materiaux concasses, 
438 199 28,7 52 pierres de construction, argile ••• 
Siderurgie et premiere 183 171 -1 ,o 783 transformation de l'acier 
Metaux et demi-produits non-
108 44,2 ferreux 334 526 
Verre 148 207 22,5 377 
Chimie minerale 104 296 30,4 316 
Chimie organique 195 369 42,5 432 
Fils et fibres synthetiques 8 125 -27,4 994 
et artificels 
Fonderie et travail des metaux 3.576 159 13,2 90 
Papier-carton 602 207 25,9 163 
Caoutchouc 166' 157 10,2 536 
Matieres plastiques 936 181 25,6 98 
Produits de construction 747 205 26,1 119 et ceramique 
Machines agrico1es 266 163 16,9 115 
Machines-outils 413 160 4,2 108 
Equipements industriels 1.894 193 17,6 101 
Materiel de manutention, pour 390 176 9,9 148 les mines, la siderurgie et le 
genie civil 
- 447 -
7.56 
Tableau 10 (suite) 
Niveau !lor.lLre PraiuctivitE Taux c.le c Taille moyenne pr()fit . !JPYenne Je ~'rtreprises ( 103 FF) moyen 00 'entreotisE 
cos Instruments et materiels de 
precision 444 174 18,3 131 
C06 Machines de bureau, materiel de 54 452 43,7 1.035 
traitement de !'information 
C07 Materiel tHectrique 699 183 16,3 290 
cos Materiel electronique 834 professionnel 215 21 '0 265 
001 Materiel electronique menager 40 15 7 15,5 428 
002 Equipement menager 97 152 16,9 549 
EO f. Auto, moto, cycle 639 166 8,4 682 
F01 Construction navale ·82 83 -63,0 327 
F02 Construction aeronautique 82 307 32,7 1.394 
F03 Materiel ferroviaire roulant 42 150 2,8 290 
G01 Parachimie-pharmacie 774 247 26,2 232 
G02 Textile t. 725 142 21 J 6 133 
G03 Habillement 1.801 109 13,2 87 
G04 Cuir et articles en cuir 328 147 22,3 71 
GOS Chaussures 405 127 17,7 158 
G06 Bois, meubles 1.577 139 15,4 76 
G07 Presse, imprimerie, edition 1 .681 212 17,6 88 
G08 Jeux et jouets 105 163 24,8 111 
G09 Articles de sport et de campement 88 168 26,8 101 
G10 Bateaux de plaisance 60 147 22,4 109 
RES Autres produits manufactures 478 169 19,5 80 
Total industriel 22.274 
- 448 -
7.57 
que dans l''tude entre lea secteura, le taux de marge est fortement d'· 
pendant de la productivit,, la taille de l'entrepriae exer~e un certain 
effet, non systematique, sur la productivit' de l'entreprise, aucun lien, 
sauf dans quelques cas limites, n'apparatt entre la taille de 
l'entreprise et son taux de marge. 
2.3. Les entreprises engagees A !'exportation sur le marche communautaire 
Nous allons maintenant nous interesser de pr~s aux entreprises 
fran~aises exportatrices sur le marche de la Communaute europeenne. Nous 
essayerons, dans un premier temps, d'etudier leurs caracteristiques spe-
cifiques, et de les comparer, dans un second temps, aux autres entrepri-
ses. L'objectif est de faire apparattre d'eventuelles differences entre 
les deux groupes en termes de productivite, taille et taux de marge. 
Etant donne que nous considerons que !'engagement A !'exportation depend 
aussi bien de la performance specifique de 1' entreprise que des condi-
tions sectorielles collectives d'avantages et de desavantages compares, 
nous distinguons dans notre analyse les secteurs beneficiant d'avantages 
compares des secteurs marques par des desavantages comparatifs. 
Sur le plan empirique, nous considerons que les entreprises fran-
~aises engagees a !'exportation sur le marche communautaire sont celles 
pour lesquelles la propension A !'exportation vers le Marche commun (ex-
portation CEE/Chiffre d'affaires H.T.) est superieure a 10%. D'autre 
part, l'indicateur utilise pour apprecier les conditions d'avantages et 
de desavantages comparatifs sectoriels dans les echanges commerciaux de 
la France au sein du Marche commun, est le bi-rapport entre la part des 
exportations fran~aises vers la CEE d'un secteur donne dans les exporta-
tions totales intra-CEE de ce secteur, et la part des exportations manu-
facturi~res fran~aises totales vers la CEE dans le total des exportations 
intra-communautaires de produits industrials. 
Un indice superieur A 1, pour un secteur donne, indiquera que la 
part detenue par la France dans les exportations intra-CEE des biens pro-
duits par ce secteur est superietire a sa part totale dans les exporta-
tions manufacturieres A l'interieur du Marche commun. Il s'agit done d'un 
- 449 -
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indicateur d'avantages comparatifs reveles. Par convention les secteura 
sont repartis en trois groupes. Le premier regroupe les secteurs ayant un 
indicateur inferieur A 0,85 (cas de desavantages comparatifs), le deuxi•· 
me les secteurs ayant un indicateur compris entre 0,85 et 1,15 (cas des 
secteurs neutres), et le troisi•me regroupe les secteurs pour lesquels la 
valeur de l'indice correspondant est superieure A 1,15 (cas d'avantages 
compares). 
Les tableaux ll.a, ll.b et ll.c presentent dans les cas des sec· 
teurs A desavantages, des secteurs neutres, et des secteurs A avantages 
comparatifs reveles, respectivement, la productivite, le taux de marge et 
la taille moyens des entreprises exportatrices et des entreprises non 
exportatrices par secteur, ainsi que les ecarts de productivite, de taux 
de marge et de taille moyens des entreprises entre les deux groupes. 
Les resultats obtenus apportent d' importantes informations con-
cernant la comparaison entre les caracteristiques des entreprises expor-
tatrices et des entreprises non-exportatrices sur le marche communautaire 
en lien avec les conditions d' avantages et de desavantages comparatifs 
sectoriels. Ces informations peuvent ~tre resumees de la maniere 
suivante : 
a) Au niveau de l'ensemble industrial, 11 appara1t qu'A 
1' exportation correspond une productivite superieure. La productivite 
moyenne du groupe des 2.992 entreprises exportatrices (206 mille francs 
par t~te) depasse de 23 mille francs par t~te la productivite du groupe 
de 19.282 entreprises non-exportatrices (183 mille francs). L'engagement 
a !'exportation semble aussi s'accompagner d'un taux de marge plus eleve 
(23,3 % pour le groupe des entreprises exportatrices contre 18,4 % pour 
le groupe des entreprises non-exportatrices). Mais la difference la plus 
importante entre les deux groupes apparait au niveau de la taille moyenne 
de l'entreprise. La taille moyenne dans le groupe des entreprises expor-
tatrices (429 employes) est trois fois et demie plus elevee que la taille 
moyenne des entreprises non-exportatrices (121 personnes). 
b) Les conditions d' avantages et de desavantages comparatifs af-
fectent, et la productivite, et le taux de marge, et la taille moyens de 
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l'entreprise. Le groupe des entrepriaea appartenant aux aecteu~a l desa-
vantages compares (12.018 entreprises) montre une productivite ~oyenne de 
162 mille francs par t6te, un taux de marge moyen de 16,3 t et une taille 
moyenne de 101 personnes par entreprise. Dans le groupe des s1ecteurs A 
avantages compares, les entreprises (2. 828 entreprises) reaU.sent une 
productiviU moyenne de 206 mille francs par personne, un taux de marge 
de 20,6 t. Elles sont d'une taille moyenne egale A 297 employes. 
c) 11 est d'un grand interet de comparer la difference entre les 
entreprises exportatrices et les entreprises non-exportatrices dans le 
groupe des secteurs A desavantages compares et dans le groupe des sec-
teurs A avantages compares. Sur ce point, les resultats obtenus sont tres 
demonstratifs. En moyenne, la productivite d'une entreprise exportatrice, 
dans des conditions de desavantages compares, depasse de 23 mille francs 
par tete la productivite d'une entreprise non-exportatrice, soit 15 % de 
plus. Or, pour une entreprise exportatrice dans des conditions 
d'avantages compares, la productivite moyenne n'est superieure que de 9 
mille francs, soit 4,5 % de plus qu'une entreprise non-exportatrice. Bien 
que cela soit moins marque que dans le cas de la productivite, l'ecart, 
en termes de taux de marge, entre les entreprises exportatrices et non-
exportatrices, est plus eleve dans le groupe des secteurs A desavantages 
compares (5, 6 points de pourcentage) que dans le groupe des secteurs A 
avantages compares (4,1 points de pourcentage). Nous en concluons que, 
dans des conditions economiques collectives d'inferiorite relative natio-
nale, les entreprises exportatrices sont celles qui ont reussi A se doter 
d'une performance specifique, en matiere de productivite, qui leur permet 
d'entrer en concurrence sur les marches exterieurs. 11 faut noter A cet 
egard qu'en matiere de taille, la taille moyenne des entreprises exporta-
trices dans les secteurs A desavantages (199 employes), qui ne depasse 
les non-exportatrices que de 91 personnes, est largement inferieure A la 
- 454 -
7.63 
taille moyenne des entreprises exportatrices dans lea secteurs A avanta-
ges compar's (698), superieure aux non-exportatrices, dans les memes see-
teurs, de 494 personnes. Les entreprises gui 1 grAce A une productiviU 
exceptionnelle, arrivent A exporter I malgre des conditions collectives 
sectorielles defavorab~s. ne se distiguent pas par une taille particu-
lierement elevee. 
2.4. Les caracteristigues des entreprises et les types d'engagement A 
!'exportation 
Du point de vue de l'entreprise, le type d'engagement A 
!'exportation (univoque, de gamme, croise) est loin d'6tre indifferent. 
En effet, dans le cas des exportations univoques, 1' entreprise a dejA 
atteint, vis-A-vis de ses concurrents etrangers, un stade de monopole 
assez avance, ce qui est, en toute vraisemblance 1 le temoin d'une capaci-
te competitive superieure. Au risque de nous repeter 1 nous devons souli-
' gner que la situation est differente selon qu'il s'agit d'une entreprise 
operant dans des conditions sectorielles d'avantages ou de desavantages 
compares. Si on nous accorde que la capacite concurrentielle au niveau de 
l'entreprise repose a la fois sur les conditions collectives de son envi-
ronnement sectoriel et sur ses efforts competitifs specifiques, i1 en 
resulte que l'intensite des efforts specifiques, pour une enteprise enga-
gee dans des exportations univoques, devra etre superieure dans le cas de 
conditions sectorielles de desavantages comparatifs. 
Dans le commerce de gamme, nous devons distinguer le cas ou les 
flux d' exportations de 1' entreprise portent sur des categories de pro-
duits haut de gamme, du cas ou ces flux sont constitues des categories de 
bas de gamme ou de gamme moyenne. Meme si,dans ces deux derniers cas, par 
definition, les categories exportees ne figurent pas dans la liste des 
importat,ions 1 il semble plus conforme a la realite de 1 I entreprise de 
parler d'une capacite concurrentielle superieure par rapport aux concur-
rents etrangers dans le cas des exportations des categories de haut de 
gamme. 
- 455 -
7.64 
Le cas des entreprises engagees 1 l'exportation dans des echanges 
croises de produits similaires ne peut pas ~tre apprehende sans prendre 
en consideration les conditions d'avantages et de desavantages compares 
au niveau des secteurrs. Les activites auxquelles correspondent des con-
ditions de desavantages compares sont normalement importatrices. Des flux 
inverses d'exportations refletent done une situation de sur-competitivite 
au niveau de l'entreprise exportatrice, qui lui permet d'entrer en con-
currence avec les entreprises etrangeres. La situation est completement 
differente dans le cas des echanges croises de produits similaires effec-
tues dans des activites qui sont caracterisees par des conditions 
d 1 avantages compares. Ces activites, normalement exportatrices, font ce-
pendant 1 1 objet de flux inverses d 1 importations. 
L1 on devrait done s 1 attendre A ce que le phenomene de sur-
competitivite de firmes apparaisse plutot dans le cas des entreprises 
appartenant A des secteurs caracterises par des conditions collectives de 
desavantages compares particulierement pour les echanges croises bilate-
raux. Dans ce cas en effet, 1 1 entreprise exportatrice reussit A entrer en 
concurrence sur le marche meme des pays origines des importations. Le 
phenomene des echanges croises triangulaires peut en revanche correspon-
dre A d 1 autres elements explicatifs, tels que la hierarchisation des 
avantages compares. 
Sur le plan methodologique, nous avons mis en correspondance le 
fichier statistique des Douanes fran~aises avec le fichier "Nimexe" du 
Marche commun. Dans 1 1 analyse des modalites du commerce de 1 1 economie 
fran~aise effectuee dans la premiere partie, chaque flux au niveau du 
produit Nimexe A 6 chiffres destine A, ou en provenance de, chaque parte-
naira de la France, a ete classe selon la modalite du commerce A laquelle 
il correspond. A 1 1 aide des statistiques des Douanes, qui nous fournis· 
sent les exportations par entreprise, produit et destination, chaque 
flux, au niveau de l 1 entreprise, a pu etre identifie selon sa modalite de 
commerce. 11 a done ete possible d 1 evaluer, pour chaque entreprise, la 
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part de ses exportations correspondant A tel ou tel type d'echangea. En· 
suite, la mise sur un m6me fichier des statistiques de l'E.A.E. et des 
statistiques des Douanes a permis de disposer pour chaque entreprise de 
ses caracteristiques economiques et de ses types d'engagement A 
!'exportation. 
Dans chaque secteur d'activites, et au niveau de groupes de sec-
teurs, nous avons calcule la productivite moyenne, le taux de marge moyen 
et la taille moyenne des entreprises exportatrices selon leur type 
d'engagement A !'exportation. 
Ainsi pour une modalite g d'engagement A !'exportation, la pro-
ductivite moyenne des entreprises appartenant A un secteur donne, ou A un 
groupe de secteurs, est egale • : 
~ VAi (~) 
PRODl1g 
!:_ EFi ( Xg 1 ) 
iEI Xti 
ou 
I : ensemble des entreprises du secteur, ou groupe de secteurs, concerne 
dont plus de 10 % du chiffre d'affaires est exporte vers la Communaute. 
PRODMg : la productivite moyenne des entreprises dans un secteur donne, 
ou dans un groupe de secteurs, engagees A !'exportation selon la 
modalite g. 
VAi la valeur ajoutee de l'entreprise i. 
Xgi : les exportations intra-communautaires de l'entreprise i correspon-
dant A la modalite g. 
Xti les exportations intra-communautaires totales de l'entreprise i. 
EFi l'effectif employe par l'entreprise i. 
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Le taux de marge moyen des entreprises pour la modalit' g sera 
'gal A 
EBEi u~~) 
MARGMg = -------
VAi u~q ~ 
i E I 
ou 
MARGMg : taux de marge moyen des entreprises du secteur ou groupe de 
secteurs concern,, engagees A l'exportation selon la modalite g. 
EBEi : l'excedent brut d'exploitation de l'entreprise i. 
La taille moyenne des entreprises engagee A !'exportation selon 
la modalite g sera egale A la somme de leurs effectifs divisee par leur 
nombre. 
Le tableau 12 presente les resultats obtenus au niveau des grou-
pes de secteurs A desavantages, A absence d'avantages et A avantages com-
pares. Les resultats detailles par secteur se trouvent en annexe. 
Les resultats- obtenus montrent, pour le groupe des secteurs A 
desavantages compares, un niveau de performance superieur pour les entre-
prises engagees dans des exportations univoques. Ceci se tradui t A la 
fois par une productivite superieure et un taux de marge superieur. Bien 
que dans le groupe des secteurs A avantages compares la productivite et 
le taux de marge correspondant aux exportations univoques soient aussi 
superieurs, leurs ecarts par rapport aux entreprises non exportatrices 
sont beaucoup plus faibles. L'on peut done en conclure que l'engagement 
exterieur d'une entreprise par des exportations univogues necessite, 
lorsgue l'entreprise appartient A un secteur A desavantages co~ares, une 
performance specifigue particulierement elevee. 
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Ces r~sultats font apparaltre aussi les performances sp~cifiques 
des entreprises exportatrices des cat~gories de produits haut de gamme 
dans les ~changes de gamme, avec encore un degr~ de performance plus 'le-
v~ dans le groupe des secteurs A d~savantages compads. 11 semble done 
que !'engagement a !'exportation selon cette modalit~ n~cessite que 
1' entreprise dispose d' avantages concurrentiels, ce qui ne saurai t se 
construire sans des efforts de productivit~ et de rentabilit~ dans 
l'entreprise. 
L'engagement a !'exportation par des flux de produits bas de gam-
me et de gamme moyenne correspond, dans le groupe des secteurs a desavan-
tages compares, a un niveau de performance qui, bien que superieur a ce-
lui des entreprises non exportatrices, n'est pas sp~cialement eleve. Dans 
le groupe des secteurs a avantages compares, !'engagement a !'exportation 
selon cette modalite correspond meme a une performance inf~rieure a celle 
des entreprises non-exportatrices. 
Les exportations dans les ~changes crois~s de produits similai-
res, dans le groupe des secteurs a desavantages compar~s. sont associees, 
dans le cas des ~changes bilateraux, a des niveaux eleves de performance. 
La productivit~ moyenne correspondante est la deuxieme en importance 
apres celle r~alis~e dans les exportations univoques. Ceci temoigne du 
niveau concurrentiel sp~cifique des entreprises qui reussissent, malgr~ 
des conditions sectorielles defavorables, a entrer en competition avec 
les entreprises ~trangeres sur leurs propres marches. Les exportations 
dans un echange croise triangulaire, tout en s'associant a des ~carts de 
productivite et de taux de marge positifs par rapport aux entreprises 
non-exportatrices, ne paraissent pas correspondre a des niveaux de per-
formance tres eleves des entreprises concernes. Dans le groupe des sec-
teurs a avantage compares, les entreprises qui sont concurrencees par des 
entreprises etrangeres sur le marche domestique fran~ais, et qui se trou-
vent par consequent situees a !'exportation sur des produits pour les-
quels existent en meme temps des importations connaissent des performan-
ces moyennes : la productivit~ correspondante est en troisieme position 
apres les exportations univoques et les exportations de haut de gamme. 
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Quant a la taille de l'entreprise, on peut remarquer qu'elle est 
beaucoup plus liee a l'appartenance sectorielle qu'a la modalite 
d'exportation. La variation de la taille moyenne entre les groupes de 
secteurs est visiblement plus importante que la variation de la taille 
moyenne a 1' int4rieur de chaque groupe se lon le type d' engagement a 
!'exportation. Notons cependant que des exportations univoques sont asso-
ciees a des tailles moyennes relativement plus elevees. 
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Conclusion 
L'analyse approfondie du commerce ext6rieur que nous avona men6e 
nous a conduit a mettre en 6vidence plusieurs modalit6s d'insertion dans 
le commerce international : des echanges univoques, des echanges de gamme 
et des echanges crois6s de produits similaires, sous forme bilaterale ou 
triangulaire. L' intensit6 de chaque modalit6 varie d'un secteur 
d'activites a l'autre, de m~me que les performances associees a chacune 
d'entre elles. 
L' etude statistique a montre une forte proportion de commerce 
croise de produits similaires dans le commerce de la France avec ses par-
tenaires de la Communaute 6conomique europeenne. 
Plus de 80 % des 6changes croises bilateraux de la France sont 
realises avec d'autres pays de la Communaute europeenne, l'intensite de 
ce type d' echanges 6tant particulierement elevee avec 1' Allemagne et 
l'ensemble Belgique-Luxembourg. 
L'etude a egalement montre l'existence d'un ordre hi6rarchique en 
matiere d'echanges croises triangulaires de produits similaires. Dans ce 
domaine, la France apparait clairement comme un pays intermediaire. Elle 
se trouve situ6e entre deux groupes de partenaires : le premier comprend 
la RFA, la Belgique-Luxembourg et les Pays-Bas, le second le Royaume-Uni, 
l'Irlande, le Danemark et la Grece. Dans cet ordre hi6rarchique, l'Italie 
parait se situer approximativement au m~me niveau que la France. 
De son cote, 1' analyse des caracteristiques individuelles des 
entreprises a revele le lien etroit entre taux de marge et productivit6. 
Un lien significatif, mais partial et non systematique, existe entre la 
taille de l'entreprise et sa productivite. Ce lien existe uniquement pour 
certains secteurs d'activites. Le rapport entre la taille de l'entreprise 
et sa productivite semble done ~tre conditionn6 par !'existence 
d'economies d'echelle dans certains secteurs. Enfin, 11 semble n'y avoir 
aucun lien entre la taille de l'entreprise et son taux de marge. 
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Dans l'ensemble, les entreprises fran~aises engagees • 
!'exportation sur le Karche commun montrent une productivite et un taux 
de marge plus eleves que les autres entreprises. La difference la plus 
importante apparalt cependant au niveau de la taille moyenne, largement 
superieure dans le groupe des entreprises exportatrices. 
Ce constat dolt 6tre immediatement nuance. Dans le groupe des 
secteurs a desavantages compares, les ecarts entre le groupe des entre-
prises exportatrices et le groupe des entreprises non exportatrices sur 
le Marche commun sont specialement importants en matiere de productivite, 
et, en revanche, ils sont faibles en ce qui concerne la taille. Les en-
treprises qui, grAce a une productivite exceptionnelle, arrivent A expor-
ter malgre des conditions sectorielles defavorables, ne se distinguent 
done pas par une taille particulierement elevee. 
Le lien entre les caracteristiques de l'entreprise et le type de 
1' engagement A 1' exportation s' etablit de la maniere suivante. Dans le 
groupe des secteurs a desavantages compares. 1' ecart de productivite 
entre les entreprises exportatrices et les entreprises non exportatrices 
sur le Marche commun est le plus eleve dans le cas de 1' engagement a 
l'exportation par des flux univoques. Viennent ensuite le commerce croise 
bilateral et les exportations haut de gamme. 
L'ecart de productivite est le moins eleve pour les exportations 
de produits de bas de gamme et de gamme moyenne ainsi que dans le commer-
ce croise triangulaire. Les ecarts de taux de marge sont les plus eleves 
dans les exportations univoques et de produits haut de gamme. Ils sont 
moins importants dans les autres types d'engagement A l'exportation. Les 
ecarts de taille ne sont en general pas discriminants entre les differen-
tes modalites d'insertion dans le commerce. 
Dans le groupe des secteurs A avantages compares, les ecarts de 
productivite et de taux de marge sont negatifs pour les entreprises ex-
portatrices des produits de bas de gamme. Ils sont moderes pour les au-
tres modalites, avec toutefois un ecart superieur pour les exportations 
univoques. 
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(1) A titre d'exemp1e, sont considerea comma des produita distinct& lea 
chambres A air pour ve1ocip,dea (401.121), pour motocyclea (401.123), 
pour voitures particu11,res (401.127), pour camions (401.127), etc. ou 
encore, 1es tis sus de co ton contenant au moins 85 % en poids de coton 
d' une largeur inferieure A 85 em ecrus (550. 901), blanchis (550. 902), 
teints (550.903), fabriques avec des fils de diverses couleurs (550.904), 
imprimes (550.905), etc. 
(2) Pour qu'un produit exporte et un produit importe, correspondant A 1a 
meme rubrique Nimexe A 6 chiffres, appartiennent A une meme categorie de 
gamme, nous avons, par convention, exige que l'ecart entre leurs valeurs 
unitaires soit inferieur A 15 %. 
( 3) Nous avons exige que les flux A 1' exportation et A 1' importation 
soient significatifs l'un par rapport A l'autre. Les echanges ou l'un des 
deux flux est inferieur a 10 % de l'autre ne sont pas pris en 
consideration. 
(4) A. Jacquemin etA. Sapir (1986) ont dejA mis en evidence l'existence 
de differences pour les pays membres de la CEE concernant les configura-
tions de leur commerce intra et extra-europeen. 
(5) K.S. Abd El Rahman, "Hypotheses concernant le role des avantages com-
paratifs des pays et des avantages specifiques des firmes", REP n• 2, 
1987. 
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ANNEXE 
R'sultats detailles par secteur 
Les tableaux presentes dans cette annexe contiennent les resul-
tats detailles portant sur la productivite, le taux de marge et la taille 
des entreprises dans chaque secteur. Les secteurs sont classes par ordre 
croissant selon le niveau de l'avantage compare du secteur. Ces tableaux 
sont des sorties informatiques qui se lisent de la maniere suivante : 
En haut du tableau, pour chaque secteur, on trouve la valeur de 
1' indice d' avantage compare correspondant A chaque secteur. Cet indice 
est calcule selon la formule suivante : 
Xif I Xi. 
X.f X .. 
oil 
Xif les exportations fran~aises intra-communautaires dans le secteur i. 
X.f le total des exportations de biens industrials de la France vers le 
Marche commun. · 
Xi. les exportations totales intra-CEE dans le secteur i. 
X.. le total des exportations industrielles A l'interieur du Marche 
NIV40 
CLASS 
commun. 
Pour chaque secteur, on lit 
le code de nomenclature du secteur. 
"DESAV" dans le cas d'un secteur A desavantages compares (indice 
inferieur A 0,85). 
"NEUTR" dans le cas d'absence ou de faibles avantages et 
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d~savantages compar'• (0,85 < 1nd1ce < 1,15). 
"AVMIT" dans le cas d'un secteur l avantagea compar's (1nd1ce 
sup,rieur A 1,15). 
SNT : nombre total d'entreprises dans le secteur. 
SPRODT : productivit~ moyenne des entreprises du secteur (101 FF par 
employ~). 
SPROFT taux de marge moyen des entreprises du secteur (en pourcentage). 
STAILT : effectif moyen des entreprises du secteur. 
SNN : nombre d'entreprises non-exportatrices sur le march~ de la CEE. 
SPRODN productivit~ moyenne des entreprises non-exportatrices. 
SPROFN taux de marge moyen des entreprises non-exportatrices. 
STAILN : effectif moyen des entreprises non-exportatrices. 
SNX : nombre d'entreprises exportatrices sur le Marche commun. 
SPRODX productivit~ moyenne des entreprises exportatrices. 
SPROFX taux de marge moyen des entreprises exportatrices. 
STAILX : effectif moyen des entreprises exportatrices. 
TYPE type d'engagement A !'exportation de l'entreprise. 
"UN" exportations univoques, 
"HG" exportations de haut de gamme, 
"MB" exportations de gamme moyenne et bas de gamme, 
"BI" exportations dans un commerce croise biladral, 
"TR" exportations dans un commerce croise triangulaire, 
"CR" exportations dans un commerce croise bilateral ou 
triangulaire. 
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PROD I productivit6 moyenne ponded a par le poids relatif des 
exportations du type i dans les exportations to tales de 
l'entreprise. 
PROF I taux de marge moyen pondere par le poids relatif des 
exportations du type i dans les exportations to tales de 
l'entreprise. 
TAILEI la taille moyenne des entreprises engagees 1 l'exportation selon 
le type 1. 
ECARTP PROD! · SPRODN. 
ECARTF PROF! · SPROFN. 
ECARTT TAILEI · STAILN. 
Le de·rnier tableau represente les resultats agreges par groupe de 
secteurs : "secteurs 1 desavantages compares", •secteurs neutres" et 
"secteurs 1 avantages comparatifs". 
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CHAPTER 8 
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Introduction 
This paper attempts to quantify the economic costs of the existing barriers 
to intra-EC trade and commerce, or conversely, the potential benefits from 
what has come to be known as "internal market completion" .1 Current 
barriers are many and various, some sectoral, others horizontal, some 
applying specifically to trade others to production or provision of goods 
and services in general. 
The reduction or removal of barriers can be expected to lead to a number of 
important effects. Differences between prices in different regions will be 
reduced with the concurrent static2 benefits of improved allocative 
efficiency and lower consumer prices. In addition greater market 
integration and increased competition will be fostered, with the associated 
dynamic2 benefits of reduced X-inefficiency (increased technical 
efficiency), erosion of oligopoly profits and improved consumer choice. 
Furthermore, it is generally accepted that innovation would be encouraged, 
both in terms of technical progress and the development of new products and 
services. This latter feature can be thought of as a genuinely dynamic 
effect and one which is consequently the most difficult to quantify. 
Few attempts have been made by economists to estimate the dynamic effects 
of trade barriers, see for example Balas sa (197 4). Such a task is even 
more difficult in the present case because the widespread changes envisaged 
are likely to entail substantial reorganisation and specialisation right 
across the Community economy and over a lengthy period. Detailed estimates 
of the potential benefits of both barrier removal and market integration 
effects are given in 'The Economics of 1992' report (1988) but the 
integration effects are obtained by estimating the economies of scale 
effects from restructuring and by extending the potential benefits obtained 
in this paper using the results of Smith and Venables (1987). For a full 
exposition of the calculation of these market integration effects, the 
interested reader is referred both to the relevant sections of the report, 
to the paper cited and to chapter 9 of this volume. 
This paper, therefore, concentrates on the static or barrier removal 
effects, and is ordered as follows. Section 1 examines the most 
significant barriers to current intra-EC trade and considers the relative 
... I . .. 
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merits of possible approaches to quantifying them, in particular partial 
and general equilibrium analysis. The second section presents the details 
of the partial equilibrium approach which is adopted and examines closely 
the potential biases or omissions. The third section covers the rather 
extensive data requirements whilst the fourth presents and examines the 
results. A fifth section concludes. 
. .. I . .. 
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Section 1: Internal Market Barriers 
The barriers to intra-EC trade which are mentioned in the White Paper may 
be classified as either cost increasing barriers or restrictions on market 
entry, and this is the focus of the paper. But it is important to 
recognise that the present internal market is characterised by a number of 
other market imperfections. Examples include quantitative restrictions or 
quotas in certain sectors (this has applied both to Community production eg 
steel and to country-specific imports eg automobiles), price support 
mechanisms in agriculture and a range of subsidy measures at both Community 
and national level, albeit with varying degrees of economic justification. 
One of the most observable cost increasing barriers in the Community is 
that due to customs procedures3. These formalities, which involve actual 
delays and various kinds of administrative procedure, impose a cost on the 
movement of all goods between member countries, a cost which varies 
according to the goods and countries concerned. 
A further cost is imposed by norms and technical standards which vary 
between countries. These require producers to manufacture or package goods 
in forms which are different for other EC markets than those for their own 
domestic market. 
Both of these elements can be thought of as cost-increasing non-tariff 
barriers which create a wedge between the cost of domestic goods and 
delivered exports, considerably greater than the· transport cost involved. 
In some cases, however, regulations or standards impose extra costs on 
local production as well as on imports. One example is the processed food 
industry where national regulations on inputs, testing and packaging not 
only restrict trade but increase production costs, often unnecessarily. 
Another important barrier is the restriction of market entry which 
ultimately imposes a cost on the consumer by limiting choice, inhibiting 
competition among sellers or curtailing the exploitation of economies of 
scale. 
exist 
In some instances the barrier is total, in that trade does not 
at all. This is often the case with public procurement 
restrictions. 
. .. I ... 
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Moreover, the cost here is not simply that governments or public 
authorities are prevented from purchasing goods or services from cheaper or 
the cheapest sources. Market segmentation allows relatively inefficient 
enterprises to survive, in some cases with considerable local market 
power, and prevents the move towards more efficient market structures which 
would be the consequence of an increase in competition. It, therefore, 
follows that such rationalisation effects are likely to be of considerable 
importance in sectors where trade and European-wide competition have been 
prohibited to date. Noteable examples are telecommunications equipment, 
power generating equipment and railway rolling stock. 
In many other sectors market access is not total but limited, either by 
quotas, regulations, restrictions on establishment, or by capital 
controls. This is particularly true for a number of service sectors eg 
banking, insurance and business services, and air and freight transport. 
One possible approach, therefore, to quantifying the potential benefits of 
internal market completion is to estimate separately the cost of each of 
the barriers observed. The major drawback here is the extent to which the 
barriers mentioned overlap and interact, making it difficult to avoid 
double-counting and at the same time account for all the potential effects. 
A much more satisfactory approach would be to use a general equilibrium 
model that was rich enough, not only to encompass spillover effects between 
sectors (substitution and income effects) and between countries (trade 
effects conditioned by some kind of trade balance restriction) but to 
consider the benefits of increased integration and competition in markets 
which are characterised by imperfections. Unfortunately, no such tool is 
available. 
The solution adopted, therefore has been to employ partial equilibrium 
techniques, where the price or cost effects are treated in a consistent 
fashion but on a sector by sector basis. Partial equilibrium methods have 
typically been used4 to examine the static effects of tariff bar¥iers both 
on importing and exporting countries. The great advantage is their 
simplicity of application and the fact that, when markets can be 
... I . .. 
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characterised by perfect competition and price effects are relatively 
small, they approximate the general equilibrium calculations. 
What they miss in comparison to general equilibrium calculations are ·the 
interactive effects between sectors which occur as relative prices and 
relative factor payments change. However, these biases are not expected to 
be particularly large for what are relatively small cost changes spread 
across many sectors. 
The main drawback of the traditional partial equilibrium analysisS in the 
context of the present problem is shared by the traditional general 
equilibrium approach. These disadvantages derive from the relatively 
restrictive assumptions behind the analysis, namely those associated with 
perfectly competitive markets. This makes traditional partial equilibrium 
methods rather unsatisfactory for dealing with potential gains from 
increased competition in markets characterised by imperfections, unless 
such market structure is specifically modelled. Reductions in 
X-inefficiency can be represented by the rightward or downward shift of 
sectoral supply curves but large economies of scale effects are not easily 
incorporated into a conceptual approach which essentially assumes them 
away. 
Furthermore, benefits and losses in the partial equilibrium framework are 
expressed in terms of welfare changes for consumers, producers and 
governments. There is, therefore, no immediate provision for examining 
adjustment costs as factors move from shrinking to expanding sectors, 
although these could be incorporated by subtracting the present value of 
the welfare costs of adjustment (occurring once and probably spread over 
the first few years) from the present value of the total welfare benefits 
of permanent market integration. 
Despite these drawbacks, the use of partial equilibrium methods can be 
defended for reasons of transparency and simplicity. It is also important 
to note that the static welfare gains from internal market liberalisation 
are of a much greater order of magnitude than would be the case for tariff 
removal or customs union formation, even though the notion of trade 
diversion can not be ignored. This is because the benefits derived from 
the lower cost of imports are not offset by a loss of tariff revenue. It 
... I . .. 
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is the welfare gain of the relevant rectangles which is more important than 
that of the traditional triangles (see section 2 for further details). 
Two implications can therefore be drawn. A first order of magnitude of 
the static economic gains can be derived on a sectoral basis by multiplying 
cost reductions by the existing level of imports (for a trade barrier) or 
by the existing level of output (for a regulation which imposes costs on 
production). This means that total welfare benefits are much less subject 
to assumptions on supply and demand elasticities than would normally be the 
case. 
For a number of reasons which are detailed in the following sections, it is 
suggested that the estimates produced in this paper do not have any obvious 
net bias. Nevertheless, a margin of error should be attached to the figures 
and this is emphasised by the presentation of a range of results • 
. . . I . .. 
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Section 2: Method 
The removal of the trade and regulatory barriers mentioned in section 1 and 
the consequent cost reductions of traded goods and production leads to a 
number of effects. 
In the first case the usual trade creation and trade diversion effects 
occur. Cheaper imports from other Community countries will to varying 
degrees be substituted for locally produced goods. Consumption and trade 
within the EC will rise and allocative efficiency will improve. At the 
same time there will be a tendency for imports from countries outside the 
Community to be reduced, except to the extent that external exporters can 
also take advantage of standardised norms or cheaper distribution within 
the EC. 
In the second case reduced regulatory activity may lower production costs 
directly and, indirectly, by inducing greater market integration and 
competition. An example in the financial services sector will serve. 
Alleviating the restrictions governing establishment or exchange controls 
will in general lower costs of banking and insurance services and, to the 
extent that there is competition, prices will fall thereby increasing 
consumer surplus without eroding producer surplus. But greater market 
access will encourage further competition at a European level. The 
consequent reorganisation, exploitation of economies of scale, 
specialisation and improved technical efficiency will lead to additional 
cost and price reductions. However to the extent that prices are pushed 
nearer to costs, there will be a redistribution of welfare from producers 
to consumers. This reduction of producer surplus has to be subtracted from 
gains in consumer welfare. 
At the same time, any cost reductions achieved within the Community will 
improve its trading position with the rest of the world. 
The methods used to encompass these various effects are treated in the rest 
of this section. Stage one treats the effects produced by lower trade 
barriers within the Community. It confines itself to final demand, 
including investment goods. Stage two concentrates on the effects due to 
... I . .. 
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lower production cost. In order to treat both intermediate and final goods 
the partial equilibrium calculations are performed in conjunction with 
Community input-output tables. Any other cost effects on intermediate 
goods (either trade or economies of scale effects) are also treated here. 
Finally stage three treats scale effects on final goods only, although the 
results of scale effects on intermediate goods are also reported as part of 
stage three. In the essentially static treatment in this paper, scale 
effects encompass no more than those which derive from spreading greater 
output over existing plant. 
The three stages should be seen, therefore, more as practical accounting 
steps rather than clear conceptual divisions, and the remainder of the 
section indicates more clearly exactly what is included and where. 
2.1 Stage 1, Trade Barriers 
The first stage operates in the usual three country framework with a single 
Community country importing both from the rest of the Community and from 
the rest of the world. To illustrate the salient features, the simpler 
two-country case is first considered. 
Figure 1 
Price 
P,. 
P.' r 
0 Q' 1 Q' 2 
P.' r 
D. 
I 
Quantity 
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Figure 1 is drawn for a single good, with Di and Si respectively 
representing the domestic or home country demand and supply schedules. The 
world price is Pr' and Pr represents the import supply schedule if the 
importing country I imposes a tariff equal to t = (Pr-Pr')/Pr'· 
Alternatively, the difference may represent an equivalent non-tariff 
barrier where t represents a mark-up which consumers or importers in the 
home country face due to the extra costs imposed by the barriers. Under 
free trade the country would import Ql 'Q2' and produce OQt' domestically. 
In the presence of the barrier, trade is lower at Q1 Q2 and consumption 
declines to OQ2• 
The barrier therefore has a trade effect, a production effect and a 
consumption effect. In the case of a tariff, it also has a revenue effect 
in that amount C (equals t times Q1Q2) accrues to the government in country 
I in the form of tariff receipts. The relative size of these effects for a 
given barrier depends on the elasticity of demand for imports which in turn 
depends on the elasticities of supply and demand for output. Thus the 
adverse effects of the barrier are less for inelastic goods than for more 
elastic goods because the distortion of quantities is smaller. 
When the non-tariff barrier is lifted, consumer surplus increases by area 
(A+B+C+D) while there is_a loss in producer surplus of A. The net welfare 
gain, therefore, is represented by area (B+C+D). For the elimination of an 
equivalent tariff barrier, the net welfare gain· would only be area (B+D) 
due to the loss of tariff revenue. 
The approach used in this paper elaborates on this model in two important 
ways. Firstly it assumes that the importing country faces a supply curve 
which is not perfectly elastic so that an increased demand for imports 
increases their price. Secondly, it assumes that goods (or services) may be 
imported both from other Community countries and from the rest of the 
world. Figu•e 2 represents this situation. 
It is assumed in figure 2 that non-tariff barriers between I and C 
disappear while the tariff (inclusive of any non-tariff barrier effects) 
against the rest of the world (in effect the Common External Tariff or CET) 
remains constant. 
• .. I . .• 
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Figure 2 
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EDi represents the excess demand schedule for the good in country I. EC 
and EC' are the excess supply schedules of C before and after 
non-tariff barriers are removed. ER and ER represent the excess supply 
schedules of R, inclusive and net of the CET respectively, ie I faces an 
import supply schedule from R of ER while producers in R receive revenue 
according to ~. The import supply schedule faced by I shifts from (EC+ER) 
to (EC'+ER) when internal barriers are removed. These schedules intersect 
EDi at prices P and P' respectively, so that the elimination of barriers 
leads to a reduction in price in country I. The amount of the price fall 
depends on the cost equivalent of the barrier (downward shift of EC), the 
excess demand elasticity in country I and the excess supply elasticities of 
C and R. The price received by exporters in C, net of costs associated 
with the barriers rises from Pc to P' while the price net of tariffs 
received by exporters in R falls from Pr to Pr'· 
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When internal barriers are removed, I' s total imports rise from M to M' , 
with imports from C rising from Me to Me' and from R falling from Mr to 
Mr'. The reduction in imports from the rest of the world, by analogy with 
customs union theory may be called trade diversion since it represents a 
shift from a lower cost producer outside the Community to a higher cost 
producer within. 
The static welfare effects on country I are: a consumer surplus gain (net 
of producer surplus loss) of (A+B+C+D); a loss of tariff revenue of 
(A+B+G+H) - (G+J). The net gain to I is given by areas (C+D-H+J). These 
areas may be interpreted as gains or losses from terms of trade changes. 
Area C equals the terms of trade gain on existing imports from C, while D 
gives the gain on additional imports from c. Area H represents the terms 
of trade loss on imports diverted from the lower cost producer R to C, 
while area J is the terms of trade gain from the reduced price paid on 
remaining imports from R. 
The welfare effect on the rest of the Community C consists of the producer 
surplus gain (net of consumer surplus loss) of areas (E+F). E equals the 
terms of trade gain on existing exports to I while F is the producer 
surplus gain on additional exports. 
The rest of the world is characterised by a loss of producer surplus equal 
to (J+K). 
Given estimates of the supply and demand elasticities, the reduction in the 
non-tariff barrier and the existing trade shares, all these welfare changes 
can be calculated as proportions of total existing imports. 
Where the barriers being removed are technical norms specific to the 
importer, it may be expected that exporters in the rest of the world will 
also benefit from market integration in that their costs of producing 
varying specifications for different Community countries will be reduced. 
This feature may also be incorporated by shifting downwards the excess 
supply curve of the rest of the world by an amount reflecting this cost 
saving. It is this model that is actually used for the calculations, see 
annex C. 
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The result will be that the diversion of imports R to C is less than in the 
simpler case illustrated above and the price reduction in country I will be 
greater. In terms of welfare changes, the gains for I will be greater, 
those for C less and the losses for R reduced. In fact if the reduction in 
R's unit costs is sufficient, the rest of the world may also experience net 
gains. 
All the algebraic details of the welfare calculations are given in annex 
c. Both the welfare areas and the price changes can be written in terms of 
the exogenous parameters: the trade shares, the elasticities, the cost 
reductions and the external tariff. 
2.2 Stage 1, Public Procurement 
Goods and services subject to public procurement restrictions warrant 
special attention. First of all, trade is often non-existent, and, 
secondly, the liberalising of these markets could be expected to lead to 
substantial long-term restructuring. 
The immediate trade effect is considered as a distinct part of stage one. 
The consultancy report for public procurement (Atkins, 1987), has estimated 
potential cost savings from buying existing quantities of publicly procured 
goods more cheaply in other Community countries, taking account of the fact 
that costs do not necessarily remain the same under increased demand. 
Eighty per cent of these estimated cost savings (assuming that twenty per 
cent of publicly procured goods can only be tendered for locally) are added 
in to stage one results on a sector by sector basis, see Table 3, annex A. 
Any welfare effects due to lower border and trade costs are automatically 
considered in the stage one calculations. 
2.3 Stage 2, Barriers affecting production cost 
The discussion in section one also emphasised the potential reduction of 
regulatory activity across the Community leading to cost savings in the 
production of goods and services. Furthermore, the removal of internal 
trade barriers is expected to stimulate competition, greater technical 
efficiency and specialisation, adding to these cost savings. This process 
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is treated in stage two as a downward shift in the supply curve for the 
Community, on a sector by sector basis. First the case of an autarkic 
Community is treated, followed by the situation in which the Community 
trades with the rest of the world. 
Figure 3 
Price 
s I 
c 
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P' 
P.: 
D 
c 
0 y Y' Quantity 
In Figure 3 the supply and demand curves for the Community are used, rather 
than excess supply and excess demand curves. Community output, before and 
after cost reduction effects shift the supply curve down from S to S', are 
given respectively by Y and Y'. The pre- and post-shift Community prices 
are given respectively by P and P', where the actual cost reduction is from 
P to Pc. 
The welfare effects consist of a consumer surplus gain of A + B and a 
producer surplus gain of C + D. 
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Figure 4 illustrates the non-autarkic case. The excess supply curve of the 
rest of the world, ER, is added to the supply curve of the Community S to 
give (S + ER). Community production is initially OY, with imports OM and 
consumption OC (equals OY +OM). Initial tariff revenues are (A+B+G+H) and 
the tariff rate t equals (P-Pr)/Pr• 
Figure 4 
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Following the fall in the Community supply curve to S', Community output 
becomes OY', imports OM' and consumption OC'. 
The welfare effects for the Community are: a consumer surplus gain of 
(A+B+C+D); a producer surplus gain of (E+F); a tariff loss of (A+B+G+H) -
{G+J). The net gain to the Community is (C+D+E+F+J-H), while the rest of 
the world suffers a producer surplus loss of (J+K). 
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2.4 Methodological problems 
A number of methodological problems arise in this second stage. These 
include additional trade effects within the Community, the distinction 
between final and intermediate goods, the question of intra-industry trade 
and the distinction between cost and price. 
The treatment of the Community as a block means that second order trade 
effects between regions or countries, following the reduction in production 
cost, are ignored. Only the trade changes with the rest of the world are 
included. This omission can only be rectified by explicitly modelling the 
interaction between the national producers in the Community. Two remarks 
may be made about this omission. One is that these trade effects will be 
small relative to the welfare effects arising from lower production costs, 
although clearly they will be more important as the variance in the fall in 
production cost between different countries is larger. Furthermore, such 
effects will be more crucial to the way in which welfare increases are 
distributed between countries than to the aggregate gain in welfare itself. 
A second problem is that production cost reductions and concomitant welfare 
gains occur at various stages of the production cycle and these should all 
be counted. There is also a significant interaction between branches of 
the economies as the output of one sector which can now be produced more 
cheaply is used as an input to other sectors. To cater for these two 
aspects, identified cost reductions by sector have been fed through the 
Community input-output matrix6 to produce a resultant effect on a vector of 
final output. These resultant cost effects are the ones which have been 
used in the partial equilibrium calculations. 
One of the difficulties of using the input-output matrix to trace through 
potential cost reductions concerns the interaction with the rest of the 
world. If as in figure 5, intermediate inputs are imported from the rest 
of the world at price P, then this will be unaffected by the downward shift 
in Community costs from Sc to Sc'· Total derived demand in the Community 
(DDc) remains the same at Q while the quantity produced within the 
Community rises from Qc to Qc', all at a constant price P. The implicit 
assumption in the approach used, therefore, is that intermediate inputs 
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are produced within the Community. For the inputs which produce the most 
significant cost effects, financial services, business services, 
telecommunications services, freight and air transport, this is indeed the 
case. 
There are other small influences on the cost of goods and services produced 
as intermediate inputs. One is the economies of scale in the production of 
intermediate inputs. Because this effect requires the same input-output 
treatment, it is incorporated into stage two. However, the results are 
reported separately with those for economies of scale on final goods in 
stage three. A second small influence is the effect on production cost of 
intermediate inputs traded within the Community, which are now cheaper 
Figure 5 
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because of lower trade barriers. This aspect has also been incorporated 
into the stage two calculations although, like the scale effects, it is 
rather insignificant compared to the specific sectoral cost effects which 
account for the major part of the stage two results. 
The third problem concerns the existence of intra-industry trade. The 
simple Heckscher-Ohlin trade model, which is based on comparative advantage 
predicts that the same good will not be both imported and exported. In 
principle all that is needed is a sufficiently disaggregated level of trade 
elasticities to discover this phenomenon. But although intra-industry 
trade indices, (Grube! and Lloyd, 1975) decline at these lower levels, 
two-way trade is still observable. 
This can be explained in two ways. Firstly, intra-industry trade in 
functionally homogeneous products can take place for a number of reasons, 
for example, where there exist transportation and storage costs. Secondly 
and more importantly, it arises because of economies of scale in the 
production of differentiated goods. Free trade allows both lower unit 
costs due to the scale effects of producing for larger markets and 
increased variety via two-way trade in differentiated goods. 
In practice, in almost all products, intra-industry trade takes place. 
While the removal of barriers implies a rise in imports, when unit 
production costs are reduced, it is also likely that exports to the rest of 
the world will increase. This gives rise to additional producer surplus 
gains which are not quantified in the stage two methodology. The 
under-estimation of the welfare gains from ignoring these effects on 
exports will to some extent offset any loss in producer surplus which 
derives from producers outside the Community exploiting the removal of 
barriers, and in particular the adoption of Community standards, to 
increase their exports to the Community. Of course it cannot be assumed 
that the offset is exact but there is no reason to believe that the bias 
operates in one or other direction. 
Finally, the important distinction between cost and price arises. The 
parameters for the trade and regulatory cost reductions are drawn in the 
main from a number of case studies (annex D) which predominantly focus on 
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potential cost reductions. However, in a number of sectors characterised 
by significant market imperfections, prices are expected to fall further 
than cost, reflecting the compression of excess profits in addition to 
improved technical efficiency and other genuine cost savings. To the 
extent that these goods or services are used as intermediate inputs to 
other sectors or finally consumed these price changes will be the o~es that 
that are passed on. However, the compression of excess profits means that 
the consequent transfer of welfare from producers to intermediate or final 
consumers has to be set against consumer gains to arrive at total welfare 
gains. 
Such a cost/price distribution arises for several sectors e.g. financial 
services, agriculture and coal. The way in which net welfare changes are 
calculated is detailed in section 3. 
2.5 Stage three, Economies of scale, existing plant 
This stage quantifies the most immediate or static effect of economies of 
scale. The survey report on economies of scale, (Pratten, 1987) gives 
estimates of unit cost gradients at given proportions of minimum efficient 
scale for existing European plant in a number of sectors. If some 
simplifying assumptions are made concerning plant cost functions then it 
is possible to convert this information into a parameter or elasticity that 
links changes in unit cost to changes in production (Annex C). 
The output increases in the Community from stages 1 and 2 following reduced 
trade and regulatory barriers give rise, therefore, to additional cost 
effects as increased production is spread across existing plant. In stage 
three the welfare gains arising from these unit cost reductions on final 
goods are considered (Annex C). The unit cost reductions from scale effects 
on intermediate goods have been included within the stage two calculations 
so that the input-output effects can be taken into account. The 
calculations are iterated in order that the unit cost reductions on 
intermediate goods from increased output can be incorporated into the 
overall calculation. Despite the inclusion of intermediate goods scale 
effects in stage two, all welfare gains due to economies of scale (both 
final and intermediate) are reported together in Table A6. 
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Section 3: Data Requirements 
The data required to undertake the calculations detailed in section 2 are 
summarised in Table 3.1. Coverage is limited to Germany, France, Italy, 
UK, and the Benelux countries, comprising about 88% of Community 
value-added in the year considered, 1985. Aggregate results are reported 
both for this group of countries, EUR7 in 1985 prices and also for EUR12 at 
1988 prices, by scaling up proportionately using GDP. 
In essence stages two and three and the adding-up stage operate at the R-44 
level of sectoral disaggregation. This facilitates the use of the 
Community input-output table which corresponds to this level and which is 
essential for the workings of stage two. In contrast stage one operates at 
a rather more disaggregated level, Nace 3-digit. 
As Table 3.1 indicates, the data needs are substantial and comprise trade 
and production data, elasticity estimates, the common external tariff and 
economies of scale parameters as well as estimates of the potential 
sectoral cost reductions following the removal of trade and regulatory 
barriers. This section concentrates on the cost reduction estimates. All 
other data aspects are discussed in Annex B. 
3.1 Stage One 
The calculations in this first stage cover the 65 predominantly final goods 
sectors which have been selected from the NACE 3-digit classification of 
166 agricultural and manufacturing sectors. For two rather important 
sectors, agriculture and energy, a proportion of trade for the sector has 
been taken to correspond to the fraction of final output in total output. 
The sectors treated in stage one correspond to about 220 billion ECU of 
intra-EC imports or about 60% of intra-EC trade for the countries 
considered. It should be stressed that the stage one calculations have 
been undertaken using each of the Community countries in turn as an 
importing country. The results in Tables A2 and A3 report total welfare 
gains for EUR7. The average cost and price changes a~e weighted by sector 
and country importance. 
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Table 3.1 Data requirements 
Parameters Stage 11 Stage 22 Stage 3 
Trade shares sc= share of imports 
from rest of EC 
sr= share of imports 
from rest of world 
Consumption shares sy= share of AC pro-
vided by EC produc-
tion 
sm= share of AC pro-
vided by extra 
imports 
Elasticities n= elasticity of ecd= elasticity of 
import demand demand in EC 
ec= elasticity of ecs= elasticity of 
excess supply from supply in EC 
rest of EC er= elasticity of 
er= elasticity of excess supply from 
excess supply from ROW 
ROW 
Common External t by sector t by sector -
Tariff 
Price or cost b= effect of lower w= cost reduction in dependent on sectoral 
Reduction trade barrier EC output increase 
Economies of Scale - EOS parameter inter- EOS parameter final 
mediate goods goods 
Data for calcula- Total imports by EC Apparent Consumption EC Production per 
tion of welfare country per sector, of EC per sector, AC sector, Y 
amounts M 
1 On a country by country basis except for the CET. 
2 Apparent consumption, {AC) = Production {Y) + extra EC imports - extra EC 
exports. 
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Two principal sources of information have been used to generate the cost 
reductions which would ensue from the elimination of Community trade 
barriers. One is an industrial survey of firms' estimates of the cost of 
these barriers (Nerb, 1987). The other is a study specifically directed at 
the cost of border formalities, administrative costs and delays, (Ernst & 
Whinney, 1987). Two matrices of cost reduction estimates (by sector and 
country) have been constructed, based principally on these two sources; 
(Tables B1 and B2). However, the sectoral estimates have been checked for 
consistency with information from specific consultants' studies (Annex D) 
where this exists. 
The first set of inputs (Table B1 and column (i) Table A3) are derived from 
the Ernst & Whinney study. The cost of border formalities comprises the 
administrative costs of both exporters and importers, agents' fees and 
border delays. The study provides estimates of these costs both by 
consignment and in relation to intra-Community trade value for exporters 
and importers within thirteen sectors, based on surveys of firms in 
Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and the UK. These 
estimates have been converted (using an import share matrix) into an 
average cost figure (as a percentage of intra-EC imports) for each Member 
State and sector. 
No adjustment has been made to these figures for the additional costs 
associated with satisfying national product norms or regulations. In 
general, therefore, these percentages can be considered to be a low 
estimate of the costs of barriers affecting intra-Community trade. 
The other set of cost reduction estimates is based on the survey undertaken 
to assess the extent of trade barriers within the Community (Nerb, 1987). 
This survey indicated that the main barriers, in order of importance, are 
standards and regulations, administrative barriers, frontier delays 
followed by a number of other barriers such as sales tax differences, 
transport regulations and the differential implementation of Community law. 
In addition enterprises were invited to indicate the expected unit cost 
savings from eliminated barriers. Sectoral responses for five countries, 
Germany, UK, Netherlands, Spain and Ireland are available, and for all 
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countries the reasons for the expected cost reductions have been given. 
First in importance is lower distribution costs, then reduced costs of 
imported materials and cheaper production process and lastly lower banking, 
marketing and insurance costs. 
However, for the calculations of stage one, it is the direct costs 
associated with delays, administrative procedures and producing for 
standards imposed in other Community countries which should be taken into 
account. The second set of estimates (Table B2 and column (ii) of Table 
A3) is derived by first transforming the survey data (using an import share 
matrix) to produce a cost reduction figure for each sector and each Member 
State as an importing country. On the basis of input-output coefficients, 
these figures have been adjusted downwards to account for the fact that the 
survey results include the indirect effects of the anticipated price 
reductions of intermediate goods and services. They have then been 
adjusted upwards to take account of the cost of border formalities borne by 
importers; this information is derived from the Ernst and Whinney study. 
In general this second set of cost reduction estimates is slightly greater 
than the first set. The range of the average cost saving is from 1.6 to 
1. 9 percent. 
3.2 Stage two 
The stage two calculations are based on aggregated Community data. They 
include the same seven countries as in the first stage and cover the 44 
sectors of the NACE-CLIO R44 classification which is used for the Community 
input-output tables. Again, two sets of input data are used (see columns 
(i) and (ii) of Table AS), constituting lower and upper estimates of 
potential cost reductions of total final output. 
This input data essentially includes three sources of cost reduction. By 
far the most important are the specific sectoral cost. reductions due to 
de-regulation, but in addition there is the reduced cost of intermediate 
inputs imported from other Member States (and not covered in stage one) 
plus the effect of scale economies on intermediate goods. 
For traded intermediate goods, cost reductions are taken from the sectoral 
estimates used in stage one and scaled down by the share of intra-Community 
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trade in Community output. The effects of economies of scale in 
intermediate goods are incorporated using the parameters derived for stage 
three and the output increases which emerge from iterative calculations. 
The cost reductions for financial and business services and 
telecommunications are based on the commissioned studies for these sectors 
(Price Waterhouse, 1987; Peat Marwick McLintock, 1987; Wdller, 1987). 
Estimates for air and road transport and energy have been added for the 
sake of completeness. These sectors form the basis of column (i) of Table 
A5. For column (ii) price reductions for agriculture and steel are also 
incorporated. 
In the case of the financial services sector, agriculture and also coal, 
potential price reductions are used in stage two, rather than potential 
cost reductions. However, such price reductions will, in the first two 
cases, derive to some extent from decreases in excess profits and, 
therefore, involve a transfer of welfare from producers to consumers. 
These full price reductions are used in conjunction with input-output 
tables to assess the effect on other sectors, but thereafter the welfare 
transferred is estimated and subtracted to derive the net gain. The 
fraction of price reduction due to the compression of rent is assumed to be 
three fifths in the case of agriculture (Thomson 1985). For financial 
services it has been assumed that one third of the increase in welfare 
should be deducted as it represents a transfer from producers to consumers. 
In the case of the energy sector, de-regulation in the production of 
refined petroleum products and in the distribution of electricity should 
lead to genuine cost reductions for these sectors. For coal, the effects 
are of price rather than cost. The reduction of internal subsidies allows 
the import of coal at world prices. For this sector welfare changes were 
modelled in a slightly different way. It was assumed that internal 
subsidies on coal and restrictions on importing coal would be removed, 
leading to lower price and higher imports. 
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Section 4: Results 
The principal estimates of the potential welfare changes from eliminating 
internal market barriers are set out in Tables A2 to A6 with the results of 
the three stages summarised in Table A7. The cost of the barriers 
affecting trade only (final goods) including the static effects of public 
procurement restrictions is estimated at between 8 and 9 billion ECU (EUR7 
at 1985 prices). The cost of barriers affecting all production is 
calculated at between 58 and 72 billion ECU, or 2.0-2.4% of GDP. 
Therefore, total potential benefits from barrier removal for these two 
stages are estimated at between 66 and 81 billion ECU or 2.2-2.7% of GDP. 
If these figures are scaled up to represent the same GDP share of EUR12 at 
1988 prices the figures become 90-110 billion ECU. In addition there are 
the small benefits from scale economies on existing plant, 4-5 billion ECU 
for EUR 7 at 1985 prices. 
These estimates should be viewed as potential gains in economic welfare if 
the full internal market programme is implemented. No attempt has been 
made to systematically estimate the likely outcome if certain barriers or 
market restrictions are not removed. Furthermore even these static 
benefits can be expected to take several years to materialise. The dynamic 
benefits or those due to market integration, which have been estimated as 
an an additional 62 to 107 billion ECU for EUR 7 at 1985 prices, are likely 
to take longer, possibly between five and ten years. 
It is probably useful at this stage to examine the possible bias in the 
figures given. First of all, the detailed calculations apply to seven 
Member States since most of the quantitative information from consultants' 
studies and surveys relates to these countries. A simple linear scaling-up 
of the results for EUR7 can be expected to underestimate the total for 
EUR12 since qualitative information from the business survey (on potential 
reductions in production costs and increase in sales) indicates that 
internal market barriers are more significant for the other five countries. 
A second source of bias derives from the use of partial techniques. Where 
the price effects are small, the bias is likely to be small even if the 
trade effects are large. Where the price effects are larger, as, for 
example, with financial services or some of the other service sectors, the 
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omission of general equilibrium effects will entail greater bias. However, 
it is not obvious in which direction the bias will lie. 
A third source of bias concerns the existence of monopoly or oligopoly 
power. To the extent that markets are characterised by market 
imperfections, the increase in output and therefore welfare is 
overestimated. However, this bias is relatively small because the 
significant welfare gains are on existing output. It also means that price 
reductions will have been overestimated, but, for a given cost reduction, 
the net gain will not be affected; there will simply be more producer gain 
and less consumer gain. Clearly where barrier removal implies an erosion 
of monopoly power it is important to exclude the reduction of excess 
profits where welfare is simply transferred from producers to consumers. 
For sectors where this information was available (e.g. agriculture, 
financial services), this adjustment has been made. 
One of the aims of the internal market programme is to encourage market 
entry and competition. To the extent that the opening of markets could 
lead to greater market power at a European level by reducing and 
concentrating the firms in an industry, then a more active competition 
policy would be required. This question is addressed in some detail in 
Part D of "The Economics of 1992". 
Fourthly, the use of unweighted averages for common external tariffs may 
produce a bias. Where the share of goods facing high tariffs would 
normally be large, in the absence of tariffs, relative to goods facing low 
tariffs, the unweighted average will be biased downwards. This leads to an 
underestimate of tariff loss and an overestimate of welfare gains. The 
bias is reversed for the. converse situation. 
probably largely off-setting. 
These sectoral biases are 
From the above discussion it is, therefore, not clear that there is any 
systematic bias in the estimates that have been produced. This does not 
exclude the fact that they may be subject to a considerable margin of 
error. The range of estimates given reflects uncertainty over the size of 
cost reduction effects following barrier removal. 
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Section 5: Conclusions. 
The modified partial equilibrium approach used in this paper has enabled a 
large amount of microeconomic data on the likely effects of market 
integration in the Community to be combined together in a systematic and 
transparent fashion. The resultant potential benefits in terms of economic 
welfare are sizeable, chiefly because non-tariff (as opposed to tariff) 
barriers are being removed and because of the significant effect on 
production cost in the Community. 
The principal drawbacks of the methodology lie with its limitations. It 
fails to deal with certain major impacts of integration. One of the most 
important is the effect of increased competition and the consequent 
restructuring of the production structure. Such market integration effects 
have been estimated for the cost of non-Europe exercise calculating 
economies of scale effects (see chapter 9) and by generalising a number of 
representative sectoral calculations, Smith and Venables (1987). This 
latter estimate has been achieved by deriving multiplier coefficients with 
which to scale up the economic welfare gains developed here. 
However, even these substantial integration effects do not exhaust the 
potential gains from internal market completion. There is evidence that 
there will be additional positive impacts on innovation (Geroski 1988) 
which will reinforce the gains from increased competition and may lead to 
an increase in the potential rate of economic growth. 
Finally, by its nature, the partial equilibrium approach fails to take into 
account the indirect macroeconomic effects of cost reductions. The effects 
of increased output on investment and of increased factor incomes on 
savings are disregarded. The analysis leaves open the question of whether 
the potential gains associated with cost reductions are taken in the form 
of reduced prices (or possibly lower inflation) or higher output. This 
balance will to some extent be determined by the reactions of consumers and 
producers to market integration, but may also be influenced through the 
choice of monetary and fiscal policies. These issues are properly examined 
using macroeconomic models and are treated in Catinat, Donni and Italianer 
(1988). 
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Footnotes 
1 See 'Completing the Internal Market', White Paper from the Commission to 
the European Council, 1985. 
2 The traditional terms 'static' and 'dynamic' of the trade literature are 
dropped in 'The Economics of 1992' report in favour of the more specific 
'barrier removal' and 'integration' effects. The 'static' welfare 
calculations in this paper, therefore, correspond to barrier removal 
effects. 
3 Customs procedures, involving frontier stops either at internal Community 
borders or inland, and related administrative costs borne inland by 
companies and the public authorities, are at present maintained within 
the Community for the following reasons: 
- differences in value added tax rates and excise duties, which are 
currently applied in accordance with the "destination principle", and 
thus necessitate border tax adjustments in the Member State of 
destination; 
- application of monetary compensatory amounts to trade in certain 
agricultural products in accordance with the Common Agricultural Policy; 
- differences in national public health standards involve veterinary and 
plant health checks; 
- checks to control road transport licenses, and the compliance of vehicles 
with national regulations including safety rules for the transport of 
dangerous products; 
- formalities carried out for statistical purposes; 
- the enforcement of certain bilateral trade quota regimes that Member 
States maintain with third countries, for example textile quotas under 
the multi-fibre agreement of the GATT and other miscellaneous national 
measures authorised under Article 115 of the Treaty of Rome. 
4 See for example Cline et al (1978), Baldwin and Murray (1977). 
5 It is of course possible to modify these traditional approaches to take 
account of non-competitive market structure, see for example Smith and 
Venables (1987) or Cox and Harris (1985). 
6 Using the Leontieff inverse (I-A)-1. 
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Table Al : Initial Values, Trade and Output EUR 7 (1985) 
Agriculture 
Oil, Natural Gas 
Mineral Oil Refining 
Pharmaceuticals 
Soap, Detersents 
llouseho1d ChemicAb 
Metal Products 
Boilermsking 
Tools, metal Goods 
Agric. Machinery 
Machine Tool& 
Textile Machinery 
Food, Chemical Mach. 
Minins Equipment etc. 
Transmission Equip. 
Other Mach. Industry 
Other Mach. Equip. 
Office Machinery 
Electrical Machinery 
Telecom. Equipment 
Radio Television 
Dom. Electrical Equip. 
Vehicles, Engines 
Vehicle Bodies 
Shipbuilding 
Rail Rollins Stock 
Cycles, Motorcycles 
Aerospace 
Optical Photographic 
Clocks, Watches 
Vesetable, Animal Oils 
Meat Preparation 
Dairy Products 
Fruit, Veg. Processing 
Fish Processing 
Grain Millin& 
Pasta 
Starch Products 
Bread, Flour 
Sugar Refining 
Cocoa, Choco., Susar 
Animal Food 
Other Food Products 
Ethyl, Distilling 
Wine 
Cider, Perry, Mead 
Brewing 
Soft Drinks, Water 
Tobacco Products 
Manufact. of Leather 
Footwear. 
Clothing 
Household Textiles 
Fur Goods 
Wooden Furniture 
Printing 
Publishing 
Rubber Products 
Retread, Repair Tyres 
Processed Plastics 
Jewellery 
Musical Instruments 
Photo.Processing 
Toys, Sports Goods 
Miscellaneous 
Total 
Stage 1 
Initial Initial 
•intra-EC 
imports 
(ECU bn) 
11.15 
5.12 
9.47 
3.57 
1.94 
4.01 
1.32 
.67 
5.35 
2.45 
2.75 
1.24 
3.44 
4.40 
2.19 
2.17 
10.44 
13.51 
4.48 
9.42 
6.18 
3.19 
27.83 
.57 
.42 
.18 
.61 
9.07 
2.41 
.40 
2.87 
10.27 
6.90 
3.28 
.93 
.79 
.22 
.62 
.90 
.58 
2.34 
1.25 
2.05 
1.00 
.53 
.01 
.70 
.32 
2.01 
.69 
3.69 
5.82 
.72 
.44 
3.01 
1.24 
1.24 
.79 
.02 
1.61 
3.60 
.17 
.12 
1.23 
7.49 
219.39 
extra-EC 
imports 
(ECU bn) 
6.81 
6.59 
5.66 
5.73 
2.24 
6.53 
1.63 
.81 
7.90 
2.98 
5.12 
2.23 
5.02 
6.55 
3.56 
3.39 
17.72 
26.70 
7.99 
20.09 
13.87 
4.49 
39.90 
.67 
1.20 
.29 
1.34 
13.94 
5.43 
1. 73 
7.83 
14.05 
7.57 
6.12 
2.30 
1.28 
.25 
1.14 
.99 
1.54 
2.96 
1.66 
3.34 
1.17 
.90 
.02 
.82 
.34 
2.11 
1.69 
6.09 
13.19 
1.64 
.89 
4.21 
1.82 
.22 
.01 
.42 
.42 
9.24 
.54 
.20 
2.88 
11.87 
341.24 
~: VISA database, Commission 
Sease 2 
Extra-EC Extra-EC Apparent Final 
Production Imports Exports Consumption Produc. 
(ECU bn) (ECU bn) (ECU bn) (ECU bn) (ECU bn) 
Agriculture 173.28 101.33 17.54 257.07 35.77 
. Solid fuels 30.44 5.23 .21 35.46 3.85 
Coke 4.09 .18 .44 3.82 .92 
Oil, gas, petrol 238.73 95.34 16.38 317.69 69.64 
Electr.,gas,water 170.64 .58 .51 170. 7l 55.78 
Nuclear fuels 3.47 1.67 1.35 3.79 1.86 
Ores, metsle 158.30 29.30 24.90 162.70 16.16 
Non-met. minerals 79.20 4.44 7.52 75.99 14.55 
Chemicals 235.08 17.51 42.61 215.77 69.69 
Metal articles 134.81 19.47 13.11 126.14 48.71 
Mechanical engineering 158.52 17.51 54.59 121.44 103.05 
Office machinery 48.49 19.47 14.97 52.98 31.60 
Electrical soods 154.85 26.81 32.46 149.20 85.00 
Motor vehicles 146.19 14.09 36.73 123.55 107.06 
Other transport 45.61 6.50 10.70 41.41 25.94 
Meats, preserves 48.32 3.78 1.88 50.22 38.91 
Dairy products 58.67 .67 3.08 56.27 43.80 
Other food products 158.94 8.60 7.55 159.99 89.57 
Beverages 54.93 .69 4.14 51.48 27.85 
Tobacco products 39.62 .10 .66 39.06 33.96 
Textiles, clothing 126.01 20.44 17.21 129.24 75.73 
Leather 25.48 4.98 5.45 25.02 18.88 
Timber, furniture 68.82 7.96 3.99 72.79 32.07 
Paper and products 131.11 12.73 6.98 136.86 28.13 
Rubber, plastics 69.06 4.15 8.38 64.82 13.60 
Other manufacturing 18.95 12.13 15.77 15.30 13.84 
Building, civil ensin. 327.26 .oo .oo 327.26 261.27 
Wholesale, retail trade 481.01 4.90 19.58 466.34 342.05 
Lodging, catering 129.83 1.65 1.16 130.32 103.34 
Inland transport 99.38 2.13 3. 31 98.20 34.38 
Sea, air transport 50.46 9.96 31.09 29.32 34.27 
Auxiliary transport 44.90 5.65 5.51 45.04 6.29 
Communications 77.97 1.03 .95 78.05 28.64 
Credit and insurance 425.30 11.81 21.19 415.92 90.56 
Rent 256.69 .77 .46 257.00 220.27 
Other market services 213.65 5.22 5.10 213.77 155.28 
Non-market services 627.51 .oo .oo 627.51 627.27 
Total 5315.59 469.39 437.47 5347.51 2989.55 
~: Sectoral and VISA database, Commission, Apparent Consumption • 
Production + Imports - Exports, Final Production from Input-Output 
tables 
~: The import figures for stage 1 only cover 
consumption, including investment goods. 
stage 2 cover both final and intermediate 
services. 
goods comprising final 
The trade figures for 
goods, together with 
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Table A.2: Results of Static Calculations, Stage 1 
Agriculture 
011, Natural Gas 
Mineral Oil Refining 
Pharmaceuticals 
Soap, Detergents 
Household Chemicals 
Metal Products 
Boilermaking 
Tools, metal Goods 
Agric. Machinery 
Machine Tools 
Textile Machinery 
Food, Chemical Mach. 
Mining Equipment etc. 
Transmission Equip. 
Other Mach. Industry 
Other Mach. Equip. 
Office Machinery 
Electrical Machinery 
Telecom. Equipment 
Radio Television 
Dom. Electrical Equip. 
Vehicles, Engines 
Vehicle Bodies 
Shipbuilding 
Rail Rolling Stock 
Cycles, Motorcycles 
AeroRpace 
Optical Photographic 
Clocks, Watches 
Vegetable, Animal Oils 
Meat Preparation 
Dairy Products 
Fruit, Veg. Processing 
Fish Processing 
Grain Milling 
Pasta 
Starch Products 
Bread, Flour 
Sugar Refining 
Cocoa, Choco., Sugar 
Animal Food 
Other Food Products 
Ethyl, Distilling 
Wine 
Cider, Perry, Mead 
Brewing 
Soft Drinks, Water 
Tobacco Products 
Manufact. of Leather 
Footwear 
Clothing 
Household Textiles 
Fur Goods 
Wooden Furniture 
Printing 
Publishing 
Rubber Products 
Retread, Repair Tyres 
Processed Plastics 
Jewellery 
Musical Inatrumanta 
Photo.Processing 
Toys, Sports Goods 
Miscellaneous 
Total 
Change in 
intra-EC 
imports (%) 
A B 
(i) (U) 
6.4 
2.7 
1.7 
1.8 
1.1 
1.8 
2.0 
1.9 
2.6 
5.7 
7.6 
7.6 
6.3 
6.4 
7.0 
6.8 
7.3 
4.4 
4.3 
4.9 
4.9 
3.6 
1.1 
.8 
1.9 
1.4 
1.7 
1.5 
6.3 
8.0 
1.0 
.7 
.7 
.9 
1.0 
.8 
.6 
.8 
.6 
1.0 
.7 
.8 
.8 
1.3 
2.1 
1.8 
1.2 
1.1 
.8 
6.8 
6.1 
6.9 
6.8 
6.2 
6.2 
3.2 
3.2 
3.6 
3.0 
3.2 
3.5 
'·' 4.1 
4.8 
3.6 
3.7 
s.o 
8.3 
5.4 
2.6 
1.6 
2.5 
2.5 
2.3 
3.2 
5.1 
7.3 
7.1 
6.0 
6.2 
6.7 
6.5 
7.0 
2.9 
6.1 
6.9 
6.9 
5.0 
3.4 
2.5 
5.0 
3.3 
4.6 
4.0 
4.0 
5.3 
2.4 
1.7 
1.6 
2.0 
2.3 
1.8 
1.4 
1.9 
1.4 
2.2 
1.6 
1.8 
1.8 
2.9 
4.9 
4.2 
2.9 
2.4 
2.0 
3.3 
2.9 
3.4 
3.4 
2.5 
4.4 
2.8 
2.8 
4.5 
3.6 
4.0 
3.9 
6.0 
4.4 
5.2 
3.8 
4.5 
Change in 
extra-EC 
imports (%) 
A B 
(iii) (iv) 
-1.8 
-.5 
-1.0 
-1.7 
-2.2 
-1.5 
-3.3 
-3.4 
-2.7 
-8.4 
-4.6 
-5.1 
-6.2 
-6.2 
-5.5 
-5.8 
-5.5 
-3.1 
-3.0 
-2.5 
-2.3 
-4.0 
-1.1 
-1.2 
-.4 
-.6 
-.6 
-.8 
-3.1 
-1.5 
.o 
.o 
.o 
.o 
.o 
.o 
.o 
.o 
.o 
.o 
.o 
.o 
.o 
-3.0 
-1.8 
-2.3 
-2.9 
-3.5 
.o 
-3.1 
-3.9 
-2.5 
-2.6 
-2.4 
-6.4 
-3.2 
-3.2 
-3.8 
-4.0 
-4.0 
-1.2 
-1.6 
-3.0 
-2.1 
-2.7 
-2.2 
-1.4 
-1.6 
-2.9 
-2.3 
-3.1 
-2.1 
-3.9 
-3.9 
-3.4 
-7.8 
-4.5 
-4.8 
-6.0 
-6.0 
-5.4 
-5.6 
-5.3 
-2.1 
-4.1 
-3.5 
-3.2 
-5.6 
-3.6 
-4.1 
-1.1 
-1.6 
-1.5 
-2.0 
-2.0 
-1.0 
.o 
.o 
.o 
.0 
.o 
.o 
.o 
.o 
.o 
.o 
.o 
.o 
.o 
-7.2 
-4.3 
-5.5 
-7.2 
-7.2 
.o 
-1.5 
-1.9 
-1.3 
-1.3 
-1.0 
-4.6 
-2.8 
-2.8 
-4.8 
-5.2 
-5.1 
-1.3 
-1.7 
-3.3 
-2.3 
-2.9 
-2.6 
Static 
Welfare 
gains 
(ECU bn) 
A B 
(v) (vi) 
.4 .3 
.1 .2 
.l .3 
.o .o 
.o .o 
.o .1 
.o .o 
.o .o 
.o .1 
.1 .1 
.1 • 1 
.o .o 
.1 .1 
.1 .1 
.1 .1 
.1 .1 
.3 .3 
.3 .2 
.1 .1 
.2 .2 
.1 • 2 
.l .1 
.2 .5 
.o .o 
.o .o 
.o .o 
.o .o 
.1 .2 
.1 .o 
.o .o 
.o .1 
.1 .3 
.1 .2 
.o .1 
.o .o 
.o .0 
.o .o 
.o .o 
.o .o 
.o .o 
.o .1 
.o .o 
.o .1 
.o .o 
.o .o 
.o .o 
.o .o 
.o .o 
.o .o 
.o .o 
.1 .o 
.1 .1 
.o .o 
.o .o 
.1 .1 
.o .o 
.o .o 
.o .o 
.o .o 
.o .o 
.1 .1 
.o .o 
.o .o 
.o .o 
.1 .2 
3.8 5.1 
Public Total 
Procure- gains 
ment (ECU bn) 
(ECU bn) 
A B 
(vii) (vtli) (tx) 
.o 
.o 
.o 
.9 
.o 
.o 
.0 
.o 
.o 
.o 
.o 
.o 
.o 
.o 
.0 
.o 
.1 
.2 
.o 
.4 
.o 
.o 
.1 
.o 
.o 
1.1 
.o 
.o 
.o 
.o 
.o 
.o 
.o 
.o 
.o 
.0 
.o 
.o 
.o 
.o 
.o 
.o 
.o 
.o 
.o 
.o 
.o 
.o 
.o 
.o 
.o 
.1 
.o 
.o 
.o 
.o 
.o 
.o 
.o 
.o 
.o 
.o 
.o 
.o 
.o 
3.9 
.4 
.1 
.1 
1.0 
.o 
.o 
.o 
.o 
.1 
.1 
.1 
.o 
.1 
.1 
.1 
.1 
.4 
.5 
.1 
.5 
.1 
• 1 
.2 
.o 
.o 
1.1 
.o 
.] 
.1 
.o 
.o 
.1 
.1 
.0 
.o 
.o 
.o 
.o 
.o 
.o 
.o 
.o 
.o 
.o 
.o 
.o 
.o 
.o 
.o 
.o 
.1 
.3 
.o 
.o 
.1 
.o 
.o 
.o 
.o 
.o 
.1 
.o 
.o 
.o 
.2 
7.7 
.3 
.2 
.3 
1.0 
.o 
.1 
.o 
.o 
.1 
.1 
.1 
.o 
.1 
.1 
.1 
.1 
.4 
.4 
.1 
.6 
.2 
.1 
.6 
.o 
.o 
1.1 
.o 
• 2 
.o 
.o 
.1 
.3 
.2 
.1 
.o 
.o 
.o 
.o 
.o 
.o 
.1 
.o 
.1 
.o 
.o 
.o 
.o 
.o 
.o 
.o 
.o 
.2 
.o 
.o 
.1 
.o 
.o 
.o 
.o 
.o 
.1 
.o 
.o 
.o 
.2 
9.0 
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Table A3: Results of atatic calculations, stage 1 
Agriculture 
Oil, Natural Gas 
Mineral Oil Refining 
Pharmaceuticals 
Soap, Detergents 
Household Chemicals 
Metal Products 
Boilermaking 
Tools, metal Goods 
Agric. Machinery 
Machine Tools 
Textile Machinery 
Food, Chemical Mach. 
Mining Equipment etc. 
Transmission Equip. 
Other Mach. Industry 
Other Mach. Equip. 
Office Machinery 
Electrical Machinery 
Telecom. Equipment 
Radio Television 
Dom. Electrical Equip. 
Vehiclea, Engines 
Vehicle Bodiea 
Shipbuilding 
Rail Rolling Stock 
Cycles, Motorcycles 
Aerospace 
Optical Photographic 
Clocks, Watches 
Vegetable, Animal Oils 
Meat Preparation 
Dairy Products 
Fruit, Veg. Processing 
Fish Processing 
Grain Milling 
Pasta 
Starch Products 
Bread, Flour 
Sugar Refining 
Cocoa, Choco., Sugar 
Animal Food 
Other Food Products 
Ethyl, Distilling 
Wine 
Cider, Perry, Mead 
Brewing 
Soft Drinks, Water 
Tobacco Products 
Manufact. of Leather 
Footwear 
Clothing 
Household Textiles 
Fur Goods 
Wooden Furniture 
Printing 
Publishing 
Rubber Products 
Retread, Repair Tyres 
Processed Plastics 
Jewellery 
Musical Instruments 
Photo.Procesaing 
Toys, Sporta Goods 
Miscellaneous 
Total 
Coat Reduction 
stage 1 (%) 
A B 
(i) (ii) 
2.0 
.a 
.a 
.a 
.a 
.a 
1.2 
1.2 
1.2 
2.7 
2.4 
2.4 
2.4 
2.4 
2.4 
2.4 
2.4 
1.4 
1.4 
1.4 
1.4 
1.4 
.5 
.5 
.5 
.5 
.5 
.5 
2.1 
2.1 
1.0 
1.0 
1.1 
1.0 
.9 
1.0 
1.0 
1.0 
1.0 
.9 
1.0 
1.1 
.9 
1.0 
1.0 
1.0 
1.0 
1.1 
1.0 
2.3 
2.3 
2.3 
2.3 
2.0 
3.1 
1.4 
1.7 
1.6 
1.6 
1.6 
1.6 
1.5 
2.2 
2.3 
1.1 
1.1 
1.1 
1.5 
1.5 
1.5 
2.5 
2.3 
2.3 
2.3 
2.3 
2.3 
2.3 
2.3 
.9 
2.0 
2.0 
2.0 
2.0 
1.6 
1.6 
1.4 
1.3 
1.4 
1.5 
1.3 
1.3 
2.3 
2.3 
2.4 
2.3 
2.2 
2.4 
2.3 
2.3 
2.3 
2.2 
2.3 
2.4 
2.3 
2.3 
2.3 
2.3 
2.3 
2.4 
2.3 
1.1 
1.1 
1.1 
1.1 
.9 
2.2 
1.4 
1.4 
2.1 
2.0 
2.0 
1.6 
1.8 
La 
1.a 
1.7 
A 
(iii) 
-.7 
-.2 
-.3 
-.4 
-.6 
-.4 
-.a 
-.a 
-.7 
-1.7 
-1.1 
-1.2 
-1.4 
-1.3 
-1.2 
-1.3 
-1.2 
-.7 
-.7 
-.6 
-.6 
-.a 
-.3 
-.3 
-.1 
-.2 
-.2 
-.2 
-.9 
-.5 
-.4 
-.6 
-.7 
-.6 
-.5 
-.5 
-.7 
-.5 
-.7 
-.4 
-.6 
-.7 
-.5 
-.7 
-.5 
-.6 
-.7 
-.9 
-.a 
-.9 
-1.1 
-.a 
-.a 
-.a 
-1.9 
-.9 
-.9 
-.9 
-1.0 
-1.0 
-.5 
-.5 
-.a 
-.6 
-~8 
-.7 
Change in 
Price (%) 
B 
(iv) 
-.5 
-.6 
-1.1 
-.5 
-.7 
-.5 
-.a 
-.9 
-.7 
-1.5 
-1.0 
-1.0 
-1.2 
-1.2 
-1.1 
-1.2 
-1.1 
-.4 
-.9 
-.a 
-.a 
-1.1 
-.9 
-1.0 
-.2 
-.2 
-.2 
-.5 
-.5 
-.3 
1.0 
-1.3 
-1.4 
-1.3 
-1.0 
-1.2 
-1.5 
-1.2 
-1.5 
-.a 
-1.4 
-1.3 
-1.2 
-1.6 
-1.2 
-1.4 
-1.6 
-.a 
-1.7 
-.4 
-.4 
-.4 
-.4 
-.4 
-1.3 
-.7 
-.7 
-1.1 
-1.2 
-1.2 
.-.6 
-.5 
-.a 
-.6 
-.4 
-.a 
A 
(v) 
3.3 
.9 
.7 
-.3 
-.7 
-.3 
-.9 
-1.0 
-.6 
-2.0 
-.4 
-.6 
-1.1 
-1.1 
-.a 
-.9 
-.a 
-.6 
-.3 
-.1 
-.1 
-.a 
-.2 
-.3 
.2 
.1 
.2 
.1 
-.2 
.3 
.3 
.3 
.3 
.3 
.3 
.2 
.3 
.3 
.3 
.3 
.3 
.4 
.3 
-1.0 
-.4 
-.6 
-1.0 
.4 
-.3 
-.1 
.4 
.3 
.4 
-1.2 
-.6 
-.6 
1.9 
1.5 
1.7 
1.7 
.2 
.1 
-.4 
-.0 
-.3 
Change in 
Imports (%) 
B 
(vi) 
2.6 
2.7 
2.3 
-.4 
-.9 
-.4 
-1.0 
-1.1 
-.7 
-2.0 
-.4 
-.5 
-1.1 
-1.1 
-.a 
-.9 
-.7 
-.4 
-.5 
-.2 
-.1 
-1.2 
-.7 
-1.1 
.5 
.3 
.4 
.4 
-.1 
.2 
.6 
.7 
.a 
.7 
.7 
.7 
.7 
.7 
.7 
.6 
.7 
.a 
.7 
-2.5 
-.9 
-1.5 
-2.6 
-2.6 
1.0 
-.1 
-.1 
.2 
• 1 
.l 
-.a 
-.6 
-.5 
2.4 
1.7 
2.1 
.2 
.1 
-.4 
-.1 
-.3 
.2 
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Table A.4: Results of Static Calculations, Stage 2 
Change in Change in Static 
output (%) extra-EC Welfare gains 
imports (%) (ECU bn) 
A B A B A B 
( i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) 
Agriculture .4 2.9 .o .o .4 2.8 
Solid fuels .o .o 2.4 2.9 .o .1 
Coke .o .o 3.9 4.4 .o .o 
Oil, gas, petrol 2.7 2.7 -4.3 -4.4 1.1 1.1 
Electr.,gas,water 2.7 2.8 -31.5 -32.0 3.3 3.3 
Nuclear fuels .o .o .o .o .o .o 
Ores, metals 2.3 8.4 -8.6 -31.0 .5 1.7 
Non-met. minerals 1.1 1.2 -8.3 -9.1 .3 .3 
Chemicals 1.7 1.8 -9.5 -10.4 1.7 1.9 
Metal articles .8 1.4 -7.1 -12.4 .7 1.2 
Mechanical engineering 1.4 2.0 -6.0 -8.4 1.6 2.3 
Office machinery 3.4 3.9 -5.8 -6.7 1.1 1.3 
Electrical goods 1.9 2.6 -5.8 -7.7 1.8 2.3 
Motor vehicles 1.4 2.0 -5.4 -7.4 1.8 2.5 
Other transport 1.7 2.2 -5.2 -6.7 .5 .6 
Meats, preserves .4 1.5 .o .o .4 1.5 
Dairy products .4 1.5 .o .o .5 1.8 
Other food products .4 1.0 .o .o 1.0 2.2 
Beverages .5 .6 -1.9 -2.5 .3 .5 
Tobacco products .2 .3 -2.2 -3.2 .2 .2 
Textiles, clothing 1.7 1.8 -5.3 -5.8 1.5 1.7 
Leather 1.8 2.2 -5.2 -6.4 .4 .5 
Timber, furniture 1.6 2.2 -5.4 -7.4 .6 .8 
Paper and products 1.7 1.8 -6.2 -6.7 .5 .6 
Rubber, plastics 1.6 1.8 -7.3 -8.1 .3 .3 
Other manufacturing 3.4 4.6 -4.4 -6.0 .5 .6 
Building, civil engin. 1.0 1.2 -2.0 -2.4 4.2 4.9 
Wholesale, retail trade .9 .9 .o .o 3.5 3.8 
Lodging, catering .9 1.4 .o .o 1.1 1. 8 
Inland transport 2.8 2.8 -7.6 -7.7 1.5 1.5 
Sea, air transport 3.5 3.6 -10.3 -10.4 1.4 1.4 
Auxiliary transport 1.1 1.2 -5.3 -5.6 .1 .1 
Communications 3.0 3.0 -30.7 -30.9 1.7 1.7 
Credit and insurance 6.7 6.7 -60.9 -61.3 10.5 10.6 
Rent .4 .4 -3.5 -3.7 1.5 1.6 
Other market services .7 .7 .o .o 5.9 6.0 
Non-market services .6 .7 .o .o 5.8 6.4 
Total 1.3 1.5 -5.7 -7.7 58.0 71.8 
... / ... 
- 525 -
- 8.36 -
Table AS: Results of static calculations, stage 2 
Cost Reduction Change in Change in total 
Stage 2 (%) Price (%) output (%) 
A B A B A B 
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) 
Agriculture 0.8 5.9 -.5 -3.9 .4 2.9 
Solid fuels 1.1 1.3 -6.4 -1.3 .8 1.0 
Coke 1.4 1.6 -4.9 -1.4 1.0 1.1 
Oil, gas, petrol 1.3 1.3 -.8 -.7 2.7 2.7 
Electr.,gas,water 5.8 5.9 -5.3 -5.3 2.7 2.8 
Nuclear fuels 1.6 1.7 -.1 .o .o .o 
Ores, metals 1.9 6.9 -1.5 -5.2 2.3 8.4 
Non-met. minerals 1.6 1.8 -1.4 -1.5 1.1 1.2 
Chemicals 1.9 2.1 -1.6 -1.7 1.7 1.8 
Metal articles 1.4 2.4 -1.2 -2.1 .8 1.4 
Mechanical engineering 1.4 1.9 -1.0 -1.4 1.4 2.0 
Office machinery 1.7 2.0 -1.0 -1.1 3.4 3.9 
Electrical goods 1.4 1.8 -1.0 -1.3 1.9 2.6 
Motor vehicles 1.5 2.1 -1.1 -1.5 1.4 2.0 
Other transport 1.5 1.9 -.7 -1.3 1.7 2.2 
Meats, preserves 0.9 4.0 -.8 -2.9 .4 1.5 
Dairy products 1.1 4.3 -.8 -3.2 .4 1.5 
Other food products 1.1 2.6 -.9 -1.9 .4 1.0 
Beverages 1.3 1.7 -.9 -1.3 .5 .6 
Tobacco products 0.5 0.7 -.4 -.5 .2 .3 
Textiles, clothing 1.3 1.5 -.9 -1.0 1.7 1.8 
Leather 1.4 1.7 -.9 -1.1 1.8 2.2 
Timber, furniture 1.3 1.8 -.9 -1.2 1.6 2.2 
Paper and products 1.5 1.6 -1.1 -1.1 1.7 1.8 
Rubber, plastics 1.6 1.8 -1.2 -1.4 1.6 1.8 
Other manufacturing 1.5 2.1 -.8 -1.0 3.4 4.6 
Building, civil engin. .13 1.5 -1.0 -1.2 1.0 1.2 
Wholesale, retail trade 1.1 1.1 -.9 -.9 .9 .9 
Lodging, catering 1.1 1.7 -.9 -1.4 .9 1.4 
Inland transport 4.4 4.4 -3.8 -3.9 2.8 2.8 
Sea, air transport 6.2 6.3 -5.2 -5.2 3.5 3.6 
Auxiliary transport 1.1 1.2 -.9 -.9 1.1 1.2 
Communications 5.7 5.8 -5.1 -5.1 3.0 3.0 
Credit and insurance 11.5 11.6 -10.2 -10.2 6.7 6.7 
Rent 0.7 0.7 -.6 -.6 .4 .4 
Other market services 3.8 3.9 -3.6 -3.7 .7 .7 
Non-market services 0.9 1.0 -.8 -.9 .6 .7 
Average 2.4 3.0· -1.5 -1.8 1.3 1.5 
... I ... 
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Table A6: Economies of scale and total static welfare effects 
Eos1 EOS Welfare Gains2 Total static 
Parameter Intermediate Final Welfare 
goods Goods Gains2 
A B A B A B 
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) 
Agriculture 0 .o .o .o .o .o .o 
Solid fuels 0 .o .o .o .o .o .o 
Coke 0 .o .o .o .o .o .o 
Oil, gas, petrol 0.12 .o .o .3 .6 .4 .6 
Electr.,gas,water 0 .o .o .o .o .o .o 
Nuclear fuels 0 .o .o .o .o .o .o 
Ores, metals 0.11 .1 .2 .o .2 .1 .4 
Non-met. minerals 0.05 .o .o .o .o .o .o 
Chemicals 0.12 .2 .2 .2 .2 .3 .4 
Metal articles 0.06 .1 .1 .o .1 .1 .2 
Mechanical engineering 0.1 .1 .2 .5 .5 .6 .7 
Office machinery o.n .1 .1 .3 .3 .4 .4 
Electrical goods 0.08 .2 .2 .3 .4 .5 ~6 
Motor vehicles 0.14 .2 .2 .3 .5 .4 .7 
Other transport 0.12 .o .o .1 .2 .1 .2 
Meats, preserves 0.04 .o .o .o .o .o .o 
Dairy products 0.04 .o .o .o .o .o .o 
Other food products 0.04 .o .o .o .1 .1 .1 
Beverages 0.04 .o .o .o .o .o .o 
Tobacco products 0.03 .o .o .o .o .o .o 
Textiles, clothing 0._03 .o .o .1 .o .1 .1 
Leather 0.03 .o .o .o .o .1 .o 
Timber, furniture 0.04 .o .o .o .o .1 .1 
Paper and products 0.07 .o .o .o .o .1 .1 
Rubber, plastics 0.04 .o .o .o .o .o .o 
Other manufacturing 0.04 .o .o .1 .1 .1 .1 
Building, civil engin. 0 .1 .1 .o .o .1 .1 
Wholesale, retail trade .1 .1 .o .o .1 .1 
Lodging, catering .o .o .o .o .o .o 
Inland transport .o .o .o .o .o .o 
Sea, air transport .o .o .o .o .o .o 
Auxiliary transport .o .o .o .o .o .o 
Communications .o .o .o .o .o .o 
Credit and insurance .o .o .o .o .o .o 
Rent .o .o .o .o .o .o 
Other market services .o .o .o .o .o .o 
Non-market services .1 .1 .o .o .1 .1 
Total 1.5 1.8 2.4 3.3 3.9 5.1 
1 Percentage reduction in average cost for a one per cent increase in output (see Annex 
C3). 
2 Billion ECU. 
. .. I . .. 
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Table A7: Total static welfare effects (bn ECU) 
(I) (II) (III) 
Trade PP Production Cost Economies of Total 
Scale 
A B A B A B A B 
Agriculture .4 .3 .4 2.8 .o .o .8 3.1 
Solid fuels .o .o .o .1 .o .o .1 .1 
Coke .o .o .o .o .o .o .o .o 
Oil, gas, petrol .2 .5 1.1 1.1 .4 .6 1.6 2.3 
Electr.,gas,water .o .o 3.3 3.3 .o .o 3.3 3.3 
Nuclear fuels .o .o .o .o .o .o .o .o 
Ores, metals .o .o .5 1.7 .1 .4 .6 2.1 
Non-met. minerals .o .o .3 .3 .o .o .3 .3 
Chemicals 1.0 1.0 1.7 1.9 .3 .4 3.1 3.3 
Metal articles .1 .1 .7 1.2 .1 .2 .9 1.5 
Mechanical engineering 1.0 .9 1.6 2.3 .6 .7 3.2 3.9 
Office machinery .6 .4 1.1 1.3 .4 .4 2.0 2.1 
Electrical goods .8 1.0 1.8 2.3 .5 .6 3.0 1.8 
Motor vehicles .2 .6 1.8 2.5 .4 .7 2.5 ~.0 
Other transport 1.2 1.3 .5 .6 .1 .2 1.8 2.8 
Meats, preserves .1 .3 .4 1.5 .0 .o .5 .5 
Dairy products .1 .2 .5 1.8 .o .o .6 .3 
Other food products .2 .5 1.0 2.2 .1 .1 1.2 1.8 
Beverages .o .1 .3 .5 .o .o .4 .7 
Tobacco products .o .o .2 .2 .o .o .2 .9 
Textiles, clothing .1 .1 1.5 1.7 .1 .1 1.7 .7 
Leather .3 .2 .4 .5 .1 .o .7 .4 
Timber, furniture .1 .1 .6 .8 .1 .1 .7 1.0 
Paper and products .1 .1 .5 .6 .1 .1 .7 5.9 
Rubber, plastics .o .1 .3 .3 .o .o .3 3.8 
Other manufacturing .3 .3 .5 .6 .1 .1 .8 1.8 
Building, civil engin. .9 .9 4.2 4.9 .1 .1 5.3 5.9 
Wholesale, retail trade .o .o 3.5 3.8 .1 .1 3.6 3.8 
Lodging, catering .o .o 1.1 1.8 .o .o 1.1 1.8 
Inland transport .o .o 1.5 1.5 .o .o 1.5 1.5 
Sea, air transport .o .o 1.4 1.4 .o .o 1.4 1.4 
Auxiliary transport .o .o 0 1 .1 .o .o .1 .1 
Communications .o .o 1.7 1.7 .o .o 1.7 1.7 
Credit and insurance .o .o 10.5 10.6 .o .o 10.5 10.6 
Rent .o .o 1.5 1.6 .o .o .15 1.6 
Other market services .o .o 5.9 6.0 .o .o 5.9 6.0 
Non-market services .o .o 5.8 6.4 .1 .1 5.9 6.5 
Total 7.7 9.0 58.0 71.8 3.9 5.1 69.6 85.8 
... I . .. 
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Annex B 
Data Requirements 
In addition to estimates of non-tariff barrier cost reductions stages one 
and two also require trade and output data, the relevant price elasticities 
and the common external tariff (CET). For the calculations of the static 
trade effects in stage one, price elasticities of import demand in each EC 
country are required plus export elasticities for both the rest of the 
Community and the rest of the world. Assuming perfectly substitutablegoods 
these elasticities can be derived from industry supply and demand curves. 
In practise the industry supply curves may be difficult to define because 
of oligopoly power. 
Trade and output 
Trade data for stage one which considers only trade in final manufactured 
and agricultural goods are drawn from the VISA databank for the EC, in this 
case at Nace 3-digit level and distinguishing intra-EC and extra-EC 
imports. For stage two which considers the whole economy but s.t an 
aggregate Community (the above seven countries) level, both production data 
and data for trade in services are required. The production or output data 
are drawn from the Commission's sectoral database which operates at the 
R-25 level. Where necessary these sectoral data are disaggregated using 
country-specific input-output tables to the R-44 level. The correspondance 
between R-44 and R-25 is given in Table B8. Data on extra-EC exports and 
extra-EC imports for the individual countries is taken from the VISA 
databank for manufactured and agricultural goods. For services the trade 
data from the most recent country input-output tables are taken and scaled 
up by the appropriate increase in output to produce 1985 figures. The data 
on output and extra-EC trade are then aggregated for the seven countries 
and transformed to give a data series for apparent consumption. 
Elasticities 
For the seven EC countries and for each sector import demand elasticities 
have been selected on the basis of a literature search, the main sources 
... / ... 
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being Stern, Francis and Schumacher 
within the Cambridge Growth Project. 
(1976) and the studies undertaken 
The latter constitute the most 
comprehensive set of disaggregated import price elasticities that are 
available. For countries other than the UK, elasticities have been 
selected (i) by taking account of Stern et alia's best point estimates 
which are generally at a higher level of aggregation, (ii) by analogy with 
those for the UK and (iii) by taking into account the fact that high import 
consumption sectors usually imply low price elasticities of demand and that 
elasticities are typically greater for manufactured goods than for 
non-manufactured goods; furthermore that among the latter, elasticities are 
typically higher for raw materials than for food and beverages. 
Econometric estimates of export supply elasticities for either the 
Community or the rest of the world are less evident. The parameters used 
here are based on surveys (Goldstein and Khan ( 1985), Davenport, ( 1986)) 
and on the expectation that these estimates are inversely correlated with 
the degree of export openness and positively correlated with real GNP 
(Gylfason 1978). It has been assumed that each Community country faces 
the same rest-of-the-Community supply elasticity. 
Most processed foodstuffs entering the Community from outside face a tariff 
and some are subject to a variable levy. This levy is determined by the 
prevailing price of products for which there is a Common Agricultural 
Policy regime and effectively excludes a supply reaction from the rest of 
the world to changes in internal Community prices. Therefore the export 
elasticity of the rest of the world was artificially set equal to zero for 
meat products, dairy products, cereals and sugar. 
For stage two where the impact of Community-wide cost reductions, both on 
goods produced for dometic consumption and on those destined for export, is 
calculated, demand and supply elasticities by sector for the Community are 
required. The uncompensated demand elasticities are based on the Hermes 
model results (Italianer 1986) for the various national estimates of the 
Rotterdam specification developed by Barten (1969). These estimates are 
supplemented with more recent studies using the same or similar 
specifications (Lluch et alia 1977). 
• .. I . •. 
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A survey of econometric models having some sectoral breakdown of the 
determination of capital formation demonstrates the extreme sensitivity of 
the estimate of the price elasticity of demand for investment goods to 
model specification• These elasticities were, in effect, set at unity. A 
complete list of the elasticities used is given in Tables B3-B5. 
Common External Tariff 
Tables B6 and B7 detail the values that have been used for the common 
external tariff (CET). The CET is actually levied on about six thousand 
goods accor~ing to their Nimexe classification. The main source of the 
values used here (which are unweighted averages for sectoral 
classifications) is material produced by the GATT Committee on Trade and 
Development. 
Economies of scale 
Finally, it is necessary to have economies of scale parameters for use in 
stage three where scale effects on final goods are treated and for scale 
effects on intermediate goods in stage two. From the information on the 
cost gradient at a given percentage of minimum efficient scale (see Pratten 
1987) it is possible to derive a sectoral relationship between increases in 
production or output and reductions in unit cost provided some assumption 
is made regarding the form of the cost function and that it is assumed that 
extra production gets spread in an even fashion across average-sized plants 
which are producing below minimum efficient scale. This has been done at 
Nace 2-digit level to produce what is essentially a rather static measure 
of economies of scale, i.e. assuming extra output is spread across existing 
plant without any restructuring of capacity. The parameters are given in 
Table A6. 
. .. / ... 
532 - 8.4~ - Table Bl: Coat B.ecluctiona 2% sector ancl countr;l for ataae 1A 
D F I NL B UK 
Aariculture 2.9 1.8 1.6 1.5 1.4 1.5 
Oil, Natural Gas .7 .8 .8 1.0 .8 .7 
Mineral Oil Refining .7 .8 .8 1.0 .8 .7 
Pharmaceuticals .4 .7 1.6 1.0 .5 .7 
Soap, Detergents .4 .7 1.6 1.0 .5 . 7 
Household Chemicals .4 .7 1.6 1.0 .5 .7 
Metal Products 1.5 .8 1.8 .5 .5 .7 
Boilermaking 1.5 .8 1.8 .5 .5 .7 
Tools, metal Goods 1.5 .8 1.8 .5 .5 .7 
Agric. Machinery 1.9 4.0 2.5 1.6 1.6 2.1 
Machine Tools 1.9 4.0 2.5 1.6 1.6 2.1 
Textile Machinery 1.9 4.0 2.5 1.6 1.6 2.1 
Food, Chemical Mach. 1.9 4.0 2.5 1.6 1.6 2.1 
Mining Equipment etc. 1.9 4.0 2.5 1.6 1.6 2.1 
Transmission Equip. 1.9 4.0 2.5 1.6 1.6 2.1 
Other Mach. Industry 1.9 4.0 2.5 1.6 1.6 2.1 
Other Mach. Equip. 1.9 4.0 2.5 1.6 1.6 2.1 
Office Machinery 1.1 1.4 1.9 1.2 1.5 1.6 
Electrical Machinery 1.1 1.4 1.9 1.2 1.5 1.6 
Telecom. Equipment 1.1 1.4 1.9 1.2 1.5 1.6 
B.sdio Television 1.1 1.4 1.9 1.2 1.5 1.6 
Dom. Electrical Equip. 1.1 1.4 1.9 1.2 1.5 1.6 
Vehicles, Engines .5 .4 .7 .5 • 3 .5 
Vehicle Bodies .5 .4 .7 .5 .3 .5 
Shipbuilding .5 .4 .7 .5 .3 .5 
B.sil Rolling Stock .5 .4 .7 .5 .3 • 5 
Cycles, Motorcycles .5 .4 .7 .5 .3 .5 
Aerospace .5 .4 .7 .5 .3 .5 
Optical Photographic 1.5 2.3 2.5 3.3 1.8 1.9 
Clocks, Watches 1.5 2.3 2.5 3.3 1.8 1.9 
Vegetable, Animal Oils 1.4 .7 1.1 .7 1.8 .5 
Meat Preparation 1.4 .7 1.1 .7 1.8 .5 
Dairy Products 1.4 .7 1.1 .7 1.8 • 5 
Fruit, Vag. Processing 1.4 .7 1.1 .7 1.8 .5 
Fish Processing 1.4 .7 1.1 .7 1.8 .5 
Grain Milling 1.4 .7 1.1 .7 1.8 • 5 
Pasta 1.4 .7 1.1 .7 1.8 .5 
Starch Products 1.4 .7 1.1 .7 1.8 .5 
Bread, Flour 1.4 .7 1.1 .7 1.8 .5 
Sugar Refining 1.4 .7 1.1 .7 1.8 .5 
Cocoa, Choco • , Sugar 1.4 .7 1.1 .7 1.8 .5 
Animal Food 1.4 .7 1.1 .7 1.8 .5 
Other Food Products 1.4 .7 1.1 .7 1.8 .5 
Ethyl, Distilling 1.4 .7 1.1 .7 1.8 .5 
Wine 1.4 .7 1.1 .7 1.8 .5 
Cider, Perry, Mead 1.4 .7 1.1 .7 1.8 • 5 
Brewing 1.4 .7 1.1 .7 1.8 .5 
Soft Drinks, Water 1.4 .7 1.1 .7 1.8 .5 
Tobacco Products 1.4 .7 1.1 .7 1.8 .5 
Manufact. of Leather 2.3 2.5 1.4 2.2 2.6 2.2 
Footwear 2.3 2.5 1.4 2.2 2.6 2.2 
Clothing 2.3 2.5 1.4 2.2 2.6 2.2 
Household Textiles 2.3 2.5 1.4 2.2 2.6 2.2 
Fur Goods 2.3 2.5 1.4 2.2 2.6 2.2 
Wooden Furniture 1.8 5.1 5.6 3.2 2.2 2.3 
Printing 1.6 1.8 1.9 1.5 1.2 1.5 
Publishing 1.6 1.8 1.9 1.5 1.2 1.5 
Rubber Products 1.6 1.8 1.9 1.5 1.2 l.~ Retread, Repair Tyres 1.6 1.8 1.9 1.5 1.2 1. 5 
Processed Plastics 1.6 1.8 1.9 1.5 1.2 1.5 
Jewellery 1.6 1.8 1.9 1.5 1.2 1.5 Musical Instruments 1.6 1.8 1.9 1.5 1.2 1.5 Photo.Processing 1.6 1.8 1.9 1.5 1.2 1.5 Toys, Sports Goods 1.6 1.8 1.9 1.5 1.2 1.5 
Miscellaneous 1.6 1.8 1.9 1.5 1.2 1.5 
Total 1.6 1.8 1.9 1.5 1.2 1.5 
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Table B2: Cost reductions b:z sector and countr:z for stase lB 
D F I NL B UK 
Agriculture 2.2 1.4 1.3 1.2 1.1 1.2 
Oil, Natural Gas 3.1 2.3 1.9 2.0 2.1 1.3 
Mineral Oil Refining 3.1 2.3 1.9 2.0 2.1 1.3 
Pharmaceuticals 1.1 .9 1.5 1.3 .9 .9 
Soap, Detergents 1.1 .9 1.5 1.3 .9 .9 
Household Chemicals 1.1 .9 1.5 1.3 .9 .9 
Metal Products La 1.3 1.6 1.2 1.7 1.6 
Boilermaking l.a 1.3 1.6 1.2 1.7 1.6 
Tools, metal Goods La 1.3 1.6 1.2 1.7 1.6 
Agric. Machinery 2.3 3.1 2.2 1.5 1.7 2.3 
Machine Tools 2.3 3.1 2.2 1.5 1.7 2.3 
Textile Machinery 2.3 3.1 2.2 1.5 1.7 2.3 
Food, Chemical Mach. 2.3 3.1 2.2 1.5 1.7 2.3 
Mining Equipment etc. 2.3 3.1 2.2 1.5 1.7 2.3 
Transmission Equip. 2.3 3.1 2.2 1.5 1.7 2.3 
Other Mach. Industry 2.3 3.1 2.2 1.5 1.7 2.3 
Other Mach. Equip. 2.3 3.1 2.2 1.5 1.7 2.3 
Office Machinery .7 1.0 1.3 .9 .9 1.0 
Electrical Machinery La 1.9 2.3 La 2.2 2.2 
Telecom. Equipment l.a 1.9 2.3 La 2.2 2.2 
Radio Television La 1.9 2.3 La 2.2 2.2 
Dom. Electrical Equip. 1.a 1.9 2.3 La 2.2 2.2 
Vehicles, Engines l.a 1.9 2.3 La 2.2 2.2 
Vehicle Bodies l.a 1.9 2.3 La 2.2 2.2 
Shipbuilding 1.7 1.2 1.1 1.0 1.3 1.5 
Rail Rolling Stock 1.7 1.2 1.1 1.0 1.3 1.5 
Cycles, Motorcycles 1.7 1.2 1.1 1.0 1.3 1.5 
Aerospace 1.7 1.2 1.1 1.0 1.3 1.5 
Optical Photographic .5 1.4 La 2.2 1.2 1.6 
Clocks, Watches .5 1.4 La 2.2 1.2 1.6 
Vegetable, Animal Oils 2.6 2.0 2.4 2.1 3.0 2.0 
Meat Preparation 2.6 2.0 2.4 2.1 3.0 2.0 
Dairy Products 2.6 2.0 2.4 2.1 3.0 2.0 
Fruit, Veg. Processing 2.6 2.0 2.4 2.1 3.0 2.0 
Fish Proceuing 2.6 2.0 2.4 2.1 3.0 2.0 
Grain Milling 2.6 2.0 2.4 2.1 3.0 2.0 
Pasta 2.6 2.0 2.4 2.1 3.0 2.0 
Starch Products 2.6 2.0 2.4 2.1 3.0 2.0 
Bread, Flour 2.6 2.0 2.4 2.1 3.0 2.0 
Sugar Refining 2.6 2.0 2.4 2.1 3.0 2.0 
Cocoa, Choco., Sugar 2.6 2.0 2.4 2.1 3.0 2.0 
Animal Food 2.6 2.0 2.4 2.1 3.0 2.0 
Other Food Products 2.6 2.0 2.4 2.1 3.0 2.0 
Ethyl, Distilling 2.6 2.0 2.4 2.1 3.0 2.0 
Wine 2.6 2.0 2.4 2.1 3.0 2.0 
Cider, Perry, Mead 2.6 2.0 2.4 2.1 3.0 2.0 
Brewing 2.6 2.0 2.4 2.1 3.0 2.0 Soft Drinks, Water 2.6 2.0 2.4 2.·1 3.0 2.0 
Tobacco Products 2.6 2.0 2.4 2.1 3.0 2.0 
Manufact. of Leather .a 1.3 1.2 1.6 1.4 1.1 Footwear 
.a 1.3 1.2 1.6 1.4 1.1 Clothing 
.a 1.3 1.2 1.6 1.4 1.1 Household Textiles .a .9 1.2 1.6 1.4 1.1 Fur Goods 
.a .1 1.2 1.6 1.4 1.1 
Wooden Furniture 1.3 3.a 3.9 2.2 1.3 l.c; 
Printing 1.4 1.5 1.5 1.3 1.2 1.4 Publishing 1.4 1.5 1.5 1.3 1.2 1.4 Rubber Products 2.4 1.9 1.9 1.6 2.1 2.1 Retread, Repair Tyres 2.4 1.9 1.9 1.6 2.1 2.1 Processed Plastics 2.4 1.9 1.9 1.6 2.1 2.1 
Jewellery 1.7 1.9 2.0 La 1.5 1.7 Musical Instruments 1.7 1.9 2.0 La 1.5 1.7 Photo.Processing 1.7 1.9 2.0 La 1.5 1.7 Toys, Sports Goods 1.7 1.9 2.0 La 1.5 1.7 Miscellaneous 1.7 1.9 2.0 La 1.5 1.7 
Total 2.2 2.0 2.0 1.7 1.7 La 
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Table B3: Excess Demand Elasticities by sector and country, stage 1 
Aariculture 
Oil 1 Natural Gas 
Mineral Oil Refining 
Pharmaceuticals 
Soap, Detergents 
Household Chemicals 
Metal Products 
Boilermaking 
Tools, metal Goods 
Agric. Machinery 
Machine Tools 
Textile Machinery 
Food, Chemical Mach. 
Mining Equipment etc. 
Transmission Equip. 
Other Mach. Industry 
Other Mach. Equip. 
Office Machinery 
Electrical Machinery 
Telecom. Equipment 
Radio Television 
Dom. Electrical Equip. 
Vehicles, Engines 
Vehicle Bodies 
Shipbuilding 
Rail Rolling Stock 
Cycles, Motorcycles 
Aerospace 
Optical Photographic 
Clocks, Watches 
Vegetable, Animal Oils 
Meat Preparation 
Dairy Products 
Fruit, Veg. Processing 
Fish Processing 
Grain Hilling 
Pasta 
Starch Products 
Bread, Flour 
Sugar Refining 
Cocoa, Choco., Sugar 
Animal Food 
Other Food Products 
Ethyl, Distilling 
Wine 
Cider, Perry, Mead 
Brewing 
Soft Drinks, Water 
Tobacco Products 
Manufact. of Leather 
Footwear 
Clothing 
Household Textiles 
Fur Goods 
Wooden Furniture 
Printing 
'Publishing 
Rubber Products 
Retread, Repair Tyres 
Processed Plastics 
Jewellery 
Musical Instruments 
Photo.Processing 
Toys, Sports Goods 
Miscellaneous 
~: see text 
D 
-1.8 
-1.0 
-1.0 
-1.7 
-1.7 
-1.7 
-1.7 
-1.7 
-1.7 
-2.0 
-2.0 
-2.0 
-2.0 
-2.0 
-2.0 
-2.0 
-2.0 
-1.0 
-2.0 
-2.0 
-2.0 
-2.0 
-1.8 
-1.8 
-3.2 
-3.2 
-3.2 
-3.2 
-1.7 
-1.7 
-.8 
-.8 
-.8 
-.8 
-.8 
-.8 
-.8 
-.8 
-.8 
-.8 
-.8 
-.8 
-.8 
-.8 
-.8 
-.8 
-.8 
-.e 
-1.0 
-1.0 
-3.2 
-3.2 
-3.2 
-3.2 
-2.6 
-2.5 
-2.5 
-1.5 
-1.5 
-1.5 
-2.5 
-2.5 
-2.5 
-2.5 
-2.5 
F I 
-1.8 -1.2 
-1.0 -1.0 
-1.0 -1.0 
-1.6 -1.0 
-1.6 -1.0 
-1.6 -1.0 
-1.6 -1.0 
-1.6 -1.0 
-1.6 -1.0 
-2.0 -1.4 
-2.0 -1.4 
-2.0 -1.4 
-2.0 -1.4 
-2.0 -1.4 
-2.0 -1.4 
-2.0 -1.4 
-2.0 -1.4 
-1.0 -1.0 
-2.0 -1.4 
-2.0 -1.4 
-2.0 -1.4 
-2.0 -1.4 
-1.8 -1.2 
-1.8 -1.2 
-3.0 -2.6 
-3.0 -2.6 
-3.0 -2.6 
-3.0 -2.6 
-1.6 -1.0 
-1.6 -1.0 
-.6 -1.0 
-.6 -1.0 
-.6 -1.0 
-.6 -1.0 
-.6 -1.0 
-.6 -1.0 
-.6 -1.0 
-.6 -1.0 
-.6 -1.0 
-.6 -1.0 
-.6 -1.0 
-.6 -1.0 
-.6 -1.0 
-.6 -1.0 
-.6 -1.0 
-.6 -1.0 
-.6 -1.0 
-.6 -1.0 
-1.0 -1.0 
-1.0 -1.0 
-1.7 -1.4 
-1.7 -1.4 
-1.7 -1.4 
-1.7 -1.4 
-1.3 -1.0 
-1.2 -1.0 
-1.2 -1.0 
-2.0 -1.5 
-2.0 -1.5 
-2.0 
-1.5 
-1.2 -1.0 
-1.2 -1.0 
-1.2 -1.0 
-1.2 -1.0 
-1.2 -1.0 
UK NL B/L 
-1.4 -1.1 -1.3 
-1.0 -1.0 -1.0 
-1.0 -1.0 -1.0 
-1.2 -.9 -1.1 
-1.2 -.9 -1.1 
-1.2 -.9 -1.1 
-1.2 -.9 -1.1 
-1.2 -.9 -1.1 
-1.2 -.9 -1.1 
-1.6 -1.3 -1.6 
-1.6 -1.3 -1.6 
-1.6 -1.3 -1.6 
-1.6 -1.3 -1.6 
-1.6 -1.3 -1.6 
-1.6 -1.3 -1.6 
-1.6 -1.3 -1.6 
-1.6 -1.3 -1.6 
-1.0 -1.0 -1.0 
-1.6 -1.3 -1.5 
-1.6 -1.3 -1.5 
-1.6 -1.3 -1.5 
-1.6 -1.3 -1.5 
-1;4 -1.1 -1.3 
-1.4 -1.1 -1.3 
-2.8 -2.5 -2.7 
-2.8 -2.5 -2.7 
-2.8 -2.5 -2.7 
-2.8 -2.5 -2.7 
-1.2 -.9 -1.1 
-1.2 -.9 -1.1 
-.9 -.8 -1.1 
-.9 -.8 -1.1 
-.9 -.8 -1.1 
-.9 -.8 -1.1 
-.9 -.8 -1.1 
-.9 -.8 -1.1 
-.9 -.8 -1.1 
-.9 -.8 -1.1 
-.9 -.8 -1.1 
-.9 -.8 -1.1 
-.9 -.8 -1.1 
-.9 -.8 -1.1 
-.9 -.8 -1.1 
-.9 -.8 -1.1 
-.9 -.8 -1.1 
-.9 -.8 -1.1 
-.9 -.8 
-1.1 
-.9 -.8 -1.1 
-1.0 -1.0 -1.0 
-1.0 -1.0 
-1.0 
-1.0 -1.6 
-1.9 
-1.0 -1.6 
-1.9 
-1.0 -1.6 
-1.9 
-1.0 -1.6 
-1.9 
-1.0 -1.1 -1.4 
-1.0 -.9 
-1.3 
-1.0 -.9 
-1.3 
-1.0 -1.5 -1.5 
-1.0 -1.5 
-1.5 
-1.0 -1.5 
-1.5 
-1.0 -.9 -1.3 
-1.0 -.9 
-1.3 
-1.0 -.9 
-1.3 
-1.0 -.9 
-1.3 
-1.0 -.9 
-1.3 
- 535 
- 8.45 -
Table B4: Excess Supply Elasticities, Community and rest of the world, stage 1 
Agriculture 
Oil, Natural Gas 
Mineral Oil Refining 
Pharmaceuticals 
Soap, Detergents 
Household Chemicals 
Metal Products 
Boilermaking 
Tools, metal Goods 
Agric. Machinery 
Machine Tools 
Textile Machinery 
Food, Chemical Mach. 
Mining Equipment etc. 
Transmission Equip. 
Other Mach. Industry 
Other Mach. Equip. 
Office Machinery 
Electrical Machinery 
Telecom. Equipment 
Radio Television 
Dom. Electrical Equip. 
Vehicles, Engines 
Vehicle Bodies 
Shipbuilding 
Rail Rolling Stock 
Cycles, Motorcycles 
Aerospace 
Optical Photographic 
Clocks, Watches 
Vegetable, Animal Oils 
Meat Preparation 
Dairy Products 
Fruit, Veg. Processing 
Fish Processing 
Grain Milling 
Pasta 
Starch Products 
Bread, Flour 
Sugar Refining 
Cocoa, Chaco., Sugar 
Animal Food 
Other Food Products 
Ethyl, Distilling 
Wine 
Cider, Perry, Mead 
Brewing 
Soft Drinks, Water 
Tobacco Products 
Manufact. of Leather 
Footwear 
Clothing 
Household Textiles 
Fur Goods 
Wooden Furniture 
Printing 
Publishing 
Rubber Products 
Retread, Repair Tyres 
Processed Plastics 
Jewellery 
Musical Instruments 
Photo.Processing 
Toys, Sports Goods 
Miscellaneous 
~: see text 
s.o 
s.o 
s.o 
s.o 
s.o 
s.o 
s.o 
5.0 
s.o 
6.0 
6.0 
6.0 
6.0 
6.0 
6.0 
6.0 
6.0 
6.0 
6.0 
6.0 
6.0 
6.0 
5.0 
5.0 
5.0 
5.0 
s.o 
s.o 
s.o 
s.o 
2.0 
2.0 
2.0 
2.0 
2.0 
2.0 
2.0 
2.0 
2.0 
2.0 
2.0 
2.0 
2.0 
s.o 
s.o 
s.o 
s.o 
5.0 
5.0 
5.0 
5.0 
5.0 
5.0 
5.0 
5.0 
5.0 
5.0 
5.0 
5.0 
s.o 
5.0 
5.0 
5.0 
5.0 
5.0 
s.o 
5.0 
s.o 
5.0 
5.0 
5.0 
5.0 
5.0 
s.o 
6.0 
6.0 
6.0 
6.0 
6.0 
6.0 
6.0 
6.0 
6.0 
6.0 
6.0 
6.0 
6.0 
5.0 
5.0 
5·.o 
s.o 
s.o 
5.0 
5.0 
5.0 
.o 
.o 
.o 
.o 
.o 
.o 
.o 
.o 
.o 
.o 
.o 
.o 
.o 
5.0 
5.0 
s.o 
5.0 
5.0 
.o 
s.o 
5.0 
5.0 
5.0 
s.o 
5.0 
5.0 
5.0 
5.0 
s.o 
s.o 
s.o 
5.0 
s.o 
5.0 
5.0 
- 536 -
- 8.46 -
Table B5: Demand and supply elasticities, stage 2 
ecd ecs er 
Agriculture -.5 1.5 .o 
Solid fuels -1.0 5.0 6.0 
Coke -1.0 5.0 6.0 
Oil, gas, petrol -1.0 5.0 6.0 
Electr.,gas,water -.5 5.0 6.0 
Nuclear fuels -.5 .o 6.0 
Ores, metals -.5 5.0 6.0 
Non-met. minerals -.5 5.0 6.0 
Chemicals -.5 5.0 6.0 
Metal articles -.5 5.0 6.0 
Mechanical engineering -1.0 5.0 6.0 
Office machinery -1.0 5.0 6.0 
Electrical goods -1.0 5.0 6.0 
Motor vehicles -1.0 5.0 6.0 
Other transport -1.0 5.0 6.0 
Meats, preserves -.5 1.5 .o 
Dairy products -.5 1.5 .o 
Other food products -.5 1.5 .o 
Beverages -.5 1.5 .o 
Tobacco products -.5 1.5 .o 
Textiles, clothing -.9 4.0 6.0 
Leather -.9 4.0 6.0 
Timber, furniture -1.0 4.0 6.0 
Paper and products -1.0 4.0 6.0 
Rubber, plastics -1.0 4.0 6.0 
Other manufacturing -1.0 4.0 6.0 
Building, civil engin. -1.0 4.0 6.0 
Wholesale, retail trade -1.0 4.0 6.0 
Lodging, catering -1.0 4.0 6.0 
Inland transport -.7 5.0 2.0 
Sea, air transport -.5 5.0 2.0 
Auxiliary transport -.5 5.0 6.0 
Counnunications -.5 5.0 6.0 
Credit and insurance -.5 5.0 6.0 
Rent -.7 5.0 6.0 
Other market services -.2 5.0 .o 
Non-market services -.8 5.0 .o 
Source: see text 
•.. I . •• 
- 5:37 - Table B6: Common External Tariff by sector, stage 1 
Agriculture 
Oil, Natural Gas 
Mineral Oil Refining 
Pharmaceuticals 
Soap, Detergents 
Household Chemicals 
Metal Products 
Boilermaking 
Tools, metal Goods 
Agric. Machinery 
Machine Tools 
Textile Machinery 
Food, Chemical Mach. 
Mining Equipment etc. 
Transmission Equip. 
Other Mach. Industry 
Other Mach. Equip. 
Office Machinery 
Electrical Machinery 
Telecom. Equipment 
Radio Television 
Dom. Electrical Equip. 
Vehicles, Engines 
Vehicle Bodies 
Shlphullding 
Rail Rolling Stock 
Cycles, Motorcycles 
Aerospace 
Optical Photographic 
Cloc «:s, Watches 
Vegetable, Animal Oils 
Meat Preparation 
Dairy Products 
Fruit, Veg. Processing 
Fish Processing 
Grain Milling 
Pasta 
Starch Products 
Bread, Flour 
Sugar Refining 
Cocoa, Choco., Sugar 
Animal Food 
Other Food Products 
Ethyl, Distilling 
Wine 
Cider, Perry, Mead 
Brewing 
Soft Drinks, Water 
Tobacco Products 
Manufact. of Leather 
Footwear 
Clothing 
Household Textiles 
Fur Goods 
Wooden Furniture 
Printing 
Publishing 
Rubber Products 
Retread, Repair Tyres 
Processed Plastics 
Jewellery 
Musical Instruments 
Photo.Processing 
Toya, Sports Goods 
Miscellaneous 
Source: see text. 
CET (%) 
.o 
.o 
.o 
6.5 
6.4 
6.7 
5.6 
5.7 
5.2 
4.1 
4.1 
4.1 
4.1 
4.1 
4.1 
4.1 
4.1 
4.1 
4.8 
5.5 
5.5 
5.5 
5.5 
6.5 
6.5 
6.5 
6.5 
6.5 
6.5 
5.6 
5.6 
15.0 
20.0 
20.0 
7.0 
13.0 
.o 
15.0 
15.0 
20.0 
80.0 
10.0 
.o 
10.0 
15.0 
10.0 
.o 
24.0 
10.0 
30.0 
7.6 
10.0 
12.5 
10.2 
5.6 
5.2 
2.7 
2.7 
6.3 
4.0 
8.0 
4.0 
5.4 
5.6 
6.1 
5.5 
- Oo"tf 
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Table B7: Common External Tariff by sector, stage 2 
CET (%) 
Agriculture .o 
Solid fuels .o 
Coke .o 
Oil, gas, petrol .o 
Electr.,gas,water .o 
Nuclear fuels .o 
Ores, metals 3.0 
Non-met. minerals 5.0 
Chemicals 6.5 
Metal articles 5.3 
Mechanical engineering 4.1 
Office machinery 5.0 
Electrical goods 5.5 
Motor vehicles 6.5 
Other transport 6.5 
Meats, preserves 20.0 
Dairy products 20.0 
Other food products 16.5 
Beverages 30.0 
Tobacco products 30.0 
Textiles, clothing 10.0 
Leather 7.5 
Timber, furniture 4.8 
Paper and products 5.5 
Rubber, plastics 6.1 
Other manufacturing 5.3 
Building, civil engin. .o 
Wholesale, retail trade .o 
Lodging, catering .o 
Inland transport .o 
Sea, air transport .o 
Auxiliary transport .o 
Communications .o 
Credit and insurance .o 
Rent .o 
Other market services .o 
Non-market services .o 
Source: see text. 
. .. / ... 
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Annex C 
Algebraic details of Method 
C1 Stage 1 
Figure C1 summarises the model for the stage 1 calculations. It is 
identical to figure 2 in Section 2 except that the excess supply curve of 
the rest of the world, ER, has shifted down by a fraction, d, of the 
downward shift in the rest of the Community excess supply curve EC. This 
reflects the extent to which non-Cotmnunity suppliers can also take 
advantage of harmonised or mutually recognised standards. Note that R 
would enjoy producer surplus gains if the displacement from ER to ER' was 
large enough for ER' to cut the new price line P' to the right of Mr. 
Net welfare gain to country I equals C + D ~ H + J and net welfare gain to 
C equals E + F. Therefore, the total Community welfare gain equals C + D + 
E + F - H + J. Welfare loss in rest of the world equals N + K. 
Using the following definitions: 
p = 
Pr = 
Pc = 
= 
= 
proportionate change in I' s import price, {P '-P) /P; { th.is will be 
negative). 
proportionate change in ROW's export price, {Pr '-Pr) /Pr; {this 
will be negative). 
proportionate change in C's export price, net of NTB costs, 
{P'-Pc)/Pc {will be positive). 
initial share of ROW in I's imports, Mr/M. 
initial share of C in I's imports, Mc/M. 
... I . .. 
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Figure Cl 
Price 
0 
m = 
M' 
c 
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M', M, M M' 
proportionate change in I's imports, (M'-M)/M. 
Quantity 
mr = proportionate change in I's imports from ROW, (MR'-MR)/MR 
(negative). 
me =- proportionate change in I' s imports from C, (MC '-MC) /MC 
(positive). 
b = the proportionate change (reduction) in costs in the Community due to 
the removal of NTBs, (P-Pc)/P (will be positive). This change 
corresponds to the potential cost reductions which are given by the 
internal market studies. It is defined as above in order that 
P/Pc • 1/(1-b). 
. .. I . .. 
- ;41 -
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t = the proportionate tariff rate (positive) on imports from ROW, 
{P-Pr)/Pr or {P'-Pr')/Pr'· 
~ = mr.sr which is a measure of trade diversion, note that 
m = mr•Sr + mc•Sc• 
n = import elasticity of demand in the home country. 
er = export supply elasticity for ROW. 
ec = export supply elasticity for the Community. 
Then c = -p. sc 
D = -(p.m)/2 
E = Pc·Sc{l-b) 
F = Pc{l-b)mc.sc/2 
H = md (t/(l+t) + p) 
J = -p(sr+md)/{l+t) 
K = -pr.md/2(1+t) 
N = -pr(sr~)/(l+t). 
All effects are expressed as proportions of the total value of initial 
imports, M.P. 
To calculate C, D, E, F, J, K, H, Nit is necessary to have expressions for 
p, Pr, Pc, m, mr, me in terms of known quantities sr, sc, t, b, n, er, ec 
where n, er and ec are the elasticities defined above. 
By definition m = n.p 
me • ec•Pc 
m = mcsc + mrsr 
Now, Pc • p + b, approximately. 
. .. / ... 
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and, Pr .. p + db (-p "' db - Pr) 
producing p ... -b(ecsc + dersr) (less than or equal to zero) 
ecsc + ersr - n 
and Pc -
b((1-d)ersr - n) 
ecsc + ersr - n 
(greater than or equal to zero) 
If d "' 0, the expressions for p and Pc reduce to 
and 
Note that Pr = b(ecsc(d-1) - nd) ecsc + ersr - n 
respectively 
(is greater than zero if nd is less 
than ecsc (d-1)) 
Then the fall in price P to P' (measured by p) will be greater the larger 
is b, the proportionate reduction in costs in the Community, ecsc and the 
smaller is ersr and n. The maximum value n can take (assuming a 
non-inferior good) is zero, in this case mcsc = -mrsr• 
Re-writing the expressions for A to N in terms of known parameters, 
C = - P·Sc• 
D = -(n.p2)/2 
E "' Pc•sc (1-b) 
F • Pc2 (1-b). ec.sc/2 
H = sr.er•Pr(t/(1+t) + p) 
J = - p.sr (1 + er•Pr)/(1+t) 
K = - Pr2•er.sr/2 (1 +t) 
N = - Prsr(1 + er•Pr)/(1+t) 
... I . .. 
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C.2 Stage 2 
The model for stage 2 is summarised in Figure C2. 
Net welfare gain to the Community equals C + D + E + F - H + J. Welfare 
loss in the rest of the world equals J + K. 
Using the following definitions: 
c = (C'-C)/C, proportionate change in apparent consumption 
m = (M'-M}/M, proportionate change in extra-EC imports 
y = (Y'-Y}/Y proportionate change in apparent production 
p = (P'-P)/P, proportionate change in price of EC consumption, 
negative 
Pc = (P'-Pc)/Pc proportionate change in EC export or supply price, 
positive 
Pr = (Pr'-Pr}/Pr proportionate change in rest of world export price 
w = (P-Pc)/P, proportionate cost reduction in EC 
sy = Y/C, share of EC production in apparent consumption 
sm = M/C, share of imports in apparent consumption 
er = export supply elasticity for rest of world 
ecs = supply elasticity for Community 
ecd = demand elasticity for Community 
By definition, 
c = ecd•P 
m = er•Pr 
Now Pc = p + w, approximately and Pr = p 
Therefore, p = 
and Pc = 
Pr = p 
... I . .. 
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Figure C2 
Price 
s 
0 y Y' M' M 
Note: OY +OM= OC 
OY' +OM'= OC 
The areas are defined as follows: 
c = 
- p(l - Sm) 
D = - ecd·P2/2 
E = Pc•sy(l-w) 
F = 2 Pc • (1-w) ecs•sy/2 
H = sm.er•Pr((t/l+t) + p) 
J = - P• sm(l+er•Pr)/(l+t) 
K = sm.er•P2/2(1+t), where Pr = P• 
S*+ER 
c C' Quantity 
All welfare changes are expressed as a proportion of the initial level of 
apparent consumption. 
. .. I . .. 
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C.3 Stage 3 
The model for stage 3 is summarised in figure C3. 
An increase in output is associated with a decrease in unit cost. This 
parameter on a sector by sector basis is derived from Pratten (1987) in the 
fashion described below. 
The welfare gain from the unit cost decrease is given by areas A and B. 
= (P'-P)/P • (Q + (Q' - Q)/2)/Q as a proportion of initial production. 
= P• (1 + q/2) 
where p = proportionate change in unit cost 
q = proportionate change in output. 
For a cost function of the following form 
log C = a + b log Y 
average cost = a yb, marginal cost = (1 + b) aYb 
The ratio of unit cost at half· of minimum efficient scale (MES) relative to 
unit cost at MES is, therefore, given by 
AC (half of MES)/AC(MES) = 
It is therefore possible to calculate the parameter, b, which links changes 
in unit cost and changes in output. These parameters are given in Table 
A6. 
One problem associated with stage 3 is that it assumes that extra output is 
spread evenly across existing Community plants. There is no consideration, 
therefore, of the trade effects either within the Community or with the 
rest of the world. 
. .. / ... 
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Figure C3 
Price 
p 
DorS 
0 Q Q' Quantity 
L MC is a quasi-supply schedule. 
Essentially industry moves from P, Q to P', Q'. 
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CHAPTER 9 
Evaluation des economies d'echelle pouvant resulter de l'ach~vement du 
marche interieur 
Michel Aujean, European Commission 
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Ce court chapitre traite des benefices qui pourraient resulter de 
!'exploitation des economies d'echelle dans un marche communautaire 
integre • Il presente la meth0d0l0gie permettant d I etablir Un lien entre 
les mecanismes decrits dans les chapitres 1 ! 4 de ce volume et les 
estimations des gains en bien-etre provenant des economies d'echelle 
provenant de restructuration. 
L'evaluation des effets de taille resultant de !'integration des marches, 
et plus particuli~rement des economies d'echelle provenant de la 
restructuration des activites productives, constitue tant sur le plan 
methodologique que du point de vue quantitatif une operation d'une grande 
difficulte. En depit des etudes disponibles a cet effet, les estimations 
qui ont ete realisees demeurent incertaines, meme si leur ordre de grandeur 
parait generalement accepte par les differents experts qui ont ete associes 
a ces travaux. 
L'estimation qui est fournie dans le rapport "1992: la nouvelle economie 
europeenne" ne vise en fait a quantifier que les seules economies d'echelle 
realisables au niveau des unites de production dans l'industrie et dans une 
partie du secteur energetique de la Communaute, apr~s restructuration des 
unites de production et exploitation de la dimension europeenne. En effet, 
meme si la notion traditionnelle d'economies d'echelle tend ! etre remise 
en cause avec 1' introduction des nouvelles technologies, il n' en demeure 
pas moins que la structure par taille de 1' industrie europeenne apparait 
encore, du fait de sa fragmentation, largement sous-optimale. Cette 
approche restrictive a plusieurs raisons: 
- des economies d I echelle statiques en amont (R et D par exemple) ou en 
aval (distribution - marketing) du stade de la production proprement dite 
sont particuli~rement difficiles ! mettre en evidence. Il en est de meme 
d' une fa~on generale dans les services1 pour lesquels aucune economie 
d'echelle n'a done ete evaluee, ce qui constitue certainement une 
sousestimation. 
- ni les economies d'echelle dynamiques (effets d'apprentissage ou 
d'experience), ni les economies de gamme n'ont pu, faute d'informations 
et de methodes d'evaluation, etre prises en consideration. 
- leS eCOnOmieS d I echelle reSUltant direCtement d 1 Un aCCrOiSSement de la 
production ont ete evaluees independamment; elles sont d'ailleurs d'une 
ampleur tr~s modeste. 
La methode de calcul repose en fait sur !'utilisation et la combinaison de 
plusieurs sources et approches. Les calculs ont ete effectues au niveau de 
desagregation sectorielle le plus fin pour lequel des informations 
statistiques etaient disponibles au niveau communautaire c' est-!-dire la 
classification NACE ! trois chiffres - la liste des secteurs est jointe en 
annexe. A ce niveau de desagregation, ont ete consideres les secteurs 
d'activite pour lesquels l'inventaire dresse par Pratten (1987) montrait 
qu'existait in abstracto un potentiel significatif d'economies d'echelle: 
1 Voir ! ce sujet les arguments presentes dans la section 6.1 du rapport 
"1992: la nouvelle economie europeenne", Economie Europeenne N° 35. 
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soit que la taille minimale soit ~lev~e par rapport A la dimension des plus 
grands march~s nationaux, soit que la pente des co\its en fonction de la 
taille soit particuli~rement forte. En outre, certains secteurs d'activit~ 
ont ~galement ~t~ pris en compte parce que des ~tudes sectorielles 
sp~cifiques sur ces secteurs avaient ~t~ entreprises par les consultants et 
fournissaient d'embl~e des estimations de baisses des co\its apr~s 
restructuation. Au total les secteurs ainsi retenus ( cf. tableau 1) 
repr~sentent environ 28% de la valeur de la production totale de la 
Communaut~ A douze en 1985. 
L 'approche propos~e par MUller et Owen (1985) a tr~s largement guid~ les 
travaux qui ont ~t~ effectu~s et en particulier les ~tudes de J. Schwalbach 
(1988) et de Helg et Ranci (1988). La logique ~conomique qui soustend le 
processus de restructuration repose sur 1e fait que le d~veloppement du 
commerce international donne acc~s pour les plus comp~titifs (sous entendu: 
les plus grands) a un plus grand nombre d' opportuni t~s de remplacer les 
producteurs plus petits, done moins efficaces et A prix plus ~lev~s, A la 
fois sur le march~ domestique et sur le march~ ext~rieur. Sur 1e plan 
empirique des travaux ~conom~triques ont ~t~ conduits par J. Schwalbach 
(1988) et par Helg et Ranci (1988) · afin d' expliquer, pour un ensemble de 
secteurs, 1' ~cart entre la taille moyenne des uni t~s de production et la 
taille minimum techniquement efficace en fo~tion de !'importance des 
~changes ext~rieurs et du potentiel d' ~conomies d' ~chelle. Ces travaux 
confirment dans leur ensemble les relations ~tablies entre d~veloppement du 
commerce, augmentation de la taille des unit~s de production et gains 
d'efficacit~ technique (baisses de co\its dues aux ~conomies d'~chelle). 
La liste des secteurs trait~s dans ces ~tudes ( 14 pour 1' Italie, 20 pour 
1' Allemagne et 19 pour le Royaume-Uni) est un peu moins large que celle 
retenue pour la pr~sente.~valuation (elle couvre environ de 12 A 20% de la 
production totale selon le pays) mais tr~s voisine dans sa nature. Il 
ressort de ces ~tudes que, pour les secteurs consid~r~s: 
- il existe un potentiel consid~rable de gains d' efficacit~ tchnique du 
fait de la taille moyenne trop r~duite des unit~s de production. Les 
surco\its ~valu~s pour !'ensemble de ces secteurs sont, en 1982-83 de 15% 
en Allemagne, 23% en Italie et 25% au Royaume Uni. 
- la relation avec le d~veloppement du commerce ext~ rieur est telle que, 
dans le cas de 1' Allemagne par exemple, un doublement simultan~ des 
exportations et des importations impliquerait, dans 1' hypoth~se d' une 
consommation domestique totale inchang~e, un accroissement de 110% de la 
taille moyenne des unit~s de production et, de ce fait, une r~duction de 
plus de moiti~ du surco\it qui serait ramen~ de 15 A environ 7%. 
A d~faut de pouvoir disposer d'un mod~le permettant d'estimer directement 
l'effet de l'int~gration des march~s sur la taille des unit~s de production 
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ou sur le d~veloppement du commerce, !'~valuation du phenomene d'economies 
d'echelle a repose en premier lieu sur !'exploitation des etudes 
sectorielles effectuees par les consultants. Ainsi un certain nombre de 
secteurs dans lesquels d' importantes restructurations pourraient prendre 
place avec 1' achevement du marche interieur font apparattre avec 
l'accroissement de la taille des unites de production li~ aux 
rationalisations - des baisses de coOts souvent fort appreciables. Ces 
baisses concernent les secteurs suivants: (24) Mineraux non metalliques, 
(257) Produits pharmaceutiques, (315) Chaudronnerie, (33) Machines de 
bureau, (342) Materiel elect rique d I equipement t (344) Materiel de 
t~Iecommunications, (351) Automobiles, (362) Materiel ferroviaire, (364) 
Avions etc ••• , (41-42) Produits alimentaires, (43-45) Textile habillement. 
En moyenne les resultats avances par les consultants montrent qu'un 
accroissement de taille de 1' ordre de 25% resulterai t de 1' achevement du 
marche interieur. 
L'accroissement de taille ainsi evalue par secteur a ensuite ete applique 
aux parametres de taille et de coOts recenses par Pratten dans son survey 
afin d'en deduire les reductions de coOts. L'ensemble des informations de 
base utilisees pour le calcul sont rassemblees dans le tableau 1 qui donne: 
1. le secteur et son code NACE 
2. la part du secteur dans la production totale de EUR 12 en 1985 (celle-ci 
etant evaluee a 6037 milliards d'ecus) 
3. le surcoOt pour une taille egale a la moitie de la taille minimum 
techniquement efficace (METS) 
4. !'evaluation des economies d'echelle, exprimees en % du coOt moyen total 
de production, telle qu'elle resulte de !'application d'une fonction de 
coOt logarithmique1. 
1 Soit une fonction de coOt moyen total (CMT) du type Log CMT = a + b Log T 
avec T = taille moyenne des unites de production dans un secteur. 
Afin d'~valuer le surcoOt de production lorsque 1a taille T est 
inferieure a la taille minimum techniquement efficace (METS), il faut 
calculer le surcoOt s tel que 
CMT1 ~ CMTo (1 + s) 
avec Log CMTQ = a + b Log (METS) 
et Log CMT1 = a + b Log T 
Connaissant le surcoOt lie a une taille egale a la moitie de la taille 
minimum METS (T ~ METS) on peut definir b qui exprime le lien entre 
-r 
taille et surcout: 
Log (1 + surcout a 1/2 METS) 
Log 1/2 b = 
(suite au bas de la page 5) 
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Les r~sultats sectoriels ainsi obtenus repr~sentent une ~conomie de coOts 
de 2.45% en moyenne pour les secteurs ~tudi~s, soit encore 1.5% du total de 
la production des secteurs industrie et ~nergie ou 0.68% de la valeur 
totale de la production de EUR 12. 
Pour les besoins des estimations effectu~es dans 1 '~valuation ~conomique 
d' ensemble, ces r~sultats ont ~t~ agr~gh au niveau de la classification 
R44 ( cf. tableau 2). Par la suite ces baisses de coOts dont une partie 
concerne des secteurs de biens de consommation interm~diaire, ont ~t~ 
transf~r~es et amplifi~es au travers des tableaux entr~es-sorties afin 
d'@tre affectees aux secteurs uti1isateurs qui beneficieront en d~finitive 
de ces r~ductions de coOts. Les r~sultats en termes de gains de bien-@tre 
sont presentes dans le tableau 2. 
Le calcul des gains en bien-@tre repose sur la methode d~crite dans 
1' annexe 3C du chapi tre 8 de ce volume. Les gains globaux en bien-@tre 
s'~levent a 56 milliards d'Ecus aux prix de 85 pour EUR 7 ou environ 1,9% 
du PNB. 
I (Suite) 
Le surcoOt (1 + s) pour une taille quelconque T inf~rieure a METS s'~crit 
alors 
T 
1 + s = eb Log 'RET'S' 
Par exemple pour la branche 344 Mat~rie1 de t~l~communications: 
T = 69% de la MES et surcoOt a 1/2 METS = 10% 
b = Log( 1 + 0• 1) = -0.1375 
Log 172 
1 + s = -0.1375 Log 0.69 e 
le surcoOt est done de 5.2% 
= 1.052 
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Tableau 1: El~ments du calcul des ~conomies d'~chelle 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Code Nom du secteur Part dans Surcout Economies d'~chelle 
NACE production pour une dues a des 
de EUR-12 taille restructurations 
en % ~gale a (baisses des couts) 
1/2 MES en % 
en % 
14 Raffinage de p~trole 3.5 4 -0.57 
221 Sid~rurgie 1.67 6 -1.25 
224 M~taux non ferreux 0.78 8 -1.18 
24 Min~raux non m~talliques 1.58 10 -2.26 
251 Chimie de base 2.14 8 -3.40 
255 Peintures, vernis ••• 0.33 3 -1.00 
257 Produits pharmaceutiques 0.62 12 -4.01 
26 Fibres synth~tiques 0.13 7 -3.26 
311 Fonderies 0.33 10 -2.73 
315 Chaudronnerie 0.37 20 -12.93 
321 Machines agricoles 0.28 6 -5.34 
322 Machines-outils 0.26 6 -2.93 
324 Machines ind. agro- 0.35 6 -2.92 
alimentaires 
325 Machines mines g~nie civil 0.58 6 -4.28 
33 Machines de bureau 0.56 6 -3.34 
342 Mat~riel ~lectrique ~quipement 0.90 10 -3.05 
344 Mat~riel de telecommunications 0.83 10 -5.20 
345 App. radio, TV, Hifi 0.50 7 -1.30 
346 App. ~lectrodomestiques 0.27 8 -2.00 
351 Automobiles 2.09 9 -2.65 
362 Mat~riel ferroviaire 0.07 20 -14.64 
363 Cycles motocyles 0.05 4 -1.53 
364 Avions, h~licopt~res 0.40 20 -6.19 
372 Mat. m~dico-chirurgical 0.06 10 -2.93 
41/42 Produits alimentaires 6.95 6 -1.53 
43/45 Textile-habillement 2.91 2 -0.38 
47 Papier imprimerie 2.44 8 -1.82 
481 Caoutchouc, plastiques 1.25 5 -1.66 
27.8% 
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Tableau 2: Les ~conomies d'~chelles dues A des restructurations: r~sultats 
Agriculture 
Combustibles solides 
Coke 
Hydrocarbures 
Electricit~, gaz, eau 
Combustibles nucl~aires 
Minerais, m~taux 
Minerais non m~talliques 
Produits chimiques 
Produits m~taux 
Construction mecanique 
Materiel de bureau 
Materiel electrique 
Vehicules automobiles 
Autres moyens de transp. 
Viande, conserves 
Produits laitiers 
Autres prod.alimentaires 
Bois sons 
Produits A base de tabac 
Textiles, habillement 
Cuir 
Bois, meubles 
Papier, art. en papier 
Caoutchouc, plastique 
Autres prod.manufactures 
B~timent, g~nie civil 
Commerce,gros et d~tail 
Logement, restauration 
Transports interieurs 
Transp.maritime, aerien 
Transports auxiliaires 
Communications 
Credit et assurance 
Loyers 
Autres services marchand 
Services non marchands 
Total (moyenne) 
Parametres de 
r~duction des 
co6ts de 
production 
0 
0 
0 
0,6 
0 
0 
1,0 
2,3 
2,6 
2,2 
2,0 
2,5 
3,0 
2,2 
5,8 
1,6 
1,6 
1,6 
1,6 
1,6 
0 
0,4 
0 
1,8 
1,7 
0 
0 
Gains de bien-@tre 
provenant des 
~conomies d'~chelle 
(en milliards d'~cus) 
1,1 
0,2 
0,0 
1,4 
0,6 
0,0 
2,5 
1,9 
7,3 
3,2 
3,8 
1,3 
4,9 
4,1 
2,5 
0,9 
1,1 
3,0 
0,9 
0,5 
0,5 
0,2 
0,3 
2,8 
1,6 
0,1 
2,2 
1,5 
0,9 
0,3 
0,3 
0,1 
0,1 
1,1 
0,2 
0,5 
2,4 
56,4 
- 557 -
9.8 
Bibliographie 
Helg R., Ranci P. (l988), "Economies of Scale and 
European Economy: the Case of Italy", Report 
Commission, Bruxelles. 
the integration of the 
prepared for the EC 
MUller J., Owen N. (1985), "The effect of trade on plant size", in 
J. Schwalbach, ed., Industry structure and performance, Sigma, Berlin. 
Pratten c. (1987), "A survey of the economies of scale", Report prepared 
for the EC Commission, Brussels. 
Schwalbach J. ( 1988), "Economies of scale and intra-Connnunity trade", 
Report prepared for the EC Commission, Brussels. 

- 559 -
- 10.1 -
CHAPTER 10 
The completion of the internal market: 
results of macroeconomic model simulations1 
by 
Michel CATINAT, Eric DONNI and Alexander ITALIANER 
Commission of the European Communities 
1 The authors express their gratitude to: M. Emerson, p. Valette and P. 
Zagam~ for their helpful comments; all the national HERMES teams which 
performed the basic country-by-country simulations (Belgium: Bureau du 
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INTRODUCTION 
The analysis presented in this article forms part of the research project 
on the "Costs of Non-Europe" which was chaired by Mr. Paolo Cecchini. The 
project as a whole included the reports of some thirty consultancy firms 
and economic research institutes in several countries, a survey of some 
11 000 firms1 and a wide-ranging comparison of prices between Member 
States. The purpose of the present article is to describe the gains which 
may be expected from completing the internal market in terms of 
macroeconomic aggregates: consequences for GDP, employment or inflation, 
and impacts on the key macroeconomic equilibria such as budget or external 
balances. 
Complementary to the preceding article ("Partial equilibrium calculations 
of the impact of internal market barriers in the European Community") it 
synthesises the primary effects quantified by the various external 
consultants and institutes on the partial areas covered by their analyses, 
and also takes account of the repercussions between partial effects through 
macroeconomic interrelationships. 
The methodology for quantifying the macroeconomic consequences is complex; 
it is described first (section 1). The article goes on to present the 
macroeconomic impacts for four large areas: the abolition of customs 
controls, the opening up of public procurement, the liberalization of 
financial services and capital movements, and the "supply effects" 
(sections 2 to 5 respectively). The final section is devoted to the 
overall analysis of the consequences of the large internal market. The 
geographical coverage is chiefly the Community as a whole. However, when 
information was available, the analysis also made it possible to aoalyse 
the macroeconomic consequences country by country, in particular for the 
Federal Republic of Germany, France, Italy and the United Kingdom. 
1 These reports or a summary of them are published in this or other volumes 
of the Document Series. 
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1 • METHODOLOGY 
The macroeconomic assessment of completing the internal market which is 
presented here is based on simulations made with the help of 
macroeconometric models. 
They have been used under rather special circumstances, since, because of 
the way in which they are constructed, these models cannot describe in an 
endogenous manner all the consequences of measures such as those covered by 
the White Paper programme. It was therefore decided to proceed in two 
stages: firstly the studies made by various external consultants 
commissioned for the requirements of the research on the cost on non-Europe 
were used to assess quantitatively the primary effects of completion of the 
large internal market on the partial fields covered by each of those 
studies (see Annex 5 for list of studies used). Secondly, these effects 
assessed "upstream" from the models were fed into the latter, thereby 
inducing certain changes in mechanisms or behaviour. In this way, the 
inability of the econometric models to describe the primary effects was 
circumvented. On the other hand, full use was made of their ability to 
simulate secondary effects i.e. the usual macroeconomic mechanisms 
(multiplier and accelerator effects, income-sharing effects, price 
competitiveness effects, inflation mechanisms, capital accumulation, growth 
potential, etc.), and their transmission from one country to another 
through international trade or movements in exchange rates. 
The introduction of the primary effects into the models is presented 
extensively in Catinat and Italianer (1988). This paper summarises only 
briefly each of the shocks (see Annex 1 for a list of the main shocks). 
The macroeconomic simulations made are "scenarios" in the sense that the 
consequences described are conditioned by the primary "shocks" quantified 
"upstream" from the models. Only the macroeconomic feedback effects are 
simulated, and in particular the effects on the easing of various 
macroeconomic constraints (improvement in budgetary and external deficits, 
reduction in inflationary dangers). Being scenarios, the simulations thus 
describe potentialities, i.e. likely macroeconomic effects if the White 
Paper proposals are implemented completely. Furthermore, the results of 
these scenarios should be considered as lying in the middle of a range 
which is defined by a margin of uncertainty of +/- 30%. This range results 
from the aggregation of the uncertainty ranges on each of the primary 
shocks as derived from the consultancy studies, cf. Catinat and Italianer 
(1988). 
Despite the methodology used and the precautions taken, the results 
provided by the models are likely to err on the side of conservatism: 
because of the model design, past behaviour as reflected in behavioural 
equations is assumed to continue and structural effects are poorly 
represented. The simulated consequences should therefore be regarded as 
covering the medium/long term (five to ten years). Beyond that time 
horizon, the structural changes should be analyzed more precisely. 
Two econometric models were used: the Commission's HERMES model and the 
OECD's INTERLINK model, used on the Commission's sole responsability. The 
fact that they are complementary made it possible to explore the principal 
effects which may be expected. Their characteristics and their dynamic or 
variant properties are analyzed in detail in Valette and Zagam~ (1988) and 
Richardson (1987) respectively. 
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The analysis first proceeds with the identification of four areas: the 
elimination of frontier controls, the opening up of public procurement, the 
liberalization of financial services and capital movements, and what is 
called the "supply effects", i.e. the strategtc reactions of firms faced 
with a new economic and financial environment. These areas are defined on 
the basis of economic criteria (Catinat (1988)) and are distinct from the 
classification used in the White Paper which mentions three kinds of 
barrier: physical barriers, technical barriers and fiscal barriers. The 
four areas in fact cover the physical and technical kinds of barrier only; 
the proposals for removing fiscal barriers are presented eleswhere 
(Commission of the EC (1987)), and will not be reexamined here. 
These four areas are sufficiently "separable'' for each of them to be 
analysed in turn: the macroeconomic consequences which they induce have 
their own logic and dynamic. The impacts of these four areas, defined and 
simulated so as to be independent!, are then combined to provide an overall 
assessment of the gains which can be expected from the completion of the 
internal market. The structure of this article1 follows the same approach: 
the consequences of completing the internal market are first analysed area 
by area (Sections 2 to 5), then globally (Section 6). 
For each of the four fields analysed, the discu~sion first concentrates on 
a description of the macroeconomic consequenc~s for the Community as a 
whole. Subsequently, a comparison of the impa¢ts on a country-by-country 
basis is attempted. But before taking a look: at the individual country 
results, a word of caution concerning their interpretation seems necessary 
and should be kept in mind. The individual country results are 
substantially influenced not only by uncertainty surrounding the model 
inputs, but also by the specifications of the country models used for 
simulation. The same model input for one country would, if inserted into 
another country model, almost certainly produc~ a different outcome. As 
far a!; differences in models account for differences in country 
specificities this is justified, but what if tnodels reflect a different 
theoretical stance? The HERMES model clearly incorporates such cases as 
the latter. For some countries (e.g. Belgium, France, Italy, United 
Kingdom) the models are macrosectoral, but for others, in particular for 
Germany, the model is macroeconomic2. The Interlink model also 
incorporates such cases. The supply blocks of the models for the larger 
countries (Germany, France, Italy, the United Kingdom) are more developed 
than those for the others, for instance. Thet1efore, where the Community 
result may be interpreted as a sample mean whicp is more or less unbiased, 
the individual results may not be entirely comparable. 
1 In particular, due care has been taken, in running the simulations, to 
avoid double counting. 
2 Updated national blocks of the Comet IV models have been used and linked 
with the others when the national blocks of the Hermes model were not yet 
available. 
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Some basic assumptions were made for all the simulations, except when 
stated otherwise: 
nominal exchange rates are unchanged (i.e. they have the same evolution 
over time as in the baseline) 
- real government expenditures are unchanged (consumption and investment) 
- real interest rates are unchanged ex post (accommodation of the real 
'iilo'Oe'y stock) 
it was assumed that all political and legislative measures needed to 
implement the internal market were taken in one particular year within 
the 1988-1992 period. Furthermore, the sta~ reactions of economic 
agents were taken to be immediate (e.g. the reduction of intra-Community 
transport costs after the removal of customs controls), while the dynamic 
effects were spread out over a five-year period (e.g. the exploitation of 
economies of scale in the integrated market). Together, these assumptions 
amount to an acceleration of the implementation and consequences of the 
White Paper proposals. Consequently, the "medium term" effects which 
result technically from a simulation over 6 years, should in reality be 
extended to the medium/long run (approximately 10 years). 
All the simulations were performed in a linked mode, which means endogenous 
and coherent changes in the trade of goods and services, factor income and 
capital flows1. Table 1.1 gives per area an overview of which models were 
given shocks for the simulations. 
1 Trade in services, factor income and and capital flows were treated 
coherently in the Interlink model only 
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2. THE ELIMINATION OF CUSTOMS CONTROLS 
The first stage in the integration of the Community market is the 
elimination of customs controls. The consequences will be psychological 
(evidence of the irreversibility of the process, firms' expectations) as 
much as economic. Without ignoring the importance of the first aspect, we 
shall concentrate chiefly on the second. 
2.1 Simulation characteristics 
The existence of intra-Community frontiers gives rise to two types of 
costs: 
- delays at customs and especially the administrative formalities of 
customs clearance are estimated to cost between 7,9 and 8,3 billion ECU 
in 1987 (0,23 and 0,24% of Community GDP), the administrative cost being 
partly borne by exporting firms and partly paid to customs agents; 
- the employment of customs officials at intra-Community frontiers: the 
cost to governments is estimated at between 0,5 and 1 billion ECU in 1987 
(0,02 to 0,03% of Community GDP). 
The removal of intra-Community frontiers would have as a direct result a 
reduction in the price of intra-Community trade, since the extra costs of 
delays or administrative formalities are paid either directly or indirectly 
by importing firms. The consultant Ernst & Whinney has estimated the 
direct costs of customs formalities for intra-Community trade in goods as 
given in Table 2.1. 
Table 2.1 Direct cost of customs formalities for intra-Community trade in 
goods (billion ECU in 1987) 
Administrative costs for firms 
-internal 
-external 
-total 
Costs associated with frontier delays 
for firms 
Total costs for firms1 
Administrative costs for public authorities2 
Total costs of customs formalities 
Source: Ernst & Whinney 
5,9 
1,6 
7,5 
0,4 to 0,8 
7,9 to 8,3 
0,5 to 1 ,o 
8,4 to 9,3 
1 i.e. between 1,6 and 1,7% of total intra-Community trade 
2 i.e. between 0,3 and 0,6% of the average public deficit in 1987 
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Additional information: was available concerning the administrative costs 
borne by firms: Ernst & Whinney estimated these costs per consignment for 
the importers and the exporters of each of the countries analysed and for 
different products. This primary quantitative information provided the 
basis for deduction of the share of these costs in the value of bilateral 
trade flows between Community countries in the HERMES sectoral nomenclature 
which, after addition of the costs associated with customs delays, gave the 
share of the total cost of customs controls in this value. Table 2.2 gives 
these total customs formalities' cost shares in the bilateral trade flow 
values, taking all products together (see Catinat and Italianer (1988) for 
a sectoral breakdown at the HERMES nomenclature level). 
Table 2.2 Share of the cost of the administrative formalities borne by 
firms in the value of bilateral trade flows - all products taken 
together 
Importer B D F I 
Exporter 
B 0,84 1,21. 1,42 
D 1,45 2,10 2,17 
F 1,64 1,72 2,25 
I 1,76 2,25 2,30 
NL 1,05 1,22 1,40 1,59 
UK 1,87 1,20 1,55 1,91 
Other Community 1,49 2,02 2,10 2,14 
countries 
EUR12 1,46 1,53 1,84 2,04 
Source: Catinat and Italianer (1988). 
The procedure for putting these values in 
assumption that it is reasonable to believe 
costs would be passed on in prices. The 
Community countries for the countries 
accordingly, as indicated in Table 2.2. 
(%) 
Other 
NL UK Community EUR12 
countries 
0,94 0,84 1,01 1,02 
1,82 1,67 1,85 1,87 
1,84 1,72 1,69 1,83 
. 1,95 1,83 1,80 2,11 
1,27 1,35 1,26 
1,33 1,76 1,54 
1,73 1,79 1,82 1,93 
1,55 1,58 1,71 1,67 
the model was based on the 
that the elimination of these 
bilateral import prices from 
analysed were thus reduced 
But this fall in prices would be partly achieved by job losses estimated at 
around 17 500 in exporting firms and at around 40 000 for private agents 
dealing with customs formalities. Due to lack of information, the job 
losses were assigned respectively to the competitive branches and to 
transport in proportion to the corresponding employment provided by each of 
the sectors in each country. Similarly, the costs borne by the public 
authorities would imply a decrease in public employment of a little over 
0,1% (see Table 2.3). 
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Table 2.3 Inputs for the "customs barriers" si111ulation 
B D F I NL 
Customs barriers 
UK EUR12 EUR12 
(as % 
of GDP) 
Average fall in the 
prices of intra-
Community imports (%) 
1,46 1,53 1,84 2,04 1,55 1,58 1,67 
Job losses (thousands) 
-exporting firms 
-customs clearing 
agents 
-customs officers 
(as a % of public 
employment) 
Total shock (% of GDP) 
Distributed in proportion to 
the corresponding employment 
in each country 
0,41 0,06 0,21 0,06 0,22 0,07 
Source: Catinat and Italianer (1988) 
2.2 Simulation results 
2.2.1 The Community as a whole 
17,5 
40,0 
0,11 
0,26 
The reduction in the price of intra-Community imports would give rise to 
two types of substitution for each Member State: 
- substitution between national production and imports from the Community 
in favour of the latter; 
- substitution between extra-Community imports and intra-Community imports 
in favour of the latter. 
Each Member State would benefit from improved terms of trade brought about 
by the fall in import prices (0,6% in the medium term in average - see 
Table A3.2 in Annex 3). The effect on their trade balance in volume terms 
is more difficult to determine in advance, because of two conflicting 
phenomena: the increase of imports and, symmetrically, the increase in 
exports (counterpart of the increase in the imports of the other Member 
States). 
On the other hand, for the Community as a whole, the resultant impact is 
unambiguous: the first substitution effect is neutral in terms of volume 
but beneficial in terms of price (improvement in each country's terms of 
trade); the second is favourable in terms of volume, since it increases the 
Community's trade balance in volume terms, and neutral in terms of price. 
In the medium term, the HERMES simulations confirm this analysis: the 
Community's external balance improves by 0,16 percentage point of GDP (see 
Table 2.4). 
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In addition, the substitution between national production and imports from 
the Community also has favourable effects on the costs of firms, because it 
brings down the prices of imported intermediate consumption. These cost 
reductions passed on in prices would spread to the whole of the economy 
through intersectoral trade. Even if the upturn in activity is likely to 
increase the dangers of demand pull inflation, the disinflationary effect 
seems to prevail, perhaps slightly in the short term (consumer prices and 
the GDP deflator falling by 0,21% and 0,01% respectively), but 
significantly in the medium term (1,02% and 0,85% respectively for the 
Community as a whole). The Community's price-competitiveness would be 
increased, and as a result the improvement in the external balance would be 
strengthened. 
The consequences for activity of the elimination of frontier controls would 
come about by means of different mechanisms: external trade would have a 
direct positive effect on growth, while the relative fall in consumer 
prices would have a favourable impact by boosting the purchasing power of 
households. However, the initial job losses (ex-ante loss of more than 
80 000 private and public jobs1) would have the consequence of reducing 
personal disposable incomes and of counteracting the positive effects 
described above: according to the HERMES model simulations, Community GDP 
could fall slightly in the short term. This could be the price to pay. 
But this adjustment cost is the condition on which, in the medium term, the 
abolition of customs controls can contribute to upturn in ac ti vi ty. The 
HERMES simulations are clear on this point: Community GDP could increase by 
almost 0,4% in the medium term. 
Table 2.4 "Customs barriers" simulation: main macro-economic results for 
EUR12 
Year1 Year2 Year3 Year4 YearS Year6 
Percenta~e differences 
Gross domestic product -0,01 0,10 0,20 0,27 0,33 0,36 
Private consumption price -0,21 -0,41 -0,61 -0,78 -0,92 -1,02 
GDP deflator -0,01 -0,23 -0,42 -0,60 -0,74 -0,85 
Real wage rate 0,06 0,10 0,15 0,20 0,25 0,29 
Labour productivity/head 0,05 0,13 0,18 0,19 0,20 0,20 
Employment -0,06 -0,03 0,03 0,08 0,13 0,16 
Absolute differences 
Employment ( 1000) -67 -32 33 102 164 211 
Budget surplus % GDP 0,03 0,08 0,12 0,16 0,19 0,21 
External balance % GDP o, 17 0,16 0,16 0,16 0,16 0,16 
Source: HERMES simulation 
1 It must be stressed that, for technical reasons, these job losses were 
concentrated at the beginning of the period analysed. In fact, they will 
probably be spread over a period of time. 
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Employment would follow the same momentum: job losses in the short term 
(around 70 000 for the Community thus slightly less than the initial 
shock), but net job creation in the medium term as a result of the upturn 
in activity (over 200 000 for the Community as a whole). 
The general government balance should improve in the short and medium term 
although for different reasons (0,03% of GDP in the short term and 0,21% of 
GDP in the medium term): in the short term this would result mainly from 
the budgetary savings made through the abolition of jobs in the customs 
service; in the medium term, it would stem largely from the upturn in 
economic activity and the consequent increase in tax revenue. 
With an upturn in activity (0,36% of GDP in the medium term), job creation 
(+210 000 jobs in the medium term), disinflation (consumer price inflation 
down by 1% in the medium term) and an easing of budgetary and external 
constraints, (respective improvements of 0,21 and 0,16 of a percentage 
point of GDP in the medium term), the abolition of customs barriers has the 
characteristic of being benefical whatever aggregate is considered for the 
Community as a whole. 
2.2.2 Individual country results 
As already stated above in section 1, a comparison of individual country 
results has to be done with caution in order not to attribute differences 
in simulation results to differences in shocks while in reality they are 
due to model behavioural differences. Keeping this in mind, the medium 
term effects for a number of important variables are compared in Table 2.5 
among the six countries which have been given shocks (more detailed 
results are given in Table A2.1 in Annex 2). 
Since two of the three employment shocks have been equally distributed 
among the countries, the differences among country results arise mainly 
from different changes in the (bilateral) intra-Community cif import prices 
(apart from behavioural differences). These price decreases bear no 
one-to-one relationship with the effects on GDP, however, since they touch 
several vital parts of the economy simultaneously. For instance, there is 
a negative effect on GDP from the import substitution provoked by the lower 
import prices. On the other hand, this import increase will favour exports 
of Community countries more than those of third countries since only 
intra-Community import prices are decreasing, therefore largely offsetting 
the initial loss through export increases. These export increases are not 
only directly proportional with the relative price decreases of each 
country, but 'also with its intra-EC trade share, thus introducing another 
differential element. At the same time, the import price decreases start 
off a disinflationary wage-price spiral which, depending on patterns of 
wage formation, may lead to differences in real wage increases. While the 
lower prices enhance competitiveness and boost exports, the real wage 
increases affect private spending through increased real disposable income 
and the substitution of labour for capital, pushing up investment. 
Strongly positive effects on private spending are notably visible fot 
Germany and the Netherlands, which would consequently experience the 
highest GDP increases with 0,57% and 0,45% respectively. These results ma) 
partly be attributed to behavioural differences compared to othet 
... / ... 
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countries, the wages in these two countries reacting fairly strong to 
productivity and unemployment changes. The increases in GDP for Belgium, 
France and the United Kingdom would be close to each other, somewhat above 
0,3%. The relatively strong increase of the (nominal) trade balance in 
Belgium is mostly due to terms of trade increases, the real trade balance 
being hardly affected. The equally strong rise in the budget balance may 
be attributed mainly to the decrease in customs officials for this country 
(cf. Table 2.3), which would cut government employment at least twice as 
much as in the other countries analysed. The smallest growth (0,24%) would 
be experienced in Italy, and this fact seems to be due to a negative 
contribution of the real trade balance. The costs of customs formalities 
for trade with Italy being high, there is a larger scope for a decrease in 
intra-EC import prices in Italy than in the other countries analysed. 
Consequently, relatively more import substitution is likely to take place, 
thus resulting in a negative real trade balance effect. 
Table 2.5 "Customs barriers" simulation: comparison of medium term results 
among countries 
B D F I NL UK EUR12 
Percentase differences 
Gross domestic product 0,34 0,57 0,34 0,24 0,45 0,31 0,37 
Private consumption 0,41 0,61 0,27 0,42 0,55 0,28 0,40 
Total fixed investment 0,61 0,76 0,45 0,20 0,93 0,29 0,47 
Consumption price -1,25 -1,27 -1,09 -0,68 - 0,94 -1,21 -1,02 
GDP deflator -0,55 -1,10 -0,98 -0,43 - 0,51 -1,15 -0,84 
Real wage rate .0,10 0,55 0,10 0,37 0,51 0,18 0,31 
Labour productivity/head 0,14 0,23 0,30 0,08 0,29 0,12 0,19 
Employment 0,13 0,34 0,03 0,10 0,15 0,20 0,17 
Absolute differences 
Employment ( 1000) 5 89 6 21 8 58 215 
Budget surplus 0,67 0,21 0,15 0,22 0,32 0,21 0,21 
as % of GDP 
External balance o, 77 0,03 0,27 0,16 0,11 0,15 0,16 
as % of GDP 
Reminder 
Shocks as % of GDP 0,26 
Source: HERMES simulation 
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3. OPENING UP OF PUBLIC PROCUREMENT 
Public purchasing covers all purchases intermediate consumption or 
investment - made by government but also by the "public enterprises" which, 
by virtue of their status, the public nature of their production or their 
strategic importance, are in a relatonship of dependence on the public 
authorities. The opening up of public contract procurement covers only 
part of these purchases: those which give rise to calls for tender or for 
negotiation, since the other purchases are made by order or direct payment 
at a level which is necessarily local. Public (contract) procurement 
represented around 55% of public purchasing in 1986 (cf. Commission of the 
EC, 1988, P• 54). 
3.1 Stmulation characteristics 
3.1.1 Quantitative information available 
Atkins-Planning, the consultant asked to produce a study of public 
procurement, distinguishes three types of effect which may be generated by 
the opening up of such markets: 
- a static effect due to increased penetration by foreign products. 
Through buying from cheaper foreign suppliers, governments and public 
enterprises would spend less for a given quantity of goods. The static 
effect pre-supposes that there will be no price change for either 
imported goods or those produced within the country. The effect is thus 
purely structural substitution between domestically produced and 
imported goods. 
- a competition effect, since, faced with increased competition in 
previously protected markets, national firms should be forced to lower 
their prices to compete with the prices of imported goods. 
- a restructuring effect; under the pressure of competition some supply 
sectors! would be induced to restructure (mergers, exploitation of 
economies of scale, removal of X-inefficiency, reduction of monopoly 
rents) and to increase productivity. The reduction in production costs 
would lead to a parallel reduction in production and import prices. 
Formally, these three effects are analysed as follows: 
For a given product traded through public contracts, initial expenditure is 
equivalent to: 
(1) pQ + PmM where Q = volume of products purchased of national or~g~n 
M = volume of imported products of foreign origin 
p = price of purchases of national origin 
Pm = price of imported purchases. 
1 Essentially equipment goods branches: metal 
electrical equipment (turbine generators, 
transport equipment (locomotives). 
products (boilers, etc.), 
telephone switching) or 
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After the opening up of public procurement, under the assumption that 
domestic prices in the end are aligned to foreign prices, expenditure 
becomes: 
(2) (Pm + dpm) (Q + dQ) + (Pm + dpm) (M + dM) 
The difference between the initial and final expenditure values is the sum 
of three factors: 
(3) (Pm + dpm) (Q + dQ) + (Pm + dpm) (M + dM) - (pQ + PmM) = 
p(Q + dQ) + Pm (M + dM) - (pQ + PmM) Static effect: the additional 
purchasing from abroad implies 
that dM > 0 and dQ < 0 
+ Pm (Q + dQ) - p(Q + dQ) 
+ dpm (Q + dQ) + dpm (M + dM) 
Competition effect: national 
producers align their price on 
import price; p becomes equal to 
Pm 
Restructuring effect: the price 
of national production (p = Pm) 
and import prices fall by dpm < 0 
The effects quantified by Atkins-Planning are therefore both static and 
dynamic (competition and restructuring effects). Several scenarios were 
envisaged whereby the consultant could scan the range of possibilities and 
evaluate the sensitivity of the figures to changes in the parameters (level 
of penetration of public markets, sectoral coverage, competitors' price 
levels). 
For the purpose of the simulation exercises, the following - medium -
scenario only was chosen: _ 
* 80% of public purchasing of manufactured products, construction products 
and business services are considered to be potentially accessible to 
foreign bidders; the remaining 20% can be provided only by local 
bidders1. 
* For each product analysed, it is assumed that the level of penetration of 
public markets converges with the penetration of the equivalent private 
markets. 
In the case of this scenario, the potential savings are shown in Table 3.1. 
For the Community as a whole, the savings achievable by government and 
public enterprises will probably amount to 12,7 billion ECU or 0,50% of 
GDP, of which 0,22% of GDP would be attributable to the static effect, 
0,03% to the competition effect and 0,25% to 'the restructuring effect. 
1 This restriction concerns the static effects only. 
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The Atkins-Planning study provides no breakdown between public 
administration and enterprises or between intermediate consumption and 
investment at the sectoral level chosen for the basic calculations (the 
three-digit NACE-CLIO level). 
For the purposes of the simulations, this breakdown had to be carried out. 
The products at the three-digit level and the savings relating to them were 
generally considered as investment if they corresponded to equipment goods 
or to construction products; the others were allocated solely to the 
intermediate consumption of public administrations!. Also, the possible 
savings on investments were broken down between public administrations and 
enterprises on the basis of their headings: telephone switching gear was 
allocated to public telecommunications enterprises, turbine generators to 
energy enterprises, locomotives to transport enterprises, etc. Where the 
allocation of products was less obvious than in the above examples, they 
were by preference allocated to public administrations. 
This breakdown is probably biased in favour of the public administrations 
(overvaluation of savings) to the detriment of the public enterprises 
(undervaluation by the same amount). 
Quantitatively, the savings in expenditure achievable by public 
administrations and enterprises could be those from Table 3.1. 
Table 3.1 Savings achievable by public administrations and enterprises as 
a result of the opening up of public procurement - medium 
scenario 
Effect . static competition restructuring total • 
Belgium mio 1984 ECU 403 62 491 956 
% GDP 0,42 0,06 0,51 0,99 
France mio 1984 ECU 387 132 1599 2118 
% GDP 0,06 0,02 0,26 0,34 
F.R. of Germany mio 1984 ECU 2599 235 1135 3969 
% GDP 0,33 0,03 0,14 0,50 
Italy mio 1984 ECU 981 228 828 2037 
% GDP 0,19 0,04 0,16 0,39 
U.K. mio 1984 ECU 1180 115 2305 3600 
% GDP 0,22 0,02 0,43 0,67 
Total mio 1984 ECU 5550 772 6358 12680 
% GDPl 0,22 0,03 0,25 0,50 
1 As percentage of the 5 industrialized countries. 
1 For the sake of simplicity. But it also seemed that public enterprises 
were all liable to favour domestic suppliers for their investment 
purchases, but that they were, by contrast, unlikely to do so for their 
purchases of intermediate goods. 
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3.1.2 Introduction of the shocks into the models 
The introduction of these effects into the models is complexl. It will 
merely be summarized here. 
The static effects were simulated, in the HERMES model, by altering the 
level of import penetration of public markets (see Table 3.2) and thus 
substituting purchases of lower-priced imported products for those provided 
by domestic producers. The volume of imports was thus increased, as was 
their price elasticity since it is assumed that the public agents who are 
initially insensitive to price differences (zero price elasticity) will in 
future make their choices in the light of these differences (the same price 
elasticity as private agents for similar products). The other two effects 
of competition and restructuring were introduced by changing prices, of 
production in the first case, of production and of imports in parallel with 
the reduction of unit cost as a result of restructuring, in the second 
case2. Reductions in prices on the supply side have as their counterpart 
reductions in prices for public purchasing (in this instance for purchases 
of equipment goods): the prices of equipment goods for government and 
public enterprises have thus been reduced proportionately (see Table 3.2). 
Table 3.2 Shocks introduced into the.HERMES model 
Opening up of public procurement 
B D F 
Static effects 
Increase in the level of 8,2 8,5 5,5 
import penetration of public 
markets (percentage points) 
Comeetition and restructurin~ effects 
Fall in prices of equipment 
goods on public markets (%) 
-public administration 0,03 0,13 0,03 
-public enterprises 
*energy 1,6 1,5 1,7 
*transport and telecom 8,5 7,8 7,6 
Total shock as % of GDP 0,99 0,50 0,34 
Source: Catinat and Italianer (1988) 
I 
4,1 
0,07 
1,1 
11,4 
0,39 
UK EUR12 EUR12 
% GDP 
3,9 5,6 0,22 
0,28 
0,12 
1,1 
7,2 
0,67 0,50 
1 The main difficulty lies in the fact that the static effects result from 
a difference in price levels (domestic prices and import prices), but the 
prices in the models are indices which conform with national accounts 
concepts. See Catinat and Italianer (1988) for a full description of the 
method of implementation. 
2 The consequences for employment of the restructuring of industries have 
not been taken into account ex ante. Therefore, the simulation results 
for employment might be biased upwards. 
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During the calculations, it was assumed that all enterprises in the energy 
and transport and telecommunications branches were public enterprises. 
This assumption results in an overvaluation .of the effects which becomes 
greater to the extent that the energy and transport and telecommunication 
branches contain a larger proportion of private enterprises. 
The central simulation was based on the assumption that the opening up of 
public procurement was of benefit to Community suppliers only. 
An alternative scenario was also simulated in which it was assumed that 
intra-Community public procurement would be opened up to the rest of the 
world without reciprocity, without the protection of public procurement 
outside the Community being reduced1. 
3.2. Simulation results 
3.2.1 The Community as a whole 
The macroeconomic consequences of the opening up of public procurement will 
spread throughout the economy through three channels: public contract 
suppliers, public enterprises and public administrations. 
In the case of public contract suppliers, the pressure of competition 
should trigger necessary restructuring and contraction - in some cases 
sharp - of their production costs. The direct beneficiaries of this would 
of course be governments and public enterprises. It is probable, however, 
that this restructuring would also affect products not exclusively intended 
for public agencies. In that case, beneficial effects could appear 
directly on private markets. 
In the case of public administrations, the opening up of public procurement 
would entail budgetary savings and would therefore help to cut public 
deficits. 
Lastly, in the case of public enterprises, the opening up of public 
procurement would entail reductions in the average cost of investment 
spending, since, according to Atkins-Planning, public enterprises could 
save chiefly on their purchases of equipment goods, by inviting a wider 
range of foreign suppliers to tender. For the public enterprises, the 
result would therefore be a fall in their production costs which, it has 
been assumed, will be passed on in their selling prices (competition policy 
in the public energy, transport and telecommunications services). These 
public services have a substantial power of dissemination to the whole of 
the economy, via the intermediate consumption of the other productive 
branches and via households. The falls in production cost, starting in 
these public services, would therefore spread to all the productive 
branches. The overall effect could therefore well be a slowdown in the 
general rate of price inflation. 
1 A third scenario corresponds to the opening up of Community public 
procurement negotiated on the principle of reciprocity with the 
signatories of the GATT Code. The consequences of such a scenario could 
be similar to those of the central scenario (opening up of public 
procurement limited to the Community area). 
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According to the central HERMES simulation where the opening up benefits 
Community suppliers only (cf. Table 3.3 and Table A3.2 in Annex 2 for 
individual country results), prices would fall progressively in line with 
the restructuring of the supplier sectors and its spread to all the 
productive branches and to final demand: around -0,3% in the short term and 
-1,5% in the medium term for both the deflators of GDP and of consumption 
(on average over the Community). 
Table 3.3 "Public procurement" simulation: main macro-economic results for 
EUR12 
Year1 Year2 Year3 Year4 YearS Year6 
Percenta~e differences 
Gross domestic product 0,20 0,25 0,31 0,37 0,45 0,55 
Private consumption price -0,30 -0,48 -0,67 -0,91 -1,17 -1,46 
GDP deflator -0,35 -0,62 -0,86 -1,11 -1,35 -1,58 
Real wage rate 0,18 0,11 0,12 0,15 0,20 0,26 
Labour productivity/head 0,15 0,13 0,16 0,18 0,23 0,27 
Employment 0,05 0,12 0,15 0,19 0,23 0,28 
Absolute differences 
Employment ('000) 62 143 192 238 290 356 
Budget surplus % GDP o, 11 0,21 0,23 0,26 0,29 0,34 
External balance % GDP -0,01 0,02 0,03 0,05 0,06 0,09 
Source: HERMES simulation 
The lower rate of inflation, all other things being equal, is a factor 
which favours growth: the purchasing power of personal disposable income 
increases and external pr:ice competitiveness improves1. In the scenario 
where the opening up of public procurement is limited to the Community 
area, ex-hypothesis, there is no loss of market share with regard to public 
contract procurement, taking the average between countries. Everything 
therefore helps to support activity: according to the HERMES simulations, 
Community GDP could increase by 0,55% in the medium term. As a result, 
over 350 000 jobs could be created in the medium term. 
The opening up of public procurement would take pressure off the budget 
deficits. First, it would do so directly, since it is synonymous with 
budget savings if the quantity of purchases remains unchanged. Second, it 
would do so indirectly, because the upturn in economic activity and lower 
inflation are both factors which favour an improvement in budget balances 
(the tax and parafiscal base expands in real terms, interest charges on the 
public debt decline). 
According to the HERMES simulations, the improvement in budget balances is 
a large one: of the order of 0,35% in the medium term for the whole of the 
Community. It is all the larger because the scenario in question 
implicitly assumes that the public administrations will wish to reduce 
their debt and will not use the budgetary savings to support demand 
directly by Keynesian reflation. 
1 With an unchanged exchange rate, as has been assumed. 
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The consequences for the external balance depend on the conditions on which 
public procurement is opened up: an improvement probably results if opening 
up is limited to the Community area, since the restructuring of the 
supplier branches on the internal market leads to increases in 
competitiveness on the external markets. 
If public procurement is opened up unilaterally without reciprocity from 
the rest of the world, the external balance will probably deteriorate 
because of an increase in the penetration of the internal market with no 
equivalent increase in the penetration of external markets. Also, the 
improvement in the budget balance could be very substantially reduced 
{divided by 2 according to the HERMES simulations): the substitution of 
imports from outside the Community for domestic production would deprive 
government of tax revenue, which in certain cases may even exceed the 
initial budget savings. The activity-bolstering effect described above 
could be reduced by 25% to 50%, according to exploratory simulations 
carried out with the help of the HERMES model1. 
3.2.2 Individual country results 
The macroeconomic consequences by country are given in Table 3.4 for the 
scenario in which opening up is limited to the Community area. This means 
that, ex ante, what is gained by some corresponds to what is gained by 
others. However, ex post, restructuring in the supplier branches would 
enable European industrialists to win back market shares on external 
markets: the size of the market to be shared would increase over time. 
With all the precautions which should be taken when comparing the 
macroeconomic consequences by country (see section 1 on methodology), one 
observation seems irrefutable: the consequences for activity (GDP or 
employment) are in magnitude largely determined by the initial shocks 
quantified upstream of the models (see Table 3.4). 
1 This alternative simulation (not shown here) assumed that the relative 
sha~es of intra- and extra-Community imports in public markets would be 
the same as in the equivalent private markets. Despite the increase in 
competition which would result from a penetration of public markets by 
extra-Community suppliers, the simulation assumed, due to lack of 
information, that prices would fall by the same amount as if the opening 
up of procurement were limited to the Community area. In this respect 
for this alternative scenario, the favourable aspects of opening up 
public procurement are liable to be undervalued. 
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Table 3.4 "Public procurement" simulation: comparison of medium term 
results among countries 
B D F I UK EUR12 
Percentage differences 
Gross domestic product 0,78 0,56 0,50 0,39 0,70 0,55 
Private consumption 0,02 0,56 0,30 0,33 0, 71 0,46 
Total fixed investment 1,25 1,52 0,48 0,31 0,97 0,88 
Consumption price -0,30 -2,15 -0,42 -0,45 -2,92 -1,46 
GDP deflator -0,57 -1,79 -0,49 -0,84 -3,41 -1,58 
Real wage rate -0,31 0,37 0,26 0,04 0,42 0,26 
Labour productivity/head 0,17 0,29 0,24 0,15 0,62 0,27 
Employment 0,66 0,27 0,26 0,20 0,32 0,28 
Absolute differences 
Employment ( 1 000) 23 70 57 44 90 356 
Budget surplus 0,76 0,23 0,37 o, 19 0,51 0,34 
as % of GDP 
External balance 0,80 0,15 0,26 0,02 -0,26 0,09 
as % of GDP 
Reminder 
Shocks as % of GDP 0,99 0,50 0,34 0,39 0,67 0,50 
Source: HERMES simulation 
The apportionment of the beneficial effects between Community countries 
will substantially depend on the nationality of the firms currently most 
efficient in supplying the public markets. The presence in a country of 
such firms is likely to limit the level of penetration of its market while 
enabling its public agencies to benefit from price reductions brought about 
by the increase in competition. It also favours gains in market share on 
foreign public markets. Lastly it is a factor in the control of industrial 
restructuring. 
The differentiation of consequences by country is therefore determined more 
by their industrial characteristics or by the extent to which their public 
market is currently protected, than by the indirect macroeconomic 
mechanisms brought into play. 
According to the HERMES simulations, the multiplier effect (ratio of the 
relative increase in GDP to the initial shock) is highest in France and 
lowest in Belgium. The reasons are difficult to determine and this 
observation would require more detailed analyses. Beyond the primary 
effects, the logic of which is described in the Atkins-Planning report, 
three macroeconomic mechanisms seem to predominate: 
- the size of the increases in productivity created; they are partly the 
result of the degree of restructuring of the national firms which supply 
the public markets; they range from 0,6% in the medium term in the United 
Kingdom to some 0,15% in Belgium and Italy. The higher they are, the 
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more they permit the redistribution of surpluses in the form of profits, 
wages or lower prices. 
- the size of the fall in prices. They are a factor in competitiveness and 
favour external growth. The reductions in prices are large for the 
United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany, but are distinctly 
smaller for the other countries. 
- the size of the increases in real wages. Where they are high, they 
support domestic growth. This is the case for France, Germany and the 
United Kingdom. 
These three mechanisms are interdependent; they operate to a greater or 
lesser degree depending on the country. 
The improvement of budget balances is also a factor to be taken into 
account. A substantial easing of this constraint is equivalent to 
increased potential for growth in the more or less distant future, because 
it permits the implementation of a less restrictive economic policy. On 
the basis of this criterion, Belgium and the United Kingdom seem as though 
they ought to benefit more than the other countries from the opening up of 
public procurement, although the United Kingdom will see its room for 
manoeuvre on the external balance becoming narrower. 
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4. FINANCIAL SERVICES AND CAPITAL MARKET INTEGRATION 
The liberalisation of financial services has implications both for 
consumers and producers of these services. Producers will be able to sell 
their services in all Community countries under conditions equivalent to 
those in their home countries (free market entry). Consumers will benefit 
from the enhanced competition in this field through a larger range of 
products and lower prices. The full liberalisation of capital, which is a 
prerequisite for the liberalisation of financial services, will encourage 
capital movements toward countries or regions with the highest real 
interest rates, implying an equalisation of the latter in the long run, as 
for the marginal efficiency of capital1. Simulating the liberalisation of 
capital and financial services therefore amounts to simulating the effects 
of competition-induced price decreases for financial services, as well as a 
movement for real interest rates towards convergence. Section 4.1 describes 
the simulation characteristics used for the simulation of these effects, 
while the simulation results themselves are presented and discussed in 
section 4.2. 
4.1 Simulation characteristics 
This section summarizes the inputs and assumptions used for the simulations 
concerning the liberalisation of capital and financial services (for a 
detailed analysis, see Catinat and Italianer (1988)). The simulations 
themselves were carried out, under the responsibility of the Commission's 
services, on the Interlink model of the OECD (for a description see OECD 
(1988) or Richardson (1987) and the references cited therein). Apart from 
the simulation shocks, the simulations were performed on the assumption of 
unchanged policy. In addition, the model was used with the options 
described in the methodological section, in particular with unchanged !!!1 
interest rates, i.e. accommodation of the real money stock. 
This assumption of unchanged real interest rates implies that ex ante 
shocks in real interest rates (as given in this exercise) are also true ~ 
post. The option of unchanged nominal exchange rates with fixed real 
interest rates is justified if one is ready to accept that real exchange 
rates follow interest rate parity. 
The liberalisation of capital and financial services was simulated by 
giving shocks to seven EC countries simultaneously, i.e. Belgium, Germany, 
Spain, France, Italy, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom2. The shocks 
were introduced once and for all in the first period, and simulated over a 
period of six years3. A comparison of the simulation results with and 
without the shocks enables one to evaluate the macro-economic impact of the 
liberalisation on a number of countries sufficiently large to represent the 
total Community (95% of 1985 EUR12 GDP). 
1 Cf. Commission of the EC (1988), Section 5.1 
2 Although simulation inputs for Luxembourg were available, they were not 
used for simulation, except for the total average price decrease, which 
was incorporated in the trade effects for the Belgium-Luxembourg Economic 
Union. 
3 Since the main interest of the exercise lies in the medium run effects, 
the gradual, as opposed to instantaneous, introduction of the effects was 
not considered as being meaningful. 
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The shocks given to the Interlink model derive mainly from increased 
competition for the financial services which squeezes the monopoly rents 
provoked by the existence of a segmented European market. Gradually, the 
costs of financial intermediation will converge toward the cost level of 
the most efficient producers, i.e. those producing at the lowest cost. On 
the basis of this reasoning, the consultants Price Waterhouse have 
calculated that, on average, the price of financial services in Europe 
could decrease by as much as 10%. 
This result, which is the middle of a range of likely price falls, was 
arrived at after a price comparison of sixteen representative financial 
products, cf. Price Waterhouse (1988). The price decreases for these 
sixteen products could be translated into shocks for five important 
macroeconomic (model) variables, L e. short and long term interest rates 
for households, the long term interest rate for firms, the price of 
financial services (other than borrowing costs) for households and the 
price of intermediary consumption of financial services (excluding 
borrowing costs) for enterprises1. To the decrease in the long term 
interest rate for firms were added the changes in the real interest rates 
to be expected from the convergence of real interest rates following the 
integration of capital markets. The shocks given are summarized in Table 
4.1. It should be noted that the interest rate decreases (except for the 
convergence effect) represent decreases in margins of financial 
intermediation, and do not affect the underlying (money market) rates. In 
terms of GDP, the shocks represent 0,7% of GDP on average, based on a range 
from 0,2% (for the Netherlands) to 1,3% (for Spain). 
1 Cf. Catinat and Italianer (1988). Note that since real interest rates are 
kept constant, ex ante changes in (real) interest rates are equal to the 
ex post changes in real interest rates. 
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Table 4.1 Simulation inputs for financial liberalisation 
A.Decreases in interest 
rate margins 
(percentage points): 
- short-term consumer 
rate for households 
- mortgage rate for 
households 
- long-term rate for 
firms (including 
interest rate 
convergence) 
B.Price decreases (%): 
B D E F I L NL UK 
0,7 2,2 0,7 1,8 2,6 0 0,6 1,9 
0,2 0,3 1,0 0,6 0 0,3 0 0 
1,2 0,2 0,2 0,5 0,7 1,3 0,9 0,4 
EUR8 
1,9 
0,2 
0,5 
-other financial ser- 16,4 3,4 18,9 10,0 19,8 13,2 3,8 2,8 7,9 
vices for households 
- other intermediary 
financial services 
for firms 
TOTAL 
- average price 
decrease (%) 
- as % of 1985 GDP 
17,7 8,0 26,0 14,3 18,4 6,3 7,5 3,9 10,4 
11,4 10,3 20,7 12,2 14,3 8,5 4,4 6,7 10,3 
0,6 0,6 1,3 0,5 0,7 1,3 0,2 0,8 0,7 
Source: Catinat and Italianer (1988). The averages for the eight countries 
(column "EUR8") have been calculated using 1985 data on value added 
in the financial service branch as weights. The bottom line was 
obtained through multiplication of the 1985 share of value added in 
financial services in GDP by the average price decrease. 
4.2 Simulation results 
4.2.1 The Community as a whole 
Extrapolating the individual country results to EUR12 one obtains the 
macro-economic effects of financial liberalisation of Table 4.21 (Table 
A2.3 in annex 2 gives the individual country results). In the medium run, 
the "multiplier" effect is high, with a shock of 0, 7% of GDP generating a 
1,5% increase in real GDP. The main contributors to this considerable 
growth result are the decreases in the long-term interest rates for 
households and firms, boosting both residential and productive investment, 
suggesting a total investment increase of 2,4% in the medium term 
(government investment is kept constant in real terms). In addition, demand 
would be sustained through 1% more private consumption, stimulated in part 
1 The simulation results have been slightly adjusted in order to abstract 
from historical trade integration effects present in the import equation 
elasticities. 
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by the lower consumer credit rates, and in the longer run by the increase 
of 0,9% in real disposable income. The latter effect is due to the 
disinflationary process set in motion through the price decreases, for 
financial services other than borrowing, which are diffused throughout the 
productive system and finally would lead to a 1,4% decrease in domestic 
prices. These price decreases also enhance competitiveness, resulting in a 
positive contribution of net exports, leading to an increase in the trade 
balance to GDP ratio of 0,3 percentage point. 
For households, the decrease in long-term interest rates for firms implies 
that capital becomes cheaper than labour, ceteris paribus. Therefore, 
labour will be substituted by capital due to relative price effects. This 
effect on employment is clearly present in the first two years of the 
simulation. After tht"s period, demand is strong enough to compensate for 
the initial loss in employment, and would result in 440 thousand new jobs 
in the medium term. In reality the initial negative employment effect is 
likely to be mitigated through the fact that the liberalisation will only 
take place gradually instead of instantaneously as introduced in the model 
simulations. Therefore less emphasis should be put on the short-term 
simulation results from this point of view. 
Table 4.2 "Financial liberalisation" simulation: main macro-economic 
results for EUR12 
Year1 Year2 Year3 Year4 YearS Year6 
Percenta~e differences 
Gross domestic product 0,43 1,06 1,33 1,36 1,39 1,46 
Private consumption price -0,47 -0,78 -1,01 -1,19 -1,32 -1,38 
GDP deflator -0,47 -o, 77 -1,00 -1,17 -1,31 -1,37 
Real wage rate 0,26 0,26 0,28 0,33 0,38 0,42 
Labour productivity/head 0,63 1,11 1,19 1,12 1,10 1,11 
Employment -0,20 -0,05 0,14 0,24 0,29 0,36 
Absolute differences 
Employment ( 1000) -245 -65 171 294 361 440 
Budget surplus % GDP 0,02 0,28 0,60 0,78 0,92 1,06 
External balance % GDP -0,03 -0,02 0,15 0,22 0,25 0,26 
Source: Interlink simulation on the responsability of the Commission's 
services 
In the medium term, the government budget balance as a percentage of GDP 
might improve by more than 1 percentage point. With nominal GDP 
approximately constant, this is mainly the result of lower nominal wage 
rates and prices paid by the public authorities, in the medium run 
supported by a lower volume of recipients of unemployment benefit and lower 
interest payments on government debt. 
For the Community as a whole, the medium term effects of the liberalisation 
of financial services and capital market seem unequivocally positive. The 
level of output would increase by 1,5%, prices would decrease by 1,4%, 
while employment could step up by 440 thousand manyears. At the same time 
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there could be an alleviation of the internal and external macro-economic 
constraints, with the government budget constraint and external balance 
improving with more than 1 and 0,3 percentage point, respectively. 
However, these positive results apply only to the medium term. In the 
short-run the effects are smaller or even negative, as in the case of 
employment. The indications above showed that this could be due to the 
instantaneous shocks in the model, affecting the relative price of labour 
before the price decreases were able to work themselves through as 
increased demand expectations, with a subsequent offsetting effect on 
labour demand. 
4.2.2 Individual country results 
As before, and indicated in the methodological remarks, individual country 
results (Table A2.3 in Annex 2) are likely to be substantially influenced 
not only by uncertainty surrounding the model inputs, but also by the 
specifications of the country models used for simulation. Nevertheless an 
attempt has been made to compare the medium term individual country 
results (cf. Table 4.3). 
Table 4.3 "Financial liberalisation" simulation: comparison of medium term 
results 
Percentage differences 
Gross domestic product 
Private consumption 
Total fixed investment 
Consumption price 
GDP deflator 
Real wage rate 
Labour productivity/head 
Employment 
Absolute differences 
Employment ( 1000) 
Budget surplus % GDP 
Trade balance % GDP 
Reminder 
Shocks as % of GDP 
B D E F I NL UK EUR12 
1,22 0,96 0,71 1,77 3,01 0,85 0,84 1,46 
0,72 0,86 0,73 0,80 1,81 0,46 0,72 0,95 
2,21 1,04 0,33 3,95 5,00 0,96 1,02 2,42 
-1,28 -0,48 -1,59 -0,86 -4,19 -0,82 -0,74 -1,38 
--1,27 -0,10 -1,65 -0,83 -5,03 -0,66 -0,41 -1,37 
1,17 0,66 0,66 0,26 -0,14 0,65 0,56 0,42 
0,69 0,54 0,89 1,36 2,55 0,26 0,53 1,11 
0,52 0,42 -0,18 0,41 0,45 0,59 0,31 0,36 
19 
0,97 
0,37 
0,6 
108 -21 
0,63 -0,01 
0,20 0,12 
0,6 1,3 
87 
1,23 
0,15 
0,5 
104 
2,50 
0,52 
0,7 
28 
0,50 
0,39 
0,2 
78 
0,65 
0,21 
0,8 
440 
1,06 
0,26 
0,7 
Source: Interlink simulation on the responsability of the Commission's 
services 
At first sight, the correlation between, say, the GDP results and the level 
of the shock is non-existent: The rank correlation coefficient is even 
(insignificantly) negative, at -.39. Part of this disparity may indeed be 
attributed to differences in model behaviour, but another part is certainly 
related to the differences between the· five different shocks as given in 
Table 4 .1. In Italy, the country which would experience, with 3%, the 
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highest increase in GDP level, the total shock (as a % of GDP) equals the 
Community average, but the price decrease of financial services (other than 
the cost of borrowing) to households is the highest among the eight 
countries considered. This decrease in consumer prices leads to a strong 
increase in real disposable income which fuels private consumption, 
together with a strong decrease in the costs of consumer credit. A 
similarly large decrease in the price of intermediate financial services to 
firms is passed through in substantially lower domestic and export prices, 
causing substitution of imports by domestic production and enhanced 
competitiveness on foreign markets, permitting gains in market shares (in 
the medium run, Italian export prices decrease almost three times the 
European average). The enhanced competitiveness is also due to the fact 
that productivity increases in Italy are not reflected in wages, such that 
the real wage rate hardly changes, and even turns slightly negative. 
Therefore, despite the absence of incentives to residential investment 
through mortgage cost decreases (bringing down the level of the total 
shock), it is possible that a total shock equal to the Community average 
could lead to the strongest results for growth and employment. Similarly, 
it is equally possible that the country with the largest total shock in 
terms of GDP, i.e. Spain, is suggested to experience the lowest growth rate 
and even negative effects on unemployment. This is mainly due to the fact 
that price decreases are concentrated in the costs of financial services 
other than borrowing. Therefore, productive investment is much less 
stimulated than in the other countries. At the same time, the consumer 
price decreases are only slowly compensated in nominal wages, such that 
real wages increase, influencing employment negatively. The latter 
increases labour productivity, which in its turn continues to push real 
wages, leading to even more unemployment and so on. Spain is therefore an 
example of a country which does not seem to be able to compensate the 
negative effect of real wages on employment through increased demand. 
France, with a total shock below the Community average, nevertheless would 
achieve the second best effect on GDP. This is caused exclusively by the 
strong growth of both residential and productive investment. For 
residential investment this follows from the relatively strong decrease in 
the mortgage rates, whereas productive investment is spurred by the 
relatively fast adjustment of the capital stock to its new equilibrium 
value as determined by the decrease in the interest rate and thus the user 
cost of capital. 
Apart from France and Italy, all other countries experience GDP increases 
in the medium run below the Community average. In this group, Belgium would 
see the strongest effect on GDP with 1,2%, mainly caused by the decrease in 
the long term interest rate for firms by 1,2 percentage points. The 
remaining countries (excluding Spain, which was discussed above) fall more 
or less in the same range, where it is surprising to see the achievement of 
the Netherlands, despite a total shock of only 0,2% of GDP. As for Belgium, 
this result can be explained by the more-than-average decline in the 
interest rate for firms, with 0,9 percentage points. The result for the 
United Kingdom is influenced by the fact that the relatively efficient 
financial sector does not leave much room for increases in domestic demand, 
while the small share of financial services in external trade does not 
allow this efficiency to be translated in a sizeable contribution of net 
external trade increases to GDP. 
. .. I . .. 
- 591 -
- 10.31 -
5. SUPPLY EFFECTS 
The generic term "supply effects" is used to analyse the consequences of 
the strategic reactions of firms faced with the change in environment which 
will be created by the large internal market. Although these changes are 
of many kinds, they can be grouped under two headings: 
- market size effects. The abolition of non-tariff barriers immediately 
places firms on a market which is the size of the Community. Exporting 
to other Community countries or producing for a national destination 
should become one and the same thing1. 
- the intensification of competition, also as a result of the elimination 
of non-tariff barriers which at present segment markets and favour the 
existence of protected situations. 
5.1 The construction of an illustrative scenario 
A scenario describing the macroeconomic consequences which could result 
from "supply effects" was constructed step by step. This scenario is 
illustrative and represents both optimistic and pessimistic hypotheses. It 
is called illustrative since it describes phenomena which could happen but 
which are not completely forseeable; optimistic because it presupposed the 
success of the strategic reactions of firms to the newly created 
opportunities; finally, it is said to be pessimistic because it does not 
include certain dynamic phenomena which are felt to be important but which 
are particularly difficult to quantify: the effects of competition on 
innovation (Geroski (1988)) and on investment, experience and learning by 
doing which are particularly important in the high technology industries. 
Three stages can be identified. 
1. The first stage is con_fined to the effects quantified by the external 
consultants. Its sectoral coverage is limited: food manufacturing and 
processing industries (Group MAC), the building materials sector (BIPE), 
the pharmaceuticals industry (EAG), telecomniunications services and 
equipment (DIW), the motor vehicle industry, including components, 
(Ludvigsen), textiles and clothing (IFO and Prometeia) and the business 
services sector (Peat Marwick). These sectors taken together cover 
about 25% on non-agricultural non-financial market production. But they 
are far more representative - although they do not provide an exhaustive 
picture - of the total supply effects which can be expected from the 
large internal market, because of the criteria on which they were 
selected. Apart from textiles and clothing, they have all in fact been 
chosen because of the scale of the non-tariff barri-ers which are now on 
record2, and therefore the scale of the consequences which would flow 
from their elimination. 
1 Apart from the cultural or linguistic differences. 
2 Textiles and clothing was, on the contrary, chosen as an example of a 
sector in which a large internal market had already been virtually 
achieved. 
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The supply effects quantified by the consultants are either direct or 
indirect. Taking the direct effects, these are equivalent to a fall in 
prices of intermediate consumption1. It is in this way that the fall in 
unit costs of the related sectors have been simulated. Taking the 
indirect effects, they are imposed through gains in productivity caused 
by the restructuring of the processes of production or by a better 
exploitation of economies of scale. In this case the productivity of 
the factors of production was increased: the productivity of capital was 
increased ex-ante in parallel with the introduction of new vintage 
investments in the capital stock2, the productivity of labour was 
increased ex-post. When the sectoral analyses by the consultants 
provided quantitative information concerning the changes in internal or 
external market share which could be caused by restructuring, these have 
been integrated. A summary of the shocks is provided in Table 5.1. 
Table 5.1 Decrease in unit costs of production for the industrial branches 
Weight of the branch 
in % of total industry(1) D F I UK 
Foodstuff industries 
Building materials produced 
by the sector of 
-intermediate goods 
-equipment goods 
-consumption goods 
Automobile 
Textiles and clothing 
Total 
Equivalent in bn ECU 1985 
%point of GDP 
18,9 
D F I UK 
3,7 3,0 4,7 2,5 
1,0 0,8 2,3 0,7 
1,9 0,8 0,7 0,6 
7,1 
6,7 
Source: Catinat and Italianer (1988) 
0,79 
0,01 
0,10 
0,10 
0,21 
0,03 
1,24 
0,77 
0,27 
0,23 
0,13 
0,32 
0,03 
0,77 
0,13 
0,36 
0,05 
0,35 
0,03 
1,75 1,69 
0,76 
0,03 
0,04 
0 
0,22 
0,07 
1,12 
'--------~~------~-29,0 
0 97 
(1) Due to lack of country-by-country information, the share of each branch 
in total industrial production was assumed to be the same among 
countries, except for building materials. 
1 Reduced cost of ingredients for food-processing industries, cuts in the 
prices of building materials for the construction sector, reduced prices 
of intermediate consumption of market services for producer branches 
generally, etc. 
2 It is in this way that the dynamic related to the restructuring or to the 
exploitation of the economies of scale, has been incorporated in the 
models. This supposes implicitly that the latter requires an investment 
effort (and that they therefore cannot be brought about only by 
disinvestment or the closures of plants) and that these effects should 
occur at the same rate as investment. All this is, of course, schematic 
and formal when compared to economic reality. Less unrealistic, however, 
than a direct increase in the productivity of existing capital because in 
this latter case no costs (on investment in particular) are taken into 
account. For more detail, see Catinat and Italianer (1988). 
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2. The second stage concentrated solely on economies of scale effects. For 
the industrial sectors! not covered by the first stage, a greater 
exploitation of the existing potentialities has been assumed. The 
hypothesis has been that the average size of the establishments 
concerned will converge, for each detailed sector (analysed at the 
three-digit NACE level), towar~s the minimum efficient technical 
scale2. The estimates thus obtained represent, from the range of 
possibilities, the upper end of that range. However, it was not 
possible to cover all the detailed sectors of industry because of a lack 
of statistical and quantitative information. On average, for industry, 
the hypotheses for economies of scale therefore do not lead to an 
overvaluation of potentialities. 
Technically, the procedure for implementing these effects into the model 
is identical to that described previously for the first stage (see 
Table 5.2). It is assumed that the strategies for exploiting economies 
of scale are successful: additional production capacities give rise to 
an increase in external market share: that is to say, for the Community 
taken as a whole, the Community market share with the rest of the world, 
increases. 
Table 5.2 Scenario of a greater exploitation of economies of scale 
Decrease in unit costs of production 
Decrease in unit costs of production in % For all countries 
Energy products 
-0,42 
Industrial products 
-1,52 
- branch of intermediate goods -2,23 
- branch of equipment goods -2,36 
- branch of consumption goods -0,48 
Source: Catinat and Italianer (1988) 
3. Lastly, the third stage seeks to describe the pure effects of the 
increased competition which would be caused by the large internal 
market. More precisely, it is concerned with the consequences of 
increased competition on monopoly rents and X-inefficiency. The decline 
in monopoly rents should imply a fall in sales prices by a decline, pure 
1 For the other branches, the service branch in particular, the 
quantitative information was too fragmentary to permit quantification of 
economies of scale effects. 
2 A survey carried out by Pratten (1988) has provided, according to the 
engineering estimates, an evaluation of the optimum production sizes for 
the major part of the detailed industrial sectors where technical 
economies of scale are substantial. 
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and simple, in firms' profit margins. X-inefficiency should also 
decline, but by elimination of inefficient areas of activity and so of a 
reduction in unit costs. The quantitative estimations upstream, as it 
were, from the models have been made in a deductive way, by using the 
differences in prices now observed between Member States as an indicator 
of future competitive pressures; by using the results of the 
Smith-Venables model (1988); and finally by using the specialist 
knowledge of expertsl. These basic estimates at the company level or at 
the detailed branch level could have been extrapolated to the 
macroeconomic level, but this would have given rise to unrealistic 
figures. Consequently, these extrapolations have been significantly 
reduced. Technically, the procedure for implementing these results into 
the models was to lower the producer prices of the market branches 
(simulation of the reduction of X-inefficiency), as given in Table 5.3. 
Experts have estimated that all these falls in the costs of production 
may be considered to come from an increase in the productivity of labour 
(by reorganizing managerial teams). 
Table 5.3 Consequence of the strengthening of competition 
Branches of HERMES model Int. Eqp. Cons. Industrial 
goods goods goods average 
Fall in production prices 1,8 1,5 0,7 1,23 
in % (1) 
Decrease in unit costs of 0,72 0,60 0,28 0,50 
production in % (2) 
Source: Catinat and Italianer (1988) 
(1) By reduction of monopoly rents and X-inefficiencies. 
(2) By reduction of X-inefficiencies. 
Transp Market 
+telec serv. 
(3) (3) 
1,0 1,0 
1,0 1,0 
(3) For the service branches, it is assumed that, due to lack of 
information, the falls in the production prices resulted directly and 
only from the reduction of X-inefficiencies. 
The above tables set out in summary form the principal hypotheses used 
for the simulation exercises. The procedure for implementing them into 
the models is complex; it is presented exhaustively in Catinat and 
Italianer (1988). Only the basic ideas have been set out here. 
The time path of supply effects is also complex. Conventionally, due to 
lack of more precise information, it has been assumed that they would 
develop gradually over 5 years. This clearly implies a substantial 
acceleration in their dynamic, in particular for the exploitation of 
economies of scale or the restructuring of the processes of production. 
1 By examination of audits in firms for the evaluation of X-inefficiency • 
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5.2 Economic consequences 
5.2.1 The Community as a whole 
Whatever the supply effects, they all result in the reduction of firms' 
production costs. The origins of these effects are probably extremely 
diverse, as is the time-scale on which they appear: the possibility of 
using less costly ingredients (the case of the food-processing industries), 
the possibility of lo~cost imports (the case of building materials), less 
need to differentiate products (standardization or mutual recognition), 
greater potential for exploiting economies of scale, reduction of 
X-inefficiency under competitive pressure. 
All these phenomena will probably combine to reduce production costs. It 
is very probable that lower costs will be passed on in producer prices in 
significant proportions since the large internal market should increase 
competition as a result of the abolition of non-tariff barriers and free 
access to markets. The fall in prices could even be greater than the fall 
in costs in cases where strong initial monopolistic powers are dismantled 
under the pressure of competition. According to the simulations carried 
out (see Table 5.4), the fall in prices would be very significant in the 
medium term: averaging -2,3% for consumer prices, and -2,6% for the GOP 
deflator of the Community of Twelve. 
Table 5.4 "Supply effects" simulation: main macro-economic results for 
EUR12 
Yearl Year2 Year3 Year4 YearS Year6 
Percenta~e differences 
Gross domestic product 0,51 0,90 1,31 1,64 1,93 2,14 
Private consumption price -0,60 -1,01 -1,41 -1,78 -2,08 -2,29 
GOP deflator -0,85 -1,32 -1,76 -2,14 -2,44 -2,65 
Real wage rate 0,26 0,32 0,56 0,80 1,04 1,25 
Labour productivity/head 0,75 0,97 1,18 1,31 1,42 1,47 
Employment -0,23 -0,07 0,13 0,33 0,51 0,68 
Absolute differences 
Employment ( 1000) -284 -86 156 409 647 859 
Budget surplus % GOP -0,03 0,15 0,23 0,37 0,49 0,62 
External balance % GOP 0,18 0,23 0,29 0,34 0,40 0,45 
Source: HERMES simulation 
Part of the supply effects stem from an increase in the productivity of the 
factors of production, labour in particular. These gains in productivity 
would make it possible not only to reduce inflationary strains, but also to 
satisfy real wage claims without aggravating unit costs. The Community's 
internal demand would therefore be stimulated by an improvement in real 
incomes, while foreign demand would be stimulated by improvements in 
competitiveness. This would produce an activity bolstering effect: 
Community GOP could increase by around 2,1% in the medium term. 
Comparing this result with the inital shock introduced into the HERMES 
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model, L e. 3, 2% of Community GDP1, the macroeconomic mechanisms have a 
low multiplier effect. This stems from ex-ante losses of employment caused 
by the increase in the productivity of labour. Fewer jobs mean less income 
and therefore an attenuation of the favourable effects of the improvement 
of supply: when GDP increases by 2,1% in the medium term, employment rises 
only some 860 000, or 1,2% of Community employment. In the short term, the 
weakness of the employment content of supply effects is even still more 
striking: a 0,5% increase in Community GDP would be matched by a loss of 
employment of almost 300 000 jobs. These losses are unavoidable, and an 
attempt to avoid them would lead to a rejection of the improvement in 
supply conditions. 
Lastly, two beneficial effects should be stressed: the external and budget 
balances would simultaneously improve by 0,4 and 0,6 of a percentage point 
of GDP respectively in the medium term for the Community as a whole. The 
former improvement would result from the increases in competitiveness 
induced by the greater dynamism of the productive system (fall in prodution 
costs, increased flexibility, stimulus to product innovation and 
differentiation2). The latter is due to a favourable mechanical effect on 
budget resources of the upturn of activity. 
5.2.2 Individual country results 
In the case of supply effects, the quantitative information available 
related only to the four large Community countries: the Federal Republic of 
Germany, France, Italy and the United Kingdom. Only the data provided by 
the external consultants made it possible to introduce different shocks per 
country. For the economy of scale effects and for the pure competition 
effects, the same shocks have been introduced for each of the different 
countries analysed. Overall, the shocks introduced are therefore very 
close for each country. 
The macroeconomic consequences simulated by the HERMES model are set out in 
detail in Table A2.4 in annex 2. Table 5.5 compares the medium term 
results for some important variables among the four countries. 
They are very broadly similar qualitatively and quantitatively: an increase 
in GDP in the medium term (from 1,8% for Italy to 2,4% for France), a fall 
in prices (from -1,8% for Italy to -2,6% for the United Kingdom in the case 
of consumer prices), creation of employment, improvement of budget and 
external balances (from 0, 4% of GDP for the United Kingdom to 0, 9% for 
France, from 0,3% for Germany to 0,7% for France respectively). 
1 Cf. Catinat and Italianer (1988). 
2 Technically, only the first factor - the fall in production costs - is 
endogenous to the simulation. 
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Table 5.5 "Supply effects" simulation: comparison of medium term 
results among countries 
0 F I UK EUR12 
Percenta~e differences 
Gross domestic product 2,10 2,45 1,82 2,15 2,14 
Private consumption 1,55 1,04 1,23 1,20 1,27 
Total fixed investment 1,88 1,90 1,41 1,13 1,63 
Consumption price -2,26 -2,53 -1,75 -2,56 -2,29 
GOP deflator -2,21 -3,33 -2,04 -3,09 -2,65 
Real wage rate 1,56 0,88 0,94 1,55 1,25 
Labour productivity/head 1,45 1,64 1,10 1,62 1,47 
Employment 0,65 0,87 0,64 0,56 0,68 
Absolute differences 
Employment ( 1000) 170 192 139 159 859 
Budget surplus 0,45 0,89 0,73 0,43 0,62 
as % of GOP 
External balance 0,32 0,66 0,34 0,48 0,45 
as % of GOP 
Reminder 
Shocks as % of GOP 3,24 
Source: HERMES simulation 
It is difficult to attribute these differences to genuine differences in 
macroeconomic mechanisms or to fortuitous differences in the specifications 
of national models. In the.case of Italy, the impacts generally seem to be 
weaker than for the other countries. Technically this is due to relatively 
small ex-post increases in the productivity of labour (despite a relatively 
strong ex-ante shock). To go further than this statement would require an 
entirely separate comparative analysis. 
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6. COMPLETING THE INTERNAL MARKET: OVERALL ASSESSMENT AND INTERCOUNTRY 
COMPARISON 
The four simulation exercises which were presented in the previous 
sections all concerned separate aspects of the internal market programme. 
Care has been taken not to include in one simulation effects that were also 
included in another one. As a consequence, there is no overlapping, and 
from the sum of the simulation results one can form a global picture of the 
macro-economic implications of the completion of the internal market. On 
the other hand, some consequences of the White Paper have not been covered, 
such as the effects of stronger competition on innovation, or the learning 
effects (dynamic economies of scale)1. While the total result will, due to 
such omissions, probably underestimate the gains to be achieved, it is 
equally true that the included effects were simulated on the premiss of 
success for the corresponding business strategies, thus balancing the 
results. 
This section presents the aggregation of the simulation results for the 
four areas which were simulated (customs barriers, public markets, 
financial services and capital market liberalization and supply effects), 
and furthermore attempts to compare the aggregate results among the four 
largest economies of the Community: Germany, France, Italy and the United 
Kingdom2. Finally, some comments are made on the likely structure of 
increases in employment. 
6.1 The impact of the internal market on the Community as a whole 
Table 6.1 gives the total effects on the Community if the extrapolated 
results for EUR 12 of the four areas are aggregated. The medium term 
macro-economic effects would unequivocally be positive: the level of GDP 
could increase by 4,5%, domestic prices decrease by more than 6% while more 
than 1,8 million new jobs could be created. At the same time the 
government budget constraint (as a % of GDP) would improve by 2,2 
percentage points, while the external balance (also as a % of GDP) gains 1 
percentage point. 
... 
... 
Of the increase in GDP, more than 40% is due to the increase in private ... 
consumption of 3,1% (see Annex 3 for the detailed macroeconomic results). 
The completion of the internal market enhances labdur productivity through 
economies of scale, restructuring and the elimination of X-inefficiency. 
About two-thirds of the increase in labour productivity is passed on to 
households in the form of real wage increases, thus reducing the labour 
share in national income. The ensuing rise in real disposable income then 
becomes the main driving force in pushing up private consumption. Other 
factors which exert a positive influence on consumption are the lower 
interest rates and the real wealth effects induced by the general price 
decreases. 
1 Furthermore, the approximation of indirect taxation has not been analysed 
in this paper, but to the extent that the proposal of the Commission 
aimed at provoking the budgetary impact to be as weak as possible on 
average for the Community, it is likely that the macroeconomic 
consequences of this approximation should also be small. 
2 These were the only four countries for which all four areas were 
simulated. 
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After private consumption, private investment by households and firms 
accounts for approximately 25% of the increase in GDP. Private investment 
is stimulated through increased demand expectations and a decrease in the 
cost of capital relative to other production factors. The decrease in the 
relative cost of capital is partially brought about by decreases in the 
cost of financial intermediation, implying also lower mortgage rates for 
households, for instance. 
Of the remaining part of the increase in real GDP, again approximately 25% 
is due to an improvement in the real foreign balance. The price decreases 
which were caused by the abolition of customs formalities, enhanced 
competition and productivity increases translate into improvements in price 
competitiveness with respect to third countries, thus permitting gains in 
market shares. 
It is important to note that almost three quarters of the predicted 
increase in Community production is due to increases in domestic demand. 
Therefore it is clear that the completion of the internal market is a vital 
instrument in promoting European growth which is internally stimulated and 
less dependent on developments in the rest of the world economy. At the 
same time, however, higher European growth contributes to an increase in 
international trade. 
The 1,8 million new jobs that are to be expected in the medium run 
correspond to an increase in employment of 1, 5%. With GDP increasing by 
4,5% it is thus clear that factors come into play which exert a detrimental 
effect on the labour demand arising from increases in GDP alone (the 
elasticity of labour demand with respect to production is often assumed to 
be equal to one). The main factor which slows down labour demand is the 
increase in labour productivity, which is a typically supply-oriented 
consequence of the completion of the internal market. In order to render 
this supply policy more employment-creating, it should be accompanied by 
appropriate demand policies. Demand may be increased by transferring the 
productivity increases to households in the form of higher real wages, or 
by using the alleviation of macro-economic constraints, such as the 
government's budget deficit, to stimulate growth. The former approach 
requires a delicate balance between the stimulus to demand from increased 
purchasing power and the offsetting effects on employment if real wages 
become too high (classical unemployment). As may be seen from Table 6.1, 
it results from the model simulations that about 50-70% of the productivity 
increases are reflected in higher real wages1, thus implying at the same 
time a stimulus to demand and some real wage moderation. While the 
distribution of productivity increases among wages, profits or lower prices 
is not really an issue policy makers decide upon, the contrary is the case 
for what concerns the use of extra room for manoeuvre created if the 
government budget balance ameliorates. With an average improvement of 2,2 
percentage points, there is indeed a large scope for the European 
governments to stimulate demand, potential output and employment. Since 
the choice among the different possible uses of the extra room for economic 
policy is a political one, it will not be pursued any further here2. 
1 Next to productivity, lower unemployment also puts some upward pressure 
on real wages. 
2 Cf. Commission of the EC (1988), Ch.10, where some calculations in this 
field are presented. 
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Table 6.1 Coaplet ion of the internal aarket: aa&reaat ion of -in 
aacro-econoatc reaultu 
Percentage difference• 
Croaa doiD&etic product 
Private conauaptloo price 
GDP detlator 
H.eal wage rate 
Labour productivity/head 
Eaployoaent 
Absolute differences 
Eaployaent ( 1ooo) 
Budget surplus % GOP 
External balance % GDP 
r.a. or GIWWIY 
Percentage~ differences 
Gross doaeutic product 
Private consumption price 
GDP deflator 
Real wage rate 
Labour productivity/head 
EaployODent 
Year1 
l, l) 
-1,58 
-1,68 
0, 77 
1,57 
-0,44 
-533 
0,13 
0,30 
1,22 
-o, 74 
-0,45 
0,44 
1, 53 
-0,31 
Year2 
2. ll 
-2,68 
-2,93 
0,80 
2,35 
-0,03 
-40 
0,72 
0,39 
1, 97 
-1,46 
-1,09 
0,91 
1,84 
0,14 
Ye~arl 
3,16 
-3,71 
-4,04 
1,11 
2,72 
0,45 
552 
1,19 
0,63 
'l, '>7 
-2,30 
-1,74 
1,44 
2,07 
0,50 
Year4 
3,64 
-4,66 
-5,02 
1,48 
2,81 
0,83 
1043 
1,57 
0,76 
2,89 
-3,52 
-2,82 
1,87 
2,08 
0,80 
4,10 
-5,49 
-5,84 
1,86 
2,95 
1,16 
1462 
1,89 
0,86 
3,52 
-4,90 
-4,10 
2,48 
2,32 
1,19 
Year6 
4, 52 
-6,16 
-6,45 
2,22 
3,04 
1,47 
1866 
2,22 
0,95 
4,20 
-6,16 
-5,20 
3,14 
2,51 
1,68 
-------------------------------------Absolute differences 
Employaent ( 1000) 
Budget surplus % GDP 
External b6lance % GDP 
Percentage differences 
Gross doaestic product 
Private consumption price 
GDP deflator 
Real wag.. rate 
Labour productivity/head 
Eaployaent 
-78 
0,13 
0,49 
1,09 
-1,00 
-1,53 
0,43 
l, 37 
-0,28 
34 
0,55 
0,53 
1, 97 
-1,64 
-2,19 
0,34 
2,00 
-0,02 
129 
0,77 
0,69 
2,88 
-2,43 
-3,07 
0,48 
2,56 
0,34 
208 
0,95 
0,73 
3,65 
-3,27 
-3,97 
0,74 
2,95 
0,73 
311 
1,18 
0,68 
4,41 
-4,12 
-4,86 
1,09 
3,30 
1,15 
438 
1,52 
0,70 
5,05 
-4,89 
-5,63 
1,51 
3/)4 
1,57 
-------------------------------------Absolut" differences 
Eaployaent ( 1000) 
Budget surplus % GDP 
External balance~ % GDP 
Percentage diff .. renceu 
Gros1 domestic product 
Private consumption price 
GDP deflator 
Ileal wage rate 
Labour productivity/head 
Eaployaent 
-60 
0,04 
0,42 
1,3') 
-2,30 
-2, '>8 
0,91 
1,94 
-0,62 
-5 
0,40 
0,57 
3,.l') 
-4,04 
-4,'>9 
0,96 
3,41 
-0,22 
73 
0,90 
0,82 
4, 54 
-5,55 
-6,38 
1,07 
4,20 
0,26 
159 
1,45 
0,98 
5,15 
-6,55 
-7,58 
1,19 
4,34 
0,70 
250 
2,05 
1,15 
5,41 
-7,02 
-8,19 
1,19 
4,18 
1,08 
342 
2,64 
1,35 
5,46 
-7,07 
-8,34 
1,21 
3,89 
1,40 
~b:o~u~e-a:f;e~e:c:a---------------------------
Eap1oyaent ( 1 ooo} -136 -so 53 150 236 308 
Budget aurplua % GOP 0, 28 1, 36 2,17 2,82 3,30 3,65 
External balance % GDP 0, 34 0, 37 0, 79 0, 90 1,00 1,03 
UUTKD I.IIIGDOII 
Percentage dilferences 
Groaa domestic product 
Private consumption price 
GDP deflator 
Ileal wage rate 
LabOur productivity/head 
Eaployment 
0,81 
-2,5) 
-2,52 
0,94 
1,79 
-0,64 
2,44 
-4,33 
-4,72 
0,65 
2,95 
-0,01:1 
3,29 
-5,57 
-6,26 
1,12 
3,10 
0,65 
3,59 
-6,39 
-7,14 
1,83 
2,93 
1,07 
3,79 
-6,96 
-7,66 
2,40 
2,89 
1,26 
4,00 
-7,43 
-8,06 
2, 71 
2,91 
1,39 
------------------------------------Absolute differences 
Eaploya.nt ( 0000} 
Budget surplus % GDP 
External balance % GDP 
-157 
-o,O& 
-0,33 
-16 
0,71 
-0,32 
167 
1, 32 
-0,02 
285 
1,61 
0,28 
342 
1,69 
0,49 
385 
1,80 
0,61 
4 
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6.2 The internal market in the four major European economies 
For Germany, France, Italy and the United Kingdom, simulation results are 
available for all four areas which were simulated; for the other member 
countries, one or more of the areas could not be simulated, due to lack of 
information. Given that the simulation inputs do not overlap, it is 
possible to calculate the macro-economic effects of completion of the 
internal market for these four countries, and to compare them to each 
other. The corresponding results are presented in Table 6.1. In Table 6.2 
an attempt is made to relate the input shocks (as a % of GOP) to the medium 
term effects on GOP. It should be stressed that expressing the shocks 
as a % of GOP does not imply that the effect on GOP may be interpreted 
as a Keynesian (expenditure) multiplier. The shocks merely represent cost 
decreases and only bear partial resemblance to standard multiplier shocks. 
This was illustrated in the section on the simulation of financial 
services. In this instance, therefore, "multiplier" means specifically the 
ratio of the effect and the shock, both as a percentage of GOP. 
Table 6.2 Comparison of model inputs with medium run effects on GOP, four 
major countries and EUR12 
Item Germany France Italy UK 
s E s E s E s E 
1. Customs 0,21 0,57 0,23 0,34 0,21 0,24 0,18 0,31 
barriers 
2. Public markets 0,50 0,56 0,34 0,50 0,39 0,39 0,67 0,70 
3. Financial 0,55 0,96 0,53 1,77 0,69 3,01 0,79 0,84 
services 
4. Supply effects 3,09 2,10 3,48 2,45 3,43 1,82 3,00 2,15 
Total 4,35 4,20 4,58 5,05 4,72 5,46 4,64 4,00 
S = Shock: simulation inputs as a % of 1985 GOP (cost decrease) 
E Effect: % increase in real GOP after 6 years 
EUR12 
s E 
0,26 0,36 
0,50 0,55 
0,66 1,46 
3,24 2,14 
4,66 4,52 
Notwithstanding, it may be seen that on average the increases in GOP are 
reasonably close to the input shocks. For the Community as a whole, for 
instance, a shock of 4,7% would generate a GOP increase of 4,5%, suggesting 
a "multiplier" value close to one. Still for the Community as a whole, the 
shock-effect relationships for the four areas individually also seem to 
make sense. The "multipliers" for customs barriers and public markets are 
in the middle of the range, with values of 1,4 and 1,1. The value 2,2 for 
financial services is high but not exceptional given that financial 
services permeate throughout the whole economic system, as was described in 
the corresponding section above. In this simulation, price decreases were 
seen to influence private consumption, fixed capital formation, the costs 
of living and costs of production at the same time, thus touching all vital 
parts of the macro-ecnomic linkages simultaneously. The low value 0,7 of 
the shock-effect multiplier for the supply simulations is not a surprise 
either, since the supply effects bear mainly on the optimal allocation of 
production factors, and depend heavily on the extend to which production 
... I . .. 
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efficiency is passed on to households. Furthermore, the initial decrease in 
employment following labour productivity increases spills over to domestic 
demand, thus reducing the medium term effect on GDP as well. Thus, while 
the relationship between shocks and effects does seem to make sense at an 
aggregate level (the last row and column of Table 6.2, say), it seems to be 
less evident at the level of individual areas and countries. 
The implication of the existence of this loose band between shocks and 
results is that differences in simulation results between countries can 
only partially be explained on the basis of differences in input shocks 
expressed as a % of GDP. A more precise explanation should take account of 
the heterogeneity of the shocks and differences in size. 
The simulated medium term effects on GDP range from a 4,0% increase for the 
United Kingdom to a 5,5% increase for Italy. Given the large margins of 
uncertainty surrounding both model inputs and simulation results, there is 
~ evidence to say that these results are significantly different from each 
other. Therefore, in explaining the differences between the point 
estimates, this aspect should always be kept in mind. 
The fact that Italy comes out strongest with a 5,5% increase in GDP is 
entirely due to the positive results in the field of financial services. 
For the three other areas, the results for Italy are the weakest each 
time. In the section on financial services it was already pointed out that 
the positive results in that field were mainly due to the large scope for 
price decreases, improving real disposable income and therefore consumer 
spending, demand expectations and investment. The aggregate result 
confirms this picture, with the GDP deflator decreasing more than 8% over 
six years. As noted above, high growth does not necessarily imply high 
labour demand. Despite the highest increase in GOP, Italy would have -with 
the UK- the smallest increase in employment with 1,4% in the medium run, 
mainly due to the large increase in labour productivity for this country. 
In terms of increases in GDP, France would obtain the second best result 
after Italy, with a 5,1% increase, still higher than the Community average 
of 4,5%. Comparatively speaking this result is mostly due to supply 
effects and, to a lesser extent, the liberalisation of financial services. 
Despite lower growth than in Italy, the employment response in France is 
somewhat stronger due to a smaller productivity increase. Compared to 
Italy, growth is more export-oriented due to a moderate increase in real 
wages which is less beneficial for private consumption but tends to 
increase competitiveness. 
There is a dichotomy between, on the one hand, France and Italy with GDP 
increases around 5%, and, on the other hand, Germany and the United Kingdom 
with increases around 4%. For what concerns financial services and supply 
effects, the effects on GDP for these two countries are almost identical, 
but there are differences between the results for public markets and 
notably customs barriers. Despite GDP increases in the same range, the 
composition of growth is much more oriented towards private spending and 
notably investment in Germany than in the United Kingdom; in particular, 
the contribution of net external trade would be double that of Germany. 
With the domestically oriented industries being more labour intensive, this 
implies stronger employment growth in Germany than in the United Kingdom: 
1,7% against 1,4%. 
. .. I . .. 
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6.3 The structure of the employment effects 
The unemployment problem is one of the most important issues of economic 
policy in Europe at present. This subsection tries to say something more on 
the distribution of the employment gains described above. 
The distribution of the effects on employment to be expected from the 
completion of the internal market has three dimensions: a temporal 
dimension, a geographical dimension and a sectoral dimension. Only if all 
aspects (including timing) of the completion of the internal market wo~ 
have been simulated with sectoral models for all European countries, would 
it have been possible to say something definite on each of these three 
dimensions. Any attempt at conclusion based on results that do not satisfy 
this criterion is therefore surrounded with uncertainty, the extent of 
which depends on the area concerned. 
Table 6.1 suggests that the timing of the effects on aggregate employment 
is such that there is a loss of more than half a million jobs in the first 
year, almost no change in the second year and a gradual increase to more 
than 1,8 million jobs in the medium run. This particular timing is, 
however, strongly influenced by the hypotheses underlying the simulations, 
which assume that the corresponding effect takes place completely from the 
first year of the simulation onwards or which is spread out ·over a 
five-year period1. Consequently, all the negative effects on employment 
due to the restructuring of industries or the reduction of custom related 
employment are concentrated in the first years of the simulation period. 
In reality, the process of completion of the internal market is a gradual 
one, in which 1) the different measures are not taking effect all at the 
same time and 2) the effects of each measure are not always immediate but 
spread out over a period of time. Although job losses cannot be denied and 
are even to be considered inevitable, it is highly unlikely, therefore, 
that they will be produced at the rate suggested by the simulations. 
Rather will the dynamic profile of the employment effects be smoother, with 
perhaps lower employment increases for some longer period in the beginning, 
but certainly not the massive loss of half a million job~ cited above to be 
concentrated in one single year. 
As regards the geographical distribution of employment effects among the 
member countries, evidence based on all four areas is only available for 
Germany, France, Italy and the United Kingdom. As discussed in subsection 
6.1 above, national differences in employment effects can be explained by 
national differences in the links between productivity increases, price 
decreases, real wage increases, expenditure increases and their subsequent 
effects on employment. Nevertheless, the differences between the effects 
on employment growth for the four largest European economies seem to remain 
slight, the effects ranging from 1,7% for Germany and 1,6% for France to 
1,4% for Italy and the United Kingdom. However, the model simulations for 
these four countries are unable to answer two main questions concerning the 
employment issue: (a) the distribution of jobs between the regions within 
each of the Member States and (b) the distribution between the less and the 
most developed Member States. 
1 In the case of the supply side effects in particular, which assumes an 
acceleration of the restructuring of industries over time. 
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As regards the sectoral distribution of the employment effects, generally 
speaking, this depends on the importance of employment in each branch. As 
shown in Table 6.3, employment in market services, for instance, is 
approximately 60% higher than in the manufacturing branch, on average in 
the Community. Consequently, a one percent increase in employment in each 
of the two branches generates 60% more jobs in the market services branch 
than in the manufacturing branch. 
The above considerations play a crucial role concerning the sectoral 
distribution of the more than 1,8 million new jobs which the simulations 
suggest will result from the completion of the internal market. The single 
European market will, in a first instance, especially foster the exposed 
branches of the national economies (traded goods branches) as well as those 
sheltered branches which become, through the internal market process, newly 
exposed to internatonal competition (e.g. financial services). Even 
though they are faced with inevitable restructuring, they are likely, 
through their increased productivity and enhanced competitiveness, to be 
the strongest growing branches in the end. It is in these branches that 
one may thus expect the strongest percentage increases in output and 
employment in the medium run. The effects of increased output and income 
are, however, diffused throughout the economy, also affecting other, 
sheltered, branches, notably parts of the market services branch. Although 
the percentage increase in output and employment might be smaller in the 
sheltered branches than in the exposed ones, their larger share in 
employment would still cause a considerable part of the 1,8 million new 
jobs to be concentrated there. 
This picture is confirmed by the partial evidence from the simulations. 
Since not all areas of the internal market could be simulated with sectoral 
HERMES models for all countries1, only an incomplete table with sectoral 
employment results can be given (Table 6.4). Excluding the results for 
financial services, for which no sectoral models were used at all, the 
partial evidence on which this table is based suggests that the increase in 
employment in absolute numbers is approximately equal in the manufacturing 
branch and the market services branch. This is the combined result of 1) a 
percentage increase in employment which is, with 2,1% versus 1,2%, stronger 
in the manufacturing branch than in the market services branch, but 2) a 
larger share in total employment for the latter branch than for the former. 
1 Table 1.1 identifies for which areas and countries sectoral HERMES models 
were simulated. 
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Table 6.4 Extrapolation of sectoral medium term simulation results for employment, 
EUR12 
Branch 
Agriculture 
Energy 
Manufacturing 
-Intermediate 
-Equipment 
-Consumption 
Building and 
construction 
Market services 
-Transport and 
communication 
-Other 
Customs 
barriers 
Public Supply 
procurem. effects 
'000 % '000 % '000 % 
14 0,24 
8 0,32 
74 0,26 
8 0,16 
25 0,19 
41 0,36 
21 0,18 
137 0,25 
-20 -0,25 
157 0,34 
17 0,27 78. 1,21 
6 0,23 4 
104 0,37 417 
16 0,39 62 
54 0,44 149 
34 0,30 206 
30 0,26 71 
0,19 
1,49 
1,64 
1,21 
1,79 
0,64 
199 0,37 
53 0,63 
288 0,54 
74 0,84 
146 0,32 214 0,47 
Subtotal 
Financial 
Liberalis. 
'000 % '000 % 
109 1,71 
18 
596 
86 
228 
281 
122 
625 
106 
518 
0,73 
2,13 
2,19 
1,84 
2,45 
1,09 
1,16 
1,21 
1,13 
Total 
'000 % 
Non-market 
services 
-43 -0,18 0 0 0 0 -43 -0,18 0 0 -43 -0,18 
Total 211 0,16 356 0,28 859 0,68 1426 1,12 440 0,36 1866 1,47 
'000 = thousands (absolute difference with respect to baseline simulation) 
% = percentage difference with respect to baseline simulation 
Source: Extrapolation based on simulation results for the HERMES models only, i.e. 1) 
results for Belgium, France, Italy and the United Kingdom for "customs 
barriers" and "public procurement", and 2) results for France, Italy and the 
United Kingdom for "supply effects". 
The basis for extrapolation to EUR12 therefore differs from the one used for 
the macroeconomic results (except for the total). 
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ANNEX 1 MAIN SHOCKS INTRODUCED IN THE HERMES AND INTERLINK MODELS FOR MACRO-ECONOMIC 
SIMULATIONS 
Description 
I.CUSTOMS BARRIERS 
*Decrease in intra-EC 
import prices (in %) 
*Employment decrease 
(thousands): 
-exporting firms 
-customs clearing agents 
*Government employment 
decrease (in %) 
-customs officials 
TOTAL SHOCK I (% GDP) 
II.PUBLIC MARKETS 
*Increase of import 
penetration rate of 
public markets 
(% Eoints) 
*Price decrease of 
equipment goods on 
public markets (in%): 
-government 
-public enterprises 
.energy 
.transport and tele-
communication 
TOTAL SHOCK II (% GDP) 
III. FINANCIAL MARKETS 
B D E F I NL 
% of EUR12 GDP 
UK EUR121 ShockZ IntervalJ 
1,46 1,53 1,71 1,84 2,04 1,55 1,58 1,7 
Distributed pro rata according to 
corresponding employment figures 
by country 
0,41 0,06 0,21 0,06 0,22 0,07 
8,2 8,5 5,5 4,1 3,9 
0,03 0,13 0,03 0,07 0,12 
1,6 1,5 1,7 1,1 1,1 
8,5 7,8 7,6 11,4 7,2 
0,99 0,50 0,34 0,39 0,67 
17 54 
' 40 o4 
' 
o, 11 
0,26 0,25-0,27 
5,6 0,22 
0,28 
0,50 0,35-0,70 
*Decrease in interest rate 
margins (% Eoints): 
-short term households 0,7 2,2 0,7 1,8 2,6 0,6 1,9 1,9 
-long term households 0,2 0,3 1 ,o 0,6 0 0 0 0,2 
-long term firms5 1,2 0,2 0,2 0,5 0,7 0,9 0,4 0,5 
*Decrease in price of 
financial services 
(in %) : 
-private consumption 16,4 3,4 18,9 10,0 19,8 3,8 2,8 7,9 
-intermediate con- 17,7 8,0 26,0 14,3 18,4 7,5 3,9 10,4 
sumption of firms 
TOTAL SHOCK III (% GDP) 0,64 0,55 1,31 0,53 0,69 0,23 0,79 0,65 0,35-0,95 
... / ... 
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Description B D E F I NL 
% of EUR12 GDP 
UK EUR121 ShockZ Interval3 
IV.SUPPLY EFFECTS 
!.Sectoral studies 
from consultants 
*Decrease in unit cost 
of production6 (in%): 
-industry ----
*Decrease in price paid 
for business services 
by firms (in %) 
Shock IV.l (% GDP) 
2.Economies of scale 
*Decrease in unit cost 
of production7 (in%): 
-industry -----
Shock IV.2 (% GDP) 
3.Pure competition effects 
*Decrease in production 
price (in %) : 
-contractiOn of monopoly 
rents in industry 
-reduction of 
X-inefficiency 
-industry 
-market services 
*Decrease in unit cost 
of productionS (in%): 
-X-inefficiency 
.industry 
.market services 
Shock IV.3 (% GDP) 
TOTAL SHOCK IV (% GDP) 
TOTAL SHOCK OF PRIMARY EFFECTS 
Notes: 
1,24 1,75 1,69 1 12 
Same shock for each country 
Same shock for each country 
Same shock for each country 
Same shock for each country 
0,97 
1,26 o, 13 
1,52 
0,73 
0,50 
1,00 
0,50 
1,00 
1,10 
1,02 
1,12 
3,24 
4,65 
0,6-1,6 
0,8-1,2 
0,7-1,5 
2,1-4,3 
3,1-6,3 
I EUR12 extrapolation of the weighted average of the analysed countries (~ differing 
units) 
2 Nominal amount as a % of 1985 EUR12 GDP 
3 Interval taking account of the precision margins indicated by the external consultants. 
For the supply effects, evaluation of the Commission's services. 
4 Total EUR12 
5 Net decrease including effects of capital market integration on interest rates. 
6 Depending on the branch and the kind of effect (direct/indirect), the decreases in unit 
cost of production are obtained through a decrease in the cost of intermediate 
consumption, an ex-ante increase in the productivity of investments (marginal capital 
productivity) or an ex-ante increase in labour productivity 
7 Obtained through an ex-ante increase in the productivity of investments (marginal 
capital productivity) . 
8 Obtained through an ex-ante increase in labour productivity 
Source: Catinat and Italianer (1988) 
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ANNEX 2 MAIN MACRO-ECONOMIC SIMULATION RESULTS BY AREA FOR INDIVIDUAL 
COUNTRIES I 
Table /\2.1: "Customs barriers" simulation: main macro-economic 
results for individual countries 
GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT ................. . 
PRIVATE CONSUMPTION PRICES ............. . 
GOP DEFLATOR ..•........•.......•........ 
REAL WAGE RATE ........................•. 
LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY/HEAD ............... . 
EMPLOYMENT S CHANGE ....•...•............ 
EMPLOYMENT ( '000) ...................... . 
BUDGET SURPLUS S COP, CHANGE .....•...... 
TRADE BALANCES GOP, CHANGE ............ . 
GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT .......... ." ...... . 
PRIVATE CONSUMPTION PRICES ............. . 
GOP DEFLATOR ...••.......••.........• • ••• 
REAL WAGE RATE .................•..•..•.. 
LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY/HEAD .......•........ 
EMPLOYMENTS CHANGE .•...•........•..•••. 
EMPLOYMENT ( '000) ...................... . 
BUDGET SURPLUS I GOP, CHANGE ........... . 
TRADE BALANCES GOP, CHANGE .........•.•. 
GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT ................. . 
PRIVATE CONSUMPTION PRICES ............. . 
GOP DEFLATOR •.••........................ 
REAL WAGE RATE. .....•..........•..•..•.• 
LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY/HEAD ••.•............ 
EMPLOYMENT S CHANGE. ................. · · · 
EMPLOYMENT ( '000) ...................... . 
BUDGET SURPLUS I GOP, CHANGE •.•••....... 
TRADE BALANCES GOP, CHANGE ............ . 
CUSTOMS BARRIERS: BELGIUM 
MOOEL : HERMES 
YEAR 1 YEAR 2 YEAR 3 YEAR ll YEAR 5 YEAR 6 
----------
---------- ---------- ---------- ---------- ----------
-0.06 
-o.45 
0.15 
0.02 
O.Oil 
-o. 10 
-II 
0.25 
0.51" 
0.13 
-o. 74 
-o.07 
0.08 
0.14 
-o.03 
-1 
0.50 
0.64 
0.21 
-o.94 
-o.25 
0.11 
0.15 
0.02 
1 
0.55 
0.70 
CUSTOMS BARRIERS: GERMANY 
MODEL : HERMES 
YEAR 1 
----------0.03 
-0.14 
0.05 
0.01 
0.08 
-0.05 
-11 
0.02 
0.15 
YEAR 2 
----------0.16 
-o.36 
-o.21 
0.07 
0.17 
-o.oo 
-1 
0.05 
0.10 
YEAR 3 
----------0.311 
-o.63 
-o.46 
0.18 
0.24 
0.10 
25 
0.11 
0.08 
CUSTOMS BARRIERS: FRANCE 
MODEL : HERMES 
YEAR 1 YEAR 2 VEAR 3 
----------
---------- ----------
-o.04 0.03 0.11 
-o.21 -0.39 -o.57 
-0.05 -o.22 -o.ll1 
0.08 0.06 0.05 
0.02 0.09 0.16 
-o.09 -o.09 -o.07 
0.26 
-1.07 
-o.37 
0.11 
0.14 
0.06 
2 
0.62 
0.711 
YEAR II 
----------O.IIJ 
-o.90 
-o. 72 
0.31 
0.23 
0.20 
52 
0.15 
0.05 
YEAR 4 
----------0.18 
-o. 74 
-o.60 
0.06 
0.20 
-o.OII 
0.30 
-1.17 
-o.47 
0.11 
0.14 
0.10 
II 
0.65 
0. 76 
YEAR 5 
----------0.53 
-1.13 
-o.95 
0.411 
0.25 
0.29 
74 
0.19 
0.03 
YEAR 5 
----------0.26 
-o.92 
-o. 79 
0.08 
0.25 
-o.01 
0.34 
-1.25 
-o.55 
0.10 
0.14 
0.13 
5 
0.67 
o. 71 
YEAR 6 
----------0.57 
-1.27 
-1.10 
0.55 
0.23 
0.311 
89 
0.21 
O.OJ 
YEAR 6 
----------O.JII 
-1.09 
-o.91 
0.10 
0.30 
0.03 
----------------------------------------------------------------- . 
-19 
0.00 
0.21 
-19 
0.05 
0.22 
-15 
0.06 
0.211 
-9 
0.09 
0.211 
-2 
0.12 
0.25 
6 
0.15 
0.27 
The top part of each table gives cumulative percentage deviations from the 
baseline projection, while the bottom part gives cumulative absolute deviations. 
See note at the end of Annex 4 for precise explanations. 
. •. I • .• 
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Table A~.1: Continued 
CUSTOMS BARRIERS: ITALY 
MODEL : HERMES 
YEAR 1 YEAR 2 YEAR 3 YEAR II YEAR 5 YEAR 6 
----------
---------- ---------- ---------- ---------- ----------GROSS OOMEST I C PRODUCT ................. . 
PRIVATE CONSUMPTION PRICES •......•...... 
GOP DEfLATOR ........................... . 
REAL WAGE RATE. ........................ . 
LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY/HEAD ............... . 
EMPLOYMENT S CHANGE. ........•.•......... 
EMPLOYMENT ( '000 I ...................... . 
BUDGET SURPLUS S GOP, CHANGE •........... 
TRADE BALANCES GOP, CHANGE ............ . 
-0.05 
-o.23 
·0.011 
0.07 
·0.02 
-0.05 
-10 
0.03 
0.111 
0.10 
-o.37 
-o.16 
0.16 
0.08 
-o.02 
-3 
0.13 
0.111 
0.19 
·O.II& 
-o.26 
0.211 
0.13 
0.02 
CUSTOMS BARRIERS: NETHERLANDS 
GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT .•................ 
PRIVATE CONSUMPTION PRICES .....•.•...... 
GOP DEFLATOR ..............•.•........... 
REAL WAGE RATE. ........................ . 
LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY/HEAD ..••••.......... 
EMPLOYMENT S CHANGE .................... . 
EMPLOYMENT ( '000) ...................... . 
BUDGET SURPLUS I GOP, CHANG£ ........... . 
TRADE BALANCE I GOP, CHANGE •.•.......... 
GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT ...........•...... 
PRIVATE CONSUMPTION PRICES ............. . 
GOP DEFLATOR ........................... . 
REAL WAGE RATE ................•......... 
LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY/HEAD ..........•..... 
EMPLOYMENTS CHANCE ...••...•...•........ 
EMPLOYMENT ( 'DOD) ...•................... 
BUDGET SURPLUS I GOP, CHANGE ..•......•.. 
TRADE BALANCE I GOP, CHAMGE •.•...•...... 
MOOEL : HERMES 
YEAR 1 
----------
-o.oe 
-o.o9 
0.38 
0.01 
0.07 
-0.15 
-7 
0.07 
0.36 
Y£.411 2 
----------
-o.02 
-o.25 
0.13 
0.08 
0.17 
-o.19 
-9 
0.01 
0.22 
Y£.411 3 
----------0.11 
-D.IIII 
-o.05 
0.16 
0.26 
-o.11t 
-1 
0.01 
0.11 
CUSTOMS BARRIERS: UNITED KINGDOM 
MODEL : HERMES 
YEAR 1 
----------0.05 
-o. 311 
-o. 19 
0.13 
0.08 
-0.03 
-9 
0.02 
0.11 
YEAR 2 
----------0.16 
-o.65 
-o.s2 
0.111 
0.16 
0.02 
5 
0.09 
0.12 
YEAR 3 
----------0.23 
-o.91 
-o.eo 
0.17 
0.11 
0.08 
21 
0.13 
o.u 
0.23 
-o.56 
-o.u 
0.30 
0.12 
0.06 
12 
0.21 
0.15 
YEAR II 
----------0.22 
-o.611 
-o.23 
0.25 
0.27 
-o.05 
-2 
0.16 
o. 111 
YEAR II 
----------0.27 
·1.06 
-o.98 
0.17 
0.17 
0.13 
36 
0.17 
0.15 
0.25 
·0.63 
-o. 39 
0.311 
0.11 
0.08 
18 
0.21 
0.15 
YEAR 5 
----------0.35 
-o.e1 
-o.39 
0.37 
0.29 
0.06 
3 
0.26 
0.12 
YEAR 5 
----------o. 30 
-1.15 
•1.08 
0.18 
0.15 
0.17 
II& 
0.19 
0.11 
0.211 
-o.68 
-D. liS 
0.37 
o.oe 
0.10 
21 
0.22 
0.16 
YEAR 6 
----------0.115 
-D.911 
-o.51 
0.51 
0.29 
0.15 
8 
0.32 
0.11 
YEAR 6 
----------o. 31 
-1.21 
-1.15 
0.18 
0.12 
0.20 
58 
0.21 
0.11 
... / ... 
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Table A2.2: "Public procurement" simulation: main macro-economic 
results for individual countries 
PUBLIC MARKETS WITH RESTRICTED OPENING: BELGIUM 
MODEL : HERMES 
YEAR I YEAR 2 YEAR 1 YEAR 4 YEAR 5 YEAR 6 
GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT ................. . 
PRIVATE CONSUMPTION PRICES •............. 
GDP DEFLATOR ........................... . 
REAL WAGE RATE. ....................... . 
LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY/HEAD ............... . 
EMPLOYMENT I CHANGE .................... . 
0. 79 
0.0!> 
-0.29 
0.03 
0.36 
0.22 
0.94 
-o.04 
-0.15 
0.20 
0.22 
0. 39 
0.115 
-0.11 
-D.42 
-o.o2 
-0.02 
0.52 
0.79 
-0.17 
-0.49 
-D.21 
-D.15 
0.61 
0.76 
-D.24 
-o.52 
-D.30 
-o.19 
0.65 
o. 711 
-o. 10 
-o.57 
-D.11 
-o.17 
0.66 
---------------------------------------- -----------------------------------------------------------------EMPLOYMENT ( '000 ) ...................... . 
BUDGET SURPLUS I GDP, CHANGE .........•.. 
TRADE BALANCE I GDP, CHANGE ............ . 
8 
0.48 
0.70 
14 
o. 72 
0.73 
19 
0.74 
0.611 
22 
0.74 
0. 73 
PUBLIC MARKETS WITH RESTRICTED OPENING: GERMANY 
MODEL : HERMES 
21 
0.74 
0. 77 
23 
0.76 
0.110 
YEAR 1 YEAR 2 YEAR 3 YEAR 4 YEAR 5 YEAR 6 
GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT ................. . 
PRIVATE CONSUMPTION PRICES., ... , ...... ,. 
GDP DEFLATOR ........................... . 
REAL WAGE RATE ................•......... 
LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY/HEAD ............... . 
EMPLOYMENT I CHANGE .•.•......... , ...... . 
EMPLOYMENT ( '000 ) ...................... . 
BUDGET SURPLUS I GOP, CHANGE ........... . 
TRADE BALANCE I GDP, CHANGE .....•......• 
0.15 
-0.10 
-0.09 
0.01 
0.10 
0.05 
12 
0.11 
0.10 
0.10 
-o.23 
-0.23 
0.06 
-o.02 
0.12 
29 
0.10 
0.10 
0.16 
·0.41 
-o.43 
0.10 
0.05 
0.11 
27 
0.09 
0.11 
0.22 
-o.90 
-o. 71 
o.u 
0.11 
0.11 
29 
0.11 
0.11 
PUBLIC MARKETS WITH RESTRICTED OPENING: FRANCE 
MODEL : HERMES 
0.17 
•1.47 
·1.27 
0.22 
0.21 
0.17 
43 
0.14 
0.10 
0.56 
·2.15 
·1.79 
0.37 
0.29 
0.27 
70 
0.23 
0.15 
YEAR 1 YEAR 2 YEAR 3 YEAR 4 YEAR 5 YEAR 6 
GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT .................• 
PRIVATE CONSUMPTION PRICES ............. . 
GDP DEFLATOR ...... , ..... , ... , .......... . 
REAL WAGE RATE ........................ .. 
LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY/HEAD ............... . 
EMPLOYMENT I CHANGE .................... . 
EMPLOYMENT ( '000) ............. , ........ . 
BUDGET SURPLUS I GOP, CHANGE .......•.... 
TRADE BALANCE I GDP, CHANGE ...........•. 
0.24 
-o.o6 
-o. 10 
0.04 
0.?.0 
0.04 
9 
0.07 
0.17 
0.34 
-o.12 
-o.20 
0.07 
0.211 
0.10 
22 
0.11 
0.25 
0.31 
-o.19 
-o.211 
0.10 
0.23 
0.15 
31 
0.211 
0.27 
0.41 
-o.27 
-o. 36 
0.15 
0.22 
0.19 
42 
0.21 
0.26 
0.45 
-o.n 
-o.43 
0.21 
0.22 
0.23 
50 
0.31 
0.26 
... / ... 
0.50 
-o.42 
-o.49 
0.26 
0.211 
0.26 
57 
0.17 
0.26 
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Table A2.2: Continued 
PUBLIC MARKETS WITH RESTRICTED OPENING: ITALY 
MODEL : HERMES 
YEAR 1 YEAR 2 YEAR 3 YEAR 4 YEAR 5 YEAR 6 
GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT .....•.......•.... 
PRIVATE CONSUMPTION PRICES ...•..•....••. 
GOP DEFLATOR ........................... . 
REAL WAGE RATE ......... , ....... , .. ,, ... . 
LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY/HEAD .........•...... 
EMPLOYMENTS CHANGE .................... . 
EMPLOYMENT ( 1 000) ...................... . 
BUDGET SURPLUS I GOP, CHANGE •........... 
TRADE BALANCE I GOP, CHANGE ............ . 
0.29 
-o.OII 
-0.23 
0.06 
0.20 
0.06 
13 
0.111 
0.07 
0.211 
-o.o9 
-o.31 
0.06 
0.15 
0.10 
21 
0.211 
0.07 
0.211 
-o.15 
-o.46 
0.06 
0.12 
0.13 
27 
0.111 
0.04 
0.30 
-o.25 
-o.62 
0.06 
0.13 
0.15 
32 
0.20 
0.03 
PUBLIC MARKETS WITH RESTRICTED OPENING: UNITED KINGDOM 
===========================-••=••aa__. ........ a•••---• 
MODEL : HERMES 
0.33 
-o. 35 
-o.73 
0.04 
0.13 
0.111 
37 
0.20 
0.03 
0.39 
-o.ll5 
-o.1111 
0.04 
0.15 
0.20 
44 
0.19 
0.02 
YEAR 1 YEAR 2 YEAR 3 YEAR 4 YEAR 5 YEAR 6 
GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT ................. . 
PRIVATE CONSUMPTION PRICES ............. . 
GOP DEfLATOR ........................... . 
REAL WAGE RATE ......................... . 
LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY/HEAD ............... . 
EMPLOYMENTS CHANGE .....••..•••..•.....• 
EMPLOYMENT ( I 000, ...................... . 
IIUDGET SURPLUS I GOP, CHANGE •.•....•..•. 
TRADE BALANCE I GOP, CHANGE ...••........ 
0.02 
-1. 17 
-1.11 
0.61 
0.11 
0.03 
7 
0.03 
-o.57 
0.21 
-1.72 
-1.96 
0.23 
0.50 
0.10 
27 
0.211 
-o.49 
0.39 
-2.12 
-2.511 
0.24 
0.60 
0.111 
47 
0.35 
-o.47 
0.54 
-2.411 
·2.97 
0.31 
0.65 
0.24 
65 
0.41 
-D.39 
0.63 
-2.70 
-1.22 
0.37 
0.65 
0.211 
711 
0.46 
-o.u 
... / ... 
0.70 
•2.92 
-3.41 
0.112 
0.64 
0.32 
90 
0.51 
-o.26 
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Table A2.3: "Financial liberal isc~tion" simulation: main macro-economic 
results for individual countries 
GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT. ................ . 
PRIVATE CONSUMPTION PRICES ............•. 
GOP DEFLATOR ........................... . 
REAL WAGE RATE ....................•..... 
LABOUR PROOUCTI~ITY/HEAD ............... . 
EMPLOYMENT S CHANGE. ................... . 
EMPLOYMENT ( 1 000 ) ...................... . 
BUDGET SURPLUS S GOP, CHANGE ........... . 
TRADE BALANCES GOP, CHANGE ............ . 
GROSS DOMESTIC PROOUCT ................. . 
PRIVATE CONSUMPTION PRICES ...•....•.. '. .. 
GOP DEFLATOR .....•...................... 
REAL WAGE RATE. ........................ . 
LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY/HEAD ............... . 
EMPLOYMENT S CHANGE. •.....•...........•. 
EMPLOYMENT ( 1 000) •............ : ........ . 
BUDGET SURPLUS S GOP, CHANGE ........... . 
TRADE BALANCES GOP, CHANGE •............ 
GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT ............•..... 
PRIVATE CONSUMPTION PRICES ....•.....•... 
GOP DEFLATOR .....•.•......•............. 
REAL WAGE RATE ........................ .. 
LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY/HEAD ....••...••..... 
EMPLOYMENT S CHANGE .................... . 
EMPLOYMENT ( 1 000) ...................... . 
BUDGET SURPLUS S GOP, CHANGE ........... . 
TRADE BALANCES GOP, CHANGE ............ . 
FINANCIAL SERVICES: BELGIUM 
MODEL : INTERLINK 
YEAR 1 YEAR 2 YEAR 3 YEAR 4 YEAR 5 YEAR 6 
----------
---------- ---------- ---------- ---------- ----------0.50 
·0.91 
·0.95 
0.80 
0.45 
0.04 
2 
0.34 
-o.oo 
0.97 
-1.09 
•1.12 
0.65 
0.74 
0.23 
1.19 
·1.27 
·1.30 
0.67 
0.72 
0.46 
17 
0.70 
0.29 
FINANCIAL SERVICES: GERMANY 
MODEL : INTERLINK 
YEAR 1 
----------0.50 
·0.24 
·0.18 
0.30 
0.50 
0.00 
-o 
0.11 
·0.05 
YEAR 2 
----------0.92 
-o.23 
-o.05 
0.58 
0.74 
0.18 
45 
0. 33 
0.02 
YEAR 3 
----------0.89 
-o.12 
0.16 
0.61 
0.62 
0.27 
69 
0.45 
0.19 
FINANCIAL SERVICES: SPAIN 
MODEL : INTERLINK 
YEAR 1 
----------0.45 
•1.22 
•1.29 
1.03 
0.66 
·0.20 
·22 
0.01 
-0.02 
YEAR 2 
----------0.81 
·1.37 
•1.42 
0.91 
1.08 
-o.27 
•28 
-o.05 
0.16 
YEAR 3 
----------0.92 
·1.44 
•1.49 
0.85 
1.09 
-o.17 
•18 
0.03 
0.19 
1.21 
•1.31 
•1.40 
0.82 
0.64 
0.56 
21 
0.88 
0.31 
YEAR 4 
----------0.71 
-().16 
0.16 
O.S7 
0.117 
0.23 
60 
0.46 
0.25 
YEAR 4 
----------0.86 
•1. 51 
•1.56 
0.78 
l.OD 
-o.u 
•15 
0.06 
0.11 
1.20 
·1.37 
·1.38 
l.OD 
0.65 
0.55 
20 
0.92 
0.34 
YEAR 5 
----------0.75 
-o.32 
0.03 
0.59 
0.48 
0.27 
70 
0.50 
0.23 
YEAR 5 
----------o. 71 
-1.56 
·1.61 
0.71 
0.93 
-o.l6 
•18 
0.02 
0.14 
1.22 
·1.28 
·1.27 
1.17 
0.69 
0.52 
19 
0.97 
0.31 
YEAR 6 
----------0.96 
-o.48 
-(),10 
0.66 
0.54 
0.42 
108 
0.63 
0.20 
YEAR 6 
----------0.71 
•1.59 
·1.65 
0.66 
0.89 
-o.18 
•21 
-o.Ol 
0.12 
... / ... 
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Table A2.3: Continued 
UROSS OOMtSIIC rHODUCl ........•......... 
PRIVATE CONSUMPTION PRICES .....•........ 
GOP DEfLATOR ... , .. , ........•...........• 
REAL WAGE RATE ......................... . 
LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY/HEAD ••..•....•...•.• 
EMPLOYMENTS CHANGE •.••..••...•.....•... 
EMPLOYMENT ( '000 ) ...................... . 
BUDGET SURPLUS S GOP, CHANGE ......•..... 
TRADE BALANCES GOP, CHANGE ..•.......... 
GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT .........•••...... 
PRIVATE CONSUMPTION PRICES ••..•...•..... 
GOP DEFLATOR ...•...••..•.••••.•••..•.... 
REAL WAGE RATE..,,., .. ,.,,,, ... , .• ,, .... 
LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY/HEAD ••••...•........ 
EMPLOYMENT S CHANGE .................... . 
fiNANCIAL SERVICES: FRANCE 
:=•··=····--·· ............ 
MODEL : INTERLINK 
YEAR 1 YEAR 2 YEAR 3 
---------- ---------- ----------U.&a6 0.110 1.17 
0.04 0.01 -o.11 
o.o1 o.o1 -o.12 
-0.03 -o.01 0.02 
0.49 0.76 1.02 
-o.03 0.011 0.111 
-6 II 30 
o.o1 0.26 0.119 
-0.07 -o.05 0.01 
FINANCIAL SERVICES: NETHERLANDS 
========&·~········--··=······· 
MODEL : INTERLINK 
=====~=·········~ 
YEAR 1 YEAR 2 YEAR 3 
---------- ---------- ----------0.211 0. 73 0.91 
-0.39 -o. 72 •1.00 
-0.33 -o.61 -o.911 
0.13 0.10 0.11 
0.23 0.46 0.41 
0.0!1 0.27 0.~7 
YEAR 4 YEAR ~ YEAR 6 
---------- ---------- ----------1.11J 1.6] 1.17 
-o.41 -o.6, -o.ll6 
-o,, 
-o.61 -o.aJ 
0.01 0.16 0.26 
1.19 1.30 1. 36 
0.211 0.33 0.111 
!11 70 17 
0.76 1.02 1.23 
0,0, 0.10 o., 
YEAR II YEAR ~ YEAR 6 
---------- ---------- ----------0.97 0.91 0.1~ 
-1. 12 
-1.03 
-o.12 
-1.011 -o.91 
-o.66 
0.33 0.41 0.6~ 
0.23 0.19 0.26 
0.711 o. 72 0.~9 
-----------------------------------------------------------------EMPLOYMENT ( '000 ) ...................... . 
BUDGET SURPLUS S GOP, CHANGE ••••.•...... 
TRADE BALANCES GOP, CHANGE •..•......... 
GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT .......•.•.•.....• 
PRIVATE CONSUMPTION PRICES ••.•••.••..... 
GOP DEFLATOR .......•...•....••.•......•• 
REAL WAGE RATE .•. , ........ , .. , .........• 
LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY/HEAD ..••••••..••.... 
EMPLOYMENTS CHANGE •.........•.......... 
EMPLOYMENT ( '000) ..................... .. 
BUDGET SURPLUS S GOP, CHANGE ...•...•.... 
TRADE BALANCES GOP, CHANGE ....••..•.•.. 
2 12 27 
-0.01 0.13 0.33 
0.011 0.10 0.111 
FINANCIAL SERVICES: ITALY 
MODEL : INTERLINK 
YEAR 1 
----------0.56 
-1.48 
-1.56 
0.!11 
1.01 
-0.4!1 
-101 
-0.08 
o.oo 
YEAR 2 
----------1.911 
-2.78 
-3.11 
0.33 
2.23 
-o.29 
-66 
0.119 
-o.OII 
YEAR 3 
----------2.79 
·3.86 
-11.38 
0.21 
2.87 
-o.o1 
•18 
1.30 
0.37 
FINANCIAL SERVICES: UNITED KINGDOM 
GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT ••....••..•....•.. 
PRIVATE CONSUMPTION PRICES .•......••.... 
GOP DEfLATOR ...•.•.•.•.....•.•.........• 
REAL WAGE RATE ..... , .. , ................ . 
LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY/HEAD ...••.•.......•. 
EMPLOYMENTS CHANGE ........•......••.... 
EMPLOYMENT ( 1 000 ) ...................... . 
BUDGET SURPLUS S GOP, CHANGE .•••........ 
TRADE BALANCES GOP, CHANGE .•.•...•.•... 
MOO£L : INTERLINK 
YEAR 1 
----------O.l9 
-o. u 
-o. 12 
·o. ,,. 
0.61 
-0.41 
-99 
-o. 13 
·0.02 
YEAR 2 
----------0.92 
-o.311 
-o.2~ 
-o.19 
1.09 
-o.n 
·110 
0.17 
-o.16 
YEAR 3 
----------1.0~ 
-o. 39 
-o.21 
-o.07 
0.8~ 
0.21 
~1 
0.~~ 
0.01 
35 
0.116 
0.11 
YEAR 4 
----------3.10 
-11.110 
-~.06 
0.12 
2.97 
o.u 
30 
1.80 
0.117 
YEAR II 
----------0.17 
-o.llll 
-o.18 
0.23 
0.~1 
o. 3!1 
89 
0.66 
0.13 
311 
0.!10 
0.30 
YEAR !) 
----------3.1~ 
-11.48 
-~.26 
-o.03 
2.83 
0.31 
72 
2.20 
0.~1 
YEAR 5 
----------0. 77 
-o.~~ 
-o.211 
0.47 
0.1111 
0.33 
83 
0.62 
0.20 
... / ... 
21 
0.50 
0.39 
YEAR 6 
----------3.01 
·11.19 
-~.03 
-o.111 
2.~~ 
0.11~ 
1011 
2.~0 
o.n 
YEAR 6 
----------0.811 
-o.lll 
-o.ll1 
0.~6 
0.~3 
0.31 
71 
0." 0.21 
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A2.4: "Supply effects" simulation: main macro-economic 
results for individual countries 
SUPPLY EFFECTS (TOTAL): GERMANY 
-~;;;=•························ 
MODEL : HERMES 
------------------------
GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT ................. . 
PRIVATE CONSUMPTION PRICES ............. . 
GOP DEFLATOR .............••............. 
REAL WAGE RATE ......................... . 
LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY/HEAD ..•.•.........•. 
EMPLOYMENT I CHANCE. ......•............. 
EMPLOYMENT C '000) .................... · .. 
BUDGET SURPLUS I COP, CHANCE ........... . 
TRADE BALANCE I GOP, CHANGE ............ . 
YEAR 
----------0.53 
-0.26 
-0.23 
0.12 
0.84 
-0.31 
-19 
-o. 10 
0.29 
YEAR 2 
----------o. 19 
-0.63 
-0.60 
0.20 
0.94 
-0.16 
-40 
0.07 
0.51 
YEAII 3 
----------1.18 
-1.07 
-1.01 
0.~6 
1.16 
0.05 
7 
0.11 
0.31 
SUPPLY EFFECTS (TOTAL): FRANCE 
=~========~=a==••••••z==---••• 
HODEL : HERMES 
YEAR 4 
----------1.~2 
-1.~6 
-1.48 
0.86 
1.27 
0.26 
66 
o.n 
0.31 
YEAII , 
----------1.86 
-1.98 
-1.91 
1.23 
1.39 
0.47 
123 
0.35 
0.31 
YEAII 6 
----------2.10 
-2.26 
-2.21 
1.~6 
1.45 
0.65 
110 
0.4, 
0.32 
YEAR 1 YEAII 2 YEAR 3 YEAII 4 YEAR 5 YEAR 6 
---------- ---------- ---------- ---------- ---------- ----------GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT. ................ . 
PRIVATE CONSUMPTION PRICES ............•. 
COP DEFLATOR .............. , ............ . 
REAL WAC[ RATE ......................... . 
LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY/HEAD .•.............. 
EMPLOYMENT I CHANCE. .... , .............. . 
. 0.43 
-o. 78 
-1.4~ 
0. 34 
0.66 
-o.21 
0.81 
-1.14 
-1.85 
0.22 
0.90 
-o.01 
1.22 
-1.49 
-2.26 
0. 30 
1.15 
0.11 
1.63 
-1.85 
-2.65 
0.45 
1. 34 
0.311 
2.08 
-2.21 
-3.03 
0.65 
1.53 
0.60 
2.45 
-2.53 
-3.33 
0.88 
1.611 
0.17 
---------------------------------------- -----------------------------------------------------------------EMPLOYMENT C '000) ...................... . 
BUDGET SURPLUS I COP, CHANGE .•........•. 
TRADE BALANCE I GOP, CHANGE ............ . 
-45 
-D.11 
0.10 
"16 
-o.o8 
0.15 
25 
0.11 
0.30 
SUPPLY EFFECTS (TOTAL): ITALY 
............................. 
HODEL : HERMES 
75 
0.32 
0.113 
132 
0.59 
0.511 
192 
0.89 
0.66 
YEAR 1 YEAR 2 YEAR 3 YEAII II YEAR 5 YEAII 6 
CROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT ...•.......•...... 
PRIVATE CONSUMPTION PRICES ...•.•...•.•.• 
GOP DEFLATOR, .•......•.... , .......• ,, .. . 
REAL WAGE RATE ......................... . 
LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY/HEAD .......•.•...... 
EMPLOYMENT I CHANGE .................... . 
0.54 
-D.55 
-o. 75 
0.21 
0.75 
-o. 111 
0.93 
-o.ao 
-1.01 
0.111 
0.95 
-o.o1 
1.28 
-1.06 
-1.21 
0.57 
1.07 
0.19 
1.52 
-1.311 
-1.57 
0.72 
1.12 
0.31 
1.68 
-1.56 
-1.12 
0.111 
1.11 
0.51 
1.82 
-1.75 
-2.011 
0.911 
1.10 
0.611 
---------------------------------------- -----------------------------------------------------------------EMPLOYMENT C '000 I ..................... · · 
BUDGET SURPLUS I GOP, CHANGE ........... . 
TRADE BALANCES GOP, CHANGE ............ . 
-38 
0.15 
o.u 
-3 
0.50 
0.20 
40 
0.50 
0.22 
11 
0.61 
0.25 
SUPPLY EFFECTS (TOTAL): UNITED KINGDOM 
~=~~========•=caca~;•a----•••••-----•• 
MODEL : HERMES 
YlAK 1 YEAII 2 YEAII 3 YEAII II 
---------- ---------- ---------- ----------GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT ................ _. 0.55 1.15 1.62 1.91 
PRIVATE CONSUMPTION PRICES ......••...... -0.91 -1.61 -2.15 -2.1111 
GOP DEFLATOR .. ,,, ...............•...•... -1. 11 -1.99 -2.68 -3.02 
REAL WAGE RATE ......................... . 0.32 0.116 0.78 1.11 
LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY/HEAD .•.............. 0.19 1.20 1.118 1.61 
EMPLOYMENT I CHANGE .................... . -D.22 -D.Ol 0.18 0.35 
110 
0.68 
0.30 
YEAII 5 
----------2.08 
-2.55 
-3.11 
1.37 
1.65 
0.118 
139 
0.73 
0.311 
YEAII 6 
----------2.15 
-2.56 
-3.09 
1.55 
1.62 
0.56 
------------------------------------------------·----------------EMPLOYMENT C '000) ......... · · · .. · .. · · · · · • -56 -a Ill H 132 159 
0.02 0.11 0.29 0.37 0.111 0.113 
0.111 0.22 0.31 0.38 0.115 0.118 
BUDGET SURPLUS I GOP, CHANGE ..•....•.... 
TRADE BALANCE I GOP, CHANGE ............ . 
. .. I . .. 
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ANNEX 3 DETAILED MACRD-ECONOMIC SIMULATION RESULTS FOR EUR12, AGGREGATED 
AND BY AREAl 
1 
Table A3.1: Detailed aggregated macro-economic simulation results 
of the completion of the 1nternal market for EUR 12 
MODEL : HERMES/INTERLINK 
YEAR 1 YEAR 2 YEAR 3 YEAR 4 YEAR ~ YEAR 6 
PRIVATE CONSUMPTION .......•...........•. 0.63 1.25 1.87 2.29 2. 70 3.08 
GOVERNMENT CONSUMPTION .................. 0.85 0.83 0.88 0.95 1.03 1.11 
GROSS fiXED CAP.fORMATION ............... 2.26 3.66 4.44 5.09 5.36 5. 39 
• GOVERNMENT •.•..•......•.....•......... o.oo 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 o.oo 
• RESIDENTIAL ........................... 0.53 1.77 3.19 4.19 4.61 4.70 
• fiRMS., •. ,, ........................... 3.68 5.47 6.19 6.78 7.01 7.03 
EXPORTS Of GOODS AND SERVICES .•.......•. 3.43 5.49 7.43 8.60 9.64 10.52 
IMPORTS Of GOODS AND SERVICES ...•....... 2.93 4.37 5.36 6.05 6.67 7.21 
GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT ................. , 1.13 2. 31 3.16 3.64 4.10 4.52 
----------------------------------------
-----------------------------------------------------------------PRIVATE CONSUMPTION PRICES .............. -1.58 -2.68 -3.71 -4.66 -5.49 -6.16 
EXPORT PRICES ........................... -o.85 -2.01 -3.33 -4.31 -5.04 -5.58 
IMPORT PRICES ............... ····.······· -1.33 -2.12 -3.15 -3.93 -4.49 -4.96 
NOMINAL WAGE RATE ... ,, .................. -1.01 -2.15 -2.88 -3.43 -3.80 -4.02 
REAL WAGE RATE .......•........... ··· .. ·· o. 77 0.80 1.11 1.48 1.86 2.22 
TERMS Of TRADE. ......................... 0.47 0.11 -D.19 -o. 38 -D.54 -o.62 
GDP DlfLATOR ............................ -1.68 -2.93 -4.04 -5.02 •5.84 -6.45 
----------------------------------------
-----------------------------------------------------------------EMPLOYMENT ( '000) ....................... -533 -40 552 1043 1462 1866 
EMPLOYMENT S CHANGE. .................... -0.44 -o.o3 0.45 0.83 1.16 1.47 
UNEMPLOYMENT ('DOD) .... ............... 464 13 -396 -746 -994 -1255 
UNEMPLOYMENT RATE, CHANGE ............... 0.27 0.02 -0.26 -o.30 -D.56 -o.68 
LABOUR PRODUCT IV I TY /HEAD ..............•. 1.57 2.35 2.72 2.81 2.95 3.04 
UTILIZATION RATE INDUSTRY., .... ,, ....... 0.811 1. 72 2.11 2.20 2.33 2.47 
8UDGET SURPLUS (BN 1985 ECU) ..•......... 4. 341 23.1186 39.311 52.000 62.609 73.464 
····················· BUDGET SURPLUS s GOP, CHANGE ... ,, ....... 0.13 0.72 1.19 1.57 1.119 2.22 
TRADE BALANCE (BN 19115 ECU) ............. 10.080 12.946 20.800 25.324 211.555 31.5711 
TRADE BALANCE S GOP, CHANGE. .... , .... , .. o. 30 0.39 0.63 0.76 0.116 0.95 
GR. OP. SURPLUS S GOP, CHANGE •......•... 0.52 o. 73 0.55 ().21 -0.011 -o.n 
REAL DISP. INCOME HOUSEHOLDS ............ 0.91 1.43 2.00 2.32 2.65 2.94 
The top part of each table gives cumulative percentage deviations from the 
baseline projection, while the bottom part gives cumulative absolute 
deviations. See note at the end of Annex 4 for precise explanations • 
. . . I . .. 
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Table A3.2: "Customs barriers" simulation: detailed macro-economic 
results for EUR 12 
PRIVATE CONSUMPTION •..•.•.•••.•••..•.•.• 
GOVERNMENT CONSUMPTION •.•.•••...••....•• 
GROSS FIXED CAP. FORMATION ••...•••••.••.. 
• GOVERNMENT ...•.•..••.••.•...•••.•.••.. 
• RESIDENTIAL. .•....••.••.•...••••••...• 
• FIRMS .•...••.....•..•.•.......••....•• 
EXPORTS OF GOODS AND SfRVICIS ..•••..••.. 
IMPORTS Of GOODS AND SERVICES •••.••..•.• 
GROSS DOHEST I C PRODUCT ...••.•••.•.•••••• 
PRIVATE CONSUMPTION PRICES •..•..•••••••. 
EXPORT PRICES .••••.••.•••.•.•••••••••••. 
IMPORT PRICES ...•..•.••...•.•••••.•••••• 
NOMINAL WAGE RATE .•..••.•.•••.•••.....•• 
REAL WAGE RATE. .••••••••..•••••••••.•••• 
TERMS OF TRADE .•.•••••••..••••.••••.•..• 
GOP DEfLATOR •..••....•.••••.•••.•.••.••. 
EMPLOYMENT ( 'OOU) ....•....••.•••••.•...• 
EMPLOYMENT I CHANGE ••..•.•••••••.••••••• 
UNfMPLOYMENT ( '000) ....•.••••••..•••...• 
UNlMPLOYMENT RATE, CHANGE. ••••••••.•.••• 
LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY /HEAD .••••••••.•.•.•• 
UTILIZATION RATE I NOUSTRY ••••••••••.•••• 
BUDGET SURPLUS ( BN 1985 ECU) ........... . 
BUDGET SURPLUS I GoP:·cHA"GE:::::::::::: 
TRADE BALANCE (BN 1985 ECU) ............ . 
TRADE BALANCE I GOP, CHANGE •.••••.••.... 
GR. OP. SURPLUS I GOP, CIIANGE •..••.••.•• 
REAL DISP. INCOME HOUSEHOLDS •.•.••.....• 
MOUll : HLRMEH 
======a•~;a:z•• 
YEAR 1 YEAR 2 YEAR 3 YEAR II YEAR 5 YEAR 6 
----------
---------- ---------- ---------- ---------- ----------0.09 0.17 0.211 0.30 o. 36 0.110 
-u. 10 -o. 10 -0.09 -0.01 -0.06 -0.011 
o.n1 0.15 0.30 0.110 0.111 0.111 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
0.011 0.11 0.21 0.30 0.36 0.38 
-0.00 0.19 o. 311 0.119 0.56 0.55 
0.21 0.111 0.69 0.82 0.92 1.00 
0. 36 0.611 0.11~ 0.9~ 1.03 1.06 
-0.01 0.10 0.20 0.27 0. 33 o. 36 
-----------------------------------------------------------------
-0.21 -0.111 -0.61 -0.711 -0.92 -1.02 
-o. 11 -o. 39 -0.511 -0.72 -O.B3 -0.91 
-0.88 •1. 12 -1.27 -1.36 •1.111 -1.11~ 
-o. 15 -o. 33 •0.117 -0.511 -0.66 -0.72 
0.06 o. 10 0.15 0.20 0.25 0.29 
0.78 0.711 o. 70 0.65 0.60 0.55 
-0.01 -0.23 -0.112 -0.60 -0.711 -0.11~ 
-----------------------------------------------------------------
·b1 •32 33 102 1611 211 
-0.06 -0.03 0.03 0.08 0.13 o. 16 
46 12 ·31 ·11 •117 •IIIII 
0.02 0.01 ·0.01 ·0.02 ·0.03 •0.011 
0.04 0.12 0.17 0.11 0. Ill 0.11 
·0.03 0.07 0.12 0.111 0.15 0.1!j 
.920 2.661 11.139 5.209 6.185 6.9112 
0.03 0.08 0.12 0.16 0.19 0.21 
5.605 5.184 5.202 ~.139 5.163 5.2113 
ll. 17 0.16 0.16 o. 16 0.16 0.16 
0.011 0.10 0.10 0.01 0.06 0.011 
0. 13 0.19 0.211 0.28 0.31 o.u 
Table A3.3: "Public procurement" simulation: detailed macro-economic 
results for EUR 1?. 
PRIVATE CONSUMPTION .................... . 
GOVERNMENT CONSUMPTION ••.••••••••••••••• 
GROSS FIXED CAP. FORMAT I ON ••••••••••.•••• 
• GOVERNMENT .••••••••••••••••••••.•••••• 
• RES I DENT I Al. ••.••.•.••••..•.•.••.•.•.• 
• FIRMS ..••...........•...•..•..•.••... 
EXPORTS Of GOODS AND SERVICES •••.•...•.. 
IMPORTS OF GOODS AND SERVICES ••.••.••..• 
GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT ..••••••.•••.•.••• 
PRIVATE CONSUMPTION PRICES •••.•.•••••••• 
EXPORT PRICES ••.•.•.••••.•••..••.••.••.• 
IMPORT PRICES .......................... . 
NOMINAL WAGE RATE ..................... .. 
REAL WAGE RATE ......................... . 
TERMS Of TRADE ......................... . 
GOP DEFLATOR ........................... . 
EMPLOYMENT ( '000) ...................... . 
EMPLOYMENT I CHANGE. ••.••••.•••••••.•••• 
UNEMPLOYMENT ( '000) .•.•••.•••...••.••... 
UNEMPLOYMENT RATE, CHANGE •.••••••....•.. 
LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY/HEAD •.••••..•••••••• 
UTILIZATION RATE INDUSTRY ••••••.•••••••• 
BUDGET SURPLUS IBN 1985 ECU) .•......•••. 
BUDGET SURPLUS I GOP, CHANGE •••••••.•••• 
TRADE BALANCE (BN 1985 ECU) •••••••...•.• 
TRADE BALANCE I GOP, CHANGE ..•..•.••••.. 
GR. OP. SURPLUS I GOP, CHANGE •••••••••.• 
REAL OISP. INCOME HOUSEHOLDS •••••••••.•• 
HODEL : HERMES 
YEAR 1 YEAR 2 YEAR 3 YEAR II YEAR 5 YEAR 6 
0.16 
0. 71 
0.27 
0.00 
0.1~ 
0. 311 
1.59 
1. 9~ 
0.20 
·o. 10 
0.011 
-o. 10 
·0.16 
0.111 
0.13 
·o. 35 
62 
0.05 
·411 
-o.o3 
0.15 
0.09 
3.6117 
o. 11 
-. 331 
-0.01 
0. 15 
0.22 
0.111 
0.69 
0.31 
0.00 
0.1111 
0.111 
1.71 
1.116 
0.2~ 
-D.IIII 
-o.12 
-o.111 
-D.II3 
0.11 
0.05 
-o.62 
1113 
0.12 
-97 
-o.o~ 
0.13 
0.111 
7.006 
0.21 
.11111 
0.02 
0.09 
0.19 
0.23 
0.611 
0.119 
0.00 
0.10 
0.!19 
1. 76 
1.1111 
0.31 
-o.61 
-o. 36 
-o. 37 
-D.62 
0.12 
0.02 
-D.II6 
192 
0.1~ 
•1111 
•0.07 
0.16 
0.17 
7.526 
0.23 
1.0116 
0.03 
0.011 
0.23 
0.211 
0.611 
0.61 
0.00 
o.aa 
o.n 
1.111 
1.88 
0.37 
-o.91 
-o.63 
-o.n 
-o.82 
0.15 
0.02 
•1. 11 
2311 
0.19 
·1119 
-o.09 
0.111 
0.19 
11.5~5 
0.26 
1.5911 
0.05 
0.02 
0.28 
o. 3~ 
0.69 
0.75 
0.00 
1.02 
0.119 
1.91 
2.00 
0.115 
•1.17 
-D.90 
-D.95 
•1.03 
0.20 
0.05 
·1.3~ 
290 
0.23 
•179 
-D.10 
0.23 
0.19 
9.6511 
0.29 
1.988 
0.06 
0.01 
o. 311 
. .. / ... 
0.116 
0.70 
0.18 
0.00 
1.15 
1.05 
2.02 
2.13 
0.5!j 
•1.116 
·1.11 
·1.23 
•1.2~ 
0.26 
0.12 
·1.~11 
356 
0.28 
-222 
-D.11 
0.27 
0.19 
11.108 
0.311 
2.1169 
0.09 
0.01 
o.•u 
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Table A3.4: "Financial li~eralisation" simulation: detailed macro-
economic results for EUR 12 
PRIVATE CONSUMPTION ....•..•.......•..... 
GOVERNMENT CONSUMPTION ................. . 
GROSS FIXED CAP.FORMATION .....•......... 
• GOVERNMENT ..•...........•••........... 
• RESIDENTIAL ............•....•...•..... 
• FIRMS ..••...•.....•..........•...••... 
EXPORTS OF GOODS AND SERVICES .......... . 
IMPORTS OF GOODS AND SERVICES .......•... 
GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT ...•.••........... 
PRIVATE CONSUMPTION PRICES .......•...... 
EXPORT PRICES .................•......... 
IMPORT PRIClS ..•....•.•....•............ 
NOMINAL WAGE RATE. ..................... . 
REAL WAGE RATE .....•...•................ 
TERMS OF TRADE ...........•.............. 
GOP DEFLATOR •...•.•..................... 
EMPLOYMENT ( '000 l ...................... . 
EMPLOYMENT S CHANGE. ................... . 
UNEMPLOYMENT ( '000) .................... . 
UNEMPLOYMENT RATE, CHANGE ...•........... 
LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY/HEAD ............... . 
UTILIZATION RATE INDUSTRY .....••........ 
BUDGET SURPLUS (BN 1985 ECU) ........... . 
..................... 
BUDGET SURPLUS S GOP, CHANGE •........... 
TRADE BALANCE (BN 1985 ECU) ............ . 
TRADE BALANCES GOP, CHANGE ...•......... 
GR. OP. SURPLUS S GOP, CHANGE .......... . 
REAL DISP. INCOME HOUSEHOLDS ..•.•....... 
MODEL : INTERLINK 
YEAR 1 YEAR 2 YEAR 3 YEAR 4 YEAR 5 YEAR 6 
0.24 
o.oo 
1.63 
o.oo 
0.28 
2.B1 
o. 37 
0.40 
D.43 
-o.47 
-o.24 
-o.18 
-o.33 
0.26 
-D.07 
-o.47 
·245 
-0.20 
250 
0.111 
0.63 
0.36 
.566 
0.02 
·1.012 
-0.03 
0.20 
0.31 
0.59 
0.00 
2.47 
0.00 
1.D5 
3.90 
1.04 
0.94 
1.06 
-o. 78 
-0.52 
-o.37 
-o.68 
0.26 
-o.14 
-o.77 
•65 
-o.os 
77 
0.05 
1.11 
0.76 
9.367 
0.28 
-.580 
-o.02 
D.4D 
0.68 
0.80 
0.00 
2.60 
D.OO 
1. 78 
3.85 
1. 79 
1.18 
1. 33 
·1.01 
-o.91 
-o.81 
-0.91 
0.28 
-o.16 
·1.00 
171 
0.14 
·151 
-o.11 
1.19 
0.83 
19.926 
0.60 
4.973 
0.15 
0.29 
0.82 
0.86 
0.00 
2.72 
0.00 
2.18 
3.84 
2.01 
1.24 
1.36 
·1.19 
·1.15 
·1.02 
·1.D2 
0.33 
-o.u 
-1.17 
294 
0.24 
•261 
-o.05 
1.12 
0.72 
26.003 
0.78 
7.160 
0.22 
0.06 
0.83 
0.90 
0.00 
2.58 
0.00 
2.14 
3.61 
2.11 
1.19 
1.39 
-1.32 
·1.20 
·1.07 
·1.06 
D. 38 
-o.u 
-1.31 
361 
0.29 
-311 
-o.23 
1.10 
0.68 
3D. 368 
0.92 
8.196 
0.25 
-o.15 
0.85 
0.95 
0.00 
2.42 
o.oo 
1.97 
3.43 
2.21 
1.23 
1.46 
·1.38 
-1.24 
•1. 11 
•1.D2 
0.42 
-o.13 
·1.37 
440 
0.36 
•377 
-o.28 
1.11 
0.72 
34.988 
1.06 
8.599 
0.26 
-o.32 
0.88 
Table A3.5: "Supply effects" simulation: detailed macro-economic 
results for EllR 12 
PRIVATE CONSUMPTION .................... . 
GOVERNMENT CONSUMPTION ................•. 
GROSS FIXED CAP.FORMATION .............. . 
• GOVERNMENT .............•.............. 
• RESIDENTIAL ....................•...... 
• FIRMS ................................ . 
EXPORTS Of GOODS AND SERVICES •.......... 
IMPORTS OF GOODS AND SERVICES ....•....•. 
GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT .......•.......... 
PRIVATE CONSUMPTION PRICES ......•....... 
EXPORT PRICES .......................... . 
IMPORT PRICES .......................... . 
NOMINAL WAGE RATE ...................... . 
REAL WAGE RATE ......................... . 
TERMS OF TRADE .....••................... 
GOP DEFLATOR ..................•......... 
EMPLOYMENT ( '000 l ...................... . 
EMPLOYMENT I CHANGE. ........•........... 
UNEMPLOYMENT ( '000 ) .................... . 
UNEMPLOYMENT RATE, CHANGE .............. . 
LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY/HEAD ............... . 
UTILIZATION RATE INDUSTRY .............. . 
BUDGET SURPLUS (BN 1985 ECU) ........... . 
BUDGET SURPLUS S GOP, CHANGE ........... . 
TRADE BALANCE ( BN 1985 ECU I ............ . 
TRADE BALANCE I GOP, CHANGE ............ . 
GR. OP. SURPLUS I GOP, CHANGE ......•.... 
REAL DISP. INCOME HOUSEHOLDS ...•.....•.. 
MODEL : HERMES 
YEAR 1 YEAR 2 YEAR 3 YEAR 4 YEAR 5 YEAR 6 
0.15 
0.24 
0. 35 
0.00 
0.05 
0.50 
1.26 
0.22 
0.51 
·0.60 
-o. 54 
-o. 11 
-0.36 
0.26 
·0.37 
·0.85 
·284 
-0.2J 
215 
0.09 
0.75 
0.46 
-.832 
·0.03 
5.817 
0.111 
0.09 
0.25 
0.32 
0.24 
0.67 
o.oo 
0.17 
0.92 
2.27 
0.92 
0.90 
-1.01 
-0.911 
-0.45 
-o.72 
o. 32 
-o.53 
·1.32 
•86 
-o.07 
20 
0.01 
0.97 
0.75 
4.851 
0.15 
7.528 
0.23 
0.14 
0. 38 
D.60 
D.29 
1.04 
0.00 
0.50 
1.37 
3.19 
1.49 
1.31 
-1.41 
-1.43 
-o. 10 
-0.89 
0.56 
-o. 73 
·1.76 
156 
o. 13 
"97 
·0.07 
1.18 
0.99 
7.720 
0.23 
9.578 
0.29 
0.11 
D.70 
0.85 
o. 34 
1. 35 
0.00 
0.82 
1.73 
3.96 
1.97 
1.64 
·1.78 
•1.110 
-0.90 
-1.01 
0.110 
-o.90 
·2.14 
409 
o. 33 
·U9 
-o.14 
1. 31 
1.16 
12.233 
0.37 
11.1132 
0.34 
0.05 
0.93 
1.08 
0.40 
1.56 
o.oo 
1.09 
1.96 
4.70 
2.45 
1.93 
·2.08 
-2.11 
•1.06 
·1.0S 
1.04 
·LOS 
·2.44 
647 
0.51 
·387 
-0.20 
1.42 
1.31 
16.399 
0.49 
13.209 
0.40 
-o.01 
1.14 
... I . .. 
1.27 
0.45 
1.63 
0.00 
1.21 
2.01 
5.29 
2.79 
2.14 
-2.29 
-2.33 
·1.17 
-1.03 
1.25 
-1.16 
·2.6S 
859 
0.68 
-509 
·0.2S 
1.47 
1.40 
20.426 
0.62 
14.1128 
0.45 
-0.09 
1.29 
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ANNEX 4 DETAILED AGGREGATED MACRo-ECONOMIC SIMULATION 
MARKET FOR GERMANY, 
RESULTS OF THE 
FRANCE, ITALY AND COMPLETION OF THE INTERNAL 
THE UNITED KINGDOMl 
Table A4.1: Detailed aggregated mac~economic simulation results 
of the completio_n __ o_f_!__he internal market for Germany 
PRIVATE CON~UMPTION .........•........... 
GOVERNMENT CONSUMPTION .......•.........• 
GROSS FIKED CAP.FORMATION .............. . 
• GOVERNMENT .........•.•................ 
• RESIDENTIAL. ........................ .. 
• FIRMS .................. , ............. . 
EKPORTS OF GOODS AND SERVICES ..........• 
IMPORTS OF GOODS AND SERVICES .......... . 
GROSS OOMESTIC PRODUCT .•...••........... 
PRIVATE CONSUMPTION PRICES •............. 
EKPORT PRICES .......................... . 
IMPORT PRICES .......................... . 
NOMINAL WAGE RATE ...................... . 
REAL WAGE RATE ..••.•. , ... , •..•..•....... 
TERMS OF TRADE ......................... . 
GOP DEFLATOR •....•........•..•.......... 
EMPLOYMENT ( '000) ...................... . 
EMPLOYMENT S CHANGE .................... . 
UNEMPLOYMENT ( '000) .................... . 
UNEMPLOYMENT RATE, CHANGE .•. ,, ..... , ... . 
LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY/HEAD ............... . 
UTILIZATION RATE INDUSTRY .............. . 
BUDGET SURPLUS (BN 19B5 ECU) ........... . 
BUDGET SURPlUS\ GoP:·cHANGE:::::::::: :: 
TRADE BALANCE (BN 1985 ECU) ............ . 
TRADE BALANCES GOP, CHANGE ............ . 
GR. OP. SURPLUS S GOP, CHANGE .......... . 
REAL DISP. INCOME HOUSEHOLDS ..•......... 
HODEL : HERMES/INTERLINK 
aaa•=•*•••••••--•• .... ••• 
YEAR 1 
0.49 
-0.24 
1. 74 
0.00 
0.63 
2.72 
3.10 
2.42 
1.22 
-o. 74 
-o.21 
-1.04 
-o.29 
0.44 
O.B4 
-0.45 
-7B 
-o.l1 
78 
0.00 
1. 53 
0.57 
1.070 
0.13 
4.0!:>11 
0.49 
0.66 
0.95 
YEAR 2 
1.11 
-0.10 
2.63 
0.00 
1.119 
3.611 
4. 72 
3.52 
1.97 
-1.116 
-1.38 
-1.78 
-0.50 
0.91 
0.40 
-1.09 
311 
0. ,., 
-65 
-o.15 
1.811 
1.01 
4.562 
0.55 
4.413 
0.53 
0.611 
1. 31 
YEAR 3 
1.65 
0.07 
3.65 
0.00 
2.15 
11.98 
6.27 
4.70 
2.57 
-2.30 
-2.65 
-3.02 
-o.B1 
1.1111 
0.37 
-1.74 
129 
0.50 
-108 
-o.22 
2.07 
0.91 
6.330 
o. 77 
5.661 
0.69 
0.56 
1.91 
YEAR II 
2.111 
0.28 
11.311 
0.00 
2.46 
5.811 
6.95 
5.43 
2.89 
·3.52 
·3.82 
-4.10 
-1.62 
1.87 
0.29 
-2.82 
208 
0.80 
-184 
-o.20 
2.08 
0.64 
7.891 
0.95 
6.029 
0. 73 
0.111 
2.19 
2.82 
0.49 
4.88 
0.00 
2.67 
6.54 
7.69 
6.16 
3.52 
-4.90 
-11.911 
-5.01 
-2.41 
2.118 
0.07 
-4.10 
311 
1.19 
-260 
-o.211 
2.32 
0.65 
9. 714 
1.18 
5.627 
0.68 
0.29 
2.73 
YEAR 6 
3.59 
0.67 
5.21 
0.00 
2.89 
6.93 
8.33 
6.89 
11.20 
-6.16 
·5. 77 
-5.86 
-3.00 
3.14 
0.10 
-5.20 
1138 
1.68 
-373 
-o.36 
2.51 
0.83 
12.575 
1.52 
5. 776 
0.70 
0.15 
3.27 
Table A4.2: Detailed aggregated macro-economic simulation results 
of the com~LPtion of the internal market for France 
--------~-------
HODEL : HERMES/INTERLINK 
YEAR 1 YEAR 2 YEAR 3 YEAR 4 YEAR 5 YEAR 6 
---------- ---------- ---------- ---------- ---------- ----------PRIVATE CONSUMPTION ............•........ 
GOVERNMENT CONSUMPTION ...•.............. 
GROSS FIKED CAP.FORMATION ...........•... 
• GOVERNMENT .......................•.... 
• RES I DENT IAL ................... , ...... . 
• FIRMS ................... ·•· .. · .. ······ 
EKPORTS OF GOODS AHO SERVICES .......... . 
IMPORTS OF GOODS AND SERVICES ••......... 
GROSS OOMESTIC PRODUCT .........•........ 
0.24 
0.58 
4.07 
o.oo 
0.40 
6.B6 
4.21 
3.45 
1.09 
0.65 
0.1111 
5.27 
0.00 
1.28 
8.116 
6.79 
5.80 
1.97 
1.04 
0.54 
5.95 
o.oo 
2.85 
9.02 
9. 30 
7.30 
2.88 
1.50 
0. 70 
6.45 
0.00 
4.31 
9.30 
11.01 
8.18 
3.65 
1.97 
0.89 
6. 73 
0.00 
5.62 
9.21 
12.79 
9.05 
11.111 
2.41 
1.10 
6.79 
o.oo 
6.59 
8.85 
111.117 
9.59 
5.05 
---------------------------------------- -----------------------------------------------------------------PRIVATE CONSUMPTION PRICES •............. 
EKPORT PRICES., ........•..•••...•....... 
IMPORT PRICES .......................... . 
NOMINAL WAGE RATE ...................... . 
REAL WAGE RATE ...........•...........•.. 
TERMS OF TRADE .•••....•.......•...••.... 
GOP DEFLATOR •.•..•...........•.........• 
-1.00 
-0.80 
-1.55 
-o. 57 
0.43 
0.76 
-1.53 
-1.64 
-1.52 
-2.43 
-1.28 
0.34 
0.93 
·2.19 
-2.43 
-2.71 
-3.32 
-1.90 
0.48 
0.63 
-3.07 
-3.27 
-3.71 
-3.88 
-2.115 
0.74 
0.20 
-3.97 
-4.12 
·4.52 
-11. 31 
-2.92 
1.09 
-o.19 
-4.86 
•4.89 
-5.18 
-4.64 
·3.25 
1.51 
-o.!U 
-5.63 
-----------------------------------------------------------------EMPLOYMENT ( '000) ...•.......••.......... 
EMPLOYMENT S CHANGE. .....•.............. 
UNEMPLOYMENT ( '000) .........•........... 
UNEMPLOYMENT RATE, CHANGE .............. . 
LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY/HfAO ............... . 
UTILIZATION RATE INDUSTRY .............. . 
BUDGET SURPLUS (BN 1985 ECU) ........... . 
BUDGET SURPLUS S GOP, CHANGE ........... . 
TRADE BALANCE (BN 1985 ECU) ............ . 
TRADE BALANCES GOP, CHANGE ..........•.. 
GR. OP. SURPLUS S GOP, CHANGE .......... . 
REAL DISP. INCOME HOUSEHOLDS ........... . 
-60 
-0.28 
l3 
o. 1~ 
1. 37 
1.37 
.262 
0.04 
2.806 
0.42 
0.24 
0.30 
1 See note at the end of this Annex 
-!; 
-o.02 
5 
0.02 
2.00 
2.07 
2.727 
0.40 
3.872 
O.!l7 
0.!;9 
0.78 
73 
0.311 
-35 
-o.16 
2.!1S 
2.90 
6.073 
0.90 
5.517 
0.82 
0.69 
1.12 
159 
o. 73 
-ao 
-o.n 
2.95 
3.56 
9.761 
1.45 
6.603 
0.98 
O.!l5 
1.56 
2!l0 
1.15 
-128 
-o.H 
3.30 
11.25 
13.860 
2.05 
7.787 
1. 1!l 
0.29 
1.99 
•.. I • •• 
342 
1.57 
-178 
-o. 79 
3.511 
... 711 
17.788 
2.64 
9.110 
1.35 
-o.OJ 
2.111 
- 622 - - 10.60 -
Table A4.3: Detailed aggregated macro-economic simulation results 
of the completion of the internal market for Italy 
MODEL : HERMES/INTERLINK 
YEAR 1 YEAR 2 YEAR 3 YEAR II YEAR 5 YEAR 6 
PRIVATE CONSUMPTION .................... . 
GOVERNMENT CONSUMPTION ................. . 
GROSS fiXED CAP.fORMATIDN •........•..... 
• GOVERNMENT ............•.•............. 
• RESIDENTIAL .......................... . 
• fiRMS .........•............•.......... 
EXPORTS OF GOODS AND SERVICES .......... . 
IMPORTS Of GOODS AND SERVICES .......... . 
GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT ..............•... 
PRIVATE CONSUMPTION PRICES .•............ 
EXPORT PRICES .....................•..... 
IMPORT PRICES ....................... ·.·. 
NOMINAL WAGE RATE ........••............. 
REAL WAGE RATE ..........•............•.. 
TERMS OF TRADE ......................... . 
GOP DEFLATOR ........................... . 
EMPLOYMENT ( '000) ...••.•••..••..•.•..... 
EMPLOYMENT S CHANG£. ................... . 
UNEMPLOYMENT ( '000 l .................... . 
UNEMPLOYMENT RATE, CHANGE .............. . 
LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY/HEAD ............... . 
UTILIZATION RATE INDUSTRY .............. . 
BUDGET SURPLUS (BN 1985 ECU) ........... . 
..................... 
BUDGET SURPLUS S GOP, Ct;ANGE. .......... . 
TRADE BALANCE (BN 1985 £CU) •............ 
TRADE BALANCES GOP, CHANGE ............ . 
GR. OP. SURPLUS S GOP, CHANGE .......... . 
REAL OISP. INCOME HOUSEHOLDS ........... . 
0.85 
•().05 
2.10 
0.00 
0. 33 
3.511 
3.62 
2.05 
1.35 
-2.30 
-1.85 
-1.82 
-1.68 
0.91 
-0.02 
-2.58 
-136 
-0.62 
131 
0.53 
1.911 
0.86 
1.569 
0.28 
1.900 
0.311 
0.27 
1.07 
1.85 
-0.05 
11.112 
o.oo 
2.20 
6.82 
5.9 .. 
3.85 
3.25 
-11.011 
""3.17 
-2.97 
-3.116 
0.96 
-<l.19 
-11.59 
-50 
-o.22 
66 
0.25 
3. Ill 
1.26 
7.559 
1.36 
2. OliO 
0.37 
0.117 
1.98 
2.98 
-o.o6 
5.06 
0.00 
5.211 
6.58 
8.55 
11.117 
11.511 
-5.55 
-5.11 
-11.28 
-11.811 
1.07 
-o.ll3 
-6.38 
53 
0.26 
-16 
"().10 
11.20 
1. 33 
12.101 
2.11 
II. 376 
0.79 
0.01 
2.92 
3.53 
"().07 
6.118 
o.oo 
7.23 
11.11 
10.15 
5. 39 
5.15 
-6.55 
-6.33 
-5.25 
-5.62 
1.19 
-1.09 
-7.511 
150 
0.70 
-92 
"().111 
... 311 
1.25 
15.708 
2.112 
5.001 
0.90 
"().611 
3. 32 
3.75 
-o.07 
6.88 
0.00 
6.95 
11.93 
11.110 
5.98 
5.111 
-7.02 
-6.99 
""5.78 
-5.92 
1.19 
-1.22 
-8.19 
236 
1.08 
-157 
"().66 
II. 111 
1.13 
18.370 
3.30 
5.5111 
1.00 
-1.28 
3.116 
3.79 
-o.oa 
6.93 
0.00 
5.70 
9.58 
12.28 
6.61 
5.116 
-7.07 
-7.311 
-6.011 
-5.77 
1. 21 
-1.26 
-11. 311 
308 
1.40 
-2011 
-<l.117 
3.119 
1.03 
20.293 
3.65 
5.7113 
1.03 
-1.89 
3.50 
Table A 4.4: Detailed aggregated macro-economic simulation results 
of_0_~ comp_l_P_t_i_o_n __ ~!_he internal market for the 
United Kingdom 
PRIVATE CONSUMPT I ON .................... . 
GOVERNMENT CONSUMPTION ......•........... 
GROSS fiXED CAP.fORMATION .............. . 
• GOVERNMENT ........•................... 
• RESIDENTIAL .......................... . 
• fiRMS ................................ . 
EXPORTS Of GOODS AND SERVICES .......... . 
IMPORTS OF GOODS AND SERVICES .......... . 
GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT ................. . 
PRIVATE CONSUMPTION PRICES ..•........... 
EXPORT PRICES ........•.................. 
IMPORT PRICES .......................... . 
NOMINAL WAGE RATE ...................... . 
REAL WAGE RATE .••.........•............. 
TERMS Of TRADE ......................... . 
GOP DEFLATOR ........................... . 
EMPLOYMENT ( '000 l ...................... . 
EMPLOYMENT S CHANGE. ................... . 
UNEMPLOYMENT ( '000) .................... . 
UNEMPLOYMENT RATE, CHANGE .............. . 
LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY/HEAD ............... . 
UTILIZATION RATE INDUSTRY .............. . 
BUDGET SURPLUS (BN 1985 ECU) ........•... 
BUDGET SURPLUS S Go;:·cHANGE:::::::::::: 
TRADE BALANCE (BN 1985 ECU) .•••......... 
TRADE BALANCES GOP, CHANGE .......•..... 
GR. OP. SURPLUS S GOP, CHANGE .......... . 
REAL DISP. INCOME HOUSEHOLDS ........... . 
MODEL : HERMES/INTERLINK 
YEAR 1 YEAR 2 YEAR 3 YEAR II YEAR 5 YEAR 6 
----------
---------- ---------- ---------- ---------- ----------1.10 1. 75 2.29 2.54 2. 73 2.91 
2.86 2.80 2.711 2.67 2.61 2.55 
1.69 3.34 11.10 11.26 3.93 3.42 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
0.55 2.118 3.57 4.17 4.57 4. 73 
2. 79 4.75 5.90 5.66 4.93 11.13 
2.50 4.113 6.111 7. 31 11.07 11.57 
11.11 11.96 5.01 5.14 5.30 5.48 
0.81 2.1111 3.29 3.59 3.79 ... 00 
-----------------------------------------------------------------
-2.55 -11.33 ""5.57 -6.39 -6.96 -7.43 
-1.10 
-2.67 -3.96 -11.57 -11.119 -5.21 
.... 33 
-1.119 -2.57 -3.10 -3.45 •3.711 
-1.64 -3.70 -4.46 -11.55 -4.56 -11.73 
0.94 0.65 1.12 1.83 2.110 2.71 
0.23 -o. 78 -1.39 -1.1111 -1.411 
-1.47 
-2.52 -11.72 -6.26 -7.111 -7.66 -11.06 
-----------------------------------------------------------------
-157 -16 167 285 3112 385 
-0.64 -o.o11 0.65 1.07 1.26 1.39 
135 10 -136 -207 -219 -223 
0.50 0.05 "().1111 -o.07 -o. 79 
-o. 79 
1. 79 2.95 3.10 2.93 2.89 2.91 
0.65 2.62 3.115 3.53 3.1111 3.116 
-.3311 4.232 7.86" 9.563 10.045 10.707 
-0.06 0.71 1.32 1.61 1.69 1.110 
.. , 987 
-1.883 -.130 1.645 2.907 3.601 
-o.u "().32 -o.02 0.28 0.119 0.61 
1.13 1.52 1.03 0.39 -o.o1 "().21 
1.17 1.68 2.11 2.311 2.60 2.110 
... I . .. 
- 6~3 -
- 10.61 -
Note to Annexes 2, 3 and 4: 
The figures in the tables represent cumulative deviations from a baseline 
simulation. The table below indicates which variables are expressed in 
percentage deviations, and which variables are expressed in absolute 
differences. 
List of variables 
Volumes 
·private consumption 
Government consumption 
Gross fixed capital formation 
- Government 
- Residential 
- Firms 
Exports of goods and services 
Imports of goods and services 
Gross domestic product 
Prices 
Private consumption price 
Export price 
Import price 
Nominal wage rate 
Real wage rate 
Terms of trade 
GDP deflator 
Other 
Employment ('000) 
Employment % change 
Unemployment ('000) 
Unemployment rate, change 
Labour productivity/head 
Utilization rate industry 
Budget surplus (BN 1985 ECU) 
Budget surplus % GDP, change 
Trade balance (BN 1985 ECU) 
Trade balance % GDP, change 
Gr.op.surplus % GDP, change 
Real disp.income households 
Percentage difference 
.. 
Absolute difference 
Percentage difference 
Absolute difference 
(% points) 
Percentage difference 
Absolute difference (% points) 
(% points) 
(% points) 
(% points) 
Percentage difference 
... I . .. 

- 625 -
- 10.62 -
ANNEX 5 LIST OF STUDIES 
This annex provides the list of studies carried out by external consultants 
or universities and used for the simulations. 
Studies concerning specific types of barrier 
1. "The Cost of Non-Europe: Customs Barriers" 
Ernst & Whinney 
2. "The Cost of Non-Europe in Public Sector Procurement" 
w.s. Atkins Management Consultants 
Studies concerning specific industries 
3. "The Cost of Non-Europe in the Foodstuffs Industry" 
Groupe MAC 
4. "The Cost of Non-Europe: the Pharmaceutical Industry" 
Economists Advisory Group 
5. "The benefit of True-Europe in the EC Automobile Sector" 
Ludwigsen Associates Limited 
6. "The Cost of Non-Europe in the Textile-Clothing Industry" 
IFO-Institut fUr Wirtschaftsforschung, and Prometeia Calcolo Srl. 
7. "Le cout de la Non-Europe des produits de construction" 
BIPE - Bureau d'informations et de previsions economiques 
Studies concerning specific service sectors 
8. "The Cost of Non-Europe in Financial Services" 
Price Waterhouse Economic and Management Consultants 
9. "The Cost of Non-Europe for Business Services" 
Peat, Marwick, McLintock 
... I . .. 
- 626 -
- 10.63 -
Studies based on particular analytical approaches 
10. "The Completion of the Internal Market: a Survey of European Industry's 
Perception of the Likely Effects" 
G. Nerb, Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs, 
Commission of the European Communities 
ll. "A Survey of the Economies of Scale" 
c. Pratten, Department of Applied Economics, University of Cambridge 
12. "Economies of Scale and Intra-Community Trade" 
J. Schwalbach, International Institute for Management 
13. "The Costs of Non-Europe: An Assessment based on a Formal Model of 
Imperfect Competition and Economies of Scale" 
A. Smith, University of Southampton, and A. Venables, University of 
Sussex 
... I . .. 
- 627 -
- 10.64 -
REFERENCES 
Albert, M. and 
europ€enne dans 
Parliament, July. 
R. Ball (1983), "Vers le 
les annees 80" • Report 
redressement 
presented to 
de l'€conomie 
the European 
Catinat, M. (1988) "Radioscopie du grand marche interieur europ€en", 
Economie Prospective Internationale, 33: 5-28, Documentation Fran~aise. 
Catinat, M. and A. Italianer ( 1988), "Completing the 
Primary microeconomic effects and their implementation 
models", Commission of the EC, Directorate-General 
Financial Affairs, Document II/140/88-EN/FR. 
internal market -
in macro-economic 
for Economic and 
Commission of the EC (1985), "European road freight deregulation 
intentions and proposals". Mac Graw-Hill, London. 
Commission of the EC ( 1987), "Ach~vement du march€ 
Rapprochement des taux et harmonisation des structures 
indirects". Communication de la Commission, COM(87)320 final. 
interieur 
des imp6ts 
Commission of the EC (1988) , "The Economics of 1992", European Economy, 
N° 35 (March). 
Geroski, P. (1988), Competition and innovation, in Research on the cost of 
non-Europe, Vol.2, Document series, Commission of the EC. 
Jacquemin, A. (1979), "Economie Industrielle Europ€enne. Structures de 
march€ et strat€gies d'entreprises". Dunod, Paris. 
OECD (1988), OECD Interlink System: Reference Manual, Paris. 
Owen, N. (1983), "Economies of scale, competitiveness and trade patterns 
within the European Community". Clarendon Press, Oxford. 
Padoa-Schioppa, T. (1987), "Efficiency, 
for the evolution of the economic system 
of a study group appointed by the 
T. Padoa-Schioppa), Mimeo, EC Commission, 
stability and equity. A strategy 
of the European Community" (Report 
EC Commission and presided by 
Brussels. 
Richardson, P. ( 1987), "A review of the stimulation properties of OECD' s 
Interlink model", OECD Working Papers, n° 46, Paris. 
Valette, P. et P. Zagam~ (ed.) (1988), "HERMES: an European system of 
econometric models", EC Commission, forthcoming. 
Venables, A.J. and A. Smith (1986), "Trade and industrial policy under 
imperfect competition", Economic Policy, 2: 622-671. 
Vignon, J. ( 1986), "Sept ans pour construire le vrai march€ commun , 
Economie Prospective Internationale, 25: 5-24, Documentation Fran~aise. 

- 629 -
ANNEXES 

- 631 -
ANNEXE 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 

- 633 -
1 
Bibliography 
1. Abd-El-Rahman, K.S., "La 'difference' et la 'similitude' dans !'analyse de 
la composition du commerce international", Revue Economique, no. 2, 
1986, PP• 307-340. 
2. Abd-El-Rahman, K.s., "Reexamen de la definition et de la mesure des 
echanges croises de produits similaires entre les nations", Revue 
Economique, no. 1, 1986. 
3. Aylen J., "Plant size and efficiency in the steel industry: an 
international comparison", National Institute Economic Review, No. 100, 
May 1982, PP• 65-76. 
4. Balassa B., "Intra-Industry Specialization", European Economic Review, 
1986. 
5. Baudoux M., "Les economies d'echelle et leur degre d'exploitation", 
Cahier !REP, no. 4, 1972. 
6. Bergstrand J.H., "Measurement and Determinants of Intra-Industry 
International Trade", in P.K.M. Tharakan, ed., Intra-Industry Trade, 
Amsterdam, North Holland 201-241. 
7. Bianchi P., "Industrial Reshaping within an Italian Perspective", First 
Draft, Unviersity of Bologna, September 1986. 
8. Black, A. P., "Intra-Industry Trade and Industrial Adjustment: The Case of 
the Automobile Industry", International Institute of Management, Berlin, 
1984. 
9. Boyer, K.D. and 
Advertising?", 
509-526. 
Lancast-er, 
The Journal 
K.M., "Are 
of Business, 
There 
vol. 
Scale Economies 
53, 1986 No. 3, 
in 
PP• 
10. Cain, L.P., Paterson, Donald G., "Biased technical change, scale and factor 
substitution in American industry, 1850- 1919", Journal of Economic 
History, 1986, Vol. 46, No. 1, pp. 153-164. 
11. Caves, R. E., Khalilzadeh-Shirazi, J. and Porter, M. E., "Scale Economies in 
Statistical Analysis of Market Power", Review of Economics and 
Statistics, May 1975. 
12. Caves, R.E., "International Trade and Industrial Organisation: Problems, 
Solved and Unsolved", mimeo, Harvard University, prepared for European 
Association for Research on Industrial. Economics, Bergen, August 1983. 
13. Caves, R.E., "Intra-Industry Trade and Market structure in the Industrial 
Countries", Oxford, Economic Papers, 1981, Vol. 23, no. 1, pp. 202-220. 
14. Caves, R.E., "Scale, openness, and productivity in Australian industries", 
The Brookings Survey of the Australian Economy Conference, Canberra, 
9th-11th January 1984. 
- 634 -
2 
15. Clair c., Gaussens o. and Phan D. L., "Le commerce international 
intra-branche et ses d~terminants d'apr~s le sch~ma de concurrence 
monopolistique: une v~rification empirique", Revue Economique, 35 (2), 
March 1984, pp. 347-78. 
16. Clark N., "Scale economies, entry and welfare", Journal of Economics 
and Business, 1984, Vol. 36, no. 2, PP• 161-176. 
17. Corden w.M., "A Note on Economies of Scale, the Size of the Domestic 
Market and the Pattern of Trade", in I.A. McDougall and R.H. Snape, 
eds., Studies in International Economics, Amsterdam, 1970. 
18. Cox, D. and Harris, R., "Trade Liberalisation and Industrial Organisation: 
some estimates for Canada", Discussion Paper 523, Queen's University 
(Canada), April 1983. 
19. Curtis, D.C.A., "Trade policy to promote entry with scale economies, 
product variety and export potential", The Canadian Journal of 
Economics, 1983, Vol. 26, No. 1, pp 109-121). 
20. Das, S.P., "Economies of scale, imperfect competition and the pattern of 
trade", The Economic Journal, 1982, Vol. 92, no. 367, pp. 684-693. 
21. Diwan R.K., "Alternative specification of Economies of Scale", Economics, 
November 1966, pp. 442-453. 
22. Eldor, D, Sudit, E.F., "Alternative specifications of returns to scale and 
joint estimation of factor demand and production functions in 
telecommunications", Review of Business and Economic Research, 1982, 
vol. 18, No. 1, PP• 15-26). 
23. Ergas, H., "Corporate Strategies in Transition", in Jacquemin, A. (Ed.), 
European Industry: Public Policy and Corporate Strategy, Oxford 
University Press, 1984. 
24. Ethier w., "National and international returns to scale in the modern 
theory of international trade", American Economic Review, 1982. 
25. George, K.D. and Ward, T.s., The Structure of Industry in the EEC: An 
international Comparison, University of Cambridge, Department of Applied 
Economics, Occasional Paper 43, Cambridge University Press, 1975. 
26. Geroski P. and Jacquemin A., "Industrial change, barriers to mobility and 
European industrial policy", Economicy Policy, 1985. 
27. Glejser H., Jacquemin A. and Petit, "Exports in an Imperfect Competition 
Framework An Analysis of 1446 Exporters", Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, 1980. 
28. Gold, Bela, "Changing Perspectives on Size, Scale and Returns: An 
interpret! ve Survey", Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. XIX, March 
1981. 
- 6.5) -
3 
29. Gold, Bela, "Evaluating scale economies: the case of Japanese blast 
furnaces", Journal of Industrial Economics, 1974. 
30. Goldschmidt, A., "The Cost Output relationship of banks revisted", European 
Economic Review; 1983, Vol. 22, no. 2. 
31. Griliches, z. and Ringstad, v., "Economies of scale and the form of the 
production function: an econometric study of Norwegian manufacturing, 
establishment data", North-Holland, 1971. 
32. Haldi J.E., "Economies of scale in economic development", Stanfort 
University, Ph.D., 1961. 
33. Harris, R. G., "Applied general equilibrium analysis of small open 
economies with scale economies and imperfect competition", Queen's 
University Discussion Paper, No. 524, 1983. 
34. Havrylyshyn, 0., "The Increasing Integration of Newly Industrialized 
Countries in World Trade: A Quantitative Analysis of Intra-Industry 
Trade", Symposium on Intra-Industry Trade, Brussels, May 1983. 
35. Helpman E., "International Trade in the Presence of Product 
Differentiation, Economies of Scale and Monopolistic Competition: A 
Chamberlin-Heckscher-Ohlin Approach", Journal of International 
Economics, 11 (3), August 1981, pp. 305-40. 
36. Helpman E. and Krugman P.R., Increasing Returns, Imperfect Competition 
and International Trade, M.I.T. Press, Cambridge MA, 1985. 
37. Jacquemin, A., "Imperfect Market Structures and International TrAde", 
Kyklos Vol. 35 no 1, 1982. 
38. Jacquemin A. and Sapir A., 
commerce communautaire: 
"Le 
une 
part des 
analyse 
~cha~ges intra-CEE dans le 
sectorielle", CEPS Working 
Documents, May 1986. 
39. Jenny F. and Weber A., "Aggregate Welfare Loss due to Monopoly Power in the 
French Economy", Journal of Industrial Economics, 1983. 
40. Jones D.T., "Maturity and Crisis in the 
Structural Change and Public Policy", Sussex 
1980, University of Sussex, Brighton, UK. 
European Car Industry: 
European Research Center, 
41. Kamien M. and Schwartz N., "Market Structure and Innovation", Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 1982. 
42. Kierzkowski H. (editor), Monopolistic competition and International 
Trade, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1984. 
43. Kol J. and Mennes L.B.M., "Intra-Industry Specialization Some 
Observations on Concepts and Measurement", Journal of International 
Economics, 1988. 
- 636 -
4 
44. Krugman, P. R. editor, "Strategic Trade Policy and the New International 
Economics", MTT Press, 1986. 
45. Krugman, P.R., "Intra-Industry Specialisation and the gains from Trade", 
Journal of Political Economy, 1981, Vol. 89, no. 5, pp. 957-973. 
46. Lancaster K., "Intra-Industry Trade under Perfect Monopolistic 
Competition", Journal of International Economics, 10 (2), May 1980, pp. 
151-75. 
47. Lloyd B., "Economies of scale", Moorgate and Wall Street, A review 
issued by Hill Samuel & Co. Limited, 1972, pp. 22-47. 
48. Locksley G., "The EEC Telecommunications Industry: Competition, 
Concentration and Competitiveness", EEC Commission, Brussels, 1982. 
49. Locksley G. and Ward T., "Concentration in Manufacturing in the EEC", 
Cambridge Journal of Economics, 1979. 
SO. Mardas D., "Les Echanges Intra-Branche: Le Cas des Dix Etats Membres de 
la Communaute Economique Europeenne (C.E.E.), Revue d'Economie 
Industrielle, 1985. 
51. Markusen, J.R. Svensson, L.E.O., "Factor endowments and trade with 
increasing returns versus, constant returns to scale", University of 
Stockholm, Institute for International Economic Studies, 1984, Seminar 
Paper no. 288. 
52. McCombie, J.S.L., "Increasing returns and the manufacturing industries: 
some empirical issues", The Manchaster School of Econ. and Soc. Studies, 
1985, Vol. 53, no. 1, pp. 55-75. 
53. Miller, E.M., "Extent of Economies of Scale: an update", Southern Economic 
Journal, 1984, Vol. 51, no. 2, pp. 582-587. 
54. Mueller D. (editor), "The Determinants and Effects of Mergers, 
Oelgesschlagere Gunn, Cambridge, Mass., 1980. 
55. MUller J., "Competitive Performance and Trade within the EEC: 
Generalizations from Several Case STudies with Specific Reference to the 
West German Economy", Journal of Institutional and Theoretical 
Economics, 1981, pp. 638-663. 
56. MUller, J. and Owen, N., Economic Effects of Free Trade in Manufactured 
Products within the EC. A pilot study of some European Industries, 
mimeo, Berlin, 1984. 
57. Mulligan, J.G., "The economies of massed reserves", American Review, 1983, 
Vol. 73, no. 4, pp. 725-734. 
58. Owen N., "Economies of Scale, Competitiveness and Trade Patterns within 
The European Community", Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1983. 
59. Owen N., "Scale Economies in the EEC", European Economic Review, 7, 
1976, PP• 143-173. 
- 637 -
5 
60. Panagariya, A., "Increasing returns and the specific factors model", 
Southern Economic Journal, 1986, Vol. 53, no. 1, pp. 1-17. 
61. Perry, M.K., "Scale economies, imperfect competition and public policy", 
Journal of Industrial Economics, 1984, VoL. 32, no. 3, pp. 313-333. 
62. Pratten, C.F., Labor productivity differential within international 
comparison, Cambridge, 1976. 
63. Ringstad, v., "Economies of Scale and the Form of the Production Function: 
Some New Estimates", The Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 1978, Vol. 
80, no. 3, pp. 251-264. 
64. Saving T.R., "Estimation of optimum size of plant by the survivor 
technique", Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1961, pp. 569-607. 
65. Sawyer, M.C., "The Economics of Industries and Firms. Theories, Evidence 
and Policy", New York, St. Martin' sPress, 1981. 
66. Schmalensee, R., "Economies of Scale and Barriers to Entry", Journal of 
Political Economy, 1981, Vol. 89, no. 6, pp. 1228-1238. 
67. Tharakan P.K.M. (editor), Intra-Industry Trade 
Methodological Aspects, North-Holland Publishing 
1983. 
Empirical and 
Company, Amsterdam, 
68. Tharakan P.K.M. and Greenaway D. (editors), Imperfect Competition and 
International Trade, Wheatsheaf Books, Sussex 1984. 
69. Truman E.M., "The Effects of European Economic Integration or. the 
Production and Trade of Manufactured Products", in B. Balassa (ed.), 
European Economic Integration, North Holland, Amsterdam, 1975. 
70. Venables A.J., "International trade, trade and industrial policy and 
imperfect competition: a survey", Centre for Economic Policy Research, 
discussion paper no. 74, 1985. 
71. Venables A.J., "Trade and trade policy with imperfect competition; the 
case of identical products and free entry", Journal of International 
Economics, 1985. 
72. Venables A.J., "Trade and trade policy with differentiated products; a 
Chamberlinian-Ricardian approach", Sussex University discussion paper, 
1985. 
73. Venables A.J. and Smith A., "Trade and industrial policy under 
imperfect competition", Economic Policy, October 1986, pp. 622-672. 
74. Winsten C. and Hall M., "The measurement of economies of scale", 
Journal of Industrial Economies, 1961, pp. 255-264. 
75. Wolinsky, A., "The Nature of Competition and the Scope of Firms", Journal 
of Industrial Economics, 1986, Vol. 34, No. 3, pp. 246-259. 

ANNEX 
PRESENTATION OF 
THE "RESEARCH ON THE COST OF NON-EUROPE" 
Annex 1: The structure of the Research 
Annex 2: The publication programme 

- 0 .. 1 -
ANNEX · 1 
THE RESEARCH ON THE "COST OF NON-EUROPE" 
The purpose of the research was to provide a solid body of 
scientific analysis regarding the costs of European market 
fragmentation, and thus the benefits on offer following the 
removal of barriers targetted by the Commission's White Pnpcr 
on "Completing the internal market", which was adopted by the 
European Community summit in 1985. 
A preliminary to embarking on the research was the 
establishment of a steering committee, bringing together the 
multi-faceted expertise needed to effectively oversee the 
project and the reports undertaken for it by independent 
consultants. As its name suggests, the committee helped to 
steer a course through the uncharted seas of inexistent basic 
data and methodologies. Its combination of Commission civil 
servants, mainly drawn from the two most directly concerned 
departments (directorates-general II and III), and leading 
outside experts proved to be a determining asset in the success 
of the operation. 
At the outset, the committee opted to make two key choices 
- to limit the scope of the "non-Europe" research to the market 
and trade barriers to be eliminated by the White Paper 
programme; 
- to ensure that the coverage of the individual studies, which 
were to be launched in the course of the project, included the 
four major Community countries, while leaving open the 
possibility of extending this geographical scope on a case by 
case basis. 
- 642 -
In carrying out the research, whose structure and main 
participants are outlined below, these two choices have been 
applied with due flexibility. In particular, the need to 
achieve as broad a geographical coverage as possible has been 
satisfied both in many of the individual studies and in the 
industrial survey in which 11,000 enterprises across the 
Community actively participated; and, perhaps more 
significantly still, by the aggregate economic estimates to be 
found in Part II. In addition, to ensure maximum coherence in 
the methodological approach adopted by the project and in the 
presentation of its results, two symposia were held between the 
Commission and the independent consultants in respectively May 
and October 1987. 
Since the outset of the research, the steering committee gave 
special emphasis to the need to develop analytic tools which 
would enable identification and quantitative evaluation of'the 
dynamic effects generated by the elimination of non-tariff 
barriers - effects which, it was strongly felt, would provide 
the most significant contribution to the resultant welfare 
benefits. These tools were developed in the early months of 
the research, when the first sketch of what was to become the 
methodology used in the macro-economic analysis was outlined. 
The same effort was made for the micro-economic analysis, 
starting with a round table of leading economists on economies 
of scale. 
This book represents the most visible part of the results of 
the research project. In the interests of wider circulation, it 
does not treat in detail the methodology used to obtain the 
results, nor does it report all the findings of the basic 
st~dies carrie4 out by the consultants. Appendix II supplies 
the list of publications in which the detailed results of the 
research can be found. 
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Criticism is expected and welcome. Such an enterprise cannot be 
immune to imperfection and even perhaps error. However the 
overall outcome of the research, which points to very 
significant gains to be derived from European market 
integration, seem to be both, accurate and reasonable. It is 
highly unlikely that the intellectual input of so many leading 
consultants, academics, officials and independent experts would 
be unanimously pointing in the wrong direction. 
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PUBLICATION PROGRAMME 
Private Publishers 
of the 
II CECCHINI REPORT'' 
The European Challenge 
199 2 
The B~nefits of a Single Market 
GOHER 
Aldershot - Brookfield, USA - Hong Kong - Singapore - Sydney 
Danish version : 
EUROPA ' 92 
Realiseringen af det indre marked 
B¢RSENS FORLAG 
Kobenhavn 
German version 
EUROPA , 92 
Der Vorteil des Binnenmarkts 
NOMOS VERLAG 
Baden-Baden 
Spanish version 
EUROPA : una apuesta de futuro 
ALIANZA EDITORIAL 
Madrid 
French version 
1992 
Le defi 
Nouvelles donnees iconomiaues de l'Europe sans frontt~rP 
EDITIONS FLAMMARION 
Paris 
Greek version 
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GROUPE EXPRESS 
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Amsterdam/Brussel 
Portuguese version 
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Lisboa 
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PUBLICATIONS 
by the 
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